THE MISSION OF DEVELOPMENT

Religion and Techno-Politics in Asia

Edited by
Catherine Scheer,
Philip Fountain and
R. Michael Feener

THEOLOGY AND MISSION IN
WORLD CHRISTIANITY

BRILL

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

UC RIVERSIDE

The Mission of Development

Theology and Mission in World Christianity

Editors-in-Chief

Kirsteen Kim (*Fuller Theological Seminary, USA*)
Stephen B. Bevans (*Catholic Theological Union, Chicago, USA*)
Miikka Ruokanen (*University of Helsinki, Finland/ Nanjing Union Theological Seminary, China*)

Editorial Board

Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu (*Trinity Theological Seminary, Ghana*)
Martha T. Frederiks (*Utrecht University, the Netherlands*)
Dana L. Robert (*Boston University, USA*)
Elsa Tamez (*Latin American Biblical University, Costa Rica*)
Rachel Zhu Xiaohong (*Fudan University, Shanghai, China*)

VOLUME 10

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/tmwc*

The Mission of Development

Religion and Techno-Politics in Asia

Edited by

Catherine Scheer
Philip Fountain
R. Michael Feener

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Scheer, Catherine, editor.
Title: The mission of development : religion and techno-politics in Asia / edited by Catherine Scheer, Philip Fountain, R. Michael Feener.
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018014199 (print) | LCCN 2018016454 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004363106 (E-book) | ISBN 9789004359086 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Missions--Asia. | Missions--Technological innovations--Asia. | Technology--Political aspects. | Economic development--Asia.
Classification: LCC BV3151.3 (ebook) | LCC BV3151.3 .M57 2018 (print) | DDC 266.0095--dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2018014199

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 2452-2953
ISBN 978-90-04-35908-6 (paperback)
ISBN 978-90-04-36310-6 (e-book)

Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense and Hotei Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

For Rita Bernardes de Carvalho,
Philip Quarles van Ufford, &
Robert W. Hefner

Contents

Preface IX
Notes on Contributors XI

1 **Development's Missions** 1
R. Michael Feener and Catherine Scheer

2 **The Gospel of Intellectuality: Indoctrinating Yenching Educational Missionaries in the Progressive Era** 28
Enyi Hu

3 **The Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, the Omi Mission, and Imperial Japan: Missionary Social Science and One Pre-History of Religion and Development** 59
Gregory Vanderbilt

4 **Missionaries and Mining: Conflicts over Development in Eastern Indonesia** 82
Maribeth Erb and Fransiska Widyawati

5 **The New Missionaries of Development: The Indonesian Council of Churches and Village Development Projects, 1971–1982** 107
Noëmi Rui

6 **"Development Missionaries" in the Slums of Bangkok: From the Thaification to the De-Thaification of Catholicism** 135
Giuseppe Bolotta

7 **Developing Faith and Character to Develop the Nation: Perspectives from an Elite Indonesian Catholic School** 165
Erica M. Larson

8 **Missionaries of a Korean Model of Development: Pentecostalism, Asian Modernity, and the Mission of the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Cambodia** 190
Hui-yeon Kim

9 **Quietist Techno-Politics: Agricultural Development and Mennonite Mission in Indonesia** 214
Philip Fountain and Laura S. Meitzner Yoder

10 **Evangelizing Entrepreneurship: Techno-Politics of Vocational Training in the Global Anti-Human Trafficking Movement** 243
Elena Shih

Index 263

Preface

Christian NGOs, foundations, charities and community organizations are ubiquitous throughout much of Asia. Whether you drive across the Cambodian countryside or walk through the streets of Jakarta, signboards of NGOs indicating some Christian affiliation have become very much part of the landscape. From health-care and English classes, to refugee services and micro-loans, there are few sectors that don't count Christian NGOs among its providers. While along with other Faith-Based Organizations, Christian development actors moved into the limelight of development studies just over a decade ago, their presence and activity in Asia, and indeed right across the developing world, is far from a recent emergence. Indeed, as we examine in this volume, Christian missionaries sent all over the world have long been active in the fields of education, health, agriculture, entrepreneurship and diverse advocacy programs. Their work has been surprisingly influential and the traces of early missionaries continue to be felt in myriad ways today.

Recent histories have connected this early missionary work with the ideas, discourses and practices of contemporary international aid and development, shedding light on so far little studied relations. Stimulated by this emerging and thought-provoking scholarship, our aim was to direct the lens—still largely focused on the Western world—to Asia. This volume includes contributions from both historians and anthropologists exploring the enduring legacies and current dynamics of religion and development across diverse Asian contexts. In doing so, it also highlights issues of 'techno-politics' as a way of facilitating of critical analysis of the interweaving of religious, political and technical considerations.

While large international faith-based NGOs such as World Vision leave little doubt about Christian actors' ability to successfully navigate and run modern development projects, there appears to be an abiding belief—or perhaps, for some, a hope—that confessional religious concerns might be set in a certain opposition to technocratic approaches to social interventions. Assumptions that religion stands markedly apart from the history of science, governance, and expertise are, however, untenable. If we consider—with thinkers of the post-political—that techniques of managerialism tend to shift people's attention from deep-seated issues to procedural concerns, this further prompts questions about whether and how Christian development agents have been directly or indirectly involved in forms of de-politicization. The chapters collected in this volume shed light on the great diversity and fluidity of articulations, and present new approaches for analyzing how the work of missionaries

has drawn from and also influenced forms of techno-politics across diverse political and cultural contexts.

This book is the fruit of exchanges and conversations that were launched at the conference on "The Mission of Development: Religion and Techno-Politics in Asia" at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore in December 2015. We are immensely grateful to the exceptional ARI staff, especially Valerie Yeo, Sharon Ong, Tay Minghua, and Henry Kwan for their outstanding work in organizing the event. This book has greatly benefited from the conversations that were had during the conference with scholars who generously shared their thoughts and questions. We would thus like to extend our thanks to all participants, especially to Karel Steenbrink, Sandra Hudd, Jérémy Jammes, Prakash Kumar, Jacob Nerenberg, Kirk Person, John Roxborogh, V.J. Varghese, Wen Shuang, Phoebe Yee, Ajit Hazra, Chen Lang, Eli Elinoff, Oona Paredes, Liang Yongjia and Aga Zuoshi.

This volume and the conference out of which it originated would not have been possible without the generous support of the Asia Research Institute and the Henry R. Luce Foundation, to whom we would like to express our sincere gratitude. As editors we would also like to thank the contributors of this volume who have enthusiastically embarked with us on these reflections on techno-politics and Christian actors engaged in development work, and from whom we have learned a great deal. We are also grateful to the good folks at Brill, especially Mirjam Elbers and Liesbeth Kanis, for working with us on this project. The manuscript has benefited from additional copyediting and formatting by Adora Elisapeta Jones. Last but not least, we are deeply grateful to the people who have—over the years and across Asia—been so generous in sharing their time, stories and experiences with us.

Notes on Contributors

Giuseppe Bolotta
cultural anthropologist and psychologist, is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the University College Dublin's School of Education. His doctoral research was a multi-situated ethnography of religious, humanitarian and state institutional policies for poor children living in the slums of Bangkok (Thailand). Between 2015 and 2017, he was a Post-Doctoral researcher at the National University of Singapore's Asia Research Institute, where he contributed to the Henry Luce Foundation funded project on "Religious NGOs in Asia." His current research project contributes to UCD's Safe Learning Study in Sierra Leone, and extends his research interests and focuses on the interrelationship between development, humanitarianism, and marginalized childhoods from Southeast Asia to West Africa.

Maribeth Erb
is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the National University of Singapore and does research on tourism, ritual, political change, and environmental politics in eastern Indonesia. Her recent research project is on the effect of regional autonomy on mining in the eastern province of Nusa Tenggara Timur.

R. Michael Feener
is the Sultan of Oman Fellow at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and Islamic Centre Lecturer in the History Faculty at the University of Oxford. He was formerly Research Leader of the Religion and Globalisation Research Cluster at the Asia Research Institute, and Associate Professor in the Department of History at the National University of Singapore. He has also taught at Reed College and the University of California-Riverside, and held visiting professor positions and research fellowships at Harvard, Kyoto University, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris), the University of Copenhagen, The Doris Duke Foundation for Islamic Art (Honolulu), and the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, the Netherlands. He has published extensively in the fields of Islamic studies and Southeast Asian history, as well as on post-disaster reconstruction, religion and development.

Philip Fountain
is a Senior Lecturer in Religious Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. He was previously a Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore's Asia Research Institute, and received his doctorate in Anthropology

from the Australian National University. His research interests include religion and development, disaster relief and peacemaking. He also specialises in the study of transnational Christian NGOs. He is co-editor of *Religion and the Politics of Development* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) and *Pursuing Peace in Godzone: Christianity and the Peace Tradition in New Zealand* (Victoria University Press, 2018). He has also edited a number of special issues, including "Salvage and Salvation: Religion and Disaster Relief in Asia" (*Asian Ethnology*, 2016) and "Anthropological Theologies: Engagements and Encounters" (*The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, 2013).

Enyi Hu
is an MPhil graduand in American Studies, School of Modern Languages and Cultures at the University of Hong Kong. She was also a graduate research assistant and teaching assistant in the department. She has just completed her MPhil thesis which examines American faculty experience at Yenching University in early 20th century China. She is particularly interested in the trajectory of American missionary discourses and the extent to which the Protestant enterprise overseas had repercussions for social, intellectual, and religious development at home. Her other research interests include US-China relations, Americans abroad, world Christianity, Soviet religious policy and the social history of modern China.

Hui-Yeon Kim
is Associate Professor and Director of the Department of Korean Studies at the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO), Paris. Her Ph.D. in Sociology, which she obtained from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, focuses on the transnationalization of a Korean Pentecostal church and aims to thereby contribute to a better understanding of the development of Pentecostal movements on a global scale. It won the prize for the best thesis in religious studies attributed by the French Association of Social Sciences of Religions in 2012 and is to be published as a monograph with AFSR/L'Harmattan. Her research on South Korean influence in Southeast Asia has been supported through a research grant by IRASEC (2013). Besides publishing the results of this research in the form of a monograph, she has also authored several chapters in edited books focused on religion in contemporary Asia.

Erica M. Larson
is a Ph.D. Candidate in Sociocultural Anthropology at Boston University. Her research interests include the anthropology of education, ethics, religious

pluralism, and politics. Her dissertation research investigates education about 'nation' in North Sulawesi, Indonesia to better understand its relationship to and implications for public ethics and building a framework for coexistence in a plural society.

Laura Meitzner Yoder
is Professor of Environmental Studies, John Stott Chair, and Director of the Human Needs & Global Resources Program, Wheaton College, IL. Her scholarship engages multiple dimensions of human-environment interaction: agricultural biodiversity, land and forest authorities and access, and rural land policy. She has particular interest in smallholder farmers and forest dwellers who feed their families and make their living in marginal conditions. This led her to work with local universities and research institutes, NGOs, and international programs in Latin America and Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia and Timor-Leste.

Noëmi Rui
is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of History, University of Bern, Switzerland and she is currently involved in an interdisciplinary project researching the role of the churches in sustainable development in Indonesia. Her specific research project focuses on the emergence of the concept of sustainable development inside the World Council of Churches and examines how this concept is transformed into blueprints for projects in Indonesia in the years 1968–1991.

Catherine Scheer
is a Lecturer at the Institute for Ethnology, Heidelberg University. She received her Ph.D. in anthropology from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and was a post-doctoral fellow affiliated with the Henry R. Luce-funded "Religion and NGOs in Asia" project (2015–2017) at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. She has done extended field research with Bunong highland inhabitants in Cambodia, and more recently followed language in education experts across international institutional settings in Southeast Asia. The intersections of Christianity, development, indigeneity, morality and policy constitute nodes of particular interest to her.

Elena Shih
is an Assistant Professor of American Studies and Ethnic Studies at Brown University, where she is also a Faculty Fellow directing a human trafficking research cluster at the Center for the Study of Slavery and Justice. Her research has appeared in *Sociological Perspectives, Contexts, Social Politics,* and *positions:*

asia critique. She serves on the editorial boards of *The Anti-Trafficking Review*, a peer-reviewed journal run through the Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women, and openDemocracy's *Beyond Trafficking and Slavery* editorial platform.

Gregory Vanderbilt
is a Lecturer at the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He earned his Ph.D. in History from the University of California, Los Angeles, with a dissertation examining the place of Christianity in modern Japanese society and politics. He has published in *The Asia-Pacific Journal* and contributed chapters to a number of edited volumes. He has research interests in Japanese and Indonesian history, literary translation and comparative religion.

Fransiska Widyawati
received her Ph.D. in Inter-religious and Cultural Studies from Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia on the development of Catholicism in Flores, eastern Indonesia. She teaches at St. Paul's Teacher Training College in Flores, and has been involved in research projects looking at the role of the Catholic Church in education, and the how various developments, including tourism and mining, have affected religious and cultural transformations on Flores Island.

CHAPTER 1

Development's Missions

R. Michael Feener and Catherine Scheer

Both mission and development are interventions aiming at the transformation of societies and the individuals that comprise them. Despite the conceptual and structural overlap between these two fields of social transformation they have mostly been studied separately, leading to two largely distinct areas of academic discussion. In much of international 'Aidland' a dominant conception of humanitarian relief and development work as clearly delimited secular spheres of activity came into being over the 1970s.[1] This broadly secularized framework was taken up by a growing number of organizations—including many associations and institutions that had originally been formed upon religious foundations in ways which served to markedly differentiate the work of development from that of Christian missionaries in fields such as health care, education, and economic empowerment.[2] While such visions of a linear trajectory from traditional/religious to modern/developed were common in mainstream social science literature of the 20th century, more recently historians and anthropologists have turned toward more nuanced explorations of the complex relations between religion and development.

This turn in scholarly orientation has been marked by new models of understanding processes of secularization. One of the most influential of these has been the work of Talal Asad, who highlights that the modern conceptual categories of 'religion' and 'the secular' are inextricably inter-dependent and

* This chapter has greatly benefitted from the constructive critical comments on earlier drafts which we received from our colleagues, Philip Fountain and Giuseppe Bolotta.

1 David Mosse, ed. *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011).

2 Terje Tvedt for instance explains the absence of scholarly attention to 'religion' in the history of mainstream development studies in relation to a pervasive marginalisation of religion in developmentalist discourse itself. Following Bourdieu, this growing trend over the second half of the 20th century might be interpreted as a case of an organization's calculation of the perceived benefits of presenting its agenda as universal rather than particularistic. See Terje Tvedt, "Understanding the History of the International Aid System and the Development Research Tradition: The Case of the Disappearing Religious NGOs," *Forum for Development Studies* 2 (2006): 353.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_002

mutually constitutive.[3] Looking at current international relations theory, Timothy Fitzgerald has traced the social scientific boundaries separating "irrational religion" and "rational secular politics" to the division of church and state in processes of modernizing transformation in European societies.[4] Philip Fountain has pursued these lines of critique further, questioning both the purported 'secular' underpinnings of development organizations, and the 'religious' designation of NGOs in ways that challenge categorisations of their work along clear-cut religious/secular boundaries.[5]

This volume attempts to situate and better understand lasting implications of Christian missionary work in the multi-vectored transformations of conceptions of religion and development. It does this by bringing together cutting edge new work examining how Christian missionaries have engaged modern technocratic procedures in a broad range of ways, informing and being transformed by diverse projects of development in modern Asia. Its case studies present explorations of how both Christian missionary institutions and development NGOs have been navigating new worlds of humanitarianism and techno-politics.

Humanitarian Interventions

A number of historians and anthropologists engaging the complex relations between religion and development have pursued their investigations through the conceptual mediating sphere of 'Humanitarianism' in a broader sense. Craig Calhoun has critically noted that when the term 'Humanitarian' came into use in the early 19th century, it was first used to describe "a theological position stressing the humanity of Christ, and subsequently efforts to alleviate suffering or advance the human race in general."[6] In his history of Humanitarianism, Michael Barnett has highlighted ways in which Christian

3 Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993).

4 Timothy Fitzgerald, *Religion and Politics in International Relations* (London: Continuum, 2011), 100.

5 Philip Fountain, "Proselytizing Development," in *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and International Development,* edited by Emma Tomalin (New York: Routledge, 2015), 83.

6 Craig Calhoun, "The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress and Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action," in *Humanitarianism in Question: Power, Politics, Ethics,* eds. Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 73–97, quoted by Peter Redfield and Erica Bornstein, "An Introduction to the Anthropology of Humanitarianism," in *Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and Politics,* eds. Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield (Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2011), 15.

quests to save souls and establish God's kingdom on earth lay behind the modern surge of 'Humanitarian' projects. As this history unfolded, we find a broad spectrum of interventions spanning from limited duration, emergency relief that are today often discussed under the rubric of 'humanitarianism' to longer term projects for social transformation currently conceived of in terms of 'development.'[7]

The argument that 'secular' Humanitarianism has a Christian missionary legacy is further explored by Didier Fassin. In his ground-breaking *Moral History of the Present*, he considers that the sacralization of life and the valorization of suffering—constituting the ethos of what he calls the 'humanitarian reason' that is currently predominant in Western thinking—have their origin in Christian religious thought. The iconic figure of a humanitarian "saving lives" is, according to Fassin, premised on secularizing transformations of particular Christian moral imaginaries. Over the course of the 18th century, however, these visions were transformed as the moral valance of suffering shifted to the field of politics. In the process, imaginations of the compassion one feels for others displaced the paramouncy of the passion that an individual may endure in order to attain salvation. Here, building upon the insights of Marcel Gauchet, Fassin argues that "the ultimate victory of religion lies [...] in its lasting presence at the heart of our democratic secular values," with humanitarianism being a case of "the religious after religion."[8]

The studies prepared for this volume highlight the fact that at the same time, Christian mission has not disappeared. Rather, its work has continued across an expanding range of modalities, from familiar agendas of proselytization to diverse projects of development pursued through the institutional apparatus of NGOs. In this, modern Christian missionary projects carry out their work alongside evolving conceptions of Humanitarianism which, as Peter Redfield has noted, developed more activist agendas for "promoting welfare"[9] as agents of intervention began to articulate visions in which "addressing suffering without holding out the prospect of eventual change [...] would now

7 In this essay we use the lower case form of "humanitarian" to refer to short-term relief operations, and the capitalised "Humanitarianism" for the broader field of interventions that extend into other spheres, including that often recognised today in terms of "development."

8 Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 249.

9 Peter Redfield, "Humanitarianism," in *A Companion to Moral Anthropology,* ed. Didier Fassin (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 457. Redfield quotes, among others, Ilana Feldman and Miriam Ticktin, eds., *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

appear 'damaging to human dignity.'"[10] Building upon this, we frame the 'Mission of Development' discussed in the contributions to this volume as 'salvationist'—involving a pronounced future-oriented temporality, and an activist stance toward this-worldly interventions.

The history of modern Humanitarianism has been pushed back to the 18th century, where Thomas Davies sees the early formation of organizations that arose out of contexts dominated by religion but were subsequently transformed into the kind of institutions recognizable as 'NGOs' today. Rearrangements of organizational structures for humanitarian relief work over the 'long' 19th century further facilitated new kinds of "intervention for the public good."[11] Charles Taylor refers to this period as "The Age of Mobilization," which had a transformative effect on the understandings and experiences of religion as laypeople became involved in new forms of collective action.[12] Peter van der Veer had recognized this earlier in his characterization of the missionary movement as a thoroughly modern innovation.[13] Over the course of the 19th century, there was a marked surge of evangelical activism in the service of humanitarian relief and political advocacy across an expanding range of global contexts—building upon an evolving Christian world view coupling proprietary interest and Humanitarian responsibility.[14] Religious activism spurred the development of organizations aimed at addressing a range of social issues that combined views of personal repentance and redemption with projects for the alleviation of "earthly woes."[15]

In her contribution to this volume, Enyi Hu presents us with a stimulating account of the American Student Volunteer Movement (SVM, founded 1888), whose slogan 'The Evangelization of the World' she describes as including the "broader spectrum of progressive development." For the students recruited

10 Craig Calhoun, "The Idea of Emergency: Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)Order," in *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions,* eds. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 35, quoted by Redfield, "Humanitarianism," 458.

11 Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 51.

12 Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 445ff.

13 Peter Van der Veer, ed., *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity* (New York, London: Routledge, 1996).

14 Michelle Tusan, *Smyrna's Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide and the Birth of the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 75, 100; Beth Baron, *The Orphan Scandal. Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); and Peter Stamatov, *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism: Religion, Empires, and Advocacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

15 Margaret Abruzzo, *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 127.

for this mission, "theological or spiritual tests were regarded as redundant"—as more emphasis was placed on their education in non-religious subjects. The Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), SVM's recruitment partner, also announced a more politically engaged agenda through their slogan promoting "National Salvation through Men of Character." The chief aim of these young envoys was to provide concrete assistance to the poor, and social aid projects thus often trumped the place of preaching on their lists of priorities.

At the same time, the 19th century was also a period in which religious actors were increasingly taking the initiative in engaging with state and civil society institutions to promote their visions of progress and transformation—for salvation in this world, as well as in the next. Andrew Porter has described this in terms of a shift from relying on religious institutional support to forging connections with secular humanitarian organizations and government institutions emphasized in modern reconfigurations of the "humanitarian character of Christian service."[16] In the process, Porter notes, "Evangelicalism in this way served a larger humanitarian purpose. This also worked in the reverse."[17]

Inextricably linked to these broader patterns of economic and social change was the rise of religious movements founded by individuals to fulfill the plan of God on earth.[18] While this is perhaps most often observed in the proliferation of Protestant denominations, it is also visible in the evolving profile of modern Catholic missions—something that may in fact be seen as a further cross-confessional unfurling of some of the implications of processes of modernization described by Philip Gorski in terms of a broader "disciplinary revolution."[19] The institutional manifestations of this can be seen particularly in the spheres of education and health care, as such work by both missionary clergy and laypeople came to be framed in terms of a progressive vision of "social justice," in addition to more established modes of charity.

In this organizational history of initiatives for the remaking of society we can see more concrete manifestations of the processes of secularization and mobilization at work. Barnett argues that it was partly under the influence of "a scientific, professionalized philanthropic sector" at the beginning of the 20th century that missionaries spreading civilization in colonial settings shifted "from saving souls to saving societies."[20] The World Missionary Conference held at Edinburgh in 1910, for example, devoted considerable attention

16 Andrew Porter, *Religion vs. Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 314.

17 Ibid., 314.

18 Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 450.

19 Philip Gorski, *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

20 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity,* 68.

and importance to scientific knowledge. In their debates over the role of anthropology, education, and medicine as areas of investigation, their working models of data gathering and analysis were shaped in relation to the standards of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.[21] In his contribution to this volume Gregory Vanderbilt provides us with a detailed description of the role played by the modern social sciences in the evaluation of missionary projects in Asia. In their chapter, Philip Fountain and Laura Yoder highlight the complex and contingent relationships between academic and confessional frameworks for action through a fascinating case study of a phase of convergence between Christian religion and modern science as complementary means for the progressive development of the human condition in the visions of Cornell University professors and Mennonite Central Committee volunteers.

Several other historically informed chapters in this volume—particularly those by Bolotta, Larson, and Erb and Widyawati—shed light on the extension of this scientific philanthropic sector into Southeast Asian missionary fields. Looking at non-colonized Siam, Bolotta describes the crucial role that the Catholic Church played in the establishment of a modern (elite) school sector, at the turn of the 20th century. While missionaries promoted modern education as means to gradually promote favorable conditions for conversion among Thai elites, "[w]hat actually happened was that the modernizing interventions offered by Catholic missionaries were appropriated by the Siamese kings to enforce the Buddhist ethno-nationalism of the Thai monarchy." While the number of Thai Christians has remained low, the power of Catholic Church in the educational sector and more broadly in the modernization efforts of the Thai nation continues to be important to this day.

Contrary to Siam, in areas of colonial Indonesia such as Flores and North Sulawesi the missionaries' contribution to the state's mission to 'develop societies' was accompanied by a successful 'saving of souls.' Erb and Widyawati demonstrate how, in 1913 an agreement signed with the Dutch government gave the Catholic Church a monopoly to run schools in Flores and Sumba, which in turn provided it with an important platform for the spread of Christianity. In Minahasa, North Sulawesi, Larson notes that Christian educational projects contributed to the conversion of large strands of the region's population during the Dutch colonial government. These educated local Christians with a taste for European culture, cultivated in Catholic schools with Dutch

21 Patrick Harries and David Maxwell, eds., *The Spiritual and the Secular: Missionaries and Knowledge about Africa* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 7. See also Barnett, *Empire of Humanity,* 70.

as the language of instruction, rose to a comparatively high status within the Netherlands East Indies.

It was however especially after the Second World War, as organizations were expanding their activities, that they moved toward a "quasi-bureaucratic" organization that could—as Barnett puts it—"apply continuous force on the world."[22] In 1948 for instance, the World Council of Churches (WCC) was officially created. It was inspired by the League of Nations and could be described as 'the UN of Churches.' While one of the WCC's aims since its inception was to promote development initiatives among its member Churches, in the 1960s development work became even more of a priority. As Noëmi Rui demonstrates in her contribution to this volume, however, this increasing emphasis did not go unchallenged within the organization and it was always open to widely differing approaches in the process of implementation on the ground.

The United States in particular emerged to play an increasingly prominent role in developmentalist interventions and long-distance advocacy over the course of the 20th century. David Ekbladh's work provides an extended genealogy of high-modern developmentalism that stretches back to the 1930s in contexts of ascendant American Progressivism. Thence he presents a narrative of US ambitions of modernization projects in Korea in post-WWII reconstruction as "the remaking of societies and economies according to a new pattern"—while also characterizing the 1950s as a period in which US-based religious groups continued to expand their engagement with overseas development activity.[23] A new kind of trans-regional agent epitomized this post-war period of decolonization: the American expat embodying an ascendancy of technocratic expertise (rather than Christian religious commitment) as a defining factor in long-distance interventions for social transformation.[24] Hui-yeon Kim's chapter in this volume describes how the Americans' reconstruction efforts in South-Korea were subsequently appropriated by the national government, and thence how Korean missionaries have come today to work toward the spread an Asianized form of (hyper-)modernity that imbues the region with a pronounced Christian 'spirit.'

---

22 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity,* 105.

23 David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 120.

24 Ibid., 170. At the same time, experiments with engaging religious actors were clearly being pursued in all kinds of ways, even during the 'secularizing' post-war period—including openness toward engagement with religious leaders and organizations beyond Christianity as well, including with Afghan mullahs in support of modernization projects. Ibid., 175–76.

The global expansion of bureaucratized organizations, such as analyzed by Lewis and Mosse, was further advanced by the ascendancy of development technocrats.[25] Over the course of the 20th century, an increasingly professionalized complex of humanitarian aid and economic development organizations arose and expanded their interventions into a growing number of fields. Their work took the forms of scientific expertise, technocratic projects, and modern managerial protocols. David Mosse has charted the longer-term impact of these shifts in the landscape of relief and development interventions, demonstrating that by the 21st century "an unprecedented expert consensus on how global poverty is to be eliminated and the poor governed" had become dominant.[26]

NGOs, FBOs, and 'Structural Adjustments'—Religion in Studies of Development

These transformations in the nature of relief and development interventions were related to broader changes in the economic, political, and social imaginaries over the last decades of the 20th century. In the United States Christian evangelicals lobbied for new legislation that would allow their charitable organizations to avail themselves of federal government funds to support community development work, including the 2001 'Charitable Act.'[27] New kinds of NGOs that came to be distinguished by the term 'Faith-Based Organization' (FBO) emerged and proliferated against this backdrop, reshaping global humanitarianism and the development landscape on both national and international levels. These new arrangements were strongly supported by then American president George W. Bush, who referred to FBOs and religious charities as "neighborhood healers" and "quiet heroes" who stood to reclaim the

25 David Lewis and David Mosse, eds., *Development Brokers and Translators. The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies* (Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2006).

26 Mosse, *Adventures in Aidland,* 3.

27 Erica Bornstein, "Charitable Choice. L'humanitarisme et les politiques de la foi," *Vacarme,* 34 (2006): 189–93. Recent antecedents of this include the "Charitable Choice" provision in the Welfare Reform Act, passed in 1996, which was followed by the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives Act, that made it possible for the government to fund FBOs, either directly or through USAID [Gregory Deacon and Emma Tomalin, "A History of Faith-Based Aid and Development," in *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development,* ed. Emma Tomalin (New York: Routledge, 2015), 74]. In 1998 the International Religious Freedom Act passed—making the protection of religious groups on a global level a US priority [Katarina Hofer, "The Role of Evangelical NGOs in International Development: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Uganda," *Africa Spectrum,* 38.3 (2003): 375–98].

field of good works from "the failed formula of towering, distant bureaucracies that too often prize process over performance."[28] In parallel, James Wolfensohn (then president of the World Bank) and Lord Carey of Clifton (then Archbishop of Canterbury) gave major impetus to these new conversations on 'religion' in relation to 'development' by bringing together actors from the development sector with faith groups and academics on a global level.[29]

The explicit opening of participation of new kinds of religious organizations to the spheres of humanitarian and developmentalist intervention that had come over previous decades to be considered as explicitly 'secular' has had broad-reaching implications well beyond the United States. Julia Hearn and Katarina Hofer have demonstrated how these US-policies played an important role in the "return" of religion into development abroad and Erica Bornstein has ethnographically documented the work of Christian non-governmental organizations such as World Vision and Christian Care in their US headquarters as well as in 'post-structural adjustments' Zimbabwe.[30] Elena Shih—in this volume—looks at the work of two evangelical organizations both in North America and in Asia, shedding light on their impressive if disquieting ability to navigate these different contexts by adapting, among others, their presentation of Christian religion as part of their social mission. Fountain and Yoder, for their part, analyze the ways in which American volunteers of the Mennonite Central Committee engage in development but try to distance themselves

28 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/reports/faithbased.html. Bush proceeded by calling into life a White House office and several centres for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (FBCI) [Hofer, "The Role of Evangelical NGOs," 382] in order 'to create a level playing field for faith and community based organisations to compete for USAID programs' [USAID quoted by Emma Tomalin, ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and International Development* (London: Routledge, 2015), 2]. According to Hearn, this provoked a very important increase in government funding granted to FBOs in the following years [Julia Hearn, "The 'Invisible' NGO: US Evangelical Missions in Kenya," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 32.1 (2002): 32–60]. A similar shift—governments attributing growing importance to faith-based organizations in development—has taken place in Europe according to Tomalin, *The Routledge Handbook*, 2.

29 Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, eds. *Development, Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Philip Fountain, "The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion," *International Development Policy: Religion and Development* 4 (2013): 9–30; and Deacon and Tomalin, "A History of Faith-Based Aid and Development."

30 Hearn, "The 'Invisible' NGO"; Paul Numrich, "United Religions at the United Nations," *Second Opinion* 8 (2001): 53–68, quoted by Hofer, "The Role of Evangelical NGOs," 379, 383; and Erica Bornstein, *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGO's, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

from the large-scale efforts of the US (and USAID) by aiming for a low-key relational approach. Beyond national contexts, Faith-Based Organizations, predominantly of Christian and Western origin, also play an important role at the United Nations, as it has been recently stressed in the work of Jeffrey Haynes, and by a research team of the university of Kent led by Jeremy Carrette.[31]

This increasingly vigorous set of conversations on religion emerged within the anthropology of development as the involvement of religious actors in development projects was reconfigured in the early 21st century. The roots of these conversations, however, stretched back to a landmark 1988 edited volume by Philip Quarles van Ufford and Matthew Schoffeleers that viewed development as a "quasi-religious" process that is often "digested" by its receivers through the medium of religion. This provocative insight was not immediately taken up by others in the field.[32] Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan and Thomas Bierschenk placed "religious networks" (*réseaux confessionnels*) as an important and historically well-established component in their typology of 'development brokers.'[33] Likewise Mosse came to include "missionaries or other 'professional altruists'" among the ranks of development workers.[34] For some time, however, these new conversations on development agents and 'brokers,' and the ways in which they negotiate dilemmas and contradictions of pursuing projects of humanitarian aid in complex intercultural contexts, were generally applied to secular development practitioners. As the chapters in this volume highlight, work along these lines can also constitute an important analytical framework to study the projects of FBO agents and of other religious actors engaged in the mission of development.

---

31 Jeffrey Haynes, *Faith-Based Organizations at the United Nations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Jeremy Carrette and Sophie-Hélène Trigeaud, "The Religion-Secular in International Politics: The Case of 'Religious' NGOs at the United Nations," in *Social Identities Between the Sacred and the Secular,* eds. Abby Day, Christopher Cotter, and Giselle Vincett (Surrey: Ashgate—Ahrc/Esrc Religion, 2013), 7–22.

32 Jeremy Carrette and Hugh Miall, eds. *Religion, NGOs and the United Nations: Visible and Invisible Actors in Power* (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017). Philip Quarles van Ufford and Matthew Schoffeleers, eds. *Religion and Development: Towards an Integrated Approach* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1988). Gilbert Rist noted the idea that the religious beliefs might be made "compatible with development" but did not further pursue this line of investigation (*The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith,* Third Edition (London, New York: Zed Books, 2008).

33 Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan and Thomas Bierschenk, "Les courtiers locaux du développement," *Bulletin de l'APAD* 5 (1993): 71–6.

34 Malin Arvidson, "Contradictions and Confusions in Development Work: Exploring the Realities of Bangladeshi NGOs," *Journal of South Asian Development* 3.1 (2008): 109–34, quoted by Mosse, *Adventures in Aidland,* 17.

Missions, Charity and Social Engagement—Development in Studies of Religion

One of the most prolific fields of scholarly investigation into the work of religious projects for social change—long pre-dating the recent surge on work on 'religion and development'—has been the history of Christian mission. Writers in this field (many of whom had themselves first-hand experience with missionary work) have long emphasized the roles that Christian organizations have played in different areas that could be classified as humanitarian relief and development work.[35] Increasingly, these discussions have also pointed to ongoing debates about the nature of mission in relation to humanitarian work. Maryse Kruithof for instance has brought our attention to internal missionary debates over the relative emphasis to be placed on "development" as opposed to "conversion" among Dutch missionaries in the East Indies.[36]

These discussions were animated by dynamics of religious visions that were deeply rooted in Reformation traditions of Christianity which, as J.A. de Jong has highlighted, coupled transcendent visions of salvation with expectations of

35 In the French book series "Mémoires d'Eglises" (Karthala editions), numerous volumes retrace the history of Christianity in non-Western contexts (to a large extend in Africa), several of them being written by local Christian academics. The history of foreign missions in Asia has also been traced in part by missionaries or Christian actors themselves, for example, François Ponchaud's history of the Cambodian Catholic Church [*La cathédrale dans la rizière: Histoire de l'Eglise au Cambodge* (Tours: CDL, 2006)] and Don Cormack's account on the Protestants' presence [*Killing Fields, Living Fields: An Unfinished Portrait of the Cambodian Church—The Church That Would Not Die* (London/Grand Rapids: Monarch Books, 2001)]. Just to mention a few of the numerous academic historical accounts in the region, Inès Zupanov [*Missionary Tropics: The Catholic Frontier in India (16th–18th c.)* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005)] studied the Jesuits' presence in 16th to 17th century India—focusing notably on how they have been shaped by their local experiences [see also Catherine Clémentin-Ojha, *Les Chrétiens de l'Inde. Entre castes et Eglises* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2008) on Christianity in India], Alain Forest [*Les missionnaires français au Tonkin et au Siam XVII–XVIII siècles. Analyse comparée d'un relatif success et d'un total échec* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 1998)] compared the Catholic missionaries relative success in Tonkin to their complete failure in Siam, from the 17th to the 18th centuries. See also Nola Cooke, "Early Nineteenth-Century Vietnamese Catholics and Others in the Pages of the Annales de la Propagation de la Foi," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 35.2 (2004): 261–85); and Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1902: A Documented History,* Vol. 1 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003) has documented the history of the Catholics in Indonesia.

36 Maryse Kruithof, *Shouting in a Desert: Dutch Missionary Encounters with Javanese Islam, 1850–1910* (PhD diss., Erasmus University, 2014), 169ff.

greater, more glorious days for the church on earth."[37] In the Anglo-American missionary tradition, he notes, "expectations were a healthy balance between other-worldly and secularized hopes, between capitulation to and underestimation of the forces of evil, between the eternal and the temporal dimensions of salvation."[38] Missiologist and theologian David Bosch recognized this close connection between aspirational visions of both this world and the next, and the ways in which this had driven modern movements for social transformation in the growing belief that "in principle, *everything was solvable*,"- continuing, "the eruption of voluntarist missionary agencies as early as the end of the 18th century ... also accounted for the incredible upsurge of optimism a century later."[39]

At the same time, however, Bosch pushes back against teleological models of secularization in his elaboration of a "post-modern paradigm" of mission that both acknowledges engagement with projects of development—while at asserting that "Mission includes evangelism as one of its essential dimensions."[40] Other missionary scholars, such as Andrew Walls, also emphasize the complexity and constant reconfigurations of Christian visions inclusive of both development projects and proselytizing programs in ways that complicate simplistic divisions between religion and the secular within contemporary frameworks such as those of today's FBOs.[41]

Adding further complexity to these entanglements of religious and secular dynamics of interventions were the political dimensions of Christian missionary work in social service provision and development projects. Even after the formal end of colonial rule, many independent nations (both majority Christian and non-) maintained access for Christian missionaries in ways that served to assist in social service provision and to facilitate the influx of foreign aid.[42] In some cases, there was a "fortuitous overlap of goals" between Christian evangelists and the developmentalist agents of states, such as Todd Hartch has demonstrated in the relation between the Mexican government and American Protestant missionaries in assimilating indigenous communities to promote

37 J.A. De Jong, *As the Waters Cover the Sea: Millennial Expectations in the Rise of Anglo-American Missions, 1640–1810* (Kampen: J.H. Kok N.V., 1970), 7.

38 Ibid., 229.

39 David Bosch, *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission* (New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 343. Emphasis in the original.

40 Ibid., 356, 10.

41 Andrew Walls, *Missionary Movement in Christianity* (New York: Orbis Books, 1996), 519.

42 Stephen Neill, *A History of Christian Missions,* Second Revised Edition (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 423.

national development projects.[43] Such arrangements both build upon and transform patterns of engagement with deeper historical roots.

Other striking examples of this can be found in some historically informed anthropological work. In contrast to the long tradition of historical literature on the subject, Christian mission only came within the purview of anthropological studies relatively recently. In 1992, John Barker stressed that "few anthropologists incorporate the Christian presence into studies of village societies and concomitantly there has been a historic reluctance to have the missionaries be part of an ethnography."[44] While there had been a few early studies—as for instance *Mission, Church, and Sect in Oceania* edited in 1978 by Boutilier, Hughes and Tiffany (co-published with the Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania), an increased anthropological interest in the work of missionaries seems to have emerged since the 1990s.[45] A landmark work in this regard was Jean and John Comaroff's two-volume study of the encounter

43 Todd Hartch, *Missionaries of the State. The Summer Institute of Linguistics, State Formation, and Indigenous Mexico, 1935–1985* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006).

44 The problematic relationship between anthropologists and missionaries has been discussed by a number of authors, among others: Roland Bonsen, Hans Marks and Jelle Miedema, *The Ambiguity of Rapprochement. Reflections of Anthropologists on their Controversial Relationship with Missionaries* (Nijmegen: Focaal, 1990); Claude E. Stipe, et al., "Anthropologists Versus Missionaries: The Influence of Presuppositions [and Comments and Reply]," *Current Anthropology* 21.2 (1980): 165–79.

45 James A. Boutilier, Daniel T. Hughes and Sharon Tiffany, eds., *Mission, Church, and Sect in Oceania* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978). See for instance on Asia and Melanesia: Lorraine Aragon, *Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and the State Development in Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); John Barker, "Christianity in Western Melanesian Ethnography," in *History and Tradition in Melanesian Anthropology*, ed. J.G. Carrier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 144–73; Marine Carrin and Harald Tambs-Lyche, *An Encounter of Peripheries: Santals, Missionaries and their Changing World* (Dehli: Manohar, 2008); Courtney Handman, *Critical Christianity: Translation and Denominational Conflict in Papua New Guinea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Yoko Hayami, "Karen Tradition According to Christ or Buddha: The Implications of Multiple Reinterpretations for a Minority Ethnic Group in Thailand," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,* 27 (1996): 334–49; Cornelia Ann Kammerer, "Customs and Christian Conversion among Akha Highlanders of Burma and Thailand," *American Ethnologist*, 17.2 (1990): 277–91; Rita Kipp, *The Early Years of Dutch Colonial Mission: The Karo Field* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Albert Schrauwers, *Colonial 'Reformation' in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 1892–1995* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), on Africa: Birgit Meyer, *Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity among the Ewe in Ghana* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1999), and on South America: Aparecida Vilaça and Robin Wright, eds., *Native Christians. Modes and Effects of Christianity among Indigenous Peoples of the Americas* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009).

between British evangelists and Southern Tswana, which critically examines strong parallels between trans-national missionary flows and capitalist expansion.[46] Since then, a growing body of literature has explored the reception of missionary work by local Christian communities in diverse contexts around the world—as part of expanding conversations in the anthropology of Christianity, as well as in discussions of modernizing transformations.[47]

Within this body of literature, Lorraine Aragon's work on Indonesia presents a fascinating description of the cooperation between state and missionary developers, showing how, since the 1890s, the colonial government of the Netherlands Indies effectively turned over areas of Central Sulawesi to the Salvation Army to administer and 'develop.'[48] Aragon's work traces the continuities and permutations over the transition from colonial rule to Indonesian independence: as the Salvation Army vision came to be seen as consonant with the developmentalist agenda of the independent Indonesian nation, the state provided regulatory support to Christian churches.[49] In the process, churches became "entrenched in the worldly development of their congregations as these groups became subject to New Order policies and philosophies."[50]

David Mosse has presented an insightful exploration of processes by which local Roman Catholic clergy in southern India built upon and subsequently critiqued earlier patterns of missionary work in developing distinctive forms of Dalit politics. Furthermore, through a combination of ethnography and archival work he also captures the ongoing dynamics of religious proselytization and this-worldly interventions across diverse Christian communities in South Asia—as when one of his Pentecostal interlocutors contrasts her community's work of "soul winning" with what she characterizes as the emphasis on "social work" among her Catholic neighbors.[51]

---

46 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

47 In the wake of seminal work by Joel Robbins [*Becoming Sinners: Christianity and Moral Torment in a Papua New Guinea Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004)], Fenella Cannell [*The Anthropology of Christianity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006)] and Webb Keane [*Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007)] amongst others.

48 Aragon, *Fields of the Lord*, 114.

49 Ibid., 137.

50 Ibid., 276.

51 David Mosse, *The Saint in the Banyan Tree: Christianity and Caste Society in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 240–41.

In such cases, the continuing entanglements of Christian mission and development clearly demonstrate that the relationship between the two is not merely an historical stage on a path toward more secularized development projects. Rather understanding the complexities of their dynamic interactions remains a vital area of contemporary concern. More broadly these development-focused analyses of mission and historicizations of the place of Christian actors in humanitarian and development work allow us to better apprehend not only the roles of religion, but also that of projects of techno-politics, in shaping the agendas and interventions of actors in context.

Techno-Politics

Beside Christian visions of salvation having played an important role in the constitution of a field of development, we have seen that Christian actors have also historically contributed to its institutionalization/ technocratization. This point is further explored in the chapters of this volume, notably by Enyi Hu who sheds light on the era in which young Americans missionaries-to-be came of age, "worship[ping] science as much as they worshiped God." Rather than religious preaching, the young volunteers en route to work at Yenching University in China focused on scientific teaching and the promotion of intellectualism as the fundamental basis to reform society. Hu connects this to these missionaries' own training in prestigious liberal arts colleges in the course of which they encountered the work of authors such as Walter Rauschenbusch, a Baptist theologian whose call for "social awakening" addressed an educated elite to work against the harms of capitalism. These Christian intellectuals, who believed in scientific knowledge fueling industrial productivity and in Protestant morals safeguarding against power abuses, thus appear to have been important actors in the spread of the United States' vision of development onto a global stage.

In Gregory Vanderbilt's contribution to this volume, the Laymen's Inquiry aimed at examining American church-funded missions in Asia at the beginning of the 20th century is described as comprising university personal as well as business men, in addition to Christian actors. The teams of 'fact-finders' were supposed to be non-missionary and non-clerical, and selected for their secular education and professionalism. Even if their final report and its modernist views came under heavy criticism by some church members at the time, the 'fact-finders' inquiry stands as an important example of a formulation and approach to Christian missions constructed according to criteria of objective technical expertise.

The institutionalization of international humanitarianism and development organizations since that time has certainly further influenced current patterns of work by missionary organizations in this direction. With the pronounced trends toward bureaucratization and professionalization in the NGO sector over the latter decades of the 20th century, it became increasingly necessary for development organizations to regularly demonstrate procedural protocols and technical expertise. Tania Li has described this in terms of processes of "rendering technical," by which she means "a set of practices concerned with representing 'the domain to be governed' as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics."[52] Li shows, for example, the ways in which World Bank experts construct narratives in the form of reports connecting specific problems to particular technical solutions—thereby defining the acceptable means of intervention to address them.[53] This approach to solving problems of development is, moreover, pursued within contexts characterized by particular forms of governance. According to Mosse, 'neoliberal institutionalism' allows "a technicalization of policy and the centralization of expertise."[54] Such analyses echo James Ferguson's seminal description of how development projects can be used to reframe political questions into technical ones.[55]

In this volume, Noëmi Rui's chapter illustrates a similar tendency in the work of Protestant missionary and development actors in Indonesia in the 1970–1980s. She describes how the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI) got involved in 'participatory development' projects with World Council of Churches. Rather than a politically engaged bottom-up approach promoted by the WCC, however, the DGI had to adjust its work to remain within the margin of maneuver granted to it by the Indonesian government. In order to counter

52 Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), quoted by Tania Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

53 See Li, *The Will to Improve*, 230–69; and Tania Li, "Rendering Society Technical: Government through Community and the Ethnographic Turn at the World Bank in Indonesia," *in Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*, ed. David Mosse (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 57–79.

54 Mosse, *Adventures in Aidland,* 4.

55 James Ferguson and Larry Lohmann, "The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development' and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho," *The Ecologist* 24.5 (1994): 176. At the same time, technical issues can also be framed as political problems as shown by Antina von Schnitzler and her definition of the term 'techno-politics' [Antina von Schnitzler, "Performing Dignity: Human Rights, Citizenship, and the Techno-Politics of Law in South Africa," *American Ethnologist* 41.2 (2014): 340].

worries of an Indonesian state that regarded religious institutions as potential threats to national stability, the DGI implemented development activities in cooperation with the government and adopted its approach to development through large-scale, top-down technocratic visions. According to Rui, this resulted in contradictory scenarios, where Christian development actors—or 'motivators'—relied on concepts such as 'participation' and 'conscientization' while promoting the new technologies advocated by the state independently of the villagers' needs.

In order to take "what is essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science," techno-politics require the cultivation of particular forms of expertise or expert knowledge.[56] In *The Rule of Experts* Timothy Mitchell depicts how specialists turn problems such as poverty and hunger into matters of public health so that technical interventions appear as viable solutions. Mitchell defines techno-politics as being "a certain way of organizing the amalgam of the human and nonhuman, things and ideas, so that the human, the intellectual, the realm of intentions and ideas seems to come first and to control and organise the nonhuman."[57] The work of development experts can be seen as translating entities such as water pumps, vehicles, phones and computers "into the material and conceptual order of a successful project" as David Mosse, drawing on Bruno Latour, has highlighted in his ethnography of development.[58]

While Mosse sees the recent formation of "an unprecedented expert consensus on how global poverty is to be eliminated and the poor governed," Latour reminds us that the success of project designs or policy ideas arise from "their ability to continue recruiting support and so impose … [their] growing coherence on those who argue about them or oppose them."[59] It is through such processes that the 'global consensus' on economic development and governance has taken powerful local forms across diverse contexts. Mitchell makes a broader argument about the creation of a sphere identified as "the

56 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

57 Timothy Mitchell, *The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

58 David Mosse, *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid and Practice* (London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005). Mosse draws here on Bruno Latour, "When Things Strike Back: A Possible Contribution of 'Science Studies' to the Social Sciences," *British Journal of Sociology* 51.1 (2000): 107–23.

59 Mosse, *Adventures in Aidland*; Bruno Latour, *Aramis or The Love of Technology*, Translated by Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

economy" as a realm of specialists claiming privileged insight into the unseen forces shaping human experience in the world.

Similarly, in certain cases, increased bureaucratization or technocratization of work led missionaries of development to delineate clear-cut boundaries between different spheres of their work. Vanderbilt describes in this volume how some missionaries criticized the Laymen's Inquiry as having been implemented by "a super-efficient human agency" who seems "to have forgotten that God should have anything to do with missions." Similarly, Fountain and Yoder's chapter in this volume suggests that despite the Mennonite Central Committee's framing of its work as 'holistic' its projects in Indonesia were compartmentalized in more 'development'-focused parts, informed by cutting-edge expertise gained at a major US university, and 'church'-related work, which some of them referred to as the 'church planting kind of thing.' While in practice, these borders often appeared to be blurred and technical support infused by a relational 'quiet' ethic, the MCC's official approach illustrates the "enduring moral force of modern categories for defining projects of transformative intervention."

On the other hand, several chapters in this book describe the definition of a sphere of "development" which—while being itself dynamic and internally contested—brings together technical and spiritual ideas and things, ranging from managerial skills to prayer. In addition to Hu's Social Gospelers, for whom their Christian faith was subsumed in their mission of spreading modern forms of worldly knowledge, Hui-yeon Kim's chapter shows how the branding of South-Korea amalgamates economic success and Pentecostalism epitomizing a particular vision of 'Asian modernity' presented in missionary fields in Southeast Asia. Organizations such as the Yoido Full Gospel Church and its NGO development arm 'Good People' present Cambodians with a form of development in which asking the Christian God for support, going to school, and working for Korean employers come together in a compelling way.

Recognizing the role of Christian mission in the formation of a sphere of 'development' in which things and ideas recurrently separated as belonging either to 'religion' or the 'secular' come together raises new possibilities for thinking about techno-politics. Larson, in her careful study here of everyday life at an elite Catholic school in North Sulawesi, raises the idea that—at first glance at least—it might be more appropriate to describe the school's goals as 'rendering ethical,' rather than 'technical' as their work casts political issues such as corruption as "matters of personal faith." However, she also pushes back against this idea, by describing the school as also and even mostly constituting a space or 'forum' of deliberation, where the relationship between religious and civic ethics is continuously (re)articulated. Relying on ethnographic

and historical data, Larson shows how Christian values become constitutive not only in the young students' cultivation of the self, but also in their related effort to participate in the building of a multicultural nation.

In her chapter here, Shih illustrates how religion can become part of the solution proposed to solve a problem that has been 'rendered technical' and at the same time, also 'rendered spiritual.' She inscribes the two evangelical organizations' ways of approaching sex work within a larger trend of "pathologizing" prostitution. Once conceptualized as being the result of an addiction, sex work can be 'cured' via a combination of (spiritual) rehabilitation and wage labor, which these organizations propose to provide through vocational training. Shih describes this as a maneuver which presents the market combined with Christian faith as a solution while it is a constitutive part of the problem.

As emphasized by Li 'rendering technical' is a process rather than a secure accomplishment.[60] Besides looking into the ways in which expert knowledge avoids and deflects questions related to the political and economic structures that maintain inequalities, Bolotta and Erb and Widywati also explore challenges of technical depoliticization efforts. Both start with rich accounts of the intricate involvement of Catholic missionaries with the dominant powers in Thailand and Indonesia, respectively, with a focus on missionary work in the institutionalization of modern education. In both cases, however, we also glimpse some of the ways in which Christian actors can both embrace and negotiate aspects of techno-politics in service of their own agendas, even to the point of working at odds with aspects of dominant state visions.

Erb and Widyawati describe how in Flores instances of police violence toward villagers in the name of environmentalism first drew a wedge between the bishop and some local nuns and priests. The official Church position was in agreement with the local government which was relying on arguments of forest conservation to react to (or subvert) villagers' claims of land compensation. Several of the Catholic actors on the ground, however, condemned the government's use of violence and contested its approach, siding instead with the villagers. In this charged political context, environmentalism grew to become an increasingly important topic in the dioceses. After a change in local government that opened up the region to mining, the Catholic Church through the Justice and Peace Commissions of the Franciscan and Divine Word Missionary orders emerged as a major anti-mining actor. The local Church's moving from an 'environmentalism of the rich' to an 'environmentalism of the poor,' can

60 Li, *The Will to Improve*, 10.

thus be seen as a dramatic shift—and one that complicates the ways in which religion interacts with projects of state-driven techno-politics.[61]

In his chapter here on development work in the slums of Bangkok, Bolotta sheds light on how an Italian nun managed to subvert the Thai Catholic Church's official government-aligned position by using the Thai legal framework regulating humanitarian organizations. Registering her home for disabled slum children in the politically and religiously neutral category of 'NGO' after having obtained financial support from religious as well as secular organizations not only gave her legal backing in her assistance to the children, but also a margin of maneuver to provide spiritual guidance to their mothers. This act was deeply imbued with the nun's specific Christian ethics, questioning both the State's and Catholic Church's elite and Thai-centered politics. In Bolotta's words, this Italian missionary filled in the secular NGOs' "technical clockwork with her 'political-theological' soul." Together, these two chapters show how techno-political frameworks can be contested not only by the people who are supposed to gratefully benefit from development, but also by those who are working within the frameworks of such developmentalist projects. In both cases its actors were influenced by and sympathetic to liberation theology who acted to subvert the technical neutrality of the development frameworks that they were navigating.

Conclusion

The contributions to this volume come together to provide a focused set of explorations of issues connected to the historical legacies and contemporary realities of Christian mission in contexts of humanitarian and development work in Asia. Taken together, they complicate understandings of how techno-political projects work by recognizing that such projects, including the institutions and experts who design and implement them, have inextricable social and cultural dimensions that include complex 'religious' considerations.[62] In

61 Robert Cribb, "Environmentalism in Indonesian Politics," in *Towards Integrated Environmental Law in Indonesia?,* eds. Adriaan Bedner and Nicole Niessen (Leiden: CNWS, 2003), quoted by the authors.

62 Such a perspective attends to how expertise is entangled in social relations and dependant on fine diplomatic skills, but also explores the important influences of expert networks [See Mosse, *Adventures in Aidland;* Mitchell, *The Rule of Experts*; Latour, *Aramis or The Love of Technology*].

addition to shedding light on the roles played by Christian actors in laying the foundations for technocratic forms of development management, this volume offers critical reflections on how, in turn, missionary interventions have taken new forms through their engagement with emerging visions of techno-politics. While some chapters show how modern distinctions came to be drawn and re-drawn between Church and social work others, on the contrary, describe the merging of religious and secular goals within the sphere of development.

Finally, the focus on Christian development actors has made it possible to enrich the discussions on techno-politics. The chapters in this volume serve not only to bring forth little known elements of Christian involvement in the regional history of development, but also shed light on the influence these religious actors' work in Asia has had on shaping distinct processes of 'rendering technical.' Through rich case studies across diverse geographic locations historical contexts and confessional traditions, the contributions direct particular attention to Christian missionaries in the role of technical experts. For example, Greg Vanderbilt highlights how the work of "missionary-academics" was compared by early 20th-century Baptist laymen to that of a stockholder committee's task of studying the affairs of a corporation in ways that prefigure the upcoming expansion of audit cultures, which were to transform development interventions later in the 20th century.[63]

The chapters by Larson, Kim, and Shih present diverse cases demonstrating ways in which being a good Christian is presented as part of the solution to socio-political issues that have been rendered technical and spiritual at the same time. The techniques used to monitor former sex workers in China and Thailand testify to this specific type of expertise, in which Christian actors present themselves both as spiritual-ethical 'experts' and as implementers of modern projects for this-worldly improvement. Examples such as this encourage us to reflect on the role attributed to ethics in development and, consequently, on how ethical visions inform the creation of particular types of expertise and authority among Christian development actors. While in some instances religious development agents seem to instill a politicized spirit into their projects, in others their ethical positioning could be seen as facilitating the de-politicizing effects of development work. This echoes with Chantal Mouffe's argument that "the current infatuation with humanitarian crusades and ethically correct good causes [is] a consequence of the lack of any credible political alternative

63 See for instance, Marilyn Strathern, ed., *Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics, and the Academy* (London: Routledge, 2000).

to the current dominance of neoliberalism" and calls for a critical stance toward the reasons and consequences of development aid in general.[64]

The work presented here thus highlights some of the complex ways in which Christian missionary engagements with technocratic procedures have influenced work in fields of humanitarian and development aid while at the same time having been themselves reconfigured in the process. Building upon the provocative discussions of this rich empirical data on missions of development in modern Asia, this volume aims to open up new lines of discussion on how missionary actors have driven, critically interrogated, and re-imagined intersections of 'religion' and 'development'.

Bibliography

Abruzzo, Margaret. *Polemical Pain: Slavery, Cruelty, and the Rise of Humanitarianism.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2011.

Aragon, Lorraine. *Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and the State Development in Indonesia.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000.

Arvidson, Malin. "Contradictions and Confusions in Development Work: Exploring the Realities of Bangladeshi NGOs." *Journal of South Asian Development* 3.1 (2008): 109–34.

Asad, Talal. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam.* London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Barker, John. "Christianity in Western Melanesian Ethnography." In *History and Tradition in Melanesian Anthropology,* edited by J.G. Carrier, 144–73. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

Barnett, Michael. *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Baron, Beth. *The Orphan Scandal. Christian Missionaries and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014.

Bonsen, Roland, Hans Marks and Jelle Miedema. *The Ambiguity of Rapprochement. Reflections of Anthropologists on their Controversial Relationship with Missionaries.* Nijmegen: Focaal, 1990.

Bornstein, Erica. *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGO's, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Bornstein, Erica. "Charitable Choice: L'humanitarisme et les politiques de la foi" *Vacarme,* 34 (2006): 189–93.

64 Chantal Mouffe, "Which Ethics for Democracy?" in *The Turn to Ethics,* eds. Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 86.

Boutilier, James A., Daniel T. Hughes and Sharon Tiffany, eds. *Mission, Church, and Sect in Oceania.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1978.

Bosch, David. *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission.* New York: Orbis Books, 1991.

Calhoun, Craig. "The Imperative to Reduce Suffering: Charity, Progress and Emergencies in the Field of Humanitarian Action." In *Humanitarianism in Question: Power, Politics, Ethics,* edited by Michael Barnett and Thomas Weiss, 73–97. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Calhoun, Craig. "The Idea of Emergency: Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)Order." In *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions,* edited by Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, 29–58. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010.

Cannell, Fenella, ed. *The Anthropology of Christianity*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.

Carrette, Jeremy and Sophie-Hélène Trigeaud. "The Religion-Secular in International Politics: The Case of 'Religious' NGOs at the United Nations." In *Social Identities Between the Sacred and the Secular,* edited by Abby Day, Christopher Cotter, and Giselle Vincett, 7–22. Surrey: Ashgate—Ahrc/Esrc Religion, 2013.

Carrette, Jeremy and Hugh Miall. eds *Religion, NGOs and the United Nations: Visible and Invisible Actors in Power.* London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2017.

Carrin, Marine and Harald Tambs-Lyche. *An Encounter of Peripheries: Santals, Missionaries and their Changing World.* Dehli: Manohar, 2008.

Clarke, Gerard and Michael Jennings, eds. *Development, Society and Faith-Based Organizations: Bridging the Sacred and the Secular.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Clémentin-Ojha, Catherine. *Les Chrétiens de l'Inde. Entre castes et Eglises.* Paris: Albin Michel, 2008.

Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff. *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Cooke, Nola. "Early Nineteenth-Century Vietnamese Catholics and Others in the Pages of the Annales de la Propagation de la Foi." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 35.2 (2004): 261–85.

Cormack, Don. *Killing Fields, Living Fields: An Unfinished Portrait of the Cambodian Church—The Church That Would Not Die.* London/Grand Rapids: Monarch Books, 2001.

Cribb, Robert. "Environmentalism in Indonesian Politics." In *Towards Integrated Environmental Law in Indonesia?,* edited by Adriaan Bedner and Nicole Niessen. Leiden: CNWS, 2003.

Deacon, Gregory and Emma Tomalin. "A History of Faith-Based Aid and Development." In *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development,* edited by Emma Tomalin, 68–79. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Dreyfus, Hubert, and Paul Rabinow. *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Ekbladh, David. *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Fassin, Didier. *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Feldman, Ilana and Miriam Ticktin, eds. *In the Name of Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2010.

Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Ferguson, James, and Larry Lohmann. "The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development' and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho." *The Ecologist* 24.5 (1994): 176. Accessed May 10, 2016. http://go.galegroup.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA16467016&v=2.1&u=nuslib&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&asid=25206c9be46a0ed6dd033a1e463d56ac.

Fitzgerald, Timothy. *Religion and Politics in International Relations.* London: Continuum, 2011.

Forest, Alain. *Les missionnaires français au Tonkin et au Siam XVII–XVIII siècles. Analyse comparée d'un relatif success et d'un total échec.* Paris: l'Harmattan, 1998.

Fountain, Philip. "The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion." *International Development Policy: Religion and Development* 4 (2013): 9–30.

Fountain, Philip. "Proselytizing Development." In *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and International Development,* edited by Emma Tomalin, 80–97. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Gorski, Philip. *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Handman, Courtney. *Critical Christianity: Translation and Denominational Conflict in Papua New Guinea.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.

Harries, Patrick and David Maxwell, eds. *The Spiritual and the Secular: Missionaries and Knowledge about Africa.* Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012.

Hartch, Todd. *Missionaries of the State. The Summer Institute of Linguistics, State Formation, and Indigenous Mexico, 1935–1985.* Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006.

Hayami, Yoko. "Karen Tradition According to Christ or Buddha: The Implications of Multiple Reinterpretations for a Minority Ethnic Group in Thailand." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 27 (1996): 334–49.

Haynes, Jeffrey. *Faith-Based Organizations at the United Nations.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Hearn, Julia. "The 'Invisible' NGO: US Evangelical Missions in Kenya." *Journal of Religion in Africa* 32.1 (2002): 32–60.

Hofer, Katarina. "The Role of Evangelical NGOs in International Development: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Uganda." *Africa Spectrum* 38.3 (2003): 375–98.

De Jong, J.A. *As the Waters Cover the Sea: Millennial Expectations in the Rise of Anglo-American Missions, 1640–1810*. Kampen: J.H. Kok N.V., 1970.

Kammerer, Cornelia Ann. "Customs and Christian Conversion among Akha Highlanders of Burma and Thailand." *American Ethnologist*, 17.2 (1990): 277–91.

Keane, Webb. *Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

Kipp, Rita. *The Early Years of Dutch Colonial Mission: The Karo Field.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990.

Kruithof, Maryse. *Shouting in a Desert: Dutch Missionary Encounters with Javanese Islam, 1850–1910.* PhD diss., Erasmus University, 2014.

Latour, Bruno. *Aramis or The Love of Technology*. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.

Latour, Bruno. "When Things Strike Back: A Possible Contribution of 'Science Studies' to the Social Sciences." *British Journal of Sociology* 51.1 (2000): 107–23.

Lewis, David and David Mosse, eds. *Development Brokers and Translators. The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies.* Boulder: Kumarian Press, 2006.

Li, Tania. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics.* Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.

Li, Tania. "Rendering Society Technical: Government through Community and the Ethnographic Turn at the World Bank in Indonesia." In *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development,* edited by David Mosse, 57–79. New York: Berghahn Books, 2011.

Meyer, Birgit. *Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity among the Ewe in Ghana*. Trenton: Africa World Press, 1999.

Mitchell, Timothy. *The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Mosse, David. *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid and Practice.* London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005.

Mosse, David, ed. *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development.* New York: Berghahn Books, 2011.

Mosse, David. *The Saint in the Banyan Tree: Christianity and Caste Society in India.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Mouffe, Chantal. "Which Ethics for Democracy?" In *The Turn to Ethics,* edited by Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz, 85–94. London, New York: Routledge, 2000.

Neill, Stephen. *A History of Christian Missions*. Second Revised Edition. London: Penguin Books, 1990.

Numrich, Paul. "United Religions at the United Nations." *Second Opinion,* 8 (2001): 53–68.

Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre and Thomas Bierschenk. "Les courtiers locaux du développement." *Bulletin de l'APAD,* 5 (1993): 71–6.

Ponchaud, François. *La cathédrale dans la rizière: Histoire de l'Eglise au Cambodge.* Tours: CDL, 2006.

Porter, Andrew. *Religion vs. Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.

Quarles van Ufford, Philip and Matthew Schoffeleers, eds. *Religion and Development: Towards an Integrated Approach.* Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1988.

Redfield, Peter. "Humanitarianism." In *A Companion to Moral Anthropology,* edited by Didier Fassin, 451–67. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2015.

Redfield, Peter and Erica Bornstein. "An Introduction to the Anthropology of Humanitarianism." In *Forces of Compassion: Humanitarianism between Ethics and Politics,* edited by Erica Bornstein and Peter Redfield, 3–30. Santa Fe: SAR Press, 2011.

Rist, Gilbert. *The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith.* Third Edition. London, New York: Zed Books, 2008.

Robbins, Joel. *Becoming Sinners: Christianity and Moral Torment in a Papua New Guinea Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Rose, Nikolas. *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Schrauwers, Albert. *Colonial 'Reformation' in the Highlands of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, 1892–1995.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000.

Stamatov, Peter. *The Origins of Global Humanitarianism: Religion, Empires, and Advocacy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Steenbrink, Karel. *Catholics in Indonesia. 1808–1902: A Documented History*. Vol. 1. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003.

Steenbrink, Karel. *Catholics in Indonesia. 1903–1942: A Documented History*, vol. 2., Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.

Stipe, Claude E., et al. "Anthropologists Versus Missionaries: The Influence of Presuppositions [and Comments and Reply]." *Current Anthropology* 21.2 (1980): 165–79.

Strathern, Marilyn, ed. *Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in Accountability, Ethics, and the Academy.* London: Routledge, 2000.

Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Tomalin, Emma, ed. *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and International Development.* London: Routledge, 2015.

Tusan, Michelle. *Smyrna's Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide and the Birth of the Middle East.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Tvedt, Terje. "Understanding the History of the International Aid System and the Development Research Tradition: The Case of the Disappearing Religious NGOs." *Forum for Development Studies* 2 (2006): 341–66.

Van der Veer, Peter, ed. *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity.* New York, London: Routledge, 1996.

Vilaça, Aparecida and Robin Wright, eds. *Native Christians. Modes and Effects of Christianity among Indigenous Peoples of the Americas*. Surrey: Ashgate, 2009.

von Antina Schnitzler. "Performing Dignity: Human Rights, Citizenship, and the Techno-Politics of Law in South Africa." *American Ethnologist* 41.2 (2014): 336–50.

Walls, Andrew. *Missionary Movement in Christianity.* New York: Orbis Books, 1996.

Zupanov, Inès. *Missionary Tropics: The Catholic Frontier in India (16th–18th c.).* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005.

CHAPTER 2

The Gospel of Intellectuality: Indoctrinating Yenching Educational Missionaries in the Progressive Era

Enyi Hu

Social Turmoil in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era

> Our cabin was on the first open deck, but we spent most of our time on the upper one. When we wanted to study stars, we went up on the roof.[1]

In 1918, the ship S.S. Shinyo Maru set off from the United States, carrying Monona and thirteen other Methodist women missionaries to East Asia. Funnels puffed heavy clouds of smoke into the sky over the Pacific Ocean with the soundings of whistles one after another, as if proudly proclaiming the opening of a new era. It was a remarkable period of transition. Technological advances narrowed the differences between home missions and overseas missions. S.S. Shinyo Maru far exceeded its predecessors in its speed, enabling one to travel to the other side of the earth within two weeks, unimaginable only decades earlier.[2] Many of the women missionaries on board had traveled far further than their mothers had ever had the opportunity. First they attended colleges or universities away from their home states. Later they sailed to the Far East as gospelers, teachers and expatriates, leaving families, friends and familiar surroundings far behind. The destinations of these missionaries varied. Some were sent to China, some to Japan and others to Korea. Monona was first stationed at Keen School, a girls' school run by American Methodist missionaries in Tientsin. She later served at Yenching University, a newly erected Christian University in Peking. The company of other missionaries during the voyage

1 Monona Cheney, *Diary of Monona Cheney's Voyage to China, 1919.* From Special Collections and University Archives, *Monona Cheney Papers, 1918–1932,* University of Oregon (Eugene, OR).

2 It took less than two weeks to travel from the States to Japan via Shinyo Maru in 1918. Osvald Siren boarded on Shinyo Maru on Dec. 28th, 1917 and arrived in Japan in early January 1918. See Minna Törmä, *Enchanted by Lohans: Osvald Siren's Journey into Chinese Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013), 35–37.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_003

lightened up their separate paths ahead and comforted every dreary and nauseating day on the sea. Sometimes when night fell, they climbed to the top deck to "study" the stars (see also Figure 2.1).[3] Monona was cautious not to succumb to Romanticism and religious sentiments. Instead of counting stars or praising the Lord for a splendid starry night, they studied stars the way Gregor Mendel attentively observed his pea plants. These missionaries worshiped science as much as they did God.

Monona was a progenitor of, as well as a testimony to, the transformative era that believed in the abundant capacities of human beings to reform society

S.S. SHINYO MARU
Displacement 21,650 tons Length 550 ft. Breadth 63 ft. Depth 38 ft. Speed 21 kts.
"My ship" - isn't it good-looking? Our cabin was on the first open deck, but we spent most of our time on the upper one. When we wanted to study stars, we went up on the "roof."

FIGURE 2.1 *Diary of Monona Cheney's Voyage to China, 1919, Monona Cheney Papers, Ax 275, box 5, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon. Reprinted with permission.*

3 Cheney, *Diary of Monona Cheney's Voyage to China, 1919.*

and human nature, though such capacities were reserved for a gifted minority.[4] As conflicts between science and Scripture intensified, Christian communities tended toward theological polarization. The Fundamentalism that encapsulated heterogeneous conservative narratives was exiled in public rhetoric from mainstream American culture, providing the opportunity for scholarly expertise to partake in the construction of secular hegemony.[5] This shift precipitated another age of Enlightenment.[6] Scholars since Jessie G. Lutz and John K. Fairbank have incisively examined American Christian experiments in Asia from the perspectives of cultural imperialism and cultural accommodation in transnational interactions. Yet often overlooked in historiography is motivational differences between conservative and liberal missionaries that resulted in drastically different proselytizing approaches. This chapter seeks to explore the technical and scientific vision of educational missioners inspired by liberal Christianity, a distinct sect.

University graduates like Monona were not primarily enthusiastic about sowing seeds for the Kingdom of God when they came to China to teach. Their religious fervor was milder compared to missionaries working with the China Inland Mission (CIM), one of the most influential Protestant missions established in the late 19th century. The founder of CIM, James Hudson Taylor, a British missionary, barely engaged in the field of higher education, believing that one did not have to enter a college to be able to read the Scriptures. He instead targeted China's hinterland and worked as a peripatetic preacher, recruiting local 'Bible women' to continue his evangelical cause when he was ready to depart for another pagan village. He built no churches; neither did he establish any school.[7] Hudson Taylor was also dubious about American missionary motives. In the hot summer of 1888, when dozens of young Americans

4 Edward L. Thorndike, pioneering American psychologist and the son of a Methodist minister, wrote in 1910: "...every advance in the sciences of human nature will contribute to our success in controlling human nature and changing it to the advantage of the common weal." See Robert F. Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 91.

5 In this chapter, fundamentalism with a small 'f' refers to the declaration of conservative faith among Bible-believing Protestants whereas capital 'F' Fundamentalism is used as an umbrella term to describe liberal Protestant or public discourses of conservative Christianity. See Susan Harding, *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), xv.

6 Ibid., 61–65. See also Ferenc Morton Szasz, *The Divided Mind of Protestant America, 1880–1930* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 133.

7 Alvyn Austin, C*hina's Millions: The China Inland Mission and Late Qing Society, 1832–1905* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2007), 119.

submitted their applications to CIM, Hudson Taylor only accepted two applicants from pious families that showed unreserved devotion to God. One was a lady called Suzie Parker who died in China one year later. Showing no regrets for her daughter's decision, Parker's father simply said: "I have given my best to Jesus." To select candidates like Suzie Parker, each CIM application underwent a strict assessment. Hudson Taylor's secretary wrote a confidential evaluation on the personality of each candidate after careful review.[8] Even when admitted CIM missionaries arrived in China, they needed to pass a two-year probationary period during which time they were required to take courses on Bible reading in Mandarin Chinese, Chinese history, Chinese geography, Chinese folk religions and pass an exam on "China's Spiritual need and claims" as well as another exam testing their knowledge on the *Principles and Practice, and Instructions* of the CIM.[9] Formal CIM missionary members trusted in God's sufficient supply. They had no income, and thus were financially dependent on their families.[10] In stark contrast to CIM, American missionaries' halfhearted attitudes towards the propagation of the religious gospel and wholehearted devotion to college teaching merits careful study.

In *Empire of Humanity,* Michael Barnett argues that humanitarianism bore a striking resemblance to the empire as both required the application of power.[11] Initiatives in Chinese higher education implemented by Protestant and Catholic missionaries in particular, buttress and enrich Barnett's argument by showing various overlaps between imperial rivalries and the seemingly less nocuous competitions for developmental missions overseas. Among all three Catholic universities in China, two (Fu Jen Catholic University and Aurora Academy) were founded by Chinese Catholics without much international collaboration involved. Though the remaining one in Peking (originally called Sacred Heart College) was inaugurated by French Jesuits, the school was founded in 1921 after America's establishment of all thirteen Protestant colleges in China, most presumably a European Catholic aspiration to challenge the monopoly of American Protestant penetration in higher education. America's pioneering status in reconstructing social edifices in China through intellectual endeavors thus necessitates a thorough analysis, which will add nuances to our

8 Ibid., 294–96.

9 Ibid., 250–54.

10 Rhonda Anne Semple, *Missionary Women: Gender, Professionalism, and the Victorian Idea of Christian Mission* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 2003), 41–42.

11 Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 16.

understanding of how American cultural imperialism differed from European imperial practices.

Amidst American eastward expansion of Christian higher education, Yenching University stood out as a prominent example in unlocking 20th century Protestant aspirations to enlighten China. Yenching ranked far ahead of its peers in terms of student population and endowment. 1941 *Life* magazine called it the "biggest, richest and best-equipped Christian university in all China, a leader of the many American Christian schools and colleges in that country."[12] Elitist in orientation, Yenching was not designed to produce mediocre engineers, second-tier scientists or proletarian revolutionaries. Its raison d'être was to produce the finest experts who maintained a cosmopolitan outlook without losing track of local concerns. To that end, Yenching vied with other Christian institutions such as Lingnan University for funding distributed by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), invited the most distinguished professors to teach, and kept firm ties with its alumni, a large number of whom worked with high government officials. The successful curricular and administrative innovations of Yenching inspired emulations among many other mission schools, though only a sporadic few were able to achieve the same prestige and impact.[13]

The case of Yenching raises an important question of whether missionary humanitarianism was a vehicle of imperialism or vice versa by pushing us to consider it in the broadest possible context. Prospective missionaries motivated by the Student Volunteer Movement from different parts of the United States came to Yenching at different times, providing useful and fairly balanced accounts that help sketch the trajectory and parameters of a national religious campaign interconnected with the social, cultural and intellectual milieu of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. After all, the decision to become an educational missionary was more than just an individual commitment, or a personal response to God's call. Given the limited availability of funding, it required an organization's deliberate consideration to select the best. It demanded both financial and emotional support from families.[14] Above all, it relied on effective publicity that injected unwavering courage into those

12 "Yenching: No.1 Christian University in China Stands Amidst the Japanese Invaders with Steady Support of American Churches and College," *LIFE* 6.10, February 10, 1941, 49.

13 Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, *New Perspectives on Yenching University, 1916–1952: A Liberal Education for a New China* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 7, 17.

14 Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010), 62.

men and women fresh out of school to transcend language barriers and fear of a far-flung land.

It is therefore crucial to raise the question of how this happened, as the entire annals of intellectuals migrating from the United States to China would lose its distinctive meaning without exploring social circumstances that shaped these educational missionaries-to-be. Via an "ideas in context" approach, this chapter situates prospective Yenching missionaries in the wider religious and intellectual environment in which historical actors found their collective Weltanschauung through engagement with the external world.

Most American missionaries travelling to China in the early twentieth century were brought up in the Gilded Age when the traumatic Civil War (1861–1865) had gradually faded from memory, when vacillating faith stirred by massive bloodshed during the war began to increasingly rest on the welfare of this life rather than the prospect of an afterlife, when railroads winding along rivers first extended to their neighborhoods, when a certain degree of privacy had to be sacrificed for efficiency and when the concept of spatial boundaries was redefined. The Gilded Age produced billionaires such as John D. Rockefeller along with the burgeoning middle-class. It attracted thousands of European immigrants with employment opportunities,[15] yet further impoverished the lower class via inflation generated by laissez-faire policies. The Gilded Age inspired missionary zeal among university students to spread the Good News to the Middle Kingdom, but saw anti-Chinese sentiments peak in the United States with the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which banned the very people that missionaries aspired to convert from entering the United States. The Gilded Age saw the coming of age of a young nation wandering between godliness and worldliness, agrarianism and urbanism, isolationism and interventionism. On one hand, there was indulgence and individual "pecuniary emulation," an imagination of rags-to-riches mythologies.[16] On the other, there was confusion and unease over social transformation, especially for the parents of prospective missionaries, their ambivalent struggle to preserve the good old traditions without being transformed.

For instance Alice Middleton Boring, who worked at Yenching from 1923 to 1950, had a humdrum and secluded childhood. She was raised in a large

15 Rebecca Edwards, *New Spirits: Americans in the Gilded Age, 1865–1905* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 48.

16 Thorstein Veblen, an American sociologist critiqued such trends among lower classes that imitated the extravagant habits of the upper class, first coined the term "pecuniary emulation." See Edwards, *New Spirits,* 97.

Quaker family above a drug store in Philadelphia owned by her great grandfather. The business should have passed down from one generation to the next as was common among Quakers, but Alice's grandfather had lost the property bequeathed to him.[17] The "Holy Experiment" of the Quakers was, nevertheless, inherited. As Alice's brother Edwin Garrigues Boring, a psychology professor at Harvard University recalled in his autobiography:

> The family had too little social life. My parents felt that they were not well off, and, when they married, they decided they could not afford to entertain. So we had few guests and seldom went out. Nor had I any playmates, for the neighborhood… had deteriorated and I was not allowed to play outdoors with the tough little gangs which I would so dearly have loved to join. I did have for many years an imaginary playmate named "Mamie," and I had other fantasies, as might be expected in so isolated a child.[18]

Edwin did not elaborate in what aspects the neighborhood "had deteriorated," nor did he state clearly who these "tough little gangs" were, but his writing does evince a desperate hope on the part of their parents to protect them from being led astray by wayward youngsters as well as a deteriorating society, even though the family may be equally deteriorated in terms of economic conditions. The Boring family decided to invest in education, for academic achievements not only elevated one's own social standing considering the rising status of academic professionals, but also provided the best antidote for social ills, the truth that shall set free 'prisoners' of the era. Three out of the four Boring children were sent to college as they wished.[19]

Most parents of educational missionaries-to-be shared such an emphasis on education. The American faculty at Yenching in the early twentieth century were among the privileged few to enjoy access to higher education, considering that less than three percent of the US population were admitted to college in 1910. The rate was nonetheless three times higher than it had been half a century earlier.[20] Cultivation of the intellect was being recognized as a progressive means to the consummation of self-realization and a transcendent apparatus to pinpoint one's existence in a galaxy of social changes. Higher

17 Edwin Boring, *A History of Psychology in Autobiography* (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1952), 4: 27–28.

18 Ibid., 28.

19 Marilyn Bailey Ogilvie and Clifford J. Choquette, *A Dame Full of Vim and Vigor: A Biography of Alice Middleton Boring, Biologist in China* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999), 10.

20 Ben Wattenberg, *The Statistical History of the United States: From Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Basic Book, 1976), 383.

education for women also expanded aggressively in the United States. By 1880, over thirty percent of college students were women.[21] The establishment of Seven Sisters, seven liberal arts colleges for women that paralleled the Ivy League universities, enabled female students to foray into academia that had hitherto been reserved exclusively for males. A large portion of the female faculty at Yenching had studied in women's colleges. Grace Boynton, an English literature professor at Yenching was a graduate of Wellesley College. The first Dean of the Women's College at Yenching, Luella Miner did not graduate from a women's school, but her alma mater Oberlin College was a staunch advocate of educational rights for women. Miner's successor Alice Browne Frame got her Bachelor's degree from Mount Holyoke College.[22] Margaret Speer, who assumed the position after Frame, graduated from Bryn Mawr College.[23]

Growing with these young graduates was a nation still in prosperous turmoil. It was the Progressive Era, an era underpinned by "the rhetoric of anti-monopolism," the discourse of "social bonds and social nature of human beings" and "the language of social efficiency," three somewhat unsystematic, disconnected, inherently contradictory streams of thought in response to an already chaotic world following the Gilded Age.[24] In 1900 when Alice Frame received her Bachelor's degree from Mount Holyoke College, the United States was at war with the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines. When the war ended in 1902, the United States had seized control of the land together with Guam from Spain, symbolizing the consolidation of its imperialistic power in the Pacific region. In 1904 when Alice Boring graduated from Bryn Mawr College, the Northern Security Company, an American railroad trust created by four industrial and financial tycoons, John D. Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, E.H. Harriman and James J. Hill, just lost its ephemeral monopoly under the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890.[25] In 1918 when Monona Cheney started graduate school in New York, the United States had already joined the First World War and the Red Scare loomed large. Strikes organized by working-class immigrants

21 Barbara Reeves-Ellington, Kathryn Kish Sklar and Connie A. Shemo, eds., *Competing Kingdoms: Women, Mission, Nation, and the American Protestant Empire, 1812–1960* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.

22 Motoe Sasaki-Gayle, *Entangled with Empire: American Women and the Creation of the 'New Woman' in China, 1898–1937* (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2009), 188.

23 Ibid., 136.

24 Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search of Progressivism," *Reviews in American History* 10, 4 (1982): 123.

25 Walter Nugent, *Progressivism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 37.

were suppressed; white gangs committed frequent lynching against African Americans, implementing their so-called justice with mob violence.[26]

Re-imagining a Better Social Order: The Transition from Religious Gospel to Social and Intellectual Gospel

Everyone was searching for order, yet people differed in their understanding of what constituted it and ways to maintain it in the midst of modernization. Characterized by historian Samuel Haber as a "secular Great Awakening," the Progressive era saw the revitalization of social activism sweep over the United States. For college-educated women like Jane Addams, no single reform was more exciting than introducing educational opportunities to the working class by launching Hull House. For radicals such as Lester Frank Ward, scientific propagation ensured material and ethical progress.[27] For Theodore Roosevelt, the benefits of volunteerism should not be confined to American society and he decided to form a regiment of volunteer cavalry for the Cuban War of Independence against Spain.

The Protestant communities in the United States too were seeking new roles in line with projects for the re-establishment of social order and as a result promoted a typological shift in American Christian discourse. Walter Rauschenbusch, a Baptist theologian, published *Christianizing the Social Order* in 1913, in which he called for the "Social Awakening" of churches to render the United States "God's country" where unfailing love and service prevailed. Similar to socialistic teachings, Rauschenbusch sounded a note of caution against the potential of a capitalistic society to grow into a dog-eat-dog "Devil's country," deeming social inequities as the inevitable aftermath of an economic system that ignited flames of avarice, selfishness and ruthlessness.[28] Yet unlike 19th century dogmatic socialists, he substituted the "swim or sink" approach of the working classes and bottom-up visions of revolutionary struggle with more moderate, and conscientious awakenings of the bourgeoisie in pursuit of top-down projects for the alleviation of conflict and the eradication of social ills. This aspirational order rested on the belief in social progress and the underlying assumption of immanent goodness in human nature, albeit at times lost in wealth, to accomplish self-redemption.

---

26 Robert Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 290.

27 Gloria Garrett Samson, *The American Fund for Public Service: Charles Garland and Radical Philanthropy, 1922–1941* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), 75.

28 Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order* (New York: Macmillan, 1913), 12, 290.

Four years after the publication of *Christianizing the Social Order*, Rauschenbusch formulated Social Awakening creeds into a systematic theology for the 'Social Gospel,' ready to turn ripples into tidal waves of large-scale social reforms pioneered by Protestant churches. The theology was nothing abstruse. Its core emphasis fell upon "redeeming the social order," otherwise it would be merely "an annex to the Orthodox conception of the scheme of salvation" which Rauschenbusch derided.[29] While Michael Barnett contends that evangelical Christianity inspired charitable activities, it is important to keep in mind that Protestant denominations varied in their respective interests in compassionate behavior.[30] As Rauschenbusch noted, the Fundamentalist wing of the American church during the 1910s launched crusades against a wide array of social problems, but these Progressive Reforms eventually served the purpose of conversion, either religiously or culturally. Although the Salvation Army, a theologically conservative Protestant branch, worked hard to remedy poverty, it worked hard to spread the religious gospel as well. The biblical literalists replaced the liberalist vision of the culturization (secularization) of evangelicalism with evangelization of culture.

Historian David Hollinger points out that earthshattering scientific findings and innovations of the time were major driving forces behind the accommodation of ecumenical Protestantism with the Enlightenment. He names the process "cognitive demystification."[31] The development of the Social Gospel followed a similar pattern. Walter Rauschenbusch did not invent the concept ex nihilo; the birth of the philanthropic movement in the United States attested to the transatlantic transplant of secularization and modernity, a key episode in European intellectual development. At the age of seventeen, Rauschenbusch became increasingly devout and committed to Christianity after a religious experience and was from thence onwards prepared to dedicate his life wholly to God. At Rochester Theological Seminary he first encountered Higher Criticism—the latest biblical hermeneutics from Germany that integrated multidisciplinary endeavors involving anthropology, history and literary criticism to evaluate the reliability of the Scriptures. Supernatural phenomena were dismissed; Jesus Christ was regarded as a man, not a deity, and the Bible was seen as a work of literature, not the sacred word of God.[32] Theology

29 Walter Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel* (New York: MacMillan, 1917), 142.

30 Barnett, *Empire of Humanity*, 60.

31 David Hollinger, *After Cloven Tongues of Fires: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 6.

32 Lian Xi, *The Conversion of Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 1907–1932* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 139.

accordingly metamorphosed into scientific criticism. Facing a wealth of evidence ferreted out by positivist scholars in Europe, Rauschenbusch resolved the contradiction between his previous faith in biblical inerrancy and liberal theological training at the seminary through his surrender to rationality.

Walter Rauschenbusch was a receptive intellectual representative of the upper classes in fin-de-siècle United States. At that time, a strong penchant for non-literal interpretation of the Bible flourished in elite schools. Charles W. Eliot, president emeritus of Harvard University addressed Harvard Summer School of Theology in 1909 arguing that "the religion of the future would not be based on any authority, either church or Bible." The only commandment is "love of God, shown through service to others by contribution to the common good." "In the future," he continued: "there would be nothing 'supernatural.' Nor might there be any further need for worship."[33] In his speech, Eliot not only negated the absolute power of God in a manner similar to Friedrich Nietzsche's striking declaration that "God is dead," but also suggested the eventual annihilation of all religious divisions that make them distinct from one another.

Highbrows likes Rauschenbusch and Eliot articulated their Modernist stance in the early 20th century Fundamentalist-Modernist debate. Controversy between the two sides revolved around attitudes toward the latest scientific discoveries. Harry Emerson Fosdick, a famous Modernist minister satirized that Fundamentalists "really love the Lord their God, not only with all their heart and soul and strength but with all their mind," and yet it is science that liberates and cultivates the mind.[34] From a liberal's perspective, Fundamentalists were anti-intellectual and anti-elite, placing their trust in basic biblical knowledge as sufficient verification of scientific hypotheses. William Jennings Bryan, a conservative politician asserted that Christianity is a religion for all, "not for the so-called 'thinkers' only." Referring to "mind worship" as "the greatest sin in the intellectual world today,"[35] he declared: "The God I worship is the God of the ignorant as well as the God of the learned man."[36] For Modernists, religious dogma imprisoned the mind, impeding the pious from obtaining the real truth of the universe. For Fundamentalists like Bryan, basic Christian doctrine freed the soul, granting commoners the secure status of being God's children just as educated elites.

---

33 Szasz, *The Divided Mind,* 70–71.

34 Ibid., 716–22.

35 Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Random House LLC, 1963), 127–28.

36 Szasz, *The Divided Mind,* 134.

Arguably, the spread of Darwinian evolutionism following Higher Criticism from Europe fomented irreconcilable disputes that had long existed in American Protestant communities. By the time of the infamous Scopes trial in 1925, Fundamentalists had reached a crucial juncture. If evolutionism was accepted, creationism could not simultaneously appear true, thus leading to a catastrophic domino effect of questioning biblical literalism and evangelical faith. But the heated debate on Darwinism went beyond intelligent design versus evolution. According to Charles Darwin, all creatures that inhabit the earth are on the long trajectory of evolution and share a common ancestor. Succumbing to natural selection, the weak are filtered out and only the fittest survive. Yet in the days when genes were not yet discovered, the hiatus between heredity and mutation remained unresolved, and the question of how variation takes place was not satisfactorily answered, thus leaving room for multitudinous explanatory attempts and a plethora of applications of the theory in human society.

On one hand, liberal Christians in America such as Asa Gray managed to reinsert a deity into the process by averring that God took charge of how species evolved in a good direction, which was beyond peradventure spurned by many canonical Fundamentalists; on the other, the philosopher Herbert Spencer insisted that orthogenesis, a belief in the inevitability of purposive variation, gave impetus to social evolution, forcing individuals to equip themselves with necessary skills and knowledge.[37] Although put forward prior to Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*, Spencer's theory gained increasing attention in the United States under the auspices of biological evolution. Historian Richard Hofstadter asserts that Spencer's Social Darwinism was seen by some as corroborating visions of Manifest Destiny, a display of imperial haughtiness irrespective of morality, justice, and fair competition that had long been embedded in the American national character, and therefore abetted free market capitalism along with economic disorder in the Gilded Age. The mistake of Social Darwinism, he argued, was its problematic ascription of social progress to social struggle, not environmental struggle. "Man's task is not to imitate the laws of nature," Hofstadter concluded.[38]

Social Gospelers were not unaware of the problems with Social Darwinism identified by Hofstadter. David Starr Jordan, an evolutionary biologist and former president of Stanford University was dubious about the philosophy of struggle as the First World War killed the fittest men, but women, children, the

37 Thomas Leonard, "Religion and Evolution in Progressive Era Political Economy: Adversaries or Allies?" *History of Political Economy* 43.3 (2011): 442–45.

38 Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), 58, 172, 199.

handicapped and the elderly at home remained alive.[39] Social Gospel advocates speculated that the perpetuation of the human species and the evolution of societies could be well achieved through innocuous artificial selection. Building on their experience with reforming religion, Social Gospelers turned their attention towards reforming Social Darwinism as well. Walter Rauschenbusch claimed the unfair method of selection that existed in the current social system led to "the survival of the unfittest." Upholding meritocracy as the only criterion for student admissions, he contended: "education can only train the gifts with which a child is endowed at birth. The intellectual standard of humanity can be raised only by the propagation of the capable."[40] Likewise, Henry C Adams, professor of political economy at University of Michigan modified evolutionism and applied it in economic settings. Paying tribute to Spencer, Adams in his "Relation of the States to Industrial Action" exposed the fallacy of laissez-faire and underscored how financial regulation could "make up the artificial environment to which society in its development must conform."[41] Edwin G. Conklin even extended evolutionary principles to spiritual spheres and invented a "religion of evolution" to sanctify such concepts as race and species. The religion of progress was fashioned into the religion of evolution.[42] Now as Social Darwinism and theology was being successfully reformed, Rauschenbusch envisioned the point had arrived "where we can make history make us."[43]

The synergy between the rise of liberalism and Charles Darwin's theory of evolution in the Old World that undergirded the Social Gospel continued to entice American reformers with glimpses of the transformational power of science. Walter Rauschenbusch decided to visit Europe.[44] Cruises to Europe became a fad in the United States during the Reconstruction Era. American intellectuals saw their European cousins as more than just reliable trading partners, but increasingly as Athena possessing the most advanced political ideals and technologies that they sought to emulate.[45] Admittedly, without the introduction of the meritocratic system and cutting-edge techniques from the

39 Leonard, "Religion and Evolution in Progressive Era Political Economy," 441.

40 Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (New York: MacMillan, 1907), 275.

41 Henry Carter Adams, "Relation of the State to Industrial Action," *American Economic Association* 1, no. 6 (1887): 8.

42 Leonard, "Religion and Evolution in Progressive Era Political Economy," 461.

43 Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order*, 41.

44 Donovan Smucker, *Origins of Walter Rauschenbusch's Social Ethics* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's Press, 1994), 122.

45 James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American thought 1870–1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3, 224.

Old World, the implementation of social reforms in the United States would likely be trapped in logistical quagmire.

Europe served as a prime laboratory for innovative strategy and tactics essential to progressive social reforms across the Atlantic Ocean. It is therefore not surprising that European languages gained steady popularity among inquisitive American undergraduates and junior researchers. Augusta Wagner, an economic instructor at Yenching University learnt French and Spanish at Wellesley College.[46] Alice Boring learnt German at Bryn Mawr College and was a Mary E. Garrett European Fellowship recipient. Prior to joining Yenching University biology faculty, she travelled to the University of Würzburg in Germany, where she benefited a great deal from her apprenticeship under world-renowned professor Theodor Boveri in expanding Darwin's theory. This overseas learning experience convinced Alice that genetics would promote agricultural and medical development.[47] David Hollinger argues that sufficient exposure to another culture challenges one's provincial faith. For American youth already disposed towards technocracy, the experience of studying in Europe reinforced their commitment to the centrality of science.

As Charles Jefferson preached in a sermon, while "man is the King of the earth," his power lies in "scientific research" rather than in faith.[48] 'Intellectual gospel' is arguably a more appropriate term than social gospel to describe the spiritual view of enterprising students like Alice Boring and Christian activists like Rauschenbusch. Trusting that others would follow Protestant ethics to practice love and justice, this well-educated branch of social gospel advocates foregrounded the significance of science and the transformative power of reason.[49] The breeze of liberalism blown from Europe awakened an intellectual seed under the fertile soil of American modernity. It was an approach to religion that commanded reverence and awe for science.[50] It was intellectual efforts that utilized scientific knowledge to improve industrial productivity,

46 Augusta Wagner, *Augusta Wagner File,* 1924, Special Collections, Wellesley College (Wellesley, MA).

47 Ogilvie and Choquette, *A Dame Full of Vim and Vigor*, 18–20.

48 Susan Curtis, *A Consuming Faith: The Social Gospel and Modern American Culture* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991), 274.

49 Hollinger, *After Cloven Tongues of Fires,* 97. For analyses regarding the contribution of the working class to Social Gospel, see Heath W. Carter, *Union Made: Working People and the Rise of Social Christianity in Chicago* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

50 David Hollinger, "Justification by Verification: The Scientific Challenge to the Moral Authority of Christianity in Modern America., in *Religion and Twentieth Century American Intellectual Life,* ed. Michael J. Lace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 124–25.

and it was a Protestant moral idealism that ensured there would be no abuse of power in industrial relations. The powerful combination of the Gospel and intellectuality, borne along by the current trends of the era, propelled the United States towards the zenith of the progressive movement, the heyday of reformed capitalist expansion,[51] and in the eyes of Christian intellectuals, the coming of God's kingdom on earth.

The Student Volunteer Movement and Yenching Educational Missionaries

Rauschenbusch was far from contented. "Our own country has lagged a generation behind."[52] He lamented after his European trip over America's need to catch up, begging for the attention of intellectuals. Nevertheless, this crisis-driven psychology does not necessarily suggest that this generation had forsaken John Winthrop's ambition to make the United States "a City upon a Hill." Inferior in terms of historical heritage, Uncle Sam longed to demonstrate his exceptional ability to lead the world. Unlike their British counterparts with a gigantic empire on which the sun never set and peripheral rebellions rarely ceased, American intellectual leaders were tantalized to create a notion of shepherding the world with soft power, "a moral equivalent for imperialism,"[53] a magnetic force that attracts the rest of the world to follow voluntarily.

To that end, Americans adopted a new missionary strategy. A returned missionary from India named W.M. Forrest alerted young missionary leaders at the Student Convention of 1906 that "No Church can succeed anywhere in any land simply by contenting itself with reaching the lowest classes." Differentiating his unique missionary blueprint from the bottom-up approach of the China Inland Mission and the top-down model designed by early Italian Catholic missionaries, Forrest clarified that "in order to make a whole land Christian, if it begins at the bottom it must take of the ablest of that lower stratum and develop from them a thinking class, a class of leaders."[54] With the

51 For discussions on Progressive leaders' attempt to restore the agrarian tradition of America, see Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* (Northampton: John Dickens & Co., 1968), 144–45.

52 Rauschenbusch, *Christianizing the Social Order,* 8.

53 William Hutchison, *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 124.

54 Clifton Philips, "The Student Volunteer Movement and its Role in China Missions, 1886–1920," in *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America,* ed. John Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 105.

'intellectual gospel,' reformed elitism dominated the worldview of American intelligentsia. Young minds in heathen lands were believed to be more responsive to scientific knowledge that could dramatically improve their lives, and that very knowledge was precisely a form of liberal Christianity promoted by many American intellectuals. It was time for the United States to reach out for the relay stick passed on by Europe, to convert heathens into flexible thinkers by introducing a new power structure based on Western knowledge. Seasoned scholars in this structure not only championed rituals of truth but also showed technically less sophisticated people the attainability of truth, giving them an incentive to explore the unknown, which avoided accusations of paternalistic philanthropy and contributed to the perpetuation of technocracy. The underlying rationale bears much similarity to what evangelical missionaries often told potential converts: "For everyone who asks receives; the one who seeks finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be open."

The export of technocracy required brainpower. Americans institutionalized the Student Volunteer Movement (SVM) in 1888 and recruited student volunteer missionaries on their own. In parallel with the Social Gospel Movement, SVM activists took a centrist missionary stance to make inter-denominational collaboration possible. The slogan of SVM "The Evangelization of the World"[55] was likely designed to be motivating yet ambiguous. Evangelization in their view might not be confined to Christian conversion. Rather the work of missionaries could be re-defined in terms of the broader spectrum of progressive development. To recruit missionaries capable of reforming societies abroad, preferences were given to students who planned to complete the four-year college education and earn a Bachelor's degree. Theological or spiritual tests were regarded as redundant, even detrimental to denominational unification and rational administration of the SVM, which prided itself on being more distinguished than sporadic disorganized missionary movements in Europe. Missionary leanings towards social and intellectual gospel were palpable among college students. The slogan of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA, SVM's long-term recruitment partner) read "National Salvation through Men of Character," reflecting the shift towards political engagement for student missionary work.[56] Pearl Buck, a Pulitzer Prize winner and daughter of two China missionaries, openly showed her distaste for conventional missionary work, an attitude shared by most of her contemporaries. Buck professed that she was "weary unto death with this incessant preaching" and that a missionary should strive to alleviate the suffering of local communities in the non-Western world.

55 Ibid., 92.

56 Xi, *The Conversion of Missionaries,* 155.

"Preaching would be his last task."[57] Albeit widely known as Fundamentalist, Robert E. Speer, secretary of the American Presbyterian Mission that employed Pearl Buck demonstrated remarkable ability in maintaining a moderate posture. Instead of criticizing Buck's critical views on Christian mission, Speer tactfully supported her position.

In fact, Speer's daughter Margaret, a graduate of Bryn Mawr College was a staunch proponent of the intellectual gospel. In a letter to her family on September 25, 1925 when working at Yenching University, she affirmed that she was not going to "substitute Western religious superstitions for Chinese superstitions."[58] For Margaret, the Fundamentalist awareness of an omnipotent and infallible God was akin to numerous little gods in Chinese folk religions, interchangeable with backwardness and anti-intellectualism that should be discarded like a piece of trash in human civilization. Less radical than Margaret, Grace Boynton, a Wellesley woman who later taught English literature at Yenching, wrote to ABCFM when applying for mission service abroad: "Non-Christian religions…are the repositories of much truth and are to be respected and honored as far as they display idealism and mobility."[59] Likewise, Robert Brank Fulton, a graduate of Yale University and Union Theological Seminary invited by John Leighton Stuart to work as a temporary advisor for Yenching Christian Fellowship in 1939 manifested his belief in liberal Christianity in an interview, refusing to label Karl Marx and Frederick Engles "atheists." He cast doubt on the connotation of the word and contended: "If it is anyone who has a different concept of God than I have or you have, a lot of other people are "atheists."

His favorable view of socialism was partly attributed to Reinhold Niebuhr, professor of Ethics and a neo-orthodox theologian at Union Theological Seminary who asked students to read the *Communist Manifesto* and *Das Kapital* before making a judgment. Robert was fascinated by the resonances he perceived between *Das Kapital* and the writings of Amos, Isaiah and Micah in the Bible, in their "passionate denunciations of oppression." The socialists' conviction in the meaning of the universe, the value of individuals and "the possibility of progress" made Marxism "a semi-religious movement," Robert concluded. Profoundly interested in the topic, he entitled his graduation thesis "A Christian Critique of the Marxist Approach to the Problem of Social Change." Robert's liberal upbringing also contributed to his intellectual open-mindedness.

57 Hutchison, *Errand to the World*, 168.

58 Margaret Speer, *Letter to Family, 20 December 1925,* Speer Family Papers, Bryn Mawr College Special Collections, Bryn Mawr College (Bryn Mawr, PA).

59 "ABCFM Candidate Files," Houghton Library, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA).

Robert never felt uncomfortable when scientific and historical knowledge did not seem to correspond to his faith, because his father taught him "there was only one truth and that was from God, but there could be differences in regard to how people interpreted the truth."[60]

Pamela Klassen contends in *Spirits of Protestantism* that liberal Protestant missionaries from North America, aware of the perils of racial arrogance, attempted to reconcile naturalistic science with the supernatural, as evidenced by their practice of spiritual healing in mission fields that combined non-Western mysticism such as Yoga and Reiki with liturgical experience. However, they "eventually came to see the deep ironies of how their own projects of healing were complicit with the evils they sought to exorcise."[61] In comparison, whilst Yenching educational missionaries advocated cultural relativism and the universality of spirituality, they did not go the extra mile to reserve a special place for the supernatural for fear of superstitions. Religion for them most likely served as a cultural and moral background, a blank canvas to which scientific thoughts and knowledge gave meaning. Even though the intellectual gospelers' customary use of biblical language indicated their familiarity with Protestant values, these Christian rhetorics accorded well with rationality and at times pointed to the sacredness of science. When Grace Boynton, upon arrival in Peking, met a Chinese young man named Hsiu-Shu who wore "enormous long" finger nails and made his brother jealous, she judged them "villainously dirty" and Hsiu-Shu a "small sinner" in her diary, playing the role of God's spokeswoman.[62] From the perspective of an intellectual gospeler, filthiness was not only a state of body, but also a state of soul, an indication of spiritual degeneration, for it touched upon the dismissal of germ theory, a disrespect of science, intruding into the very essence of the gospel of intellectuality.

Evading theological schism and stressing instead social reforms, the SVM provided good opportunities for ambitious men and women at home armed with the 'intellectual gospel' to release their idealistic energies. Alice Boring, before teaching at Yenching University, worked at Peking Union Medical College in China and later at Wellesley College in America. Grumbling that

60 Robert Brank Fulton, interviewed by Jane Baker Koons, 1979, in Clemens, M. Granskou, "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project," A typed transcript of tape-recorded interviews, Midwest China Oral History and Archives Collection, Luther Seminary (St. Paul, MN), 37–39, 1–4.

61 Pamela Klassen, *Spirits of Protestantism: Medicine, Healing, and Liberal Christianity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), xii.

62 Grace Boynton, Yenchao Diary, 9 Nov. 1925, Grace Morrison Boynton Papers 1925–1951, Arthur and Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA).

science was "downtrodden by the Humanities" at Wellesley, Alice found her colleagues unenthusiastic about the biology project that she initiated. Most disappointing of all was the academic performance of Wellesley students who lacked motivation and were complacent with just a mediocre score. Alice suspected that most Wellesley girls muddled along till they got married. Chinese students by contrast were much more industrious and set clear goals for their professional development. When working in China, Alice felt her work was appreciated and her talents utilized at full capacity whereas in the States, she felt nobody cared about her, partly because she was a woman, partly because of the still conservative atmosphere in a liberal arts college lacking due respect for science. Alice had an intense desire to go back to China to teach. Thanks to the Wellesley-Yenching program produced at the height of the SVM, Alice was able to revisit China.[63]

However, most student missionary volunteers were not as fortunate to have work experience both at home and overseas as was Alice. Letters and brochures written by missionaries in China therefore served as a vital lens through which American students could remotely learn about this ancient country. To highlight the unparalleled success of these printed materials in invigorating college students in the United States, I borrow Mary Louise Pratt's term the "contact zone" as a way of conceptualizing such cross-cultural encounters that set the tone for future interactions between American educational missionaries and the Chinese. Although in Pratt's *Imperial Eyes*, the term refers to the colonial frontier "where subjects previously separated by geography and history are co-present,"[64] the "contact zone" I use here is not about physical space, for interactions between American faculty and Chinese students did not take place merely at Yenching. What I draw attention to in this section is the understanding of missionary writings as a form of engagement that transformed American colleges influenced by the SVM into a contact zone where the construction of knowledge about China was assimilated into the American metanarrative for Europe and the world.

For example, a pamphlet called the *Book of Peking* was published anonymously in 1924. Presumably, several Yenching missionaries wrote it, for one core aim set out in its preface was to bring American readers in touch with "a great Christian University" which will "prove one of America's greatest gifts to Asia and to the world."[65] At the very beginning of the book, the author(s)

63 Ogilvie and Choquette, *A Dame Full of Vim and Vigor,* 45.

64 Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London: Routledge, 2008), 8.

65 *Book of Peking* (Ithaca: Cornell University Library, 1924), 3.

quoted John Dewey's remark on "the transformation of the mind of China" as "the real problem of the Pacific." The seemingly imperialistic suggestion offered by Dewey was to remake China "into the new form required by the impact of immense alien forces."[66] In light of Dewey's commitment to Social Gospel and empirical faith, it is apparent that the pamphlet targeted a liberal audience who at least had no objection to theological modernism. While some might argue that Dewey's words also manifested a sort of practical expansionism and imperialist arrogance, it is equally essential to think of the citation from an intellectual gospel reader's perspective. The "immense alien forces" may not necessarily be violent or intrusive, but could function as a benevolent and generous "gift" as well. Hence the intention here was to ignite the passion of well-educated young elites to join this momentous humanitarian movement by portraying China as a promising country, yet in need of intellectual awakening.

The entire *Book of Peking* was permeated by this kind of rhetoric as the author(s) aimed to lend a delicate air to this exotic land. When introducing historic sites such as the Temple of Heaven, considerable emphasis is placed on the artistic value of chinoiserie. The "rich restrained blue" tiles of the Temple were associated with "the deep azure of skies." To enhance the credibility of the pamphlet, the book introduced "a professor of architecture" in one of the top universities in America claiming that "no city in the world…can compare with Peking in plan and stateliness of design."[67] In a similar vein, the Altar of Heaven near the Temple was described as "one of the three great places of worship of the world" on par with Jerusalem and Mecca—places much more familiar to the American audience. The Chinese emperor's annual sacrifice on the Altar was comparable with the Jewish offering ritual, and predominant populations in China groundlessly presented as being Christianized.[68] Most intriguing of all was naming Kalgan, to which the Great Wall stretches, the "coming Kansas City of the Far East."[69] The delineation of a homelike city dispelled young Americans' apprehension of the savage other. Panegyric on the pristineness of Peking resembled old tales of America's untouched wilderness, a space to be cherished, enshrined, and sublimated in the same process of redeeming Native Americans from their backwardness. Another noteworthy feature in the book was the parallel drawn between the democratization of the United States and that of China. China's speedy achievements of constitutional liberty which

66 Ibid., 5.
67 Ibid., 13.
68 Ibid., 12.
69 Ibid., 6.

"meet the needs of the modern day" was compared with America's bumpy road to national freedom and the emancipation of slaves that took decades. The author(s) highlighted that "the great student body at Peking" in particular "have inspired the whole nation with hope and energy and constantly rising courage" by rallying the other classes such as merchants and farmers. "In no other country in the world have the intellectuals such a chance to lead." American educational inputs in this country thus seemed crucial. Missionaries of Yenching "at the heart of the East" were depicted as contributing to "careful, fearless, enthusiastic but well-balanced leadership" of a commendable kingdom that would make a substantial difference in the world.[70]

American educational missionaries defended students' involvement in communist activities that were outlawed by the Kuomintang government. Randolph Sailer, a psychology professor at Yenching admitted that Yenching faculty members including British educational missionaries like Ralph Lapwood and some of the Chinese faculty were naturally "drawn to radical students" who showed deep concern for social issues such as poverty. Randolph even hid "a big suitcase" of communist literature for students.[71] For Randolph, communism achieved what Yenching had been striving to do, which was to change the Chinese literati's attitudes towards social service. Previously, manual labor was discarded as the job of janitors and coolies. Yet motivated by communism, Yenching students no longer whined about doing physical work.[72]

Aside from political engagement that connected students to the working class, Yenching favored the idea of national salvation through scientific modernity.

As early as 1923, Yenching pioneered the department of home economics among higher education institutions in China and welcomed its first female students.[73] The founder of the department Ava Milam was an expert in food science. Her goal was to encourage Yenching girls to embrace a grand vision of raising the quality of meals in China for all social classes, upper and lower. Students experimented in Yenching practice house and kitchens on different

70 Ibid., 13.

71 Randolph Sailer, interviewed by Jane Baker Koons, 1980, in Clemens, M. Granskou, "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project," A typed transcript of tape-recorded interviews, Midwest China Oral History and Archives Collection, Luther Seminary (St. Paul, MN), 42–44.

72 Sailer, "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project," 38–39.

73 Helen M. Schneider, "Raising the Standards of Family Life: Ginling Women's College and Christian Social Service in Republican China," in *Divine Domesticities: Christian Paradoxes in Asia and the Pacific,* eds. Hyaeweol Choi and Margaret Jolly (Canberra: The Australian National University Press, 2014), 118.

types of food with a wide price range. Wotou bread made from corn flour, stereotyped as food for coolies, was found nutritious by Yenching students and soon entered into the menu of the Residence Halls for Women. Likewise, after numerous experiments, soymilk added with bonemeal was sent to a refugee camp nearby. Ava encouraged undergraduate girls to pursue a postgraduate degree in home economics or nutrition science in the United States on International Friendship Scholarships worth $500 per annum sponsored by Oregon University and the American Home Economics Association. Thanks to Ava's efforts, from 1924 till 1949, Chinese women accounted for the largest share among international students majoring home economics in the US These professional women returned to China after graduation and taught in government universities such as Northeast University and Zhejiang University as well as Christian institutions including Lingnan, Hua'nan and Ginling Women's College that were modeled on Yenching and launched their home economics programs in the 1930s one after another.[74]

Patrick Harries and David Maxwell's *The Spiritual in the Secular* showcases the image of missionaries as evangelical scientists who transferred the knowledge from the periphery areas to the metropole while remaining loyal to their missional duty.[75] Efforts toward modernization were thus portrayed as a necessary step to spiritual salvation. An ample supply of information maximizing benefits of going to China obtained via the contact zone of her alma mater Wellesley College during the SVM ignited Grace Boynton's passion to carry out educational missionary work at Yenching. Apart from stating in the application that her motive was "to do the will of Christ," Grace hoped to satisfy her "personal need of an engrossing life activity."[76] By the same token, the holiness of serving abroad conveyed through missionary writings was powerful enough to inspire Luella Miner in the contact zone of Oberlin College where she did her undergraduate studies. In a letter to her father, Luella was determined to pay her debt to her education as well as to her father by "making it count" for as much as she can in the world.[77]

Different from Grace and Luella, sons and daughters of American missionaries, usually haunted by their unpleasant childhood experience of conducting evangelical trips with parents, tended to harbor even stronger aversion to

74 Schneider, "Raising the Standards of Family Life," 132–42.

75 Patrick Harries and David Maxwell, eds., *The Spiritual in the Secular: Missionaries and Knowledge about Africa* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012), 27.

76 "ABCFM Candidate Files."

77 Jane Hunter, *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 35–36.

Christian conversion overseas. John Leighton Stuart, president of Yenching University recollected incredulous stares from Chinese listeners when he recounted his youth following his missionary father preaching on the streets. Seeing his father bombarded with questions from the crowd, Stuart Jr. sensitively perceived this as a Chinese collective revulsion against Christianity and felt his fragile dignity disintegrate. Instead of speaking up for his father, Stuart Jr. found it difficult to identify with his father's cause in the name of God that elicited constant animosity in rural China.[78]

Having spent most of his time with Chinese *amahs*, John Leighton Stuart, like many second-generation missionaries, spoke better Chinese than English, grew more accustomed to rickshaws than carriages, resonated more closely with Chinese traditions than American values, and naturally desired to conform to Chinese social norms. For Stuart already suffering from social exclusion because of his Western appearance, what is the point of making more enemies by imposing a Western God upon the Chinese? In his early twenties, Stuart completed his undergraduate education at Hampden-Sydney College in the United States. He enjoyed life immensely in Virginia where he created lifelong camaraderie with several college students. No one there scrutinized him the way people did in China. When continuing his studies at Union Theological Seminary, Stuart, however, vacillated about whether to return to China as a missionary.

Though he disapproved of his father's missionary strategy, Stuart, as the president of a student organization had to work with Arthur Ewing, traveling secretary of the SVM for the missionary campaign. As a son of missionaries, Stuart was under tremendous pressure, not from parents, but from the school, or at least his good conscience to carry on the family tradition. Stuart wrote in his memoir that he "restlessly" "tossed in bed" contemplating whether he could honestly call himself a Christian and whether he was willing to live a God-oriented life. Eventually Stuart decided to put his faith to "the ultimate test" and signed up for the mission to China.[79] Different from his peers who were cognizant of what they were going to contribute, Stuart appeared to be more imperturbable and judicious. Without a definite aim, Stuart viewed the mission as a trial and error adventure rather than harboring intellectual fantasies of recreating a more enlightened China.

---

78 John Leighton Stuart, *Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart Missionary and Ambassador* (New York: Random House, 1954), 16. For discussion on American second-generation missionaries, see also: Sarah R. Mason, *Missionary Conscience and the Comprehension of Imperialism: A Study of the Children of American Missionaries to China, 1900–1949* (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1978).

79 Ibid., 29.

Second-generation missionaries formed their own coterie. John Leighton Stuart invited in person Randolph Sailer, a 'second-generation' missionary to join the Yenching faculty, asking him to prepare for courses in psychology. Randolph's father was not a foreign missionary, but he often envisioned himself serving in Chinese missions. As "the only son of a widowed mother," his father could not attend missionary programs overseas and committed instead to missionary education in the United States. Randolph's father, instilled with pragmatism, regarded classical liberal arts education to be of little use and therefore sent Randolph to Teachers College to receive practical training as well as to earn a "routine" master's degree.

Similar to Stuart's experience, Randolph was unhappy about his father's self-assertive attitude. The dichotomy between good and evil, the meaningful and the meaningless from Randolph's point of view was not always essentially constructed. Randolph often reacted against his impatience and ill temper. Nonetheless, under the influence of their petulant father, Randolph and his older sister Josephine decided to fulfill their father's missionary dream.[80] The concordant social and religious outlook brought Randolph and John Leighton Stuart closer, which set a liberal tone on campus. In 1924, Yenching gave up required chapel attendance and Bible study, dedicating itself entirely to the spread of intellectual gospel.[81]

Advancing Secular Knowledge: Yenching University and the Rockefeller Foundation

Through all this, the strong links between Yenching University and the Rockefeller Foundation are important to bear in mind. Gates, a Baptist minister in charge of the Foundation believed that the global expansion of missionary enterprises would be "immensely profitable." With penetrating insight and a commitment to the ideology of free trade, Gates pointed out in a letter to Rockefeller that "imports from heathen lands furnish us cheaply with many of the luxuries of life" that now are regarded as "necessities." Whoever controls countries like China will hold the lifeline of the US economy. In January 1914, at a Rockefeller Foundation in-house conference, James H. Franklin of the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society proposed in detail an education program "of the proper kind" to train "Chinese leaders who will do the things we have done so long for China" and most importantly, "who will do the things

80 Sailer, "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project," 2–4.

81 Ibid., 8.

we wish to see done." Rockefeller decided to invest in Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) by establishing China Medical Board as a subsidiary organization of the Foundation to underwrite the school in the early 1920s.[82] Similar to SVM, the Medical Board of the Foundation recruited qualified teachers with no religious requirements. Alice Boring for instance, who harbored personal antagonism towards missionaries, was able to work in China at PUMC premedical school shortly after graduation owing to the Board's non-religious criteria.

Anna Marie, a Yenching missionary was not pleased with the mercantile motive of PUMC teaching staff, believing that doctors came to PUMC "for high priced trade" instead of doing pioneer work. The modernity promoted by PUMC that colluded with imperialism was not what Yenching intellectual gospelers pursued. Nevertheless, Anna sensed that if missionary institutions like Yenching refused to link up, "it will seem as if they are going to come trailing along doing inferior work."[83] In 1921, China Medical Board of the Foundation transferred the PUMC premedical program and faculty members to Yenching University, together with a grant worth 250,000 dollars for the division of natural sciences.[84]

The influx of irreligious professors from PUMC accelerated secularization of the Christian college. Yenching treated the faculty affiliated with PUMC well. Though Alice Boring came to Yenching via the Wellesley-Yenching program, her connection with PUMC gave her an advantage in heading the Yenching biology department.[85] Student applicants from PUMC were also viewed favorably. Since the 1930s, over fifty percent of PUMC's graduates were admitted to Yenching. One of the most profound impacts PUMC exerted on Yenching was its contribution to the internationalization of Yenching education. Under the insistence of PUMC, English was used as a medium of instruction in lieu of Chinese so that the latest scientific knowledge and techniques could be imported from the west without delay.[86]

With a sweeping ambition to expand the Yenching science program, the China Medical Board requested Yenching President John Leighton Stuart to raise an equivalent amount of 250, 000 dollars elsewhere. Stuart eventually

82 Arnove, *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*, 127–32.

83 Anna Marie Lane, *Letter to Friends, 5 July 1919,* Anna and Stanley Wilson Papers, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School (New Haven, CT).

84 Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, "Yenching University and Sino-American Interactions, 1919–1952," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 14 (2007): 23.

85 Ogilvie and Choquette, *A Dame Full of Vim and Vigor,* 50–54.

86 Mary Brow Bullock, *An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 114–15.

found a Chinese banker willing to match the Rockefeller grant on condition that the grant be deposited in his bank. The banker promised to return all the money once the amount of interest generated by the deposit reached 250, 000 dollars. The China Medical Board however, considered the deal invalid and withdrew its grant, which piqued Stuart.[87] Without stable financial aid funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, Stuart resolved to build up a first class science program on his own at the cost of other departments, especially the School of Religion. Dr. T.C. Chao, head of Yenching School of Religion in a letter to Stuart indicated his misgivings about the disproportionately meager spending on the school, pressurizing it to be financially independent from the university, believing that, "it will be in a very precarious position."[88] Stuart's financial decision attested to the triumph of the 'intellectual gospel' facilitated by Yenching's dynamic relations with the Rockefeller Foundation.

Conclusion

American faculty members at Yenching University were shaped by their times. Born of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, a crucial historical period where regional peace and global war coexisted, where strikes for higher pay and monopolists' celebrations of wealth took place, where some children were sent to factories and others to schools, American Protestants began to question the progressiveness of modernization and to look for a practical Christianity to ease class tensions. The Social Gospel was created from the belief that humans have the capacity to perfect society, to establish God's harmonious and prosperous Kingdom on earth. For ambitious university students in the US, love and justice alone was inadequate for the accomplishment of this ideal without the indispensable assistance of knowledge. The introduction of liberalism and science from Europe boosted confidence in the conquest of nature, nourished a sort of 'whiggish' optimism about future life and triggered the desire to create a gospel of intellectuality that departed from Christian teachings, albeit with some remaining aura of religiosity. Though social and intellectual gospel were a derivative of the European Enlightenment tradition rather than, strictly speaking, a home-grown one, the United States was unrivalled in popularizing among the haut monde the concept of Protestant activism epitomized by the

87 Yu-ming Shaw, *An American Missionary in China: John Leighton Stuart and Chinese-American Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1992), 66–67.

88 T.C. Chao, 赵紫宸, *Letter to John Leighton Stuart, 5 March. 1931*. Andover-Harvard Theological Library Manuscripts and Archives, Harvard Divinity School (Cambridge, MA).

"Good Samaritan," making the boundaries between secular affairs and spirituality porous. Such blurred distinctions evolved into acquiescence to pluralist hermeneutics of faith in the name of ecumenism in American missiology, which differed from a predominantly Christ-centered approach adopted by French Catholic missionaries and British contemporaries.

The SVM offered prospective missionaries opportunities to transform the explosive strength of spirituality to autonomous initiatives in helping the non-Western world achieve modernization through scientific explorations. Energized by the movement, American educational missionaries to Yenching set the goal to disseminate the 'intellectual gospel' that served the Chinese intelligentsia's ultimate aim of national salvation. Additionally, the educational investment of Rockefeller Foundation in China further stimulated the aspiration of Yenching to lead the country by prioritizing its science program. Yenching even became a harbor for European intellectuals who were sidelined by their home mission boards because of their controversial theological stance. The dynamic, all-embracing atmosphere of Yenching engendered by the sanctification of knowledge as a substitute for established forms of Christian theology was not a singular phenomenon. It could be found in almost all Christian colleges established by American missionaries throughout China as well as the Middle East during this period.[89]

Yenching educational missionaries should be understood as actors between two worlds that constantly wrestled with the balance between an instinct to impose American configurations on the unenlightened masses in China and an understanding of the limitations of Western models of social development. Yenching educational missionaries endeavored to prevent their ivory tower from being contaminated by sybaritic life styles, degenerated morality and philistine mentalities that accompanied industrialization in the West. Yet like faculty members of other Christian colleges in China such as Lingnan University, they inadvertently helped cultivate a group of compradors, who by virtue of their English skills acquired at school acted as agents for foreign enterprises, selling compatriots goods sometimes deemed representative of the evils of capitalism. The circulation, indoctrination and exportation of the intellectual gospel are to be considered as closely connected with transcendental experiences, oriented toward a global surge of faith in scientific humanism, somewhat discordant with the master narrative of imperial coercion in the history of Christian mission in Asia.

89 Mark Amstutz, *Evangelicals and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 55–56.

Asymmetrical interactions between Yenching faculty and the Chinese did however create a sort of historical dependence and subordination, fostering among the benefactors a smug sense of achievement. Yenching missionaries were proud of their pioneering educational work, which they believed would exert a huge impact on this chaotic society in transition; perhaps more importantly and inconspicuously if somewhat ironically, they prided themselves on their non-chauvinistic attitudes, the willingness to engage with a community drastically different from their own. The unconscious air of superiority Yenching missionaries assumed in the popularization of their doctrines was to a certain extent a sham: not necessarily racist, but a self-reward for the sacrifices they made. It constituted a pseudo-imperialism different from cultural imperialism prevalent in the American-controlled Philippines where proposals for indigenous organizations were taken as a warning sign on grounds of the inability of the locals to be independent.[90] The story of Yenching educational missionaries has a metaphorical connotation. It is a testimony to a richly interwoven web of the 20th century that connects religion with science, personal sentiments with multicultural social ethos, national development with global competitions.

Bibliography

"ABCFM Candidate Files." Houghton Library, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA).

Adams, Henry Carter. "Relation of the State to Industrial Action." *American Economic Association* 1, no. 6 (1887): 7–85.

Amstutz, Mark. *Evangelicals and American Foreign Policy.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Arnove, Robert F. *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

Austin, Alvyn. *China's Millions: The China Inland Mission and Late Qing Society, 1832–1905.* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2007.

Barnett, Michael. *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Book of Peking. Ithaca: Cornell University Library, 1924.

Boring, Edwin. *A History of Psychology in Autobiography,* vol. 4. Worcester: Clark University Press, 1952.

90 Joseph McCallus, *The MacArthur Highway and Other Relics of American Empire in the Philippines* (Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2010), 76.

Boynton, Grace Morison. *Yenchao Diary, 9 November 1925.* Grace Morison Boynton Papers 1925–1951, Arthur and Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA).

Bullock, Mary Brow. *An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.

Carter, Heath W. *Union Made: Working People and the Rise of Social Christianity in Chicago.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Chao, T.C. 赵紫宸, *Letter to John Leighton Stuart, 5 March. 1931*. Andover-Harvard Theological Library Manuscripts and Archives, Harvard Divinity School (Cambridge, MA).

Cheney, Monona. *Diary of Monona Cheney's Voyage to China, 1919.* From Special Collections and University Archives, *Monona Cheney Papers, 1918–1932,* Ax 275, box 5, University of Oregon (Eugene, OR).

Curtis, Susan. *A Consuming Faith: The Social Gospel and Modern American Culture.* Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991.

Edwards, Rebecca. *New Spirits: Americans in the Gilded Age, 1865–1905.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Fulton, Robert Brank. Interview by Jane Baker Koons 1979, in Clemens M. Granskou, "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project," A typed transcript of tape-recorded interviews, Midwest China Oral History and Archives Collection, Luther Seminary (St. Paul, MN).

Harding, Susan. *The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Harries, Patrick, and David Maxwell, eds. *The Spiritual in the Secular: Missionaries and Knowledge about Africa.* Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012.

Hofstadter, Richard. *Social Darwinism in American Thought*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944.

Hofstadter, Richard. *Anti-intellectualism in American Life.* New York: Random House LLC, 1963.

Hofstadter, Richard. *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.* Northampton: John Dickens & Co., 1968.

Hollinger, David. "Justification by Verification: The Scientific Challenge to the Moral Authority of Christianity in Modern America." In *Religion and Twentieth Century American Intellectual Life,* edited by Michael J. Lace, 116–35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Hollinger, David. *After Cloven Tongues of Fires: Protestant Liberalism in Modern American History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Hunter, Jane. *The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

Hutchison, William. *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Klassen, Pamela. *Spirits of Protestantism: Medicine, Healing, and Liberal Christianity.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011.

Kloppenberg, James T. *Uncertain Victory Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American thought 1870–1920.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Lane, Anna Marie. *Letter to Friends, 5 July 1919.* Anna and Stanley Wilson Papers, Special Collections, Yale Divinity School (New Haven, CT).

Leonard, Thomas. "Religion and Evolution in Progressive Era Political Economy: Adversaries or Allies?" *History of Political Economy* 43.3 (2011): 429–69.

Mason, Sarah R. *Missionary Conscience and the Comprehension of Imperialism: A Study of the Children of American Missionaries to China, 1900–1949.* PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1978.

McCallus, Joseph. *The MacArthur Highway and Other Relics of American Empire in the Philippines.* Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2010.

Nugent, Walter. *Progressivism: A Very Short Introduction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Ogilvie, Marilyn Bailey, and Clifford J. Choquette. *A Dame Full of Vim and Vigor: A Biography of Alice Middleton Boring, Biologist in China*. London: Taylor & Francis, 1999.

Philips, Clifton. "The Student Volunteer Movement and its Role in China Missions, 1886–1920." In *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America,* edited by John Fairbank, 91–109. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Pratt, Mary Louise. *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation.* London: Routledge, 2008.

Rauschenbusch, Walter. *Christianity and the Social Crisis.* New York: MacMillan, 1907.

Rauschenbusch, Walter. *Christianizing the Social Order*. New York: Macmillan, 1913.

Rauschenbusch, Walter. *A Theology for the Social Gospel.* New York: MacMillan, 1917.

Reeves-Ellington, Barbara, Kathryn Kish Sklar and Connie A. Shemo, eds. *Competing Kingdoms: Women, Mission, Nation, and the American Protestant Empire, 1812–1960.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010.

Rodgers, Daniel T. "In Search of Progressivism." *Reviews in American History* 10, 4 (1982): 113–32.

Rosenbaum, Arthur Lewis. "Yenching University and Sino-American Interactions, 1919–1952." *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 14 (2007): 11–60.

Rosenbaum, Arthur Lewis. *New Perspectives on Yenching University, 1916–1952: A Liberal Education for a New China.* Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Sailer, Randolph Interview by Jane Baker Koons 1980, in Clemens, M. Granskou, "Midwest China Oral History and Archives Project." A typed transcript of tape-recorded interviews, Midwest China Oral History and Archives Collection, Luther Seminary (St. Paul, MN).

Samson, Gloria Garrett. *The American Fund for Public Service: Charles Garland and Radical Philanthropy, 1922–1941.* Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.

Sasaki-Gayle, Motoe. *Entangled with Empire: American Women and the Creation of the 'New Woman' in China, 1898–1937.* PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2009.

Schneider, Helen M. "The Professionalization of Chinese Domesticity: Ava B. Milam and Home Economics at Yenching University." In *China's Christian Colleges: Cross-cultural Connections, 1900–1950,* edited by Daniel H. Bays and Ellen Widmer, 125–46. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Schneider, Helen M. "Raising the Standards of Family Life: Ginling Women's College and Christian Social Service in Republican China." In *Divine Domesticities: Christian Paradoxes in Asia and the Pacific,* edited by Hyaeweol Choi and Margaret Jolly, 113–42. Canberra: The Australian National University Press, 2014.

Semple, Rhonda Anne. *Missionary Women: Gender, Professionalism, and the Victorian Idea of Christian Mission.* Rochester: Boydell Press, 2003.

Shaw, Yu-ming. *An American Missionary in China: John Leighton Stuart and Chinese-American Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1992.

Smucker, Donovan. *Origins of Walter Rauschenbusch's Social Ethics.* Quebec: McGill-Queen's Press, 1994.

Speer, Margaret. *Letter to Family, 20 December 1925.* Speer Family Papers. Bryn Mawr College Special Collections, Bryn Mawr College (Bryn Mawr, PA).

Stuart, John Leighton. *Fifty Years in China: The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart Missionary and Ambassador.* New York: Random House, 1954.

Szasz, Ferenc Morton. *The Divided Mind of Protestant America, 1880–1930.* Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982.

Törmä, Minna. *Enchanted by Lohans: Osvald Siren's Journey into Chinese Art.* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013.

Tyrrell, Ian. *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Wagner, Augusta. *Augusta Wagner File,* 1924. Special Collections, Wellesley College (Wellesley, MA).

Wattenberg, Ben. *The Statistical History of the United States: From Colonial Times to the Present.* New York: Basic Book, 1976.

Wiebe, Robert. *The Search for Order, 1877–1920.* New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.

Xi, Lian. *The Conversion of Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 1907–1932.* University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

"Yenching: No.1 Christian University in China Stands Amidst the Japanese Invaders with Steady Support of American Churches and College." *LIFE* 6.10, February 10, 1941.

CHAPTER 3

The Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, the Omi Mission, and Imperial Japan: Missionary Social Science and One Pre-History of Religion and Development

Gregory Vanderbilt

At the end of 1935, William Merrell Vories (1880–1964), an American missionary to Japan who was fairly mainstream in theological outlook but unusual in methodology, spoke in Indianapolis at one of the final conventions of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions (SVM).[1] Starting in 1886, this massive movement sent thousands of North American college graduates into missionary endeavors around the world under the watchword of the "evangelization of the world in this generation."[2] Thirty-four years earlier, at the SVM's Toronto assembly, Vories had experienced Christ's calling while listening to Geraldine Taylor of the China Inland Mission recount her story of surviving the Boxer Rebellion. Now, in a session on "The Christian Fellowship and Industrial Problems," Vories read a paper titled "The Omi Mission in Japan" discussing the independent organization he had helped found in Omi Hachiman, a small town in rural central Japan. The use of the name Omi Mission was anachronistic as the organization had been renamed the Omi Brotherhood (*Kyōdaisha*) in 1934 in an attempt to shed the negative overtones of the word 'Mission' (*misshon*) in Japan.

When Vories told the two thousand prospective student-volunteers representing 450 North American colleges that "the work should not be a foreign system foisted upon the native people, but cooperation with the people of another nationality in an international movement … it must be interdenominational; it must be self-supporting upon the field," he was using the language of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry (LFMI). Surprisingly, given that this

1 William Merrell Vories, "The Omi Mission in Japan," in *Students and the Christian World Mission: Report of the Twelfth Quadrennial Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions*, ed. Jesse R. Wilson (New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1936), 130–39. Vories had also expanded his missionary narrative *A Mustard Seed in Japan* (five editions, starting in 1911) into *The Omi Brotherhood in Nippon* (several editions, starting in 1934).

2 See Enyi Hu in this volume.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_004

was the first missions conference since the Inquiry's findings were published in 1932, this "lay" investigation and evaluation was little mentioned in the Indianapolis proceedings. This omission is especially notable because the final report and best-selling book entitled *Re-Thinking Missions: A Laymen's Inquiry After One Hundred Years*, along with the seven supplemental volumes of specialized, social-science based "fact-finders'" and "commission of appraisal" reports, spurred heated controversy by undermining simultaneously the theological imperatives and the technical expertise of missionaries.

Recalling his own experience, Vories spoke of "a new meaning of mission work" arguing that "being a missionary meant to take the thing personally, as a real relationship." In this, Vories' attempted to identify new ways of being a missionary in a world increasingly "rendered technical."[3] Vories offered the student-volunteers an example of a Japanese convert who had responded to a Christian way of life. In so doing, he highlighted both the gap between evangelical and ecumenical ways of understanding the Christian gospel (a tension on the mind of many at that conference) and between the promise of utopia and the force of expertise as expressed in a laymen's gospel of social science. Together with several of his students Vories had founded the Omi Mission only two years after his arrival in Japan in 1905 as a student-volunteer English teacher. The Mission was at once an alternate form of organization to the foreign-funded mission, a rural utopian experiment with urban networks and a successful enterprise that "evangelized" through "moral suasion" defined broadly to incorporate a sanatorium, a thriving architectural firm, and the marketing of the famous skin salve Mentholatum as well as through the more standard means of teaching and publishing.[4]

The story Vories told the student-volunteers was of a Tokyo University physics professor who came to the Omi Mission's architecture office, which served as both a source of financial support and a demonstration of a modern, healthy, and moral way of life for the Omi Mission, about plans for his Tokyo residence. The young professor was moved by such requirements as giving the

3 The term is Tania Li's. See Tania Murray Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

4 Gregory Vanderbilt, "'The Kingdom of God is Like a Mustard Seed': Evangelizing Modernity between the United States and Japan, 1905–1948" (PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2005); Gregory Vanderbilt, "'Smelling of Pickled Radish, not Butter': The Wartime Search for a Christianity Viable in Japan," in *Encountering Modernity: Christianity and East Asia*, eds. David Yoo and Albert Park. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), 130–39; "Moral suasion" is the translation offered by the historian Sheldon Garon for *kyōka*, a term which was part of the Mission's legal name at this time.

workers Sundays off, through which "we …demonstrate the principles of the kingdom of God."

> This erstwhile agnostic resigned from the Imperial University, sold his possessions, went into that country village, bought a farm, moved his family there, put on overalls instead of cap and gown, and began to give his whole life and use his whole resources to building up a branch of the Kingdom ("a second Omi Mission," he calls it) in that mountain fastness, among backward farmers…

Since the former academic took a library in five languages with him into the countryside, Vories added that "the only human likeness to it which I know of is Albert Schweitzer, that great European scholar who went to 'bury his life.'" But, he added, "the better pattern is Jesus Christ."[5]

As a way to one pre-history of the discourse on "religion and development," it should be noted at the outset, however, that neither term is a particularly salient part of the vocabulary of the period treated in this chapter, in which 'development' could point to the rise of industry, to the establishment of educational programs, or to the instilling of character, and 'religion' pointed back to regulation by the imperial state, characterized by both the quasi-religiious civic ideology focused on the Emperor and by the empire in Asia. This discussion returns to this moment in the early 1930s, to an episode at the end of the brief career of what might be called "missionary social science," a form of expertise grounded in the everyday and in mission networks of funding and reporting. Missionaries like Vories and their networks, including the missionary-academics who taught in the campuses he designed, had been the drivers of newly professionalized kinds of social inquiry as knowledge that was both secular and strategic for evangelization but they found their own competence evaluated against standards set by lay (though hardly secular) experts with business and scientific tools for evaluation. The professionalism of these new lay experts called into question the authority of missionaries, who had for some decades occupied positions supported and authorized by the churches

5 Vories, "The Omi Mission in Japan." Vories did not identify this physicist-convert either here or a decade later when he offered the same example to Robert Terrill Baker for his account of "the remnant" of Japanese Christians during the Second World War (1947), but he was most likely pointing to Suzuki Sukeyoshi (1899–1990), who, after this encounter with Vories, became a disciple of Uchimura Kanzō and founder of the Christian Independence High School (Kirisutokyō Dokuritsu Gakuen) in the Yamagata mountains. Suzuki offered a memoir of his admiration for Vories in "Merrell-sensei and I," reprinted in his 1979 collection *Shinri to Shinkō*, 627–31.

and their missionary agencies without question. A moment of diverging vocabularies such as this one cracks open not only the pre-suppositions of concepts that become naturalized, like the rendering technical of development, but also the ethical gaps behind the world they insert themselves into, a missionary sense of home and field, a modern Japan already both an empire and a "small country," and finally a Christianity without urgency.

The American missions world's senior statesmen John R. Mott and Robert Speer were both present in Indianapolis, as they had been at the preceding eleven SVM conferences spanning half a century, and, while the attendance of the conference was roughly the same of that for the 1902 Toronto assembly, the mood and tone of the discussions there were different. Such changes reflected the fact that far fewer attendees would actually go "to the field" than would have been the case three decades earlier. The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr told the assembled that "what our world is like is more obvious to us today than it was to the generation of students before us…" for the "false dream of the possibilities of a Christian nation, imagining that it would be an easy thing to achieve a Christian social order and a Christian world order…," was finally falling away before the harsh realities of human sin.[6] The celebrity Japanese Christian evangelist, writer, and social movement leader Kagawa Toyohiko was there to speak on "Christianity in Japan," declaring that Christianity had brought five things to his nation: "purity, the ideal of peace, spiritual blessings, respect for labor, and, more important than all the others, …the true spirit of personal piety to the Eternal God."[7]

Kagawa had become famous because he represented to a world audience the connection of modern social reform and the long-awaited Christianization of society. However, as the historian Sheldon Garon has argued, there were many Japanese Christians, including laymen like Namae Takayuki, who provided social scientific expertise to the government and helped it in its campaigns to change the behavior of the population, becoming, in Garon's phrase, "one of the best kept secrets in Japanese history."[8] In 1931, Namae had published his history of "Christian social work(s)" in Japan, positing a division at 1888—the twentieth year of the modern Meiji State but only the fifteenth since it

6 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Our World," in *Students and the Christian World Mission: Report of the Twelfth Quadrennial Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions*, ed. Jesse R. Wilson (New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1936), 7–14.

7 Toyohiko Kagawa, *A Significant Word from Asia,* introduction by Brenton Thoburn Badley. (Bombay: n.p., 1936), 121ff.

8 Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 20.

became legal to practice Christianity again—between the era of the missionaries and that of native leadership, mentioning the Omi Mission's tuberculosis sanatorium as an example of the latter.[9] Despite Kagawa's early celebrity and Japan's histories of "achieving" a rapid modernization over the latter half of the nineteenth century under the rubric of "civilization and enlightenment" (*bunmei kaika*)—followed by the imposition of its imperial ambitions on to others—and its history of subsequent high-speed economic growth within the context of the Cold War, Japan only became prominent in the discourse on development when it became an economic superpower under pressure to "give back" to the world, including formerly occupied territories. It has, moreover, never been known as a "successful" missionary field, as the numbers of church members remain famously miniscule (fewer than 1% of the population). Even Vories himself titled his own postwar memoir "Autobiography of a Failure." Yet, pre-Pacific War discourse on modernization and Christianity often cast Japan as a potential success in those terms, as somehow almost demonstrating Christianity or experiencing "penetration," if not conversion, by it. The arena was society, a space which expanded into possibility under certain conditions before being subsumed by the state in others.[10]

The Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry and Its Report

The publication of the report of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry in the fall of 1932 brought the entire American Protestant missionary enterprise in Asia into controversy. The Inquiry had set out not only to describe the state of missionary activity at the time, but also to evaluate its efficacy and to re-assess the theology undergirding the mission enterprise. The first four chapters of *Re-Thinking Missions* dealt with "General Principles," including an assessment of the global role of mission and discussion of the place of Christianity in relation with "other religions," "non-religion," and "the Orient." The chapters that followed included discussion of specific missional sectors (education, medicine, agriculture, etc.) along with specific recommendations of what needed to change.

---

9 Namae Takayuki, *Nihon Kirisutokyō Shakai Jigyōshi* (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta, 1996 [1931]).

10 This was a point I made in an earlier publication through analysis of the complex career of Kagawa: Gregory Vanderbilt, "Postwar Japanese Christian Historians, Democracy, and the Problem of the 'Emperor-System' State," in *Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict*, eds. Julius Bautista and Francis Lim Khek Gee. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 60–61.

The Inquiry had its origins three years earlier when a group of Baptists gathered with the most famous of Baptist laymen, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. They had also met with Mott—one of the most famous Protestant lay leaders of the day—who had just returned from a trip around the world during which he had presided over the 1928 Jerusalem meeting of the International Missionary Council, and commissioned Kagawa's Kingdom of God movement, a large-scale five-year evangelism campaign that followed Kagawa's being pushed out of the labor and other social movements. Mott, who had presided at every major missionary conference for nearly half a century, including the SVM assembly in Toronto in 1902 and the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910, gave an alarming report of conditions in the mission "field." In response, the Baptist laymen called for an investigation, to be joined by laity of other denominations: "We said, 'This must be a thorough-going, scientific thing. We must get the best data available.' We found ourselves in somewhat the same predicament in which a committee—a stockholders' committee—does which is asked to study the affairs of a corporation."[11]

With funding from Rockefeller and an advisory board from seven "mainline" denominations, the Inquiry dispatched a lay commission on a nine-month journey through India, China, and Japan. They set out from New York just as Japan expanded its control in China with the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 and they arrived back in Hawaii in June 1932. The group consisted of two professors of philosophy, two university presidents and one vice-president, two medical school deans, the pastor of a large New York City church, the head of an engineering firm, two businessmen, an agricultural economist, and a leader of the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), all from the Northeast and Midwest. Separate teams of expert "fact-finders" had been dispatched in the months prior to their visit.[12] Implicit in this vocabulary of fact-finding and

11 Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, "The Proceedings of the Meeting of the Directors and Sponsors of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry and Representatives of Foreign Missions Board," Unpublished Pamphlet. (n.p., 1932), 119.

12 Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, "The Proceedings of the Meeting," 2–3, 121. The commission's schedule is recounted in the foreword from William Ernest Hocking, *Re-Thinking Missions: A Laymen's Inquiry After One Hundred Years* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932), xii. Hocking was the chairman of the Commission of Appraisal. One missionary remembered forty years later that "in a word, the commissioners were snooty" and "they regarded missionaries as uncultured." He added "a story, well attested, that all the commissioners except two took cocktails—horrors—in their hotel before dinner." See Howard Norman, "Re-thinking Missions after Forty Years," *Japan Christian Quarterly* (Summer 1974), 162–63. Accounts of the LFMI can be found in: Timothy Yates, *Christian Mission in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1996, 70–93; William R. Hutchison, *Errand to the Word: American Protestant Thought and Foreign*

appraisal was a normative definition of lay-men: non-missionary and non-clerical (though several were, in fact, ordained) but educated and professional; objective and hence able to transcend expertise, as the named and Ph.D.-ed "fact-finders" were to precede the "committee of appraisal" which was to speak with one voice. Moreover, this category of laymen was understood as male, as twelve out of fifteen commissioners and all but two (of twenty-seven) "fact-finders" were men, and with "women's interests and distinctive activities" constituting a separate and final chapter in each volume.

Vories' fellow missionaries in Japan likely learned of the Inquiry from a letter and questionnaire sent from the Park Avenue offices of the Institute for Social and Religious Research (ISRR) on January 20, 1931, on the imposing letterhead of the Japan staff of the Fact Finding Commission. Also chaired by Mott and sponsored by Rockefeller, the ISRR was the independent agency that had conducted the Survey of Race Relations directed by the University of Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park in response to anti-Japanese racism on the West Coast, but the LFMI was to be its highest-budget project.[13] The executive secretary of the ISRR for nearly its entire thirteen-year history was Galen M. Fisher, previously a long-time worker at the Tokyo Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and old friend of Vories; he took the title "general director" of the "Fact-Finders," including regional research staffs for China, India and Burma, and Japan, as well as one for the "home base."[14] In the *Japan Christian Yearbook*, the annual English-language review of missions, H.H. Guy, the chief Fact-Finder for Japan, explained their charge "to bring the methods of social science to bear upon the solution of religious and socio-religious problems, and also to

Missions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 158–75; Gretchen Elisabeth Bogor, "American Protestantism in the Asian crucible, 1919–1939" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2008), 168–212; and David A. Hollinger, *Protestants Abroad: How Missionaries Tried to Change the World but Changed America* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017), pp. 69–81.

13 Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, "The Proceedings of the Meeting," 3. Although resonant in the value it placed on scientific expertise, these Rockefeller-funded endeavors had little connection to the Rockefeller Foundation founded by John D. Rockefeller, Sr., in 1913, and the ISRR was not included in, for example, the debates in the 1980s about the Foundation using sociology as a tool of cultural hegemony. For an overview of research carried on or sponsored by the Institute, written on its disbanding in 1934, see Galen M. Fisher, *The Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1921–1934* (Privately printed, 1934); and Gina A. Zurlo, "The Social Gospel, Ecumenical Movement and Christian Sociology: The Institute of Social and Religious Research," *American Sociologist* 46 (2015): 177–93. On the survey, see Henry Yu, *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

14 Fisher, "The Institute," x–xi.

promote cooperation among the Christian forces of the world" as well as to carry on a study "in a judicial, scientifically thorough, constructive and sympathetic manner."[15] The questionnaire the missionaries and other informants received asked them "how far are the missions exhibiting comprehensiveness in their work" in relation to a standard quoted from the 1928 Jerusalem meeting of the International Missionary Council:

> The one inclusive purpose of the missionary enterprise is to present Jesus Christ to men and women the world over as their Redeemer and to win them for entrance into the joy of his discipleship. In this endeavor, we realise that man is a unity, and that his spiritual life is indivisibly rooted in all his conditions, physical, mental, and social. We are therefore desirous that the program of missionary work among all peoples may be sufficiently comprehensive to serve the whole man in every aspect of his life and relationships.[16]

The Fact-Finders' research in turn drew explicitly on two institutions that were at the time producing what can be called missionary social science. Religion is seldom if ever mentioned in histories of the professionalization of social science, through what Richard Wightman Fox once called the "culture of liberal Protestant progressivism," which emerged from the Social Gospel and carried its own moral imperatives and exclusions in shaping the underpinnings of what Daniel Rodgers termed "an Atlantic Era in social politics."[17] This mood of reform can easily be read to include Imperial Japan as Kagawa and Namae and numerous others studied abroad and conducted social scientific experimentation almost simultaneously with their Euro-American counterparts.[18] Through the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR),

15 Harvey H. Guy, "Fact Finding Commission," *Japan Christian Yearbook* (1931): 343–47.

16 International Missionary Council. *The Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council, March 24-April 8, 1928*. Vol. 6. New York: International Missionary Council, 1928, 245.

17 Richard Wightman Fox, "The Culture of Liberal Protestant Progressivism, 1875–1925," *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 23:3 (1993): 639–60; Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998). Missions and missionaries, however, go unmentioned in Rodgers's book and in Theodore M. Porter and Dorothy Ross, eds. *The Cambridge History of Science*. Vol. 7. The Cambridge History of Science. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), except as a source in anthropology.

18 The first professional academic anthropologist would not begin ethnographical fieldwork in Japan until 1935.

twenty-one experts, most of whom (like Namae and Kagawa, who were among them) were Christian and many familiar as members of the establishment of Protestant social reformers, were commissioned to write reports on "the influence of Christianity on" topics ranging from Buddhism to social welfare and temperance "in our Country."[19] Although its overt missionary thrust quickly waned, the IPR emerged within the YMCAs of the Pacific region against the background of anti-Japanese racism on the West Coast. Vories' Japanese wife, an expert in early childhood education, was a delegate to the IPR's inaugural assembly held in July 1925 in Honolulu and he accompanied her as an associate member, writing in *Voice at the Lakeside* (*Kohan no Koe*) and *Omi Mustard Seed*, the Omi Mission's Japanese-language and English-language magazines respectively, that he appreciated how "all races are living together peacefully" in diverse Hawaii, "so far the best laboratory of inter-racial mixing and peaceful relationships," an implied foil to West Coast racism and national exclusion laws.[20]

A second institution of missionary social science can be found in the standards the Inquiry set for itself when it cited the resolutions from the 1928 Jerusalem conference of the International Missionary Council as its standard.[21] Although that statement was paired with the declaration of mission

19 Reports were commissioned from a wide range of intellectuals including Tokyo Imperial University professor of religious studies Anesaki Masaharu (Buddhism), Namae (social welfare work), Kagawa (social movements), Sugiyama Motojirō (rural movements), Yoshino Sakuzō (political ideas), Tagawa Daikichirō (education), and Nagao Hampei and Abe Isoo (temperance). The reports can be found in a notebook in Guy's box of papers, LFMI collection, UTS.

20 William Merrell Vories, *A Mustard-seed in Japan* (Omi Hachiman: Omi Mission, 1925), 3–5, 57–61. Vories Makiko was one of the nineteen members, four of whom were women, who comprised the Japanese delegation. On the ship to Hawaii, they met the delegations from colonized Korea and the Philippines, which as "Pacific peoples" (a category which elided colonial relationships) had been granted ostensibly equal placement at the table and, hence, an opportunity to speak to their colonizers. The Japanese delegation was comprised of members of the liberal elite, from overlapping circles of prominent Christians and of university professors, including Harada Tasaku. After decades of post-McCarthy erasure from the historical record, the IPR has returned to consideration, primarily as an early NGO. See in particular Tomoko Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–1945* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

21 Though officially formed in 1921, the IMC was one of the outcomes of the 1910 World Missionary Conference as were the Missionary Research Library in New York City, reference works like the World Missionary Atlas (1925), and a new journal, the *International Review of Missions,* launched in 1912. Vories had contributed his own narrative of "Pioneering in Japan" to the journal, to a series on "Realities of Missionary Life" in the pages of the

of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, North, (Vories's own affiliation) that "the supreme and controlling aim of Foreign Missions is to make the Lord Jesus Christ known to all men as their Divine Savior and to persuade them to become his disciples ...," the standard of the whole man pointed to social context.[22] It had been on the Mount of Olives where the chairman of the LFMI's Commission of Appraisal, Harvard philosophy professor William Ernest Hocking, had come to the fore when he presented on the "psychological conditions for the growth of faith," as an answer to the crucial question of the "Missionary Message and the non-Christian Religions." At the 1910 World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh, the debate turned on the concept of fulfillment, and how Christianity fulfilled needs present in other religions, such as a supposed Hindu longing for monotheism, and at Jerusalem, the "absoluteness" of Christ came under harsher questioning ("Christ is no avatar," stormed one angry delegate in response). At the same time, the conference drew heavily on ISRR research and presented the work of missions within social contexts. For instance, Vories's friend Fisher reported on "Relations between the Occidental and Oriental Peoples on the Pacific Coast of North America" in the context of "the Christian mission in light of race conflict," and a rural sociologist produced an extensive survey of "economic, social, and religious conditions" in rural Korea, accepting Japanese official data down to Japanese readings of place names, but never calling Japanese colonial rule in Korea into question.[23]

Since the mandate of the Inquiry was to examine American Protestant church-funded missions, and since Vories and his closest collaborator, Yoshida Etsuzō, were abroad when the commissioners visited Kyoto, the Omi Mission

---

April 1917: "'Pioneering in Japan?'—so you ask—'that civilised, educated modern nation, already sixty years under Christian influences and largely a finished task as to mission!' Yes, *pioneering* in Japan is what we mean," he began. He then emphasized that by pioneering he meant not so much entering an "unoccupied province" as he meant the need to experiment with new methods of evangelization and to put forth a clear statement of ideals: "to illustrate a brotherhood of mutual goodwill and forbearance is far more indispensable to the spread of the Kingdom than all the eloquent preaching about it." William Merrell Vories, "Realities of Missionary Life," *International Review of Mission* 5, 2 (April 1917): 258–66.

22 List dated September 10, 1930; reprinted in Orville A. Petty, *Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry: Supplementary Series*. Vol. 3. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1933), 206–11.

23 International Missionary Council, "*The Jerusalem Meeting*," 1–2, 163. In contrast to Edinburgh, where all but a handful of the more than 1,300 delegates came from the United States and Britain, over half of the 250 carefully chosen attendees at Jerusalem were "nationals" of the mission field. From Japan came three missionaries and five Japanese, including one woman.

was not within its particular purview. In June 1931, however, Vories was asked to respond to a telling inquiry about church architecture. Charles Sears, the researcher compiling the "Fact-Finder's Report" on "The Church" and its "naturalization," sent him photos of the new building then under construction for the Baptist church at Sendai and asked whether it "demonstrated any adaptation of the Western forms of the church along Japanese lines." Vories answered that he had shown the photos to the Japanese staff of his architecture firm and "no one can find any *Japanese* element in the pictures, either exterior or interior..." He praised the church as "a rather good adaptation of western lines" and added that its tower is "purely the style developed by Mr. Wright of Chicago—who used it on the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo years after he had used it in the United States." The verdict Vories then offered was that "the only thing Japanese about the building is its architect...."[24] (The new building, which had been dedicated that April, was in fact designed by a Japanese student of Frank Lloyd Wright's named Minami Shinobu.) Sears reported this response in his chapter in the Japan volume of the report: "Mr. Merrell Vories, an authority on church architecture in Japan, is strongly of the opinion that it is too early in the Christian development of Japan to expect a distinctive church architecture."[25]

Here, naturalization could be read as both local control and a synonym for inculturation/contextualization. The Inquiry had defined its three sites for study: India (combined with Burma), China, and Japan (minus its colonies) as organic entities, each with a character and a wholeness, a culture, to be respected. However, this move also allowed it to elide the realities of imperial domination, including of Korea, even if it did recognize "a century of sweeping changes in the life of the Orient," including both "the emergence of a basic world-culture" and "the rise of nationalism in the East." It took "mystical life" and "appreciation of man's direct approach to God" as crucial for India and Burma, of the "family life as a unit" for China, and of the "aesthetic appeal" for Japan.[26]

Reading as Missionaries and Christians in Imperial Japan

As soon as it reached him following publication in November 1932, Vories underlined passage after passage of his own copy of *Re-Thinking Missions:*

24 Letter from Vories to Dr. C.H. Sears, June 16, 1931, in Sears box, UTS, folder VI.

25 Petty, *Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry,* 152–53.

26 Hocking, *Re-Thinking Missions,* 87. A reviewer for the IPR's *Pacific Affairs* notably remarked that: "The writers of this report do not pretend to speak for countries where there is a low cultural level—Africa, for example" Weaver 1933: 122–25.

A Laymen's Inquiry After One Hundred Years, the Inquiry's one-volume summary for mass consumption. In the January-March 1933 issue of *The Omi Mustard Seed*, he told readers that "one thing we can add to their plea for attempting certain reforms: Where they urge, 'This should be done,' we can declare, 'It can be done: we are doing it.'" Reading its criticisms positively as a description of the Omi Mission, Vories could say that the Omi Mission fit with the Inquiry's central recommendations found in a table at the heart of the book which contrasted the present model of missions and the better one that could be achieved if missions could adapt from temporary to permanent functions, from church planting to "foreign service or ambassadorship." The chart put "sending many persons of various equipment to preach widely, so that the message shall have been heard" against "maintaining a relatively few highly equipped persons, representing the Christian way of thought and life, acceptable to or invited by the foreign land," and exacerbated the contrast with word choice: rather than "aggressively promoting" and "expounding single-mindedly," missionaries should be "maintaining," "studying sympathetically," and "seeking."[27]

Vories was disappointed that the Omi Mission had not been discussed in *Rethinking Missions* but explained that, though the Fact-Finders had visited, they could not "endorse an independent mission,—even when it is the only one that is carrying out their principles,—because to do so might weaken the appeal for consolidation of control." He reaffirmed, in italics, the Omi Mission's identity as different: "had other Missions been practicing what they advocate a quarter-century ago, there would never have been an Omi Mission." And at the same time he saw it as a statement of modern Christianity: "if the average educated non-Christian could be persuaded to read sympathetically Rethinking Missions and The Bible, without commentary or propagandum, I believe he would be brought to accept Jesus's Way." In the following issue, he responded to criticisms from readers and co-workers for his praise with a favorite metaphor: "only don't let us obstruct a cure simply because we don't like the physician's theology."[28]

When it was made public in October and November of 1932 with the publication of *Re-Thinking Missions* and of the seven more detailed volumes, preceded by a disastrous public relations campaign in which calls for cooperation on industrial and social problems were presented in such popular headlines as "Missions Advised to Befriend Reds," the Inquiry became the object of controversy.

---

27 William Merrell Vories, "Re-Thinking Re 'Re-Thinking Missions,'" *Omi Mustard Seed* (1933): 191–97; Hocking, *Re-Thinking Missions,* 28.

28 Ibid.

Despite a disclaimer in the foreword about significant theological differences among commission members, *Re-Thinking Missions* was written with one authoritative voice in bold statements, professing "a significant body of agreement, which we trust may afford a firm basis for reinterpreting and redirecting one of the noblest expressions of that undying hope of the soul, the spiritual unity of mankind."[29] To the question whether the missionary enterprise should continue at all, there was a tepid answer: "It is somewhat like asking whether good-will should continue or cease to express itself… one offers one's own faith simply because it is the best one has to offer."[30]

Readers recognized the single voice of *Re-thinking Missions* as Hocking's and as modernist, and placed the report as a final salvo in the 1920s struggle among modernist, fundamentalist, and moderate Protestants.[31] Vories's own origin, the northern Presbyterian Church, was particularly torn. Its mission board secretary, the same Robert E. Speer, was insistent on a moderate position, that "for us, Christ is still *the* Way, not *a* way, and there is no goal beyond Him or apart from Him, nor any search for truth that is to be found outside of Him, nor any final truth to be sought by a universal religious quest, except it be sought in Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life."[32] It was another Presbyterian, Pearl S. Buck, whose novel *The Good Earth* had been awarded the Pulitzer Prize earlier in 1932, who captured the most public attention when she offered a position akin to Hocking's to answer the question "Is There a Case for Foreign Missions?": "I do not believe we can spare anything that is good.

29 Hocking, *Re-Thinking Missions,* xv.

30 Ibid., 4, 18–23, 33, 37, 59.

31 An associate professor of missions at the University of Chicago divided the response in three categories: a school for which "what man needs for salvation, then, is God come to his rescue;" a school for which the gospel "is no longer Bibliocentric, but rather Christocentric;" and a third school, the "advanced liberals," who operate through "essentially a belief in a theistic God, which has been arrived at by the naturalistic methods of investigation and reasoning." Followers of the first two schools, which corresponded to the fundamentalists and conservatives and to the moderates saw Hocking within the third, in which "men are saved in so far as they catch his [Jesus Christ, "the Great Exemplifier of spiritual insight and perfection"] spirit and follow his quest, in response to the spoken word, but more especially to the example of Christlike living." Vories's response to the Inquiry reflected his sympathies for both the second and third positions as well as his interest in the techniques the Inquiry offered. See Archibald G. Baker, "Reactions to the Laymen's Report," *Journal of Religion* 13 (1933): 379–98; Bogor, "American Protestantism in the Asian crucible," 168–212.

32 Robert E. Speer, *"Re-Thinking Missions" Examined* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1933), 7–27; specifically quotes from 11, 13, 29.

How much less, then, can we spare that union of inner mystic spirit combined with social dynamic which we recognize as the highest form of Christianity!" Moreover, Buck placed herself closer to the people among whom she had been a missionary, expressing emotionally what Vories would do legally nine years later when he naturalized as a Japanese Imperial subject: "By birth and ancestry, I am American; by choice and belief I am a Christian; but by the years of my life, by sympathy and feeling, I am Chinese."[33]

Speer and Buck, and not the Inquiry, became the target of attack from the conservative and fundamentalist positions. By 1933, the leading fundamentalist Presbyterian J. Gresham Machen had attacked Speer's board in "Modernism and the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A." on six loosely connected points, including its failure to dissociate itself enough from "Mrs. J. Lossing Buck" or from Kagawa's idea of the "redemptive power" of Jesus's experience. Furthermore, according to Machen, the Presbyterian missionary in Tokyo A.K. Reischauer had failed to recognize that the Inquiry deserved the response it had received from the Japanese press: the response had been "sensational quite properly, because the Report was sensational in its attack upon the Christian religion as the Christian religion has hitherto been known."[34]

Missionaries themselves reacted angrily to the Inquiry and the negative publicity surrounding it. The IMC's *International Review of Missions* included Vories among the responses it compiled from missionaries, naming them "the *real experts*."[35] It quoted from "a general chorus of disapproval" of its "disregard for the finality of Christ as the revelation of God and the authority of the Christian message." Among this chorus, Vories too responded negatively: "the Commission itself, being a super-efficient human agency, seems at some points to have forgotten that God should have anything to do with missions." Thirteen missionaries, who had met in January in Tokyo, sought to emphasize the "progressive elements" which could be brought to Christianity, but not through compromise with other religions: "After all, Christianity has much more in common with the forces of our common world culture—science, modern education, the spirit of democracy, the passion for social

33 Pearl S. Buck, *The Good Earth* (New York: John Day, 1932), 155; Pearl S. Buck, *Is There a Case for Foreign Missions?* (New York: John Day, 1932), 1434–437.

34 J. Gresham Machen, "Modernism and the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.," in *Modernism and Foreign Missions: Two Fundamentalist Protests*, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York: Garland, 1988 [1933]), 51, 56.

35 "Missionary Reactions to 'Re-Thinking Missions'" *International Review of Missions* (July 1933).

justice—than it has with the non-Christian religions."[36] Another study group composed of several missionaries, most of the Japanese Christians who had been listed as "Counselors" on the Fact-Finders' letterhead, as well as the Omi Mission's own Takahashi Ken, expressed broad agreement with most policies the Inquiry advocated, but questioned its apparent abandonment of the "uniqueness and absoluteness of the Christian faith." In looking for the balance between respect for culture and the evangelical motive, the Inquiry had gotten it wrong: "Although we dislike the motive of pity which has characterized evangelism among less cultured peoples in the past we deplore the impression that as culture advances the need for evangelism vanishes."[37]

The sharpest criticism of the Inquiry and of missionary knowledge itself pointed out that the modern bifurcation of knower and known was overlaid onto the missional geography of "home" and "field." The Inquiry, ever blind to imperialism, maintained this split, with an important difference. It was Kagawa Toyohiko who pointed this out when he lamented that the Inquiry had failed to call for an international spirit that would "forget… the distinction between 'home' and 'foreign.'" In his criticisms of the Inquiry, published in English in the 1933 *Japan Christian Yearbook* and in a pamphlet printed in Bombay as "A Significant Word from Asia" and in his Japanese magazine *Kumo no Hashira* (Pillar of Cloud), he decried the Report's "retreat from Christian internationalism" and said that it "ignored the Cross." Kagawa compared this possibility to what he found in the "Third Internationale of Moscow," as he referred to Comintern, and he declared that "we who belong to Christ should possess a stronger international spirit, and should give ourselves to the propagation of the Christ-spirit."[38]

The important difference was that while the missionary had long been the source of knowledge about the missionary "field" for its "support base" in the United States, by the 1930s, the Inquiry had transformed the missionaries themselves into the object of scrutiny—advancing a trend already evident in

36 "Observations on the Report of the Appraisal Commission of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Enquiry [sic], made after group study by thirteen missionaries from seven missions working in Japan." Tokyo: n.p., January 1933.

37 "Findings Based on a Group Study of the Report of the Laymen's Appraisal Commission" (report of a meeting at Aoyama Gakuin, 15–16 May 1933) (LFMI box at UTS); this was published as "Japanese Christian Views of Missions" with the same subtitle, *International Review of Missions* (September 1933) and as a pamphlet "Japanese Christian Leaders Appraise the Appraisal." (Tokyo, 1933).

38 Toyohiko Kagawa, "After Reading 'Re-thinking Missions,'" in *The Japan Christian Yearbook*, ed. E.C. Hennigar (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1933), 169–79; Kayagawa, *A Significant Word from Asia*, 11.

books like *Japan Speaks for Herself* (1927) and *Japanese Women Speak* (1934) which rhetorically bypassed the missionary and translated the voices of Japanese Christians, including many who were informants to the Inquiry. In 1934's *Suzuki Looks at Japan*, the editor of the *Japan Christian Yearbook* invented a dialog between a "bungling, question-asking, statistics-loving 'Foreigner'" and a composite of Japanese Christian laymen he knew. Published with a guide for adult discussion groups, the book was partly its author Willis Lamott's reply to the Inquiry. It was based on his extensive knowledge but told from Suzuki's point of view to argue his thesis that "the Japanese Christian still needs the help of his Western brothers and sisters in his attempts to bring Christ into a redeeming contact with Japanese life." Lamott's closing line preserved the difference that expertise makes, but tempered it in a new way, implying a defense from the Inquiry's stance towards the missionary and his knowledge: "the Foreigner and Suzuki, side by side, walk on together toward the breaking day."[39]

Religion and Development in a Small Country

Lamott's "everyman" Suzuki appeared to be an urban Christian, but, in an important insight, the historian Emily Anderson has also highlighted another discourse that began in this context about how Japan might become a "small country" instead of an empire that imposed itself on others. Kagawa was telling the story with the metaphor of a grain of wheat (drawn from John 12:24) which echoed Vories' frequent reference to the parable of the mustard seed (e.g. Mark 4: 30–34), both of them pointing to agricultural metaphors that connected to farm life, even if the plants were imported. Anderson's study of Congregationalists is heavy with irony, in that one of the leading exponents of the "farmers' gospel schools" on a Danish model associated with the early nineteenth-century educator and pastor Nikolai Grundtvig and much admired around the world at time had been part of a failed attempt by Japanese Christians to send their own missionaries to colonized Korea, as well as tragedy, in that her story ends with their attempts to build Christian agricultural colonies in Manchuria as the empire was on the eve of collapse.[40] Admiration for Denmark ran deep in 1930s Japan. In the language of the Inquiry, it was "rural reconstruction work" and the commission of appraisal did make a brief mention of how "W.M. Vories founded his Omi Mission as a 'non-sectarian

39 Willis Lamott, *Suzuki Looks at Japan* (New York: Friendship Press, 1934), ix.

40 Emily Anderson, *Christianity and Imperialism in Modern Japan: Empire for God* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), Ch. 6.

experiment in rural evangelization.'" The commission went on to both criticize Kagawa's Kingdom of God movement—"we are convinced there is a better way of approach than through the method of public meeting evangelization"—and to praise it—"one of the best features of the Movement is its plan for training rural leaders in Peasant Gospel Schools, after the type of the Folk Schools in Denmark," adopting one possible translation for *nōmin fukuin gakkō*, which was in turn one possible translation for Grundtvig's *Folkehöjskole*.[41] At the time of the Inquiry, the Omi Mission was also running these gospel schools, not as full-time institutions but as several-week courses taught by both Omi Mission members and Kyoto-based Christian academics as well as Kagawa and other national figures. Subject matter ranged from history and social science to entomology to the establishment of cooperatives, with Kagawa's translation of F.H. Stead's 1924 *The Story of Social Christianity* as one key textbook.

That same summer of 1931 as the Fact-Finders were surveying across Japan, the Omi Mission was visited by a leader in this gospel of social science: the rural sociologist Kenyon L. Butterfield, who had argued at Jerusalem three years earlier that the purpose of "modern missions" is "to Christianise human life" and that "rural civilisation will become economically efficient and socially Christian only as those natural local groupings or units of people do their work efficiently and live their lives in a Christian spirit."[42] When he sat down for a discussion with a group of men and women of the Omi Mission on "problems of the farming village," a transcript of which appeared in the July 1931 issue of *Voice at the Lakeside*, he reiterated the influential arguments he had made at the Jerusalem meeting three years earlier, "on the ideal use of talent needed to develop farming villages, from the Christian perspective." Christians must not be satisfied with their own salvation but must serve society; leaders must be chosen for their experience and talent with Christian ideals inculcated into their bodies, spirits and souls; and lay people must be cultivated to be Christian in their daily lives.

Anticipating the core of *Re-Thinking Missions*, while displacing the discourse onto native pastors rather than foreign missionaries, Butterfield disparaged overly theological, overly intellectual rural pastors and called for experts in social problems willing to work alongside rural people as well as "foreign counselors" who would replace the missionaries. Butterfield's audience at the Omi Mission responded to his emphasis on building an independent,

41 Petty, *Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry,* 66.

42 Kenyon L. Butterfield, "Christianity and Rural Civilization," in *The Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council: The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems,* Vo.6 (New York: International Missionary Council, 1928), 5–12.

self-supporting church by insisting on the importance of theological ideas and on the role of the pastor. They argued that because of the pressure they felt from state ideology and from the transformations of capitalism which subjected the countryside to urban industrialization and its attendant social problems. In this, they were more integrated into a national society than were the cases he drew on from China of what he called "the rural billion."[43]

In terms of religion, the one-volume *Re-Thinking Missions* was given to broad statements and notably sparse in detail and example. An exception that caught Hocking's eye, though it had been passed over by both the "Fact-Finder" who collected the report (M.E. Sadler, preparing to write on "Religious Education") and the committee compiling the regional report on Japan, was "A Venture in Understanding," a four-page account of an inter-religious discussion group in Okayama. From this minor effort by a Congregationalist missionary named C.B. Olds to convene a group of several Buddhist and sectarian Shintō priests as well as a Christian pastor and two laymen, Hocking seized on Olds' reflection that "We are brothers in a common quest, and the first step is to recognize it and disarm ourselves of our prejudices" as laying out "the requirements of a simple truth."[44] Inter-religious cooperation (with the State) was not new in Japan: in 1912, most Christians had exulted that theirs was one of the three incorporated into the Home Ministry's Assembly of the Three Religions (Sankyō Kaidō), replacing Confucianism (which has almost no institutional base in Japan) in the pluralist trio of the day. Leaders of recognized religions were asked for help in the "moral suasion" of the nation towards a "modern" way of life and experts like Namae were brought on as paid advisors to the ministry. Founded on Christian anxiety about being read as foreign and unpatriotic, this cooperation and collaboration continued, for the most part, through the Asia-Pacific War. But what Hocking assumed from the brief report on Olds' "A Venture in Understanding" was not religions subsuming themselves into the demands of the

43 "Nōson mondai kondankai," *Voice at the Lakeside* (July 1931: 35–42); Butterfield returned the criticism in his report on his trip, complaining that the Omi Mission was not self-supporting, but "rather an enterprise in Christian business cooperation which utilises its surplus to encourage definite Christian work in the prefecture in which it is located," and concluding pessimistically that "'less, probably, than in any other country in the world where missionaries have gone, has the Christian enterprise reached the farming folk of Japan.'" (Kenyon L. Butterfield, *The Rural Mission of the Church in Eastern Asia: Report and Recommendations* (New York: International Missionary Council, 1931), 117, 125).

44 Hocking, *Re-Thinking Missions,* 31–32; C.B. Olds sent a "A Venture in Understanding" typescript report dated 20 February 1931, in LFMI papers at UTS.

state but rather religions seeking their commonalities as equals striving toward the betterment of all, to a hope for dialogue instead of monologue.

Re-Thinking from Asia

For its 1938 meeting, the IMC commissioned Hendrik Kraemer, a Dutch historian of religions who was also a former missionary in Java, to lay out the question of "the fundamental position of the Christian church as a witness-bearing body in the modern world" and the "evangelistic approach to the great non-Christian faiths." The resulting *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* answered both Hocking and the Inquiry's modernism and the depoliticized version of Karl Barth's theology then current across the Protestant world, including in Japan. Kraemer's approach would, he explained, encompass both the central thesis that "the Christian revelation as the record of God's self-disclosing revelation in Jesus Christ is absolutely sui generis" and the evaluation of "the non-Christian religions" as "all inclusive systems and theories of life."[45] Although Japan had withdrawn from both the IPR and the League of Nations and although the IMC had had to relocate this meeting to the new campus of Madras Christian College in southern India due to Japanese aggression in China, it still welcomed a delegation of thirteen Japanese and six missionaries, including Kagawa—who would go on to meet Gandhi, with whom he (and Schweitzer) was often seen as a kind of 'spiritual statesman' of the 1930s.

The conference at Madras was the first such conference at which delegates from Asia comprised the plurality (if not quite majority) of the 450 in attendance. By comparison, while representatives of the "home" countries comprised fewer than 25% of those at this gathering. Moreover, the few scattered mentions of war and empire in East Asia made there were generally subsumed within the call to build an ecumenical church. Where the Jerusalem conference a decade earlier had devoted its attention to social and political contexts of religion and had commissioned a great deal of social scientific research from the now-closed Institute of Social and Religious Research, the Madras meeting zeroed in on the church and the "authority of the faith," with an implied sense of responding to the Laymen's Inquiry. Vories understood this much when,

45 H. Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938); Sebastian C.H. Kim, "The Kingdom of God versus the Church: The Debate around the Conference of the International Missionary Council at Tambaram, Madras in 1938," in *Interpreting Contemporary Christianity: Global Processes and Local Identities*, ed. Ogbu U. Kalu (Grand Rapid, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2008), 131–47.

responding to *Japan Christian Quarterly* reports on Madras, he reminded readers that the idea that every lay person needed to be an evangelist was key to the early church and subsequent reform movements, including those in which he placed himself.[46]

A leading historian of the US missionary movement, Dana Robert, has recently characterized this interwar period with the pairing of "internationalization" and "indigenization" and suggested it be productively compared to twenty-first century referencing of globalization.[47] This is certainly instructive at the levels of theology and the question of relationships between religions. At the same time, the overlapping networks of "missionary social science" and "lay expertise" placed imperial Japan—and especially its Christian minority—within a world of social politics, one that rightly resisted the monological trajectory from home to field. By returning to Kagawa's call in his "significant word from Asia" for the centrality of the Cross at the point of divergence in this pre-history of the techno-politicalism of religion and development discourse, a final moment of diverging vocabularies in which a future not rendered technical was still possible. This possibility, however, came from within imperial Japan—a quasi-religious state and an empire with a declared ideological intent to "overcome modernity." At the same time as it was already religiously plural, Kagawa recognized that it needed the something larger he found in the Cross in order to become a "small country," and one that might have developed without being "rendered technical."

Bibliography

Akami, Tomoko. *Internationalizing the Pacific: the United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919–1945*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Anderson, Emily. *Christianity and Imperialism in Modern Japan: Empire for God*. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.

Baker, Archibald G. "Reactions to the Laymen's Report." *Journal of Religion* 13 (1933): 379–98.

46 William Merrell Vories, "What Does the Church Need Most?" *Japan Christian Quarterly* (July 1939).

47 Dana L. Robert, "The First Globalization? The Internationalization of the Protestant Missionary Movement Between the World Wars," in *Interpreting Contemporary Christianity: Global Processes and Local Identities*, eds. Ogbu U. Kalu and Alaine Low (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 93–130.

Bautista, Julius, and Francis Lim Khek Gee (eds). *Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Bogor, Gretchen Elisabeth. "American Protestantism in the Asian crucible, 1919–1939." PhD diss., Princeton University, 2008.

Buck, Pearl S. *The Good Earth.* New York: John Day, 1932a.

Buck, Pearl S. *Is There a Case for Foreign Missions?* New York: John Day, 1932b.

Butterfield, Kenyon L. "Christianity and Rural Civilization." In *The Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council: The Christian Mission in Relation to Rural Problems*, Vo. 6. New York: International Missionary Council, 1928.

Butterfield, Kenyon L. *The Rural Mission of the Church in Eastern Asia: Report and Recommendations.* New York: International Missionary Council, 1931.

"Findings Based on a Group Study of the Report of the Laymen's Appraisal Commission." LFMI box at UTS. Report of a Meeting at Aoyama Gakuin, Japan, May 15–16, 1933. [Other versions include: "Japanese Christian Views of Missions." *International Review of Missions* (September 1933) and "Japanese Christian Leaders Appraise the Appraisal." Pamphlet. Tokyo: n.p., 1933.].

Fisher, Galen M. *The Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1921–1934.* Privately printed: n.p., 1934.

Fox, Richard Wightman. "The Culture of Liberal Protestant Progressivism, 1875–1925." *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 23:3 (1993): 639–60.

Garon, Sheldon. *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Guy, Harvey H. "Fact Finding Commission." *Japan Christian Yearbook* (1931): 343–47.

Hocking, William Ernest. *Re-Thinking Missions: A Laymen's Inquiry After One Hundred Years*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1932.

Hollinger, David A. *Protestants Abroad: How Missionaries Tries to Change the World but Changed America* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2017).

Hutchison, William R. *Errand to the Word: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

International Missionary Council. *The Jerusalem Meeting of the International Missionary Council, March 24-April 8, 1928*. 8 vols. New York: International Missionary Council, 1928.

Kagawa, Toyohiko. "After Reading 'Re-thinking Missions." In *The Japan Christian Yearbook*, edited by E.C. Hennigar, 169–79. Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1933.

Kagawa, Toyohiko. *A Significant Word from Asia.* Introduction by Brenton Thoburn Badley. Bombay: n.p., 1936.

Kim, Sebastian C.H. "The Kingdom of God versus the Church: The Debate around the Conference of the International Missionary Council at Tambaram, Madras in 1938." In *Interpreting Contemporary Christianity: Global Processes and Local Identities*, edited by Ogbu U. Kalu. Grand Rapid, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2008, 131–47

Kraemer, H. *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938.

Lamott, Willis. *Suzuki Looks at Japan*. New York: Friendship Press, 1934.

"Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry Records, 1879–1940." The Burke Library Archives, Columbia University Libraries, Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1940.

Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry. "The Proceedings of the Meeting of the Directors and Sponsors of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry and Representatives of Foreign Missions Board." Unpublished Pamphlet. n.p., 1932.

Li, Tania Murray. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.

Machen, J. Gresham. "Modernism and the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A." In *Modernism and Foreign Missions: Two Fundamentalist Protests*, edited by Joel A. Carpenter. New York: Garland, 1988 [1933].

"Missionary Reactions to 'Re-Thinking Missions.'" *International Review of Missions* (July 1933).

Niebuhr, Reinhold. "Our World." In *Students and the Christian World Mission: Report of the Twelfth Quadrennial Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions*, edited by Jesse R. Wilson (New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1936), 7–14.

Norman, Howard. "Re-thinking Missions after Forty Years." *Japan Christian Quarterly* (Summer 1974), 162–63.

"Nōson mondai kondankai." *Voice at the Lakeside* (July 1931): 35–42.

"Observations on the Report of the Appraisal Commission of the Laymen's Foreign Missions Enquiry [sic], made after group study by thirteen missionaries from seven missions working in Japan." Tokyo: n.p., January 1933.

Petty, Orville A. *Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry: Supplementary Series*. 7 vols. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1933.

Porter, Theodore M., and Dorothy Ross, eds. *The Cambridge History of Science*. Vol. 7. The Cambridge History of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Robert, Dana L. "The First Globalization? The Internationalization of the Protestant Missionary Movement Between the World Wars." In *Interpreting Contemporary Christianity: Global Processes and Local Identities*, edited by Ogbu U. Kalu and Alaine Low, 93–130. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008.

Rodgers, Daniel T. *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.

Speer, Robert E. *"Re-Thinking Missions" Examined*. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1933.

Sukeyoshi, Suzuki. *Shinri to Shinkō*. n.p., 1979.

Takayuki, Namae. *Nihon Kirisutokyō Shakai Jigyōshi*. Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta, 1996 [1931].

Vanderbilt, Gregory. "'The Kingdom of God is Like a Mustard Seed': Evangelizing Modernity between the United States and Japan, 1905–1948." PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2005.

Vanderbilt, Gregory. "Postwar Japanese Christian Historians, Democracy, and the Problem of the 'Emperor-System' State." In *Christianity and the State in Asia: Complicity and Conflict*, edited by Julius Bautista and Francis Lim Khek Gee, 59–78. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Vanderbilt, Gregory. "'Smelling of Pickled Radish, not Butter': The Wartime Search for a Christianity Viable in Japan." In *Encountering Modernity: Christianity and East Asia*, edited by David Yoo and Albert Park, 224–53. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014.

Vories, William Merrell. "Realities of Missionary Life." *International Review of Mission* 5, 2 (April 1917): 258–66.

Vories, William Merrell. *A Mustard-seed in Japan.* Omi Hachiman: Omi Mission, 1925.

Vories, William Merrell. "Re-Thinking Re 'Re-Thinking Missions'" *Omi Mustard Seed* (1933): 191–97.

Vories, William Merrell. *The Omi Brotherhood in Nippon*. Omi Hachiman: Omi Brotherhood Book Department, 1934.

Vories, William Merrell. "The Omi Mission in Japan." In *Students and the Christian World Mission: Report of the Twelfth Quadrennial Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions*, edited by Jesse R. Wilson, 130–39. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1936.

Vories, William Merrell. "What Does the Church Need Most?" *Japan Christian Quarterly* (July 1939).

Weaver, G.R. "Review of *Re-Thinking Missions*." *Pacific Affairs* 6: 2–3 (Feb-Mar 1933): 122–25.

Wilson, Jesse R. *Students and the Christian World Mission: Report of the Twelfth Quadrennial Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions*. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1936.

Yates, Timothy. *Christian Mission in the Twentieth Century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Yoo, David, and Albert Park (eds). *Encountering Modernity: Christianity and East Asia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014.

Yu, Henry. *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Zurlo, Gina A. "The Social Gospel, Ecumenical Movement and Christian Sociology: The Institute of Social and Religious Research." *American Sociologist* 46 (2015): 177–93.

CHAPTER 4

Missionaries and Mining: Conflicts over Development in Eastern Indonesia

Maribeth Erb and Fransiska Widyawati

Reimagining Development: The Church, Politics and the Environment in Eastern Indonesia

In October 2014 massive demonstrations against mining were led by the Roman Catholic clergy in the capital cities of the three districts of Manggarai, which make up the western part of the island of Flores in eastern Indonesia.[1] Dozens of clergy from the Diocese of Ruteng, to which these three districts belong, along with thousands of villagers, college students and townsfolk, demanded a halt to all mining activities. They also called for the retraction of the exploration and exploitation permits given by the three district heads to various mining companies over the previous years. This was perhaps the first time that the Catholic Church clergy had united to publicly show defiance to a government policy which was ostensibly aimed at economic development and the creation of jobs for the people of Flores. The demonstrations were also distinctive in that, while they were led by Catholic clergy, at the same time and as part of the same protest, traditional ritual sacrifices were carried out as a way to 'exorcise' mining from the western part of Flores Island. In earlier years such rituals would not have been condoned by Church authorities.

The clergy's involvement in these protests, including their resistance to government policy and support for traditional culture, represent a significant rupture from earlier Catholic positions. It also signaled a dramatic shift in the Church's relationship with development. In this chapter we examine these changes as part of an analysis of Catholic mission work on the island of Flores. These demonstrations, we argue, actively politicized both issues of development and cultural revival. They implied that development choices are clearly political, and that traditional culture, instead of being an impediment

1 These three districts used to be one, and were divided in 2003, with the creation of West Manggarai, and then one more in 2007 with the creation of East Manggarai. All three continue to be part of one diocese.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_005

to development and to being a "good Catholic," could be used as a tool for politics, sustainability and improving livelihoods.

Since 2006 mining has increasingly become a sore point in the relationship between the local governments and the Catholic Church in a number of districts across Nusa Tenggara Timur province in eastern Indonesia, where Flores is located. Political changes resulting from the implementation of regional autonomy and decentralization legislation, passed since the collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, gave local heads more power and, since 2005, mandated their direct election. Taking advantage of these shifts, district heads began offering what appeared to be lucrative mining contracts to reputedly fund their election campaigns, but also to ostensibly create jobs and prosperity for people in this poor province. However, with dramatic plans to turn almost the whole island of Lembata, east of Flores, into a massive gold and copper mine in 2006, and to allegedly move most of the people off of the island, massive protests were mobilized.

Starting with the support of village priests, this movement to reject mining came to be coordinated by the Justice and Peace for the Integrity of Creation Commission (JPIC) of the Franciscan Order, and eventually included other missionary orders and environmental and social welfare groups. In 2007, after news about the Lembata gold and copper mine plans started to spread, the church leaders in Ruteng Diocese in western Flores sought out more information about mining that had already taken place for some decades in the Central and Eastern Manggarai districts on the northern coast of western Flores. With the knowledge they had gathered about the environmental destruction and the labor exploitation experienced in those locations, the bishop and other clergy of the Ruteng Diocese, as well as many other clergy throughout the province, increasingly moved to reject mining as a development and economic livelihood option for Nusa Tenggara Timur province.[2]

In this chapter we take a look at this resistance to mining against the background of the role that the Catholic Church has played in development over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. What has led them to change their position towards development, the government and traditional culture? As an extremely important and powerful institution in eastern Indonesia, the Catholic Church has been a major actor in development programs over the past century. It has facilitated education and training that has dramatically changed the lives of people in Nusa Tenggara Timur Province, particularly on the island of Flores. The Church has played an important role in providing health

2 Alex Jebadu, et al., eds., *Pertambangan di Flores-Lembata: Berkah atau Kutuk* (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2009).

services, and the improvement of agriculture, communication and infrastructure. In these efforts, it has always been supportive, if not leading, the local government, and has always seen itself as an instrument of progress in this poor and more remote part of Indonesia. However, recent political changes in Indonesia, mentioned above, as well as global developments in environmental concerns and consciousness, have deeply affected the Church's position in regards to community livelihoods and development. These changing positions become increasingly apparent when looked at against the backdrop of the recent conflict over mining in Nusa Tenggara Timur.

We argue that the changing stances toward development and traditional culture are closely tied with a growing emphasis in the Catholic Church on issues of justice, community rights, and concern over the environment. It is this emphasis which has recently set the Church in western Flores, and some other parts of Nusa Tenggara Timur Province, on a collision course with the local governments in eastern Indonesia. In this chapter we examine the shifting ideologies of justice and 'environmentalism' that have penetrated the discourse and actions of the local Church in Flores and influenced its approach to 'development.' To do so, we will analyze global development trends and the ways in which they have been appropriated into the Indonesian context at specific moments. We contextualize this examination against the critique of development as a technical enterprise that aims at 'de-politicization,' as well as against the recent 're-imagining' of the politics of development that sees development itself as akin to a religion. Likening 'development' to a religious ideology opens up space to query how the Catholic Church in Flores has re-imagined its own relationship with not only 'development,' but also 'religion.' Part of this 'reimagining' is a 're-politicization' of development through engagement with particular conceptions of 'justice.' We argue that the contemporary Florenese Catholic Church has rejected a 'techno-political' approach that reduces development to bureaucratic procedures and technical problems, and has attempted to dehumanize the changes and decisions that go into livelihood choices for Florenese communities. It is our contention that it is the conflict over mining in eastern Indonesia which has brought these changes to the fore, and has helped to highlight, and arguably consolidate, a position in the Catholic Church vis-à-vis governance, power, traditional culture, and justice which has been slowly shifting over the course of the 20th century.

Development and the Catholic Church in Western Flores

For much of the 20th century, the Catholic Church in Flores held a position similar to other agencies interested in progress and development in the colonial and post-colonial world. It tended to view traditional culture as an

impediment to development that would continue to mire local communities in poverty and 'backwardness' if it were not radically changed or eradicated. Sociological and anthropological literature of the later twentieth century had already begun to critique these positions, and to question the very construction of the idea of 'development' and the benefit that it would bring.[3] There has been a growing critical examination of how 'development' is designed and controlled. Scholars have shown how development programs are constructed as apolitical, standardized fixes for populations perceived as deficient.[4] These programs are construed and evaluated by 'experts' whose technical solutions often unwittingly shape unplanned and unexpected social and political responses, in a process that has become referred to as 'techno-politics.'[5]

Recent further critiques of the politics of development suggest that development itself has been an ideology akin to religion. In a volume examining the politics of religion and development in Asia, Fountain, Bush and Feener, explore the boundaries often assumed to exist between the secular world of development and the world of religion.[6] The dichotomy of the 'religious' and 'secular,' found at the very heart of early sociology and anthropology, is one which represents the types of epistemological divisions often associated with the 'modern' industrial world. Salemink, in that volume, examines the creation of 'religion' as a separate category in early modern Europe, and the resulting creation of a separation between church and state.[7] Salemink calls this separation

3 For example, see Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

4 James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Tania Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

5 Timothy Mitchell, *The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Antina von Schnitzler, "Traveling Technologies: Infrastructure, Ethical Regimes and the Materiality of Politics in South Africa," *Cultural Anthropology* 28.4 (2013): 670–93; Antina von Schnitzler, "Performing Dignity: Human Rights, Citizenship and the Techno-Politics of Law in South Africa," *American Ethnologist* 41.2 (2014): 336–50.

6 Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and Michael Feener, eds. *Religion and the Politics of Development* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).

7 Oscar Salemink, "The Purification, Sacralisation and Instrumentalisation of Development," in *Religion and the Politics of Development*, eds. Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and Michael Feener (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 42, following Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

a 'myth of modernity,' and indeed Fountain and colleagues suggest that in Asia, many states are not secular entities, but are often closely tied with a particular religion, which informs their politics.[8] This connection with religion, Salemink argues, goes further, in that 'religious thinking,' or more specifically a kind of 'fundamentalist' orientation—that is the idea of 'one correct answer' and little toleration for dissent—underpins many secular institutions of the contemporary world. Analogous patterns are apparent in environmental conservation, where areas designated as needing conserving are often carefully separated and preserved from undesirable, 'non-expert' human intervention. The division of 'nature' and 'culture' is equally part of the modern ideological system that separated 'religion' from the 'secular.'[9] Thus a kind of 'development fundamentalism,' based upon a binary logic, which insists upon reform, structural adjustments, and the like, "constitutes a process of forced conversion," and in this way 'development' participates in a kind of 'religious politics.'[10]

The Catholic Church started its mission in Manggarai (western Flores) eastern Indonesia in the early 20th century, three centuries later than in eastern Flores.[11] Tracing the history of the Catholic Church in eastern Flores, Prior relates how early Portuguese colonial efforts in the 16th century facilitated the arrival of Catholicism to the far eastern islands of Asia.[12] With the eventual ascendancy of the Dutch in the region, however, the Portuguese presence in eastern Flores, and the missionary work protected by it, came to an end.[13] In a treaty between the Portuguese and the Dutch signed in the mid 19th century, the Portuguese formally gave up all claims to Flores and West Timor.[14]

8 Salemink, "The Purification," 42; Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, "Religion and the Politics of Development," in *Religion and the Politics of Development*, eds. Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 22. This, as we will show, is true not only in terms of the national level, but also at the local level, where the relevant religion may be a different one than that which is influential at the national level.

9 Vassos Argyrou, *The Logic of Environmentalism: Anthropology, Ecology and Postcoloniality* (New York: Berghahn, 2005).

10 Salemink, "The Purification," 43.

11 K. Steenbrink and J. Aritonang, eds., *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008); K. Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia. 1903–1942: A Documented History*, Vol. 2 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).

12 John Mansford Prior, *Church and Marriage in an Indonesian Village*, Studies in the Intercultural History of Christianity no.55. (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1988).

13 Ibid., 6–11.

14 Ibid., 17.

The Dutch also agreed to send only Catholic missionaries to Flores.[15] At the beginning of the 20th century Dutch policy changed with the move toward the 'ethical policy' which was concerned less with profit and more with the education and health of the population, and with the 'pacification' of the rest of Flores in 1908. In response, the Catholic Church was able to expand into various parts of the interior, as well as become involved in the building and organization of schools and other facilities.[16] The Jesuits, who had been present in east Flores from the 17th century, were slowly withdrawing from Indonesia, and the islands of Nusa Tenggara Timor became the domain of the more recently established 'Society of the Divine Word' (SVD, Societas Verbi Divini).[17]

Western Flores, which had never been controlled by the Portuguese, had for a number of centuries fallen under the suzerainty of the Islamic Sultanates of Goa and Bima on the islands of Celebes (now Sulawesi) and Sumbawa, respectively. However, Islam had not penetrated very far into the interior of Flores. Although Dutch troops had taken control of Manggarai in 1908, they still left the territory under the royal authority of the family of the Sultan of Bima. It was the SVD missionaries, systematically setting up mission posts in Manggarai from 1920, who started to instigate a movement against the Muslim Bima rule.[18] In 1924 the Dutch granted Manggarai the right to set up its own treasury, and a Manggaraian man was appointed as a viceroy of the Sultan of Bima. Eventually in 1928, after numerous protests and clever lobbying from the Catholic clergy, the Dutch consented to the Manggaraians having their own king. The person crowned as *raja* in 1930 was mission-educated.[19]

This change was considered a great victory for the Church in terms of separating Flores off as a distinctly Catholic island. It is also clear from this how, from the beginning, the Catholic Church played a prominent political role in Manggarai, and how the Dutch had a vested interest in the spread of Catholicism on the island. The Church and colonial state stood in a relationship of mutual benefit; the Church helped the colonial administration to dominate the population and the Dutch helped the missionaries to bring Catholicism to the local communities. This was the beginning of collaboration between the state and religion in this area, which was to continue even beyond the end of

15 Sareng Orin Bao, *Nusa Nipa: Nama Primbumi Nusa Flores* (Ende: Percetakan Arnoldus, 1969), 231–32.

16 Prior, *Church and Marriage,* 19.

17 Ibid., 20.

18 Propinsi SVD Ruteng, *Buku Kenangan 25 Tahun*, 13 Mei, 1988, 6.

19 Robert Lawang, *Stratifikasi Sosial di Cancar-Manggarai Flores Barat* (PhD diss., Universitas Indonesia, 1989), 199–206.

colonialism despite the broader national Indonesian context being majority Muslim.

The first Dutch development program on Flores opened roads that enabled the different regions to be better connected with each another, allowing for more control by the colonial state. The Dutch also introduced wet rice farming in the low land areas, in a region which had previously known only shifting agriculture, encouraging people to move from the highlands into the lowlands, near the roads and wet rice fields. In cooperation with the missionaries, the Dutch also forced the people to leave their communal houses, which were considered unhealthy with hundreds of occupants and poor ventilation.[20] When the Dutch left Manggarai, the missionaries continued and expanded these development programs.

Education was the main focus of Church development programs in Manggarai, with schools being seen as a primary tool to spread Catholicism and to form a Catholic identity among the young.[21] In 1913, the Dutch government and the Jesuit missionaries signed the Flores-Soemba Regeling agreement, which gave the Church a monopoly over running schools in Flores and Sumba. After independence, the missionaries continued to open schools, and the Church remained the main means by which education expanded in Flores. This lasted until the 1980s when the central government began to build schools on the island. Over time these schools became new societal centers, with many villagers moving their residence into the surrounding areas. In villages far from the parish center, schools were used as places to pray and for celebrating mass when the priest visited, and served as the *stasi*—or administrative centers—of the local parish. Where they were built, church buildings themselves also became a political center of their community. In this way the church came to be closely associated not only with education but also administration and governance. As a consequence, many traditional villages, called *beo*, structured around kinship, became peripheralized, and the traditional village heads lost their power and authority. Those that had received a high level of formal education, including particularly government officers and religious leaders, became the new elites. This had a major impact on the values and laws that organized peoples' lives. This dramatic transformation can be directly traced to the influence of the Catholic missionaries.[22]

---

20 C. Nooteboom, "Enkele feiten uit de geschiedenis van Manggarai (West Flores)," *Bingkasan Budi* (1950): 207–14.

21 Eduard Jebarus, *Sejarah Persekolahan di Flores* (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2008).

22 Fransiska Widyawati, *The Development of Catholicism in Flores, Eastern Indonesia: Manggaraian Identity, Religion and Politics* (PhD diss., Universiti Gadja Mada, 2013).

John Prior's critique of the effect of the early missionary activity in Flores is relevant to thinking about the transformations effected in the lives of the Florenese, as well as for considering the subsequent changes in missionization and the Church's position on 'development.' Before the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), Church leaders held to the doctrine of the Church as a *societas perfecta*, a perfect society that existed above and beyond any particular cultural or social group.[23] The Church created its own world, quite apart from the village life that existed on Flores, and seemingly oblivious to the colonial world which allowed for its existence.[24] With this approach there was very little compromise with cultural norms that were different and appeared to oppose the Church's ideals. The early Church in Flores expected converts to accept Christianity as a 'package deal,' "to be accepted or rejected as it [was] presented."[25] Prior shows how this approach furnished a very inflexible attitude towards many of the customs of the Florenese people. The Church strategy of baptizing young children, at birth or at school, and in many respects ignoring the 'pagan' elders, who were seen to be in essence unchangeable, did not further the goal of planting an indigenous Church. This is because, as Prior points out, these young people were still brought up within the ideologies and ethical practices of their villages.[26] Hence the world of the Church and the world of the villages in Flores for a long time were overlapping, while remaining distinct.[27]

The Second Vatican Council (1962–65), which re-evaluated the Catholic Church's stand on many issues, set out to create a different relationship between the Church and local communities. The community, the 'people of God,' were placed before the hierarchy of the Church within the Church structure.[28] Theoretically this meant that the Church was to work more at adapting itself locally to merge with the customs of village life, rather than vice versa, a process termed 'inculturation.' This attitude, however, was very slow in making it to the ground. Some of the foreign missionary priests who had spent many years in Flores were sympathetic to indigenous ritual and custom, others were not. Many had a very strict attitude towards traditional sacrifice, seeing it as 'pagan,' though some were willing to accommodate and integrate traditional religious beliefs and practices into Catholicism.[29]

---

23 Prior, *Church and Marriage,* 174.

24 Ibid., 175.

25 Hillman, in Prior, *Church and Marriage,* 26.

26 Ibid., 24.

27 Ibid., 175–82.

28 Ibid., 177–79.

29 Maribeth Erb, "True Catholics: Religion and Identity in Western Flores," *Histoire et Anthropologie Asies* 2 (2003): 125–60.

In the post-independence period, and after the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), a new generation of Florenese priests was educated to be sensitive to cultural concerns, but at the same time most had been removed from their villages at a very early age to engage in education and training. It became again to a large extent a question of individual interest and preference, whether they became involved in furthering the work of 'inculturation.' This distance from local community practices on the part of the clergy remained a bone of contention, which became acute during the conflicts over traditional farming practices and the environment in the immediate reform period of the early 21st century. However, as we will show, it was precisely concern over justice and the environment that had an influence on the local clergy's attitudes toward local practices, when new governmental development plans began to be perceived as a threat to the community and to the environment. The fact that at the beginning of the 21st century almost all of the priests in Manggarai are now local Manggaraian, or from somewhere else on Flores or in Nusa Tenggara Timur Province, means that their interest in local politics is much more acute than that of the earlier European missionaries. They are also generally much more proactive in their willingness to negotiate with, or contest the local government on matters of justice than the foreign priests who sentineled the first efforts toward 'inculturation' and reform in the early Vatican II period.

In general, it can be said that the history of the Catholic mission over the 20th century is a history of the rise of a particular identity on the part of the Florenese people. Given the important role that the Catholic Church has had in the history of development and education in Flores, it is not surprising that the Florenese people identify themselves not just as Florenese but also as Catholics. To be a Manggaraian means to be a Catholic.[30] It can be argued, therefore, that the Church has become the most important institution in the lives of the people of Flores, and that this role continues to grow, in an era of political reform and uncertainty. The Church's values, laws and teachings have been important references for the people of Flores. The people are generally respectful to religious leaders. Priests and bishops have a very prominent position in society, arguably higher and more trusted than the government officials. Although many people now are not hesitant to criticize religious leaders, the voice of Catholic clergy still carries a lot of weight. The Church has strong influence on local political practices, including through attempts to persuade people to choose or to reject particular political candidates. No events, whether good or bad in Manggarai, can be considered without taking into account

30 Ibid.

the role of the Church and, as we shall see, the role of the Church has been particularly significant politically with regards to questions of development and the environment.

Contextualizing the Local and the Global: The Church, Development and the Environment

The Church's concerns about development and the environment have been affected by broader changes that have taken place globally. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, concerns about justice, for example, were more acutely concerned with human exploitation as a result of the industrial revolution, and were not about issues to do with the environment. In 1891 Pope Leo XIII wrote an encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, criticizing the exploitation of workers due to the excesses of the liberal-capitalist economic system in Europe. This encyclical was the first of what has come to be referred to as the Catholic Social Teaching (CST), expressed through papal and episcopal documents. *Rerum Novarum* thus legitimated the Church's involvement in the social, political, and economic structures of the modern world. In 1931, on the 40th anniversary of the *Rerum Novarum*, the Vatican issued its second social encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, on 'social reconstruction' which addressed concerns over unrestrained capitalism. Since 1961, the tradition has been to issue a new social encyclical annually to commemorate the anniversary of the first encyclical.

The CSTs have covered various topics. All have been an influential part of the growing movement for political and economic equality, as they have been concerned with human dignity, solidarity, justice, and the rights of the poor and the vulnerable. In following the concerns of the social teachings since the 1960s, a theology of liberation emerged in Latin America.[31] This theology has encouraged active engagement in responding to injustice as a problem of society, including criticizing the Church as one of the causes of problems. Liberation theology has reassessed the Church's teaching about the kingdom of God. It proposes a thorough critique of the structures that are seen as the root causes of injustice within society, as it promotes a stance of solidarity with the poor and oppressed.[32] Latin American liberation theology has inspired theologians

31 Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (London: SCM Press, 1974.); Richard P. McBrien, *The HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995); J.L. Segondo, *The Liberation Theology* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976).

32 According to Alberigo [*A Brief History of Vatican II*, translated by Matthew Sherry (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2006), GS #1], "The joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the people of our time, especially of those who are poor or afflicted, are the joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well."

in many part of the world to rethink their theological positions, as liberation theologies have emerged in new contexts across Asia, Africa and Europe.

Until the middle of the twentieth century the CST and the popes' encyclicals were very Euro-centric. For instance, the Church gave special attention to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, but gave little attention to the demise of apartheid in South Africa or other political tragedies in Asia. Moreover, the CSTs were entirely anthropocentric; with human beings as the sole focus of development ethics and progress. Very little concern was shown, however, for the environment or ecology.

The Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992 changed this by raising awareness globally of an impending ecological crisis. The ethical stance of the Catholic Church was reshaped and it began speaking much more directly and critically on environmental themes. In the light of growing environmental awareness, CST has increasingly incorporated ecological elements. The massive focus on ecological crises has required the Church to expand its focus and thus, in recent decades, there has been much theological and scriptural reflection on the environment. The Church has spoken out on the need for 'conversion' in the face of the widespread evidence of environmental degradation and has urged people to review the way humankind lives on the earth. This is reflected in Chapter 10 of the Compendium of Catholic Social Teaching (2005), which directly addresses 'safeguarding the environment' as a main theme. Pope John Paul II, in his message for the 1990 World Day of Peace noted the growing awareness,

> that world peace is threatened not only by the arms race, regional conflicts and continued injustices among peoples and nations, but also by a lack of due respect for nature, by the plundering of natural resources and by a progressive decline in the quality of life.... Faced with the widespread destruction of the environment, people everywhere are coming to understand that we cannot continue to use the goods of the earth as we have in the past.

Twenty years later, Pope Benedict delivered a similar statement on the same occasion, arising from the "neglect—if not downright misuse—of the earth and the natural goods that God has given us."[33] Benedict has also spoken of a "covenant between human beings and the environment, which should mirror the creative love of God, from whom we come and towards whom we are journeying."[34]

---

33 Pope Benedict XVI, *Message for the World Day of Peace* (Vatican: 2010), 1.

34 Pope Benedict XVI, *Message for the World Day of Peace* (Vatican: 2008), 7.

Responding to these changes, in the mid-1990s the Vatican established the International Commission of Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation (JPIC). Through the JPIC the 'integrity of creation' gained new prominence in the Church's ethics, and this was also linked directly with the struggle over justice and peace. Following this policy, dioceses, religious congregations, and bishop's conferences throughout the global Catholic Church have established JPIC commissions. In Indonesia, including in Flores and specifically in Manggarai, these commissions became pioneers in struggles over justice and the environment. In the early part of the twenty-first century this began to include the question of mining and its impact.

The Church's changing position with regard to the environment also needs to be contextualized within the national Indonesian situation. In Indonesia during the latter part of the twentieth century 'environmentalism' was part of a changing political landscape, which fluctuated between global and more 'elite' concerns, to those more locally based, focused on environmental injustice. As Cribb shows in his analysis of the politics of the environment in Indonesia, in the 1970s Indonesia came under pressure from the global community to introduce more measures to regulate environmental destruction.[35] New Order elites saw this as an opportunity to limit democratic rights, and used the environment as a way to strengthen the authoritarian, corporatist rule of the regime. Thus, one of the most valuable resources in Indonesia, tropical hard woods, came to be controlled by political elites, partially by applying various strategies to exclude local communities from forests.[36] One such strategy was the creation of national parks and the extension of protected forest reserves originally created for watershed protection at the time of the Dutch colonial regime.[37]

However, many New Order polices that were focused on development counteracted apparent government concerns for environmental destruction. These included agricultural programs using green revolution technologies, large-scale industrialization, leading to extensive pollution, and corrupt practices associated with the allocation of logging permits. The outcome was that New Order environmental rhetoric became increasingly viewed as superficial and the government lost the support of environmental groups. Over time, as Cribb argues, environmental concern opened up space for more wide-ranging

35 Robert Cribb, "Environmentalism in Indonesian Politics," in *Towards Integrated Environmental Law in Indonesia?* eds. Adriaan Bedner and Nicole Niessen (Leiden: CNWS, 2003).

36 Nancy Peluso, *Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

37 Cribb, "Environmentalism in Indonesian Politics," 41.

criticism of the regime.[38] What began as dialogic encounters between the government and environmental groups over ecological concerns eventually grew into more explicit and confrontational criticisms about ineffective governance, human rights abuses, and the trajectory of Indonesia's development.

In this way, Cribb shows in the history of environmentalism in Indonesia's New Order, that environmental concerns can be used both as a tool of repression, on the part of elites to manage resources for their own purposes, as well as a tool of dissent by civil society groups and local communities, to fight against destruction of their livelihoods and abusive, exploitative practices that have ignored many of their rights. He summarizes well, therefore, how both, what might be called the 'environmentalism of the rich' and the 'environmentalism of the poor,' have had important roles to play in Indonesia's political history.[39] The former concerns the conservation of disappearing wilderness and the control of natural resources for the benefit of corporate and state profit, and the latter is attention to deteriorating localities used for everyday livelihoods.

What we show below is the way in which these two environmentalisms continued to have an influence on politics in western Flores in the post-New Order reform period of the early twenty-first century. In Flores environmentalism has been used as a political strategy, as it intersects with developmental concerns in various ways. This was not only the case at the broader national level, but also within the Catholic Church, which has played a specific role in politicizing environmentalism, first as an apparent tool of development, but subsequently as a criticism of and resistance to development. We argue that eventually the more urgent focus on justice has pushed the Church to re-imagine what development is, how it should work, and what the role of the Church should be. Concern with justice, thus appears to have reconfigured the way in which the Church sees 'development,' not as something that comes from without, but as something that comes from within, rejecting a 'de-politicized,' standardized, technocratic approach to development, and in the process, re-politicizing it.

The Church and Environmental Conflict in Western Flores

On the 10th of March 2004, six farmers were killed and twenty-eight others wounded or maimed outside the police station in Ruteng, the capital of

38 Ibid., 44–47.

39 Ramachandra Guha, "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique," *Environmental Ethics* 11 (1989): 71–83; Ramachandra Guha and Juan Martinez-Alier, *Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South* (London: Earthscan Publications, 1997); Rob Nixon, *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

Manggarai Regency. They originated from an area called Colol, where villages, since the time of the Dutch, have been famous for their coffee and other cash crops. These farmers were protesting because a number of their fellow villagers, mostly women and old men, had been arrested for digging up root crops on land from which they had recently been evicted. These events came in response to two years of the local government's strong-armed measures to clear farmers and coffee trees from land that, it was claimed, fell within the boundaries of state-protected forest.

After the end of New Order regime land conflicts proliferated. Some villages sought to reclaim land they felt they had been inadequately compensated for. In other cases population growth led to the opening of forested land that resulted in shrinking mountain springs and also increased flooding in the lowlands. The local government maintained that the only solution for resolving land conflicts and environmental degradation, was strict conservation enforcement. In 2002 they had begun a 're-greening' program which consisted of clearing away any habitation on government claimed forest land. Funds were allocated by the central government to 'clean up' these forests, which meant getting rid of all the cash crops—mostly coffee trees—, that according to the government had been planted on state land and which they identified as the main culprit of ecological degradation.[40]

So in October 2002 the first operations began west of Ruteng, where various government officials, army, police, and hundreds of high school students from Ruteng entered villagers' land, chain-sawed down their coffee trees, and also, candlenut, vanilla and clove trees, and burned down houses. Altogether 2000 hectares of land was cleared. Local NGOs supported the villagers in massive protests, but those who returned to the land were arrested, as were some NGO advocates who supported them. Other advocates, worried about further arrests, travelled to Jakarta to seek help from environmental NGOs as well as from legal aid societies, seeing these programs as a clear assault against indigenous peoples' rights. They formed the Advocates for the Manggaraian People (*Tim Advosasi Rakyat Manggarai*, TARM) and sought to defend the farmers who were on trial for being 'illegal users of the forest' (*perambah hutan*), claiming instead that they were an 'indigenous' and traditional community (*masyarakat adat*) who were simply using the land of their ancestors.

Despite the outrage that the first chain-sawing incident caused, in October 2003 the regent continued the procedures in the village area of Colol where,

40 TARM (Tim Advokasi untuk Rakyat Manggarai). *Kronologis Penggusuran dan Pengusiran Petani dan Masyarakat Adat Meler-Kuwus di Kawasan Hutan Adat Meler Kuwus* (*RTK III*), *Kabupaten Manggaraia, Nusa Tenggara Timur* (Jakarta: WALHI, 2003), 10.

according to reports, the level of belligerence and violence was even greater than in the earlier operation. Not only did they cut down all of the villagers' valuable trees, and burn their houses, but they also took anything they wanted from the villagers' property: livestock, food, household utensils and garden equipment. This plundering was accompanied by constant threats and sexual insults.[41] Despite government claims that these operations were for environmental purposes, according to reports from the Indonesian Environmental Network the local government had in fact signed six contracts for industrial forest concessions with teak and mahogany plantation investors.[42] Many questioned whether teak and mahogany would be any more environmentally beneficial, in terms of ground water loss and ecological changes, than coffee.[43]

In March 2004 several people were arrested and jailed when they tried to return to their land to dig up some root crops. It was when fellow villagers went to Ruteng to protest their detainment that the police opened fire, resulting in the fatalities and casualties referred to above. The incident caused a major outcry among the general public and the investigations conducted in its wake were the focus of much attention. These investigations included studies into the whole history of the coffee clearing operations as well as the history of contestations over the 'forested land.' Various NGOs contested the idea that Manggaraian farmers needed someone else to 'conserve' the forest for them, claiming that their traditional cultural beliefs in spirits protected the deep forests, and the traditional working of the land was ecologically sensitive and hence 'environmentally friendly.'[44] They argued that this traditional relationship had gone out of sync because of government policy during the New Order and the introduction of a capitalist economic system. The TARM rallying cry to 'try to become Manggaraian again' ('*mencoba* [*lagi*] *menjadi orang Manggarai*') was thus a challenge to the local inhabitants to regain control over their land and property, as well as the decision making over them. To achieve this, these NGOs sought to revive traditional cultural beliefs and practices, thus hoping for a return to an environmentally sustainable livelihood.

---

41 Alexander Aur, "Dari Babat Kopi ke Babat Nyawa: Narasi Tragedi Petani Kopi Colol demi Hak-Hak dan Martabat Kemanusiaan Para Petani," in *Gugat Darah Petani Kopi Manggarai*, eds. Eman J. Embu and Robert Mirsel (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2004), 107.

42 TARM. *Kronologis Penggusuran.*

43 John Mansford Prior, *Arnold dan Josef : dua pribadi, satu misi* (Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2003); Frans M. Parera, et al., *Kebebasan pengarang dan masalah tanah air : esai-esai Iwan Simatupang* (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2004).

44 TARM (Tim Advokasi untuk Rakyat Manggarai), "Mencoba [lagi] Menjadi Orang Manggarai: Rekaman Kejahatan Operasi Kehutanan di Manggarai, Nusa Tenggara Timur," *Kertas Posisi Tim Advokasi untuk Rakyat Manggarai* (Jakarta: WALHI, 2004).

The official position of the Catholic Church on this environmental conflict was very controversial. The bishop, a close ally of the regent, supported the government's hard stance towards the coffee farmers' reputed encroachment into government land even though he condemned the violence enacted against the villagers. However many individual priests, including the parish priest in Colol, were actively involved in supporting the villagers' struggle to maintain their coffee lands, and after the tragedy, several religious orders such the Franciscan JPIC commission from Jakarta and the sisters of the Good Shepherd supported and helped the people of Colol. Several groups of priests and members of religious orders outside of the Ruteng Diocese reacted strongly to the tragedy and insisted that the policemen and the regent be brought to court. Many were upset at the official position of the Church and urged the bishop and the Diocese to speak up for the victims. However the bishop would not relent. On the contrary, together with some priests, he even blamed the villagers for the tragedy, saying that it was their fault, since they had not taken care of the protected forest land.

In 2005 the Indonesian government implemented the first direct elections of local officials. This introduced a radically new political dynamic into the environmental dispute in Flores. The district head, who had been in office when the coffee trees were razed and the Ruteng shooting incident occurred, was voted out of office. The new political system gave the people strategic roles in determining who would be their leader, forcing candidates to actively seek votes from the people. The authoritarian leadership styles that characterized the New Order could no longer be sustained. However, the changes have not been altogether positive. The cost of campaigning and of securing support from political parties has resulted in a steep increase in the costs of entering politics.[45] This has opened the door for various outside funders to influence the district-level politics, and has arguably been one of the factors motivating large mining corporations to enter into remote regions of Indonesia. In this new era, environmental issues are increasingly being used as political tools in election campaigns, resulting in a highly politicized debate around the environment.

The winner of the 2005 local elections served two terms in office; however, he did not seek to defend the protected forest lands of Manggarai. Instead, he awarded a mining concession to a Chinese company which included areas within the boundaries of protected forest land. In its plans for development the local government has therefore ironically contributed to the decline

45 Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, eds., *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia: Direct Elections for Local Leaders* (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2009).

of forested areas, and to the destruction of the environment. While its position appears to have reversed in regards to environmental protection, the local government often continues to ignore the rights of the local villagers when it comes to the allocation of mining contracts on village lands.

The Church has also radically changed its position, particularly over its concern with protecting villager rights, their customary activities, and livelihood strategies. This change has been partly due to the political alliance that had existed between the Bishop and the district head who was ousted in 2005. The subsequent death of the Bishop in 2010 opened up the possibility of ecclesial change. The new Bishop immediately made his rejection of mining known by holding mass within a mine site. He underscored a very clear position of the Church in opposition to the government, something that would not have happened in earlier years. Additionally, negative attitudes towards traditions, which could be mustered as political tools against mining, were increasingly softened. Many in the Church hierarchy have come to see the revival of traditional ritual as one means of rejecting mining companies, and of raising awareness about environmental sustainability.

In this context, the Ruteng Diocese has started to hold regular synods and in recent years the question of the environment has become a leading issue. In the Diocese's second synod in 2006–2007 parishioners were asked to identify what they saw as the main problems they were facing. Feedback from these focus group discussions, not surprisingly, highlighted environmental degradation as one of the three dominant issues.[46] This was the first time that the Church in Ruteng Diocese had talked about the issue of the environment in an official meeting. The increased focus on environmental justice was significantly influenced by a growing number of young local priests and lay leaders who had learned about contextual and liberation theology in other parts of the world. Since this synod meeting the theme of the environment has become a main topic in catechesis, mass, and other religious activities. This new emphasis on ecology and indigenous rights clearly builds upon broader theological shifts within the Roman Catholic Church, as already discussed, but it also took place in this specific context only after mining became a serious matter of concern.

The Growth of Mining Resistance in Western Flores

Since the first series of protests in 2007–2010, the JPIC commissions of the Franciscan and Divine Word missionary orders have been a major force in building resistance to mining. They have helped to form a massive movement to provide information to the villagers about the results of mining in other places in

46 Sinode II Keuskupan Ruteng, *Seri Dokumen Puspas,* 2008.

Indonesia and around the world. Building upon their own transnational links, they have established extensive networks with various environmental organizations nationally and internationally. As the movement has grown they have led efforts to bring the anti-mining protests to the United Nations.

Since 2010 the issue of mining has become the main concern for almost all JPIC commissions in Indonesia. More so than any previous issue, the Catholic Church in Flores has actively collaborated with other organizations over the question of mining. For the first time in the history of Catholicism in Flores, most people of all dioceses are united to intensively speak about issues of injustice and the environment. This movement gives a new picture of Flores as a 'Catholic Island.'

In the midst of these activities, the awareness about the negative effects of mining has started to grow. In many cases mining has not given local people wealth, but rather disaster. Mining greatly benefited local government officials and corporations, but local inhabitants have become spectators and even victims. Concern over destruction of the environment is growing, especially where people see the transformation of the land from forests to gapping pits. The irony is that some places which the government previously claimed to be protecting from coffee farmers as protected forest land in the name of environmental conservation, are now being allocated to mining companies and destroyed far more extensively than they could ever have been destroyed by the local communities. This contradiction has not been lost on some of the villagers, who have shown considerable anger at the government over this apparent injustice. The poor get thrown in jail, but the rich not only get away free, but are aided by the police and military. A common saying in recent times is, 'the law cuts sharply below, but bluntly above.'

These questions of environmental injustice have started to create in Manggarai an 'environmentalism of the poor,' which includes concern with deforestation and toxic pollution. Some even attempt to reject a 'consumeristic ethic,' which has been promoted by the government and the mining companies (money is needed and mining jobs are a way to get it), and have embraced what we might call a 'sustainability ethic.' This ethic has strengthened an appreciation of the ways of life of their ancestors, and a desire to guard that way of life, and protect the land and environments which they inherited from the past. A very clear concern is shown for the future generations, who will have nothing if the land is allowed to be mined in the present.

This sustainability ethic is not always achieved in practice, and the discussions are still evolving. But the fact that such issues are now a common topic for conversation in the region is indicative of the extent to which the anti-mining movement has inspired a broad ranging political critique.

This 'environmentalism of the poor' has been fostered by the Church's vocal position on mining and dissemination of information about its destructive effects. Mining has indeed dominated the discussions and politics of the Church in recent years. In Ruteng Diocese the routine Diocese-wide meetings of priests from 2009–2011 were dominated by the issue of mining. The Church also invited experts on mining to several seminars and workshops. Moreover the bishop and several priests have visited mining sites and presided over ecological masses there and held catechesis meetings about the environment and mining. The third synod of Ruteng Diocese has taken the problem of environment and mining as a main issue of their discussions.[47] The Church has asked its officials to learn about mining regulations, investigate mining activities, identify problems, and organize activities to increase awareness of mining and its environmental effects. There have been many seminars and workshops, as well as recommendations, petitions, and statements, which are clearly against mining.

These activities have led to a clear politicization of the Church's involvement in Flores based on a repositioning of its engagement with development. The Church has come to ask very forthrightly: Who will benefit from the government's plans for mining? The young priests involved in the JPIC commissions are not afraid to speak out against the government, and they accuse its representatives of corruption in the allocation of mining contracts. On the other hand, government supporters accuse the Church of taking an 'anti-development' position. These critics argue that the Church's position is intended to ensure that villagers remain poor and lack opportunities for development, since their 'empowerment' and prosperity would result in the Church losing much of its power and authority in Flores. As a way of countering these accusations, the JPIC commissions have been involved in introducing economic alternatives to mining. Various seminars, workshops, and village gatherings have been organized to introduce financial activities, such as micro-credit and savings support groups, as well as new farming approaches. These economic activities have been entwined with various cultural activities that affirm farmers' identities and which refer back to cultural traditions as a means of resisting mining. In this way, through its support for an environmental ethic, the Church has fostered a new religious ethic as well, one which embraces aspects of the message of Vatican II more substantially than had previously been the case.

47 Sinode II Keuskupan Ruteng, *Seri Dokumen Puspas,* 2014.

Conclusion

Resistance to mining in Flores in the twenty-first century has placed the Church in a position that is unique in its history on Flores. For most of the past century the Catholic Church has embraced a role as an important 'development arm' of the ruling government, whether it was the colonial state, the independent Indonesian Republic, the New Order regime, or the early Reform Period (*Reformasi*) government of the 21st century. Over the past decade, however, a crack has appeared in the relationship between the Catholic Church and the government in western Flores, with contestations over the meaning of 'development.' This crack appeared, we argue, because a younger generation of local priests have re-politicized 'development' and its workings. For them it was no longer acceptable to just go along with the established technocratic conceptualization of progress promoted by the state. Instead they found it necessary to examine who would be the winners and losers in the 'development' process, which included being concerned about the detrimental effects it could have, not just on communities, but also on their environments. The Catholic Church's reform, post-Vatican II, and its increasing concern with justice for the marginalized and the destruction of planet earth, influenced by global environmentalist and anti-globalization movements, have seeped into the workings of the Flores Church. Changes in the local clergy brought these young local priests into power within the Church. Catalyzed by the issue of mining in Nusa Tenggara Timur they were not reluctant nor afraid to take on their local government to act decisively and politically on development plans and strategies.

Since the beginning of its mission work in eastern Indonesia, the goal of the Catholic Church was not only to make the people Catholic, but also to aid in their 'development.' This has tended to be imagined as what would now be referred to as a 'top-down' affair. The Church sought to eradicate spiritual beliefs and practices that were seen as inappropriate to the Catholic faith and change the 'undeveloped' life styles to make them more similar to those in the modern, developed world. In the pursuit of this goal, the Church has played a crucial role across Flores in running schools, opening hospitals, building workshops and repair shops, road construction, building houses, and cultivating agriculture. All this has indeed significantly contributed to a changing lifestyle in Flores. Many Florenese have become highly educated, and work in places across Indonesia, even across the world, which must be recognized as an outcome of the education work of the Catholic Church. In carrying out the role of agent of change for the people of Flores, the Church has historically partnered with the local government.

This partnership, however, has become shaky in recent years. With the Church's main goal having shifted from promoting 'development,' defined as a technically achievable and universally beneficial progression, to working toward a more 'just' society, the Catholic Church often finds itself in a clash with the local governments across eastern Indonesia. This has been true in Flores, as we have shown, with the Catholic Church's active opposition to the local government's pursuit of mining as a project for economic development. At the same time this contrary position to the government has also put the Church into a different position in its relationship with the villagers. In its pursuit of resistance, the Church has shown greater levels of respect toward local traditions than it had in the past. Local traditions are revived, as means of resisting mining company encroachment into local land, and to resurrect a sense of pride in a farming lifestyle promoted as sustainable, in contrast to the destructive activities of the mining industry. These different approaches of the Church inspired questions not only about what 'development' is, but also about the meaning of the Christian mission. In both cases there seems to have been a certain 'opening up' in recent years towards less dogmatic positions. This study shows the complexity of the factors involved in such a change: not only have there been modifications in the global Church's agenda, and in international development paradigms, but the local Church and government administration have also changed, in part due to the arrival in Flores of new mining operations. The Church's active leadership in the anti-mining movement has thus resulted in a religious politicization of development, which has had far-reaching consequences for the Catholic Church's position in Flores society.

Bibliography

Aditjondro, George. "Dialektika antara Pemekaran Daerah dan Pertambangan di NTT." In *Berkah atau Kutuk?: Pertambangan di Flores-Lembata*, edited by Alex Jebadu, Marsel Vande Raring, Max Regus and Simon Suban Tukan, 321–29. Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2009.

Alberigo, Giuseppe. *A Brief History of Vatican II*. Translated by Matthew Sherry. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2006.

Argyrou, Vassos. *The Logic of Environmentalism: Anthropology, Ecology and Postcoloniality*. New York: Berghahn, 2005.

Asad, Talal. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Asad, Talal. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Asia Development Bank. "Appraisal of the Biodiversity Conservation Project in Flores and Siberut in Indonesia." Manila, 1992.

Aur, Alexander. "Dari Babat Kopi ke Babat Nyawa: Narasi Tragedi Petani Kopi Colol demi Hak-Hak dan Martabat Kemanusiaan Para Petani." In *Gugat Darah Petani Kopi Manggarai*, edited by Eman J. Embu and Robert Mirsel, 102–20. Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2004.

Benedict, XVI. *Message for the World Day of Peace*. Vatican: 2008.

Benedict, XVI. *Caritas in Veritate.* Vatican: 2009.

Benedict, XVI. *Message for the World Day of Peace*. Vatican: 2010.

Brockington, Dan. *Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania.* Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis Press, 2002.

Buscher, Bram and Veronica Davidov. *The Ecotourism –Extraction Nexus: Political Economies and Rural Realities of (un)Comfortable Bedfellows.* London: Routledge, 2014.

Coolhaas, W.P. "Bijdrage tot de kennis van het Manggaraische Volk (West Flores)." *Tijdscrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig* 59 (1942): 148–77, 328–60.

Cribb, Robert. "Environmentalism in Indonesian Politics." In *Towards Integrated Environmental Law in Indonesia?* edited by Adriaan Bedner and Nicole Niessen. Leiden: CNWS, 2003.

Dale, Cypri Jehan Paju. *Kuasa, Pembangunan dan Pemiskinan Sistematik.* Labuan Bajo: Sunspirit Books, 2013.

Denar, Benny. *Mengapa Gereja (Harus) Tolak Tambang. Sebuah Tinjauan Etis, Filosofis dan Teologis Korporasi Tambang.* Maumere: Ledalero, 2015.

Embu, Eman J. and Robert Mirsel eds. *Gugat: Darah Petani Kopi Manggarai*. Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2004.

Erb, Maribeth. "True Catholics: Religion and Identity in Western Flores." *Histoire et Anthropologie Asies* 2 (2003): 125–60.

Erb, Maribeth. "Talk of Corruption in Eastern Indonesian Communities: Reactions to Local Government in the Post-Suharto Reform Era." in special issue on Eastern Indonesia Reform, *Asian Journal of Social Science* 39.2 (2011): 171–95.

Erb, Maribeth. "Dissonance of Conservation: Environmentalities and Environmentalism of the Poor." *Raffles Bulletin of Zoology* 25 (2012): 3–15.

Erb, Maribeth and Yosef Jelahut. "For the People or for the Trees?: Case Study of Violence and Conservation in Ruteng Nature Recreation Park." In *Biodiversity and Human Livelihoods in Protected Areas: Case Studies from the Malay Archipelago*, edited by Navjot Sodhi, Greg Acciaioli, Maribeth Erb and Alan J.K. Tan, 222–40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Erb, Maribeth and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, eds. *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia: Direct Elections for Local Leaders*. Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2009.

Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

Fountain, Philip, Robin Bush and Michael Feener, eds. *Religion and the Politics of Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015a.

Fountain, Philip, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, "Religion and the Politics of Development," in *Religion and the Politics of Development*, edited by Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, 11–34. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015b.

Guha, Ramachandra. "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique." *Environmental Ethics* 11 (1989): 71–83.

Guha, Ramachandra and Juan Martinez-Alier. *Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South*. London: Earthscan Publications, 1997.

Gutierrez, Gustavo. *A Theology of Liberation*, London: SCM Press, 1974.

Hasiman, Ferdy. *Monster Tambang, Gerus Ruang Hidup Warga Nusa Tenggara Timur*. Jakarta: JPIC-OFM, 2014.

Jebadu, Alex, et al., eds. *Pertambangan di Flores-Lembata: Berkah atau Kutuk?*. Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2009.

Jebarus, Eduard. *Sejarah Persekolahan di Flores*. Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2008.

Kapanlagi.com. "Eksploitasi Tambang Emas di Lembata Dimulai 2008." Accessed September 19, 2009. http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/old/news20070708.html.

Kirsch, Stuart. *Mining Capitalism: The Relationship between Corporations and their Critics*. Oakland: University of California Press, 2014.

Kleden, Paul Budi. "Menimbang Rakyat atau Mengambang Emas? Tentang Rencana Tambang di Lembata." In *Berkah atau Kutuk?: Pertambangan di Flores-Lembata*, edited by Alex Jebadu, Marsel Vande Raring, Max Regus and Simon Suban Tukan, 91–7. Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2009.

Lawang, Robert. *Stratifikasi Sosial di Cancar-Manggarai Flores Barat*. PhD diss., Universitas Indonesia, 1989.

Lawang, Robert. *Konflik Tanah di Manggarai Flores Barat. Pendekatan Sosiologi*. Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press, 1999.

Li, Tania. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.

McBrien, Richard P. *The HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism.* San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995.

Mirsel, Robert. "Masyarakat Manggarai: Sejarah, Alam Pikiran, Tanah dan Hutan." In *Gugat Darah Petani Kopi Manggarai*, edited by Eman J. Embu and Robert Mirsel. Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2004.

Mitchell, Timothy. *The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Nixon, Rob. *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Nooteboom, C. "Enkele feiten uit de geschiedenis van Manggarai (West Flores)." *Bingkasan Budi* (1950): 207–14.

Orin Bao, Sareng. *Nusa Nipa: Nama Pribumi Nusa Flores*. Ende: Percetakan Arnoldus, 1969.

Parera, Frans M., et al., *Kebebasan pengarang dan masalah tanah air : esai-esai Iwan Simatupang*. Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2004.

Peluso, Nancy. *Rich Forests, Poor People: Resource Control and Resistance in Java*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

Peluso, Nancy. "Coercing Conservation: The Politics of State Resource Control." *Global Environmental Change* (June 1993): 199–217.

Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*. 2005.

Prior, John Mansford. *Church and Marriage in an Indonesian Village*. Studies in the Intercultural History of Christianity no.55. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1988.

Prior, John Mansford. *Arnold dan Josef : dua pribadi, satu misi.* Maumere: Penerbit Ledalero, 2003.

Propinsi SVD Ruteng. *Buku Kenangan 25 Tahun*, 13 Mei, 1988.

Salemink, Oscar. "The Purification, Sacralisation and Instrumentalisation of Development." In *Religion and the Politics of Development*, edited by Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and Michael Feener. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015.

von Schnitzler, Antina. "Traveling Technologies: Infrastructure, Ethical Regimes and the Materiality of Politics in South Africa." *Cultural Anthropology* 28.4 (2013): 670–93.

von Schnitzler, Antina. "Performing Dignity: Human Rights, Citizenship and the Techno-Politics of Law in South Africa." *American Ethnologist* 41.2 (2014): 336–50.

Segondo, J.L. *The Liberation Theology*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1976.

Sinode II Keuskupan Ruteng. *Seri Dokumen Puspas*. 2008.

Steenbrink, K. *Catholics in Indonesia. 1808–1902: A Documented History.* Vol. 1. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003.

Steenbrink, K. *Catholics in Indonesia. 1903–1942: A Documented History*. Vol. 2. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.

Steenbrink, K. and J. Aritonang, eds. *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Tambang Online. "Lembata Akan Jadi Tambang Terbesar Di Dunia." Last modified 20 January 2009. Accessed on 19 September 2009. http://www.majalahtambang.com/detail_berita.php?category=18&newsnr=1015.

TARM (Tim Advokasi untuk Rakyat Manggarai). *Kronologis Penggusuran dan Pengusiran Petani dan Masyarakat Adat Meler-Kuwus di Kawasan Hutan Adat Meler Kuwus (RTK 111), Kabupaten Manggarai, Nusa Tenggara Timur*. Jakarta: WALHI, 2003.

TARM (Tim Advokasi untuk Rakyat Manggarai). "Mencoba [lagi] Menjadi Orang Manggarai: Rekaman Kejahatan Operasi Kehutanan di Manggarai, Nusa Tenggara Timur." *Kertas Posisi Tim Advokasi untuk Rakyat Manggarai*. Jakarta: WALHI, 2004.

Watts, M. 2004. "Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria." *Geopolitics* 9, 1 (2004): 50–80.

Widyawati, Fransiska. "Kolonialisme, Islamisasi dan Masuknya Agama Katolik di Manggarai." *Missio*, 4/1 (2012).

Widyawati, Fransiska. *The Development of the Catholicism in Flores, Eastern Indonesia: Manggaraian Identity, Religion and Politics*. PhD diss., Universitas Gadja Mada, 2013.

CHPATER 5

The New Missionaries of Development: The Indonesian Council of Churches and Village Development Projects, 1971–1982

Noëmi Rui

In the 18th and 19th centuries European colonial powers began justifying their transnational empires with the language of a 'civilizing mission' in which colonial rule was imagined as a moral duty that had to be maintained for the sake of the colonized.[1] In so doing the colonial authorities drew heavily on Christian mission rhetoric and incipient humanitarian morality. Just as Christian mission rhetoric was used to buttress colonialism, after the Second World War concepts of development—secular or religious—often included similar justifications for the moral and political necessity of development projects undertaken by the West across the globe. This included what Immanuel Wallerstein called "the unavoidable internal feeling of cultural or 'theoretical' superiority" of the so-called 'civilized world.'[2]

Christian agents—during the colonial era and since—have considere that a part of their role in the world has been to provide a range of services, including education, healthcare, new techniques in agriculture and new cultural or religious orientations. But this has not always been understood as participating in 'development.' The rise of development discourse in the second half of the 20th century raised new questions for church and missionary groups about whether or how they would engage with this new ideological frame. In 1966 the World Council of Churches (WCC), a major worldwide interchurch Council founded in 1948 which operates as an umbrella organization for Protestant and Eastern Orthodox Christian churches,[3] decided that member churches

1 Larry Grubbs, *Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 9; Miwa Hirono, *Civilizing Missions: International Religious Agencies in China* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

2 Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "African Historical Studies: Academic Knowledge as Usable Past," *African Studies Review* 32 (1989): 3. See also Ngô's 2016 study [*The New Way: Protestantism and the Hmong in Vietnam* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016)] which examines similar dynamics in the conversion of Hmong to Christianity in highland Vietnam.

3 The Roman Catholic Church is notably not a member of the WCC, although the WCC does sometimes invite Catholics to join discussions in a consultative capacity.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_006

and missionary organizations should strengthen their involvement in development activities, even at the cost of traditional forms of proselytizing through missionary work. This decision initiated a broad-ranging discussion within the WCC about how development activities should be conducted and who should be involved.[4] The primary issue was the question of how to engage in development while still maintaining the distinctive Christian identity, theology and mission of the WCC.[5]

Drawing upon Corinna Unger's call: "[…] to analyse in greater detail how ideas about development and modernisation circled the globe, how they were appropriated, and who transported them,"[6] this chapter attempts to shed light on links between global concepts and local practices, exploring the ways in which theoretical concepts of development were implemented and analyzing how the concepts were adapted to the needs of particular contexts. This chapter presents a case study of the circulation of development by examining how the WCC and their Indonesian counterpart, the Indonesian Council of Churches (Dewan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia/DGI), engaged with development activities in the context of Indonesia. In particular, I examine the roles of Christianity as institutions, theologies, identities, and global networks in this process of circulation, translation, and implementation.

Historians of development have highlighted diverse ways in which development policies have served as instruments of foreign policy goals both during and after the Cold War.[7] According to this view, the goals of developmental policies had largely been determined by the interests of Western states. However, this approach neglects the fact that the so-called recipient countries played active roles of the process themselves. As has been increasingly noted in the literature, development concepts and projects were rarely simply the outcome

4 See especially Zaugg-Ott [*Entwicklung oder Befreiung?: die Entwicklungsdiskussion im Ökumenischen Rat der Kirchen von 1968 bis 1991* (Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 2004)] who examines how the WCC implemented development, including questions of whether WCC development strategies were more influenced by 'development' or 'liberation' discourses. Zaugg-Ott focuses his study on debates within WCC conferences from 1968 until 1991.

5 Zaugg-Ott, *Entwicklung oder Befreiung,* 31–55.

6 Corinna Unger, "Histories of Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections, Future Research," *H-Soz-Kult* (Berlin, Germany), December 9, 2010. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2010-12-001, 26–27.

7 Christopher M. Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005); Sara Lorenzini, *Due Germanie in Africa: la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la competizione per i mercati di materie prime e tecnologia* (Firenze: Polistampa, 2003); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

of unilateral implementation and instead were shaped by intensive exchange between a wide variety of agents.[8] In these discussions of development's history the roles of Christian churches have, however, been largely neglected.[9] This followed a more generally secularist perspective in which 'religion' was regarded as an aspect of 'tradition,' and thus an obstacle to development or even a 'development taboo.'[10] Modernization theory thus discounted religion and its role in development.[11] At the same time it saw 'secularization' as driving toward the diminishing social influence of religion, understood as a desirable goal and those countries aspiring to be developed were imagined as necessarily also being secular.[12] Nevertheless, as Larry Grubbs argues in *Secular Missionaries*, the difference between the Christian 'civilizing mission' during the colonial era and Western concepts such as the 'mission' of 'modernization' were not as profound as often asserted.[13] Both visions of social transformation shared assumptions about linear historical progress propelled by technological innovation.[14] Progress along this path was marked in stage of evolutionary hierarchies of development, and it carried with it assumptions that those at advanced stages of development were obligated to help those lagging behind.[15] The concept of 'social engineering' as formulated by Karl Popper in 1945 was rediscovered in the 1970s as the optimistic idea of being able to construct a new human society through technical inventions and rational methods.[16] Many of the dominant development paradigms of the 1970s and 1980s were deeply

8 Hubertus Buschel and Daniel Speich, *Entwicklungswelten: Globalgeschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2009); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

9 Ben Jones and Marie Juul Petersen, "Instrumental, Narrow, Normative? Reviewing Recent Work on Religion and Development," *Third World Quarterly* 32.7 (2011): 1291–306.

10 Kurt Alan Ver Beek, "Spirituality: A Development Taboo," *Development in Practice* 10.1 (2000): 31–43.

11 For further information, see: Alexander Ervin, *Cultural Transformations and Globalization: Theory, Development, and Social Change* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2015); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

12 Bryan Ronald Wilson, *Religion in Sociological Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 49.

13 Grubbs, *Secular Missionaries.*

14 Ibid., 9.

15 Uma Kothari, *A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2005).

16 K.R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966).

inflected by logics of social engineering.[17] In the case of Indonesia, Michael Feener has called attention to the ways in which state development projects have engaged with Islamic religious leaders in the formulation of ambitious social engineering experiments throughout and even after the New Order (1965–1998).[18]

While there were close similarities between a range of secular and Christian understandings of development in the 1970s, a number of Christian actors, including the WCC, actively sought to articulate a distinctly Christian approach. Given the WCC's extensive involvement in community-building missions, its long-established presence in economically marginalized regions, and their often self-proclaimed political neutrality,[19] the churches and missionaries came to be seen as credible partners for donors, governments, and local populations. Yet during the first UN-declared development decades in the 1960s and 1970s the WCC repeatedly and publicly criticized large-scale modernist development projects financed by the World Bank and Western states. It was against this backdrop that in 1973 the WCC put forth its alternative vision of 'holistic' or 'integral' development, calling for development initiatives that would include not just economic targets but also social, ecological and spiritual goals.

The WCC was active all over the world, including having a very strong and direct connection in the 1970s and 1980s with Indonesia. In this majority Muslim country the relatively young churches of the newly independent nation often relied on Western missionary organizations and the churches which had established them for staffing churches and schools, as well as funding.[20] The critical

17 Grubbs, *Secular Missionaries.*

18 R. Michael Feener, *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia* (Oxford: University Press, 2013).

19 In the early 1970s the Joint Committee on Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX), convened by the WCC and the Holy See, was very active in shaping discussions about development within the WCC. In 1974 some member churches accused the WCC of supporting revolutionary social movements. To avoid internal conflict, the WCC headquarters renounced the work of SODAPAX, which was subsequently closed down in 1980. The WCC also declared itself to be an apolitical organisation. But as Cviic ["The Politics of the World Council of Churches." *The World Today: Chatham House Review* 35.9 (1979): 369–76] points out it is questionable as to whether the WCC ever achieved its goal of political neutrality. Over the years it has engaged in a series of activities which can only be construed as thoroughly political. Nevertheless the framing of neutrality was an important political intervention to protect its activities, and its member churches, from unwanted criticism.

20 See also: Mujiburrahman, *Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

analysis of development cooperation carried out by Christian Faith Based Organizations (FBO) in the Global South is a relatively new field of study.[21] In the case of Indonesia there is a growing literature in the area, building on research into historical connections between the former Dutch colonial churches and their Indonesian counterparts and also examining the difficult and often conflict-ridden relationship between Christian organizations and the Muslim majority during the late Suharto and post-Suharto eras.[22] Considering the amount of research done in this broader field the case of Indonesia is remarkably well represented by diverse disciplinary perspectives analyzing the roles of Christian churches with the development policy in Indonesia.[23]

This chapter begins by analyzing debates about development policy within the WCC. I focus particularly on their conceptualization of the idea of holistic development in the 1970s, including examining how they approached the demand to proclaim the Gospel. The second part focuses on the circulations of

21 Séverine Deneulin and Masooda Bano, *Religion in Development: Rewriting the Secular Script* (London: Zed Books, 2009); Katharina Hofer, "The Role of Evangelical NGOs in International Development: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Uganda," *Afrika Spectrum* (2003): 375–98; Esther Imhof, *Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Religion: Fallstudie und ethische Reflexion zu einem angespannten Verhältnis* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012).

22 Lorraine Aragon, *Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); Jan S. Aritonang and Karel A. Steenbrink, eds. *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Maribeth Erb, "Between Empowerment and Power: The Rise of the Self-supporting Church in Western Flores, Eastern Indonesia," *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 21.2 (2006): 204–29; Webb Keane, *Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007); Susanne Schröter, ed., *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power* (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010).

23 Aragon, *Fields of the Lord*; Wilhelm Conterius Djulei, *Die kirchliche Entwicklungsarbeit im Erzbistum Ende—Indonesien: Studie zu einer kirchlichen Entwicklungsarbeit im Lichte der katholischen Soziallehre und im Verhältnis zur Mission* (Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 1999); Philip Fountain, *Translating Service: An Ethnography of the Mennonite Central Committee* (PhD diss., Australia National University, 2011); Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, eds. *Religion and the Politics of Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Tania Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007); Suzanne Moon, *Technology and Ethical Idealism: A History of Development in the Netherlands East Indies* (Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2007); Philip Quarles van Ufford and Ananta K. Giri, eds. *A Moral Critique of Development: In Search of Global Responsibilities* (Mirano: Routledge, 2003); Karel A. Steenbrink, "The Power of Money: Development Aid for and through Christian Churches in Modern Indonesia, 1965–1980," in *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power*, ed. Susanne Schröter (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 105–36.

this concept of holistic development and its adaption by the DGI to the context of Indonesia. These two parts are connected in the third section in which the conceptualization of the 'village development approach' is linked to its local implementation through the example of the 'motivator project' between 1973 and 1982. The chapter concludes with reflections on the ways in which the 'expertise' of these motivators placed them in a new position, one which moves across and complicates labels such as 'secular missionaries' or 'religious development workers.'

The Concept of Holistic Development in the WCC

Between 1966 and 1974 the WCC held a number of conferences focused on development which sought to address changing understandings of their mission.[24] At 1968 conferences in Beirut and Uppsala the 'old guard' of American and European men from established churches largely drove the conversations.[25] However, this came to be challenged with the increasing assertiveness of former colonial churches. Accordingly, the balance of power began shifting as the representatives from so-called receiver-countries gained greater influence.[26] The more conservative representatives of the WCC held onto concepts of development based on modernization and the stabilization of established structures and they largely rejected the idea of churches interacting closely with revolutionary movements, which were at the time gaining momentum across large parts of Asia, Latin America and Africa.[27] On the other hand, leaders of the churches from developing countries, influenced by liberation theology, the social movements of the 1960s, and revolutionary movements, began to openly challenge the WCC's paternalistic approach to development work and mission.

24 For further information see: Katharina Kunter and Annegreth Schilling, *Globalisierung der Kirchen Der Ökumenische Rat der Kirchen und die Entdeckung der Dritten Welt in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren Band 058 Band 058* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014) or Zaugg-Ott, *Entwicklung oder Befreiung.*

25 The old leadership of the WCC, mostly white men from Europa or the USA. For further information see: Kunter and Schilling, *Globalisierung der Kirchen,* 336–43.

26 Ibid.; See also Zaugg-Ott, *Entwicklung oder Befreiung.*

27 For further information: Kunter and Schilling, *Globalisierung der Kirchen,* 77–119; Hans-Georg Link, *Hoffnungswege: wegweisende Impulse des Ökumenischen Rates der Kirchen aus sechs Jahrzehnten* (Frankfurt: Lembeck, 2008).

In the WCC's 1970 conference in Montreux, the concluding paper by Samuel Parmar presented what has now become known as the 'Montreux-Trilogy.'[28] According to his formula, the development work of the Church should be guided by "economic development, social justice and self-reliance."[29] At roughly the same time the Joint Council for Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX), established in 1967 as a collaboration between the WCC and the Pontifical Commission Justice and Peace of the Holy See, began formulating its own alternative understanding of development, and the role of the Church therein. SODEPAX was heavily influenced by liberation theology and their assigned task was to promote development, justice, and peace by means of study and reflection programs.

The synthesis between the SODEPAX framing of development and the Montreux-Trilogy gained institutional momentum when the development executive organization of the WCC, the Commission for Church Participation in Development (CCPD), explicitly embraced both framings. The resulting new guidelines defined the WCC's development work in the 1970s as a commitment "toward a just, participatory and sustainable society."[30] According to a 1968 statement, the main challenges for future holistic development plans were the reduction of hunger, provision of education, family planning, the stabilization of the political framework and forcing Western countries to interact more justly with developing countries in the international market.[31]

One key emphasis that arose in the course of these discussions was the importance of 'people's participation in development.'[32] While the concept of 'participation' had emerged in the 1940s in the Colonial Office of the United Kingdom, the term as interpreted by the CCPD was greatly influenced by Latin American liberation theology in the late 1960s—as a bottom-up, people-centered development approach which prioritized popular education,

28 Samuel Parmar was a Professor of Economics in India and chairman of the working group on Church and Society. He was also a member of the WCC Commission on the Churches Participation in Development.

29 Philip Land, "Sodepax: An Ecumenical Dialogue," *Ecumenical Review: A Quarterly* 37 (1985): 45.

30 WCC 24.2.109, Just Participatory and Sustainable Society—Some Remarks on the Asian Region, 12.-15 September 1978.

31 WCC: 24.2.051, Statement of the Conference on World Cooperation for Development, 27.4.1968.

32 PGI 184–254, People's participation in development in Indonesia, Workshop on people's participation in development, Bossey, 30.03.1973.

conscientization, and training for transformation.[33] This approach was explicitly juxtaposed to the top-down, technocratic and blueprint planning of state-led modernization.[34] This strategy became influential in the village development projects implemented in Indonesia in the 1970s as part of new work toward a 'holistic' development approach.[35]

On the place of proselytizing as part of development activities, the WCC was ambivalent. Several conferences were held all over the world to discuss how to combine development work and proclamation of the gospel. A prominent line of thinking at these conferences was that, drawing on an optimistic framing about the possibility of constructing new social systems, whether by revolution or reformation, conversion was seen primarily as an advantageous side effect of development work. According to mainstream opinion within the WCC in the 1970s, the Church's development work would generate incentives to convince recipients of the value of converting to Christianity.[36] At the same time, the reluctance of the WCC to elaborate its objectives in relation to a project of evangelization also reflects the tension that was mounting within Indonesia at that time over perceived threats of "Christianization" (*kristenisasi*) among Muslims that were amplified in reaction to the triumphalist discourses of some foreign protestant missionaries active in the country.[37]

33 Originally in Latin America this was centred on the importance of the idea of being aware of the conditions of social and political injustice, and of making others aware as well.

34 Hickey and Mohan 2004: 4–9.

35 This can be seen clearly in different sources from the early 1970s, including: PGI 184–254, Dr. Fridolin Ukur, Indonesia as One Area of Church Witness, Service and Participation in Development—Obstacles to be Overcome, September 1973; PGI-184-254- Drs. HJ Pooroe, Motivasi Pelayanan Gereja 2 di Indonesia dalam rangka Partisipasi Gereja didalam Pembangunan, 28.09.1973; PGI 184–254, Indonesia and the Development Center—DGI, 18.04.1974.

36 In the early 1980s this opinion was challenged and reformulated by new understandings of how development and evangelisation should be combined. While highly influential these changes lie outside the focus of this chapter on the WCC in the 1970s. For further information see: Kunter and Schilling, *Globalisierung der Kirchen*; Zaugg-Ott, *Entwicklung oder Befreiung.*

37 On Indonesian Muslim discourses on 'Christianisation' during this period, see: R. Michael Feener, *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), Mujiburrahman *Feeling Threatened*, and M.C. Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2012).

Development Discourse in the Indonesian Council of Churches

The relationship between the Dutch colonial administration, Christian missionaries, and the churches they planted, was complex. On one hand Christian missionary and church activities were tightly controlled by the colonial government. Strict limitations were placed on evangelization in order to avoid potential tensions in Muslim majority regions. But on the other hand the colonial administration frequently privileged Christian converts and missionary schools and universities were for a long time regarded as the leading education facilities in the Dutch East Indies.[38] After gaining independence, President Soekarno established *Pancasila* as the official ideology of the new Indonesian nation. *Pancasila* was based upon 'five principles': Belief in one God (*Ketuhanan Maha Esa*), Just and Civil Humanity, National Unity, Democracy, and Social Justice.[39] In line with this, the government required every Indonesian citizen to officially declare adherence to one of five recognized world religions: Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Protestant Christianity, and Catholicism.[40] The state heavily regulated religious affairs in attempting to contain and channel religious organizations in line with national development agendas. These relationships were, furthermore, reconfigured again after the establishment of the New Order regime following the mass killings of 1965 as tensions between government officials, Islamic organizations, and Christian leaders in the country were exacerbated in new ways.

In the years between independence and 1970, Indonesian Protestant churches faced a number of distinct challenges. A significant problem was the desperate financial situation of the Indonesian churches and a general lack of qualified personnel and leaders. It is was this context that the Indonesian Council of Churches (Dewan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia; DGI) was formed in 1950 as the national umbrella movement for Protestant churches and the national chapter of the WCC.[41] Participation in the WCC allowed the national office to access WCC funding while still being able to develop their own

38 For more on this, see, Aragon, *Fields of the Lord*, as well as Erica Larsen's chapter in this volume.

39 For further information see also: Michael Wood, *Official History in Modern Indonesia: New Order Perceptions and Counterviews* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

40 Schröter, *Christianity in Indonesia,* 11–15.

41 In 1984 the General Assembly of the DGI in Ambon changed their Name to Persekutan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia (PGI—Communion of Churches in Indonesia). To avoid confusion the term DGI is used throughout the chapter.

independent structure. A prominent field of cooperation between the DGI and WCC was the development agenda.

The DGI was closely related to the broader Indonesian nationalist movement as both sought to unify ethnically and geographically diverse communities as part of the project of nation-building.[42] While the leadership of the DGI actively pursued their agenda to form one united Church in Indonesia which shared the same confession, order and liturgy, this goal proved elusive. Many of the DGI's member churches were struggling to find their own identity following often quite traumatic shifts in leadership, including the end of close ties with missionary organizations and mother churches in Europe. In response to a broadly-shared lack of enthusiasm for unification, and drawing on the national slogan of 'Unity in Diversity' (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*), DGI leadership gradually modified their goal to accept ongoing institutional and confessional diversity. According to Zakaria, "The unity was situated more in the common mission and vision of manifesting the Gospel in various possible ways in people's lives, rather than in a rigid structure of centralized organization."[43] Even though the DGI continued to play a significant role in the national and international network of churches and the development policy in Indonesia, the organization was relatively weak within the political settings of Indonesia. As a minority group in Indonesia, DGI leaders were frequently more concerned with their at times precarious position within Indonesian politics than for the struggle of a holistic development approach as articulated by the WCC.[44]

One challenge the DGI faced in its nationalist ambitions was the strong regional connections of most of its member churches. Many of the oldest, largest and most powerful churches were embedded in particular places and ethnic groups as writing in 1973 DGI leader and theologian Fridolin Ukur highlighted these divisions in a report to the organization:

> Most of our churches in Indonesia, established by various mission boards, are tribal or ethnic churches (…). We may talk about church oneness and national unity, but we all are consciously and stubbornly clinging such kinds of division.[45]

---

42 For further information see: Aritonang and Steenbrink, eds. *A History of Christianity in Indonesia.*

43 J. Ngelow Zakaria, "Indonesian Protestantism towards the 21st Century," in *Reshaping Protestantism in a Global Context*, ed. Volker Küster (Berlin, LIT Verlag, 2009), 80.

44 Ibid.

45 PGI 184–254, Dr. Fridolin Ukur, Indonesia as One Area of Church Witness, Service and Participation in Development—Obstacles to be overcome, September 1973, 9.

Ukur also pointed to suspicion among member churches that the language of 'unity' was simply another term for internal colonialism, with Java-centred institutions coming to dominate the outlying islands. Fear of the 'Javanization' of the church placed limits on how vigorously DGI leaders could pursue their unification agenda.[46]

Ukur's report also discusses tensions emerging from the DGI's relationship with the Indonesian state. Suharto's New Order regime considered the religious institutions as an alternative structure of power which threatened to challenge national stability, especially in the outlying regions. These suspicions were especially pronounced when Indonesian church personnel and institutions received foreign funding. Ukur argued that "this situation created or still creates impressions that churches might become the last defense of a colonial hook."[47] To overcome these tensions the DGI endeavored to appear almost totally apolitical. One way to achieve this was by cooperating with the government in carrying out development activities, as the Indonesian state began experimenting with ways in which funds from foreign missionary sources could be channeled in ways that supported their own development projects in some parts of the country. This was particularly important for health care and education in areas outside of Java where the government's reach was limited. In such cases the government tended to view cooperation with the churches' long-established networks very positively.[48]

The New Order's five-year development plans (*Repelita*) closely followed modernization approaches which emphasized the importance of pursuing economic growth through large-scale top-down investments.[49] The DGI's engagement with this approach to development was always complicated. However they had to delicately seek to bridge the dominant distinctions drawn

46 Ibid., 3–6.

47 Ibid., 8.

48 According to reports of ICCO and the DGI the idea that churches will interact apolitically was so far spread in the Indonesian society that they could work with political prisoners without being suspected as pro-communist. For further information see: Documents of ICCO: Box 289 288.

49 The Ministry of National Development Planning (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional*, Bappenas) created the governmental five-year development plans—the *Repelitas*—which served as overarching frameworks for national development. Although alternative development goals were mentioned in the national development agenda, these tended to be marginalised in the Repelitas and, therefore, also in development practice. See Radius Prawiro, *Indonesia's Struggle for Economic Development: Pragmatism in Action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 95–212.

between the government's five-year plans and its *Pancasila* ideology on one hand, and the increasing radicalism of the WCC on the other. These tensions over differing development discourses were not merely theoretical but rather were negotiated during the course of specific projects. For example, the DGI became involved in a number of very large governmental programs, including the controversial transmigration scheme, large rail and road infrastructure projects, and the national 'alphabetization' campaign of *Repelita II* (1974–1979). The DGI's participation in such projects ran directly against the approach advocated by the WCC which, as outlined earlier, promoted a bottom-up model of development which was both holistic and participatory.[50] While embracing the WCC agenda by proclaiming their desire to pursue development as an "integral activity to develop the human being as a whole,"[51] in actual fact its cooperation with the state frequently saw it approach development in ways that more closely resembled the infrastructural, top-down, large-scale initiatives favored by New Order technocrats.

The DGI: Development, Theology and *Pancasila*

Development cooperation with the New Order government was accompanied by considerable debate within the DGI. Likewise, within the WCC, some member churches accused the DGI of placing too much emphasis on social and political problems and betraying its task of carrying out mission and evangelism.[52] In seeking to counter this criticism Fridolin Ukur and others in the DGI proposed a 'Theology of Development,' which would help justify and legitimate their activities.[53] Ukur argued that the church needed a new definition of mission because otherwise it would face the same misfortune as Western churches, many of which were at the time experiencing significant drop-offs in membership. As maintained by Ukur, the loss of power of European churches was caused by their lack of active participation in the development of their

50 Kunter and Schilling, *Globalisierung der Kirchen*, 99; PGI 184–254, Indonesia and Development Center—DGI, 18.04.1974., 14.

51 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980, 9–10.

52 PGI 184–254, Dr. Fridolin Ukur, Problems of Development and Missiology, September 1973, 1.

53 For further information: Ignatius Swart, *The Churches and the Development Debate: The Promise of a Fourth Generation Approach* (Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2006).

nations. Processes of modernization and secularization therefore resulted in their exclusion from wider society.[54]

In his paper presented to the 1973 DGI conference "Consultation on Strategy for Service and Development" Ukur defended the DGI's involvement in development by arguing that it was paternalistic approach to mission that needed modification. According to him it was no longer appropriate to see the mission of the church as only preaching the gospel in order to attract new believers. The new mission of the church had to address the human being as a whole. The church had to follow an integrated approach to development which did not only seek the salvation of the soul, but sought salvation for the human being as such.[55] He concluded this would have to involve the struggle for "liberty or independence, justice, equal opportunity, genuine human dignity and full participation."[56] Subsequently the highly influential T.B. Simatupang wrote that:

> The total mission is the proclamation (…) of the Gospel to be implemented through what we say, are and do. (…) Participation in development can be a partial manifestation of that one mission, if that participation is motivated by an understanding of the Gospel which includes "freedom, justice, truth and wellbeing as willed by God for the world."[57]

According to both Ukur and Simatupang, the church had to be involved in development and understand development as an integral part of the gospel.[58]

While the Montreux trilogy and SODEPAX reports gave the DGI some general guidelines for development, the churches in Indonesia continued to actively search for their own particular vision of development. Their active

54 PGI 184–254, Dr. Fridolin Ukur, Indonesia as One Area of Church Witness, Service and Participation in Development—Obstacles to be overcome, September 1973, 11.

55 PGI 184–254, Dr. Fridolin Ukur, Problems of Development and Missiology, September 1973.

56 Ibid., 5.

57 PGI 184–255, Simatupang, Lessons Learned and Future Perspective: Personal Notes on the Work of the DGI Development Center, 10.11.1975, 2. T.B. Simatupang was called the General, due to his former career in the Indonesian Armed Forces. He was one of the most influential ecumenical leaders in Indonesia and a member of the presidium of the DGI/PGI since the early 1960s. In the early 1970s he was president of the Asian Council of Churches and between 1975–1983 he was president of the WCC.

58 Ibid., 4.

participation in development was one expression of their responsibility to build a strong Indonesia based on the principles of *Pancasila*. After several discussions and conferences the DGI started in the 1970s to develop its own combination of the two guidelines and brought up its own theoretical foundation for church participation in development.

> Since Pematang Siantar and Montreux, Indonesia has concluded that our aspirations to develop a *Pancasila* society (consisting of Belief in the Lord Almighty, Humanity, Social Justice, National Unity and Democracy), a trilogy of development (i.e. economic growth, social justice and self-reliance), where both ideas are not controversial to one another, even they are complementary, are considered as the basic principle for churches' participation in development in Indonesia [sic.].[59]

As maintained by the 'holistic approach,' the DGI argued that development had to include more than just economic growth. But holism for the DGI was construed largely as incorporating the principles of *Pancasila* so as to include freedom, justice and well-being in development targets. This enabled the DGI to argue that their development activities were indeed in line with those of the WCC guidelines about the pursuit of a "just, participatory and sustainable society."[60] Moreover they were aware of the societal impact of modernization.[61] Engaging with contemporary debates over 'modernization' as 'Westernization,' they argued that in order to avoid "blind acceptance" of Western concepts development had to be undertaken by the people themselves. To develop 'maturity of thinking' as sought by the DGI, the main target of development had to involve educating the broader society to develop an open-minded approach to modernization and awareness of its own developmental capacity.[62] Furthermore they had to enhance self-confidence and raise their efficiency to achieve new technical skills and knowledge. Such visions of 'social engineering' were found equally in New Order development policy and reflected the general ideas of the development discussion during this period that took root across confessional religious lineages.[63]

---

59 PGI 184–255, Progress Report Development Center to the Core Consortium Meeting in Bossey, August 1975, 1.

60 WCC 24.2.109, Just Participatory and Sustainable Society—Some Remarks on the Asian Region, 12.-15 September 1978.

61 ICCO 289 289, Darma Cipta, Indonesia and Development Center DGI, 1976, 13.

62 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980, 11.

63 Steen Hyldgaard Christensen et al., eds. *Engineering, Development and Philosophy: American, Chinese and European Perspectives* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012).

The New Approach: Motivators and the Village Development Projects

> Our churches are now aware that development is not a physical development, it may not be charity orientated, but it is a development for man as a whole. Development must not be discussed only, it must be transferred into concrete actions.[64]

The DGI founded the Development Center (DC) of the Council of Churches in Indonesia in 1971 to explore new ways that the DGI could be involved in development and to bring the development plans into the broader framework of the mission of the churches. Since 1974 the DC was cooperating with the Commission for the Church Participation in Development (CCPD) of the WCC and a group of international Christian development agencies including the Dutch Inter-church Organization for Development Cooperation (Interkerkelijke Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking; ICCO), and the German Protestant Association for Cooperation in Development (Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe; EZE). In the early 1970s the DC was still largely reliant on foreign experts in fields of planning, industrialized agricultural reforms, and distribution. To become fully independent in development the DGI began to actively recruit and train a new generation of Indonesian 'experts' that could take the place of foreign missionaries to fill positions as teachers and development workers across the country.

The main instrument to mobilize the poor into participation in development was the 'motivator program.' The model of village development project mandated by the DGI was based on four objectives: (1) to promote a renewal in the society itself, to ensure that truth, social justice, welfare and recognition of human dignity would become more real in the structures, values and lives of people; (2) to concentrate on the socially marginalized, the poor and neglected groups including women, children, and the elderly; (3) to achieve a renewal of witness and service in the churches; and (4) to nurture a sense of stewardship of congregations, thereby helping the members to become aware of their responsibility toward nature and all things created.[65] Their development work was carried out all over Indonesia, in different settings and through different approaches. But the main reference of all the attempts was the ideology of peoples' participation in development. The main target of the motivators was to implement the changes to build awareness and capacity to develop.

64 PGI 184–256, Ed Lalisang, Report on the Development Center, c.1980, 1.

65 Het Utrechts Archive: 289-303-2, DGI—Parem progrema, c.1983, 1–2.

The core strategy of the village development projects focused on the motivators who were sent to the selected villages. The intention was that these activists, trained to see new possibilities, would be able to find the most promising way to develop their area according to the vision of the local population and in cooperation with them. The expectation was that the motivators would be able to find a good balance between the right techniques, knowledge and investments without overthrowing the established authorities. By being designated as 'motivators,' rather than 'leaders' of the development activities, they had a more circumscribed mandate, and were not supposed to not get too involved in their region. This was so as to avoid problems in case the motivators needed to be sent elsewhere or when it came time to close down the project. The motivators thus functioned as brokers between the DC and the rural areas. They had to represent 'the villagers' and their needs to the external funders and planners.[66]

The DC's village development approach included a range of activities associated with the DGI's development plan, including participation in the transmigration or 'resettlement' program,[67] 'education for development' and 'participation of the population.' The Indonesian village development project served as a worldwide model for the WCC's development projects. Even though the DGI was promoting bottom-up development, the village development plan was also characterized by paternalistic, top-down dynamics. The contradictions involved in this combination were especially apparent in the work of the motivators. These missionary development workers were tasked with empowering villagers to develop themselves by providing the necessary tools, but on the other hand the decisions about which tools villagers would get, and in what form they were supposed to develop, were predetermined by church leaders based at the DGI headquarters in Jakarta and the DGI's regional office. Holding the contradiction of this structure with the ideals of 'bottom-up' development together was a delicate balance which occasionally came undone, and in fact on a number of occasions projects failed when villages began to question the orders coming from the DGI.

Each village development project began with education for development. The instruction prioritized by the motivators was not limited to basic literacy but included the desire to build awareness by encouraging people to analyze

66 David Lewis and David Mosse, eds. *Development Brokers and Translators: The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006), 12.

67 For further information about the resettlement projects see: Ryo Fujikura and Mikiyasu Nakayama, eds. *Resettlement Policy in Large Development Projects* (London: Routledge, 2015).

their own situation and to strive for new possibilities. Education for development also involved mobilizing change by facilitating greater organization through farmers unions and other groups as well as providing skills and training for practical tasks.[68] According to the researchers of the DC, in addition to the problems of remote areas lacking modern technology, efficient administration and management techniques, the 'mentality' which was required for development was deemed not to be present in some rural communities.[69] They saw their task as bringing each of these aspects of "modern Indonesian behavior" to backwards villages. In so doing, they adopted a thoroughly paternalistic approach reflecting dominant Indonesian state models of development, and thus imagined their task as involving thoroughgoing social engineering in order to change the behavior of entire populations. DC scholars were aware that "education for development means to change mentality and attitudes, which requires time and patience."[70] But their goals were not modified by diverse responses from the villages. Regardless of response, DC motivators promoted new technologies and approaches, confident that their approach would improve the lives of those they sought to help by enabling villagers to participate fully in their own development[71]

The motivators were trained to become part of the development activities in the rural area. The idea was to educate skilled young people and send them to particular villages in order to organize the inhabitants and to motivate them to be part of development. It was not meant that the motivators should decide what to develop or manage the projects, they were rather facilitators or brokers who would bring the ideas of development to the village.[72] One of the core problems of this approach was that the motivators were often from other parts of Indonesia, and from different ethnic backgrounds than the villagers they were intended to serve. This was not only a problem because of language-barriers, but also because motivators were sometimes seen as outsiders who lacked sufficient authority to implement the changes they proposed.

The motivators all came from member churches of the DGI. Each church was required to send a certain number of motivators and each motivator had to fulfill specific criteria including appropriate age, a formal education at least

68 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980, 48–53.

69 PGI 184–254, Dr. PD Latuihamallo, "Sociological and Theological Problems in the Church's Participation in Development," September 1973, 1–2.

70 Ibid., 4.

71 PGI 184–254, DC, Notes on Education for Development Case: Indonesia Perspective. c.1974.

72 See: Lewis and Mosse, *Development Brokers and Translators.*

until middle school, physical and mental stability, readiness to work far away from home, and willingness to postpone marriage until after service as a motivator. After successfully passing an entrance test all motivators completed a stint at the DGI training center in Cikembar, West Java. The future motivators learned the basics of agriculture, fishery, market-orientated organization, building up labor cooperatives and credit unions, and the basic aspects of family planning and hygiene. As many of the motivators came from urban areas, the program also included training on how to live in rural areas. The training course lasted for six months at the end of which approximately half of the participants returned home to their towns and villages, either because they had not passed the training or out of a willing decision to end at that point.[73] Those who remained in the program at end of the training course were divided into two groups. Some of were allocated to working as motivators, including focusing on development training and knowledge building. Others were selected based on their special skills and became field workers who were assigned to work with farmers and teach them practical skills and new agrarian techniques. The plan was to send at least one motivator and one field worker to every selected village. One would be a teacher and organizer of the people and the other would focus on practical education were neither meant to become leaders themselves, but rather to mobilize the residents to participate and create their own leaders for development.[74]

The selection of the villages themselves was an important part of the process. The villages had to meet certain criteria including a sufficient population size, a perceived potential for development, and a willingness to host motivators. The DGI's plan was that the selected villages would serve as models for other communities by providing examples of what development could look like. Although religion was not a formal criteria, the majority of the villages selected were largely Christian. In some areas the village development projects took place in the same locations as government-initiated transmigration projects. The transmigration program was a governmental initiative to encourage people living in high density areas in Java and Bali to resettle to outlying, under-populated islands. Some participants in the transmigration program were forced into migrating while others were attracted by the incentives offered by the government, including a new home, agricultural land, and support for the time of resettlement.

Even though the resettlement areas were less densely populated, there were still existing communities who were displaced by the new transmigrants, which

73 PGI 184–255, DC, Programme for Motivator Training, August 1975.

74 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980.—[unnamed], 15–41.

led to tensions. On the one hand some of the residents were afraid that the new settlements would enforce a 'Javanization' of their territory and that the government would only develop those new settlements and ignore the needs of the others. On the other hand, they noticed that the new settlements were opportunities to develop their whole area, as streets were built, new agricultural techniques entered, and better connection with markets was achieved. Those living close to the settlements were thus presented with opportunities to engage with new technologies and the new ways of organizing.[75] However churches started to criticize these projects in the late 1980s. Many of the new settlements not sufficiently supported with health care, water supply or education facilities, which hampered the potential for the transmigrants to start a new life. The idea of bottom-up approaches to development was also implicitly compromised as the transmigration scheme was also fully under the control of the government regarding time and place of the resettlement.[76]

Motivators in the Field

In Eteng Village in North Central Sulawesi the motivators began implementing some major changes. As was often the case, the motivators assigned to Eteng worked as a pair. When Yansen Simanjuntak and Djasmin arrived in Eteng in 1976 they both already had work experience. Yansen had worked in the import/export business of his uncle and Djasmine had experiences in working with cooperatives.[77] After a period of initial assessment they started to work on a model field and convinced some farmers to learn the new methods. At the same time they initiated an evening lesson for teaching farmers basic literacy and simple bookkeeping. They saw the most important step toward further development of the village as being the implementation of a comprehensive cooperative, including farmers from different religious backgrounds and the head of the village. In addition to normal classes the village head received further education in writing and political organization. In 1978 they planned to start a class for basic economic strategies, management of the cooperative and investment strategy.

The work with the cooperative and the basic classes followed the approach to participation advocated by the WCC. The main goal of these development activities was the self-government of the village and the conscientization of

75 Ibid., 10.

76 PGI 184–254, Simatupang, Indonesia: One Area of Churches' Participation in Development Amidst A World which is struggling for Humanity, Social Justice and Peace, September 1973, 18–30.

77 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980, 24–30.

the villagers to be able to fully participate in their own development process. The peasants in the cooperative started to work together and were trained by the motivators in new agricultural techniques, investment, and basic business strategy. Within a few years they had adequate savings to buy an ox and a plough to increase agricultural production.[78] Step by step they incorporated more modern techniques and after only six years they were able to earn sufficient funding in order to pay for a local school and a teacher. One interesting point is that the motivators did not accept important positions inside the cooperative. The chairman and the secretary were both locals, and as the motivators left the village the cooperative was ready to function without their assistance. With this success they attracted other families and the village economy grew and prospered.

A second example is Petani Jaya in North Sumatra, a new settlement in the middle of the jungle. The official reports of the DGI-delegation drew a very optimistic picture of a pioneer village which was based on cooperation and cooperative work including building infrastructure and harvesting peanuts and other agricultural products on cooperative fields. According to one report the implementations of new techniques and the distribution of arable land were forged ahead while streets and houses were built to connect the village with the outside world. The official report emphasized the main problem in the lack of connection to markets in the provincial capital of Medan to sell the agricultural surplus and inadequate health care. It described the population as eager to learn and the motivator, Mathias, as involved in many different activities in the village. Mathias saw his own success mainly in the fields of agriculture and education.

The very same report also mentions that the local government was very critical about the work of the motivators, as almost no one was following their example to do backyard gardening and their recommendation to attend basic economics classes in Medan.[79] In the early 1980s Karla Krause, was visiting the area working a book that presented a picture of village development that was far more critical than that found in contemporary official reports. According to her research the main problem was the power balance in the village. While many people were engaged in the development process and almost everyone was working part-time for the cooperative, the only one who actually benefitted from the work was the village head.

78 Karla Krause, *Weisse Experten nicht gefragt: Selbsthilfe in indonesischen Dörfern: Protokolle* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verla, 1981), 123–48.

79 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980, 37–39.

While the official report talked about the innovative and open minded village chief, Krause's report presented him as a despot intent on retaining power. According to Krause's report, the chief controlled the inhabitants with fear and violence and if someone resisted he was able to expel them from the village. The more personal statements of the motivator reveal that even he and his predecessors were unable to do anything without the permission of the village chief and that the positive progress would only continue as long as the chief continued to profit the most. As stated by the official report the new prepared land was divided equally within the population, but according to the testimonial of the motivator the village chief and his family owned most of the land and leased it to the villagers. One statement of an inhabitant was very clear: According to him neither the money of the church, nor the work of the motivators would help them as both just reinforced the current imbalance of power. And if the church was not able to break the power structure in the village, it would be better not to send any further funds or aid.[80]

A third example is Maganyo on the Mentawai Islands in West Sumatra where the motivators first arrived in 1977. The main task of development in this very isolated area was the implementation of what the DGI called 'maturity of thinking.' This included a basic change in the local habits and to educate the population about how to be open-minded to modernization and aware of one's own capability to develop. To implement this change the main activities were to enlarge the local knowledge in basic literacy, economic strategies and conscientization and only as a second attempt to teach new techniques of agriculture and boat making.[81] In this village the motivator worked very much like a 'social engineer.'

Besides the region's remoteness, a major challenge for the motivator program there was the impact of the international logging industry through the Minas Lumber Corporation. In only four years almost a third of the island's forest was cut down and the habitat of the villagers was endangered. The nearby industry already had a significant impact on the village as several young men and women were leaving the area to work in the industry and only a few were coming back. The inhabitants were sometimes overwhelmed by the fast change of the island and according to them the loss of social control caused an increase of social vices in the area, including robbery, alcoholism, and prostitution.[82]

---

80 Krause, *Weisse Experten nicht gefragt,* 97.

81 ICCO 289 289 Darma Citpa, Narrative Report—Village Development Program 1976–1978, September 1978, 3.

82 Krause, *Weisse Experten nicht gefragt,* 100–22.

One last example is Batunadua Village in Tapanuli among the Batak of North Sumatra. According to the mediators the main problem in this area was the traditional division of labor. While the men traditionally engaged in hunting, warfare, and protecting the community against wild animals or aggressions from other groups, the women organized family life, the household and subsistence agriculture. With the introduction of new agricultural techniques the villagers were able to shift from subsistence agriculture to participation in a market economy, especially in the highlands where the soil was fertile. However, greater production levels would require more intensive labor, and this would require the men to also engage in agricultural work. While considerable effort was invested in encouraging this shift, the end goal proved unattainable. Faced with the choice between breaking with old traditions and greater economic resources, many Batak men from the area chose to maintain the gendered division of labor.

Things began to change when Ruth Tandi Ramba came to work in Tapanuli in 1976 as the first female motivator. Instead of blaming the men for sitting in the coffee houses rather than adapting to new socio-economic realities and finding productive employment, she installed a women's training center to encourage participation. The target was to develop women's awareness of their own situation, and to convince women to change it. The women organized themselves as a cooperative and learnt new ideas of agriculture, family life, health, nutrition and so on. According to the report the men "were appreciative of these changes and… voiced a sometimes even alightly [sic] jealous interest in having a similar program."[83] Through her attention to the situation of the women and the youth Ruth helped achieve some major changes in this village. But she also confessed that the inhabitants talked more enthusiastically about new ideas than they actually felt about them, and often did not work particularly hard to implement them.[84]

These examples identify some of the main challenges the village development programme faced. These challenges included internal factors such as miscommunication about values or targets, the incompatibility between the projects and the local traditions or the power distribution of the region. As seen in Petani Jaya the village development projects were all extremely vulnerable to established power structures in particular areas, and sometimes the cooperation with village leaders actually served to reinforce and exacerbate hierarchies. Along with this imbalance of power came problems of nepotism.[85] As seen in Batunadua the traditional division of labor made effective

83 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980, 35.

84 Krause, *Weisse Experten nicht gefragt,* 71–8.

85 PGI 184–257, The History of the Development Center, c.1980, 63.

agriculture impossible and to change such an established pattern of behavior had to be done slowly and carefully to avoid rejection by the community. The presence of a female motivator who did not blame the men for not working, but targeted the women to develop their own potential was a significant start. But without the acceptance of the male population and the support of the pastor and the village chief, Ruth would not have had the influence she managed to establish.

The Batunadua example shows clearly how limited the influence of the motivators often was and how they were frequently trapped in-between competing requirements. As much as WCC and DGI discourse promoted participation as the ideal in development, the motivators also had their own agenda and targets. In order to fulfill certain plans the participatory development work frequently became a top-down endeavor. In these cases the motivators' were caught in the middle of contradictory goals. Their work was not only to facilitate local initiative, but also to guide this in ways largely predetermined by the DGI and WCC hierarchies. As seen in the example of Maganyo as well, changing fragile systems of value and tradition through the modernization of agriculture posed significant challenges for the local population. Maganyo villagers talked about the moral decline brought about by the new rules and the implementation of modernization, rather than of the benefits of their impact. The main challenges from the outside were the governmental policy of transmigration and the challenge of multinational corporations that were exploiting the area. However as seen in the example of Eteng, the development of one village could affect the surrounding area as well. The new techniques were being adapted to other villages and the experiences of the peasants in Eteng spread over to other cooperatives. Such positive examples were sometimes presented as models for further projects in the same area, or even elsewhere in Indonesia.

Conclusion

> The development of Indonesia should try to maintain national 'union and unity,' promote economic growth, decrease dependence from foreign countries, increase social justice and also increase the application of principles of human rights and democracy. This will be a long road which will be full of critical periods.[86]

86 PGI 184–254, Simatupang, Indonesia: One Area of Churches' Participation in Development Amidst A World which is Struggling for Humanity, Social Justice and Peace, September 1973, 4–5.

When writing these words in a 1974 statement concerning the future of DGI development activities Simatupang probably did not imagine just how long this road would be. The discussion within the DGI about its development strategies and projects concentrated on the task of bridging the gap between the global concepts promoted within the WCC and national and local requirements within Indonesia. Internal discussions in the DGI show that they sought to both work with WCC concepts as well as develop their own 'Indonesian' frameworks, which by necessity worked closely with New Order priorities for modernization and nation-building. While more research is needed to examine how the DGI worked with the Indonesian state—including any potential attempts to subvert or renegotiate this relationship, as well as shifts over time—some form of cooperation was seen as unavoidable, especially in nation-wide activities such as education or transmigration resettlement projects. Within this general political context it is hardly surprising that the Village Development Project and the work of the motivators were also part of what, following David Mosse, we might call a broader 'modernization institutionalism.'[87] And yet the motivator approach is notable for its considerable independence. While receiving some funding from the Indonesian state for facilities and technical aid, the project nevertheless came closest of all DGI development initiatives to the bottom-up, participatory ideals promoted by the WCC.

The motivators' role was to facilitate village participation in development. In this the motivators were not located by the DGI as pastors or religious leaders, but rather as technical experts. Having received training the motivators were sent out to find technical solutions to problems faced by Indonesian communities.[88] Together with local communities across the archipelago the motivators identified problems and, again with those communities, sought to provide solutions. The end goal was to motivate these communities sufficiently to pursue development activities without further external assistance. The optimistic ideals of the WCC—to develop society by giving technical support and by strengthening their awareness of their potential—were, however, overwhelmed by the still paternalistic practice of social engineering by local 'experts.' The motivators functioned as mediators or 'brokers' of information between the donor organization and recipient communities as well as simultaneously working as resource coordinators, technical experts and development workers. They were

87 The phrase reworks what Mosse calls 'neoliberal institutionalism.' See David Mosse, "Introduction: The Anthropology of Expertise and Professionals in International Development," in *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*, ed. David Mosse (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 4.

88 Li, *The Will to Improve,* 69.

a new form of Indonesian religious expert; a national, rather than local, trained elite who could weave in-between Western norms (as articulated by the WCC), New Order imperatives, and local realities. Through the practices of Christian development the motivators represented a new interplay between local environments and the circulations of global development policy.

One final crucial point has to be underlined. In contrast to some other development organizations, the churches remained active in diverse regions over a long period of time. This resulted in the changes they implemented often being more enduring and sustainable than those in other project settings where development workers have only very limited interaction with 'the field' over the course of short-term projects. The churches and the DGI tended to be active over several years, even after a pair of motivators had left a particular village, and the supervision of the long term effects of a project were better organized. Nonetheless, as the examples shown in this chapter have illustrated not all DGI projects achieved success. Caught between competing imperatives, limited by their own capacity to achieve the social engineering outcomes they desired, and faced with communities who were by no means committed to the aspirations of modernization, the motivators developmental and Christian missions rarely accomplished the goals envisaged by the DGI. Simatupang's 'long road' of development stretched out in front the Indonesian churches, promising a future that has yet to be attained.

Bibliography

Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*. New York: Basic Books, 2005.

Aragon, Lorraine. *Fields of the Lord Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000.

Aritonang, Jan, and Karel Steenbrink, eds. *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Buschel, Hubertus, and Daniel Speich. *Entwicklungswelten: Globalgeschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2009.

Christensen, Steen Hyldgaard, Carl Mitcham, Bocong Li, and Yanming An, eds. *Engineering, Development and Philosophy: American, Chinese and European Perspectives*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.

Cviic, K.F. "The Politics of the World Council of Churches." *The World Today: Chatham House Review* 35.9 (1979): 369–76.

Deneulin, Séverine, and Masooda Bano. *Religion in Development: Rewriting the Secular Script*. London: Zed Books, 2009.

Djulei, Wilhelm Conterius. *Die kirchliche Entwicklungsarbeit im Erzbistum Ende—Indonesien: Studie zu einer kirchlichen Entwicklungsarbeit im Lichte der katholischen Soziallehre und im Verhältnis zur Mission*. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 1999.

Ekbladh, David. *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Erb, Maribeth. "Between Empowerment and Power: The Rise of the Self-supporting Church in Western Flores, Eastern Indonesia." *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 21.2 (2006): 204–29.

Ervin, Alexander. *Cultural Transformations and Globalization: Theory, Development, and Social Change*. London: Paradigm Publishers, 2015.

Feener, R. Michael. *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia*. Oxford: University Press, 2013.

Feener, R. Michael. *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

Fountain, Philip. *Translating Service: An Ethnography of the Mennonite Central Committee*. PhD diss., Australia National University, 2011.

Fountain, Philip, Robin Bush, and R. Michael Feener, eds. *Religion and the Politics of Development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Fujikura, Ryo, and Mikiyasu Nakayama, eds. *Resettlement Policy in Large Development Projects*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Gilman, Nils. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Grubbs, Larry. *Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009.

Hickey, Samuel, and Giles Mohan, eds. *Participation—From Tyranny to Transformation?: Exploring New Approaches to Participation in Development*. London: ZED Books, 2004.

Hirono, Miwa. *Civilizing Missions: International Religious Agencies in China*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Hofer, Katharina. "The Role of Evangelical NGOs in International Development: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya and Uganda." *Afrika Spectrum* (2003): 375–98.

Imhof, Esther. *Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Religion: Fallstudie und ethische Reflexion zu einem angespannten Verhältnis*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2012.

Jewsiewicki, Bogumil. "African Historical Studies: Academic Knowledge as Usable Past." *African Studies Review* 32 (1989): 1–76.

Jones, Ben, and Marie Juul Petersen. "Instrumental, Narrow, Normative? Reviewing Recent Work on Religion and Development." *Third World Quarterly* 32.7 (2011): 1291–306.

Keane, Webb. *Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007.

Kothari, Uma. *A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions and Ideologies*. Cape Town: David Philip, 2005.

Krause, Karla. *Weisse Experten nicht gefragt: Selbsthilfe in indonesischen Dörfern: Protokolle*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verla, 1981.

Kunter, Katharina, and Annegreth Schilling. *Globalisierung der Kirchen Der Ökumenische Rat der Kirchen und die Entdeckung der Dritten Welt in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren Band 058 Band 058*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014.

Land, Philip. "Sodepax: An Ecumenical Dialogue." *Ecumenical Review: A Quarterly* 37 (1985): 40–6.

Lewis, David, and David Mosse, eds. *Development Brokers and Translators: The Ethnography of Aid and Agencies*. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006.

Li, Tania. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.

Link, Hans-Georg. *Hoffnungswege: wegweisende Impulse des Ökumenischen Rates der Kirchen aus sechs Jahrzehnten.* Frankfurt: Lembeck, 2008.

Lorenzini, Sara. *Due Germanie in Africa: la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la competizione per i mercati di materie prime e tecnologia*. Firenze: Polistampa, 2003.

Moon, Suzanne. *Technology and Ethical Idealism: A History of Development in the Netherlands East Indies*. Leiden: CNWS Publications, 2007.

Mosse, David, ed. *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2011a.

Mosse, David. "Introduction: The Anthropology of Expertise and Professionals in International Development." In *Adventures in Aidland: The Anthropology of Professionals in International Development*, edited by David Mosse, 1–32. New York: Berghahn Books, 2011b.

Mujiburrahman. *Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia's New Order*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006.

Ngô, Tam T *The New Way: Protestantism and the Hmong in Vietnam*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016.

Popper, K.R. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Prawiro, Radius. *Indonesia's Struggle for Economic Development: Pragmatism in Action*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Quarles van Ufford, Philip, and Ananta K. Giri, eds. *A Moral Critique of Development: In Search of Global Responsibilities*. Mirano: Routledge, 2003.

Ricklefs, M.C., *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2012.

Schröter, Susanne. *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power*. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010.

Simatupang, Tahi Bonar. Membangun manusia pembangun. Flores: Ende, 1970.

Steenbrink, Karel A. "The Power of Money: Development Aid for and through Christian Churches in Modern Indonesia, 1965–1980." In *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power*, edited by Susanne Schröter, 105–36. Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010.

Swart, Ignatius. *The Churches and the Development Debate: The Promise of a Fourth Generation Approach*. Stellenbosch: Sun Press, 2006.

Unger, Corinna. "Histories of Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections, Future Research." *H-Soz-Kult* (Berlin, Germany), December 9, 2010. Accessed May 29, 2013. http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2010-12-001.

Ver Beek, Kurt Alan. "Spirituality: A Development Taboo." *Development in Practice* 10.1 (2000): 31–43.

Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Wilson, Bryan Ronald. *Religion in Sociological Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Wood, Michael. *Official History in Modern Indonesia: New Order Perceptions and Counterviews.* Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Zakaria, J. Ngelow. "Indonesian Protestantism towards the 21st Century." In *Reshaping Protestantism in a Global Context*, edited by Volker Küster, 71–84. Berlin, LIT Verlag, 2009.

Zaugg-Ott, Kurt. *Entwicklung oder Befreiung?: die Entwicklungsdiskussion im Ökumenischen Rat der Kirchen von 1968 bis 1991*. Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 2004.

CHAPTER 6

"Development Missionaries" in the Slums of Bangkok: From the Thaification to the De-Thaification of Catholicism

Giuseppe Bolotta

Beginning from the 1970s, transnational 'secular' rhetoric on children's rights and the global mediatized representation of 'street children' as 'victims' have led to the appearance of several Western and international NGOs in the most marginal urban areas of the Thai capital. Between 2011 and 2014 I undertook several periods of fieldwork research in the slums of Bangkok and had the opportunity to engage with and analyze the work of these organizations.[1] Despite being officially secular, many of these NGOs were actually led by Catholic 'development missionaries.' In 2012, as part of my fieldwork, I volunteered at the Little Ones' House, an NGO providing assistance to disabled children in the slums. The head of the NGO, Sister Serafina, is an Italian missionary of the Xaverian Missionary Society of Mary.[2]

In this chapter, I explore the shifting roles played by those missionaries who—like Sister Serafina—have been engaging in the field of 'secular' humanitarian development within Thai Catholicism. Indeed, NGOs like the Little Ones' House constitute a relatively recent innovation in both the aid landscape addressing disadvantaged people in Thailand and in the geography of Catholic missionaries' activities. Previously, Catholic and Christian proselytism efforts mainly targeted the mountainous and ethnically variegated northern regions of the country. Home of numerous 'non-Thai' ethnic groups,[3] condescendingly

1 I owe special thanks to the editors of this volume Catherine Scheer, Michael Feener and Philip Fountain, and to my colleagues Eli Elinoff and Bernardo Brown, for their thoughtful suggestions and comments during the composition and revision of this chapter.

2 To protect the identity of my informants, all names of people throughout the article are pseudonyms.

3 Even though the term 'Thai' refers commonly to all the citizens of the modern nation state of Thailand (regardless of their ethno-linguistic background), I use the term primarily to refer to Central or Siamese Tai—the hegemonic group whose ethno-linguistic characterization was used as the main reference for 'Thainess,' the modern national identity. Accordingly, I use the term 'non-Thai' to refer to both non-Tai *chao khaw* ('hill tribes') and other minority Tai groups, like for example the Northeastern Tai Lao or the Northern Tai Lü.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_007

labeled as 'hill tribes' (*chao khaw*) in official Thai state discourse, these areas have historically registered the most significant rates of conversion to Christianity in the country.[4] On the other hand, the historical presence of Catholic missionaries in Bangkok was officially circumscribed to the pastoral care of the small foreign enclaves (especially those of Chinese and Vietnamese residents).

I will argue here that the post-war invention of 'development,' as a parallel, mobile, multi-localized and officially secular system of global governance, and the ratification of the human and children's rights conventions by the Thai government, have provided Catholic missionaries with a new techno-political framework for (re)organizing their missionary strategies in Thailand along 'secular' humanitarian lines.[5] Along these 'developmental lines,' missionaries can now penetrate areas that were previously inaccessible. As with many other international 'secular' actors involved in the global aid industry, Catholic NGOs are gaining access to the Thai capital through its poorest slums, urban spaces that are by definition "structural holes" in the relationship between the state and its own territory.[6]

In examining the work of these contemporary Catholic missionaries, I argue that NGOs like the Little Ones' House represent an emergent and specific political-theological current within the realm of Thai Christianities. By staying 'with a foot in two institutional shoes' (the Church and the NGOs system) Western missionaries and 'non-Thai' local priests have the opportunity to free themselves from the normative elitist approach of the 'Thaified' Catholic Church and to put forward an anti-normative 'cultural accommodation' of Catholicism that aims to counter-indigenize the Gospels in favor of the liberation of 'non-Thai' ethnic minorities from the political and economic dominance of the Thai state.

In order to understand the specific historical nature(s) of the relationship between religious, developmental, and political elements in the case of NGOs such as the Little Ones' House, I will adopt a twofold analytical framework. Specifically, I will combine ethnographic attention to how this relationship is

4 See for example Anders Hovemyr, *In Search of the Karen King: A Study in Karen Identity with Special Reference to 19th Century Karen Evangelism in Northern Thailand* (Uppsala: Studia Missionalia Upsaliensia XLIX, 1989); Cornelia Kammerer, "Customs and Christian Conversion among Akha Highlanders of Burma and Thailand." *American Ethnologist* 17.2 (1990): 277–91.

5 Mariella Pandolfi, "Sovranità mobile e derive umanitarie: emergenza, urgenza, ingerenza," in *Oltre lo Sviluppo: Le Prospettive dell'Antropologia,* ed. Roberto Malighetti (Rome: Meltemi, 2005), 151–85.

6 Ronald S. Burt, "Structural Holes Versus Network Closure as Social Capital," *in Social Capital: Theory and Research*, eds. Nan Lin, Karen Cook and Ronald S. Burt (New Jersey: Transaction Publisher, 2001), 31–56.

managed, interpreted and embodied by Sister Serafina with an historical perspective situating her Catholicism within the realm of Thai Catholicism(s) and in relation to global 'secular' development discourses, NGO institutional forms and operational procedures as well as the (Buddhist) cultural politics of the Thai State.[7]

It should already be clear here that I consider religion, development and politics as deeply interconnected, overlapping, historically situated and mutually constitutive—simultaneously shaping and being shaped by local, national and global processes.[8] Nevertheless, since recent academic interest on religious NGOs has often theoretically treated 'religion' as an essentialized object, I believe—responding to the recent concerns importantly expressed by some authors—that a preliminary epistemological, theoretical and methodological clarification on the subject is required before proceeding to my analysis of this particular case.[9]

Religion, Development and Politics: Conceptual Clarifications

Over the past few years several researchers have pointed out that religion had been overlooked or intentionally avoided within much literature on development studies.[10] Philip Fountain, among others, has sharply explained this epistemological and theoretical "amnesia" as an intrinsic feature of modern

7 The historical trajectories of Catholicism in Thailand will be analyzed here beginning with the 19th century. The historical period preceding the advent of the Rattanakosin dynasty will be only briefly considered. For an exhaustive report on Jesuit and *Missions Étrangères de Paris* (MEP) French missionaries' activities in 17th–and 18th century Siam, see Alain Forest, *Missionnaires français au Tonkin et au Siam, XVII–XVIII siècles: Analyse comparée d'un relatif succès et d'un total échec* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998).

8 Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, "Religion and the Politics of Development," In *Religion and the Politics of Development*, eds. Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015), 17.

9 Emma Tomalin, *Religions and Development* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Philip Fountain, "The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion," *International Development Policy: Religion and Development* 4 (2013): 9–30; Philip Fountain, "Proselytizing Development," in *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development*, ed. Emma Tomalin (London: Routledge, 2015), 80–97.

10 Lisa Selinger, "The Forgotten Factor: The Uneasy Relationship between Religion and Development," *Social Compass* 51.4 (2004): 523–43; Erica Bornstein, *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality and Economic in Zimbabwe* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Tomalin, *Religions and Development*; Fountain, "The Myth of Religious NGOs."

Western thought.[11] Tracing back its discursive genealogy to the Enlightenment period, Fountain identifies the origin of the "great divide" between the "rational secular" and the "irrational religious" in a line of Western thought compartmentalizing reality into separate domains and drawing a hermetic dividing line between the rational and the irrational. With the separation of church from state, opposition between secular politics and the religious sphere was then increasingly reproduced by scientific (rational) analyses that either ousted religion from their "purified" discourse or provided de-historicized, essentialized, decontextualized, and taxonomic definitions of religion.[12]

Other scholars exploring the immensely diverse panorama of Christianities in Asia have also recently expressed their dissatisfaction with the very concept of religion. Young and Seitz, for example, underline the Eurocentric nature of the concept arguing that the late emergence of a specific word for religion in most of the Global South's languages is only comprehensible as the result of Western influence.[13] The very idea of religion as a separate, circumscribed domain of reality is then not to be seen as a universal concept, but rather as an artifact of a particular cultural history of the modern West that obscures the complex interplay at work between the sphere designated as 'religion' and those of economic interactions, political forms, and social realities. As anthropologist Didier Fassin has pointed out, while some contemporary Euro-American states are officially secular, Western political structures, rhetoric and legislation systems continue to be significantly shaped by Christian moral categories.[14] If we translate these observations to Asian states, then, the indissoluble relation between religion and politics appears even more evident.[15]

In Thailand, the Indo-Buddhist foundation of both the traditional and the contemporary geo-socio-political order has been widely described and analyzed in modern scholarship and is embodied by a deified 'constitutional' monarch who is both the head of state and the patron of all religions.[16]

---

11 Fountain, "The Myth of Religious NGOs"; Fountain, "Proselytizing Development."

12 On 'purification,' see Bruno. Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

13 Richard F. Young and Jonathan A. Seitz, "Introduction," in *Asia in the Making of Christianity: Conversion, Agency, and Indigeneity, 1600s to the Present*, eds. Richard F. Young and Jonathan A. Seitz (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 1–26.

14 Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

15 Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, eds., *Religion and the Politics of Development* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015).

16 Charles F. Keyes, "Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 30.3 (1971): 551–67; Stanley J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror & World Renouncer: A*

At the same time the modern Thai national identity, or 'Thainess' (*qwham pen thai*)—'the authentic Thai mode of being'—is a tripartite, ethnicized configuration juxtaposing the secular concept of nation (*chat*) with those of monarchy (*phramahakasad*) and 'religion' (*sadsana*) that is, Buddhism. As Talal Asad has demonstrated, "religion and the secular are closely linked, both in our thought and in the way they emerged historically."[17] For this reason, and following Fountain's methodological recommendations, in this chapter I consider religious and secular as mutually determined and intrinsically interwoven realms.[18] Moreover, I will intentionally juxtapose these two terms where modern Western thought would generally keep them separated, occasionally deploying specific examples in order to reveal their essentialized and artificial nature.

Recently a number of scholars have provided interesting new historical accounts of links between religious institutions in relation to formulations of the contemporary global aid system. Barnett, for example, has located the history of humanitarianism well before the Second World War, while highlighting the prominent role of Christianity in it.[19] Davies, on a different but related level, has shown that organizations similar to those today called NGOs were already widely present in the West over an even longer historical period in traditions of religious organizations stretching back to the 18th century.[20] Despite standard non-religious representations of modern Western history, studies such as these have thus well established the foundational connections between religion (and Christian mission in particular) and development politics.

These accounts make clear the historical entanglement of Christian missions in the global spreading of modernity, secularism and development. They also corroborate, as many anthropologists have argued, that this entanglement

---

Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against a Historical Background (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994). At the time of revising this chapter King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX), on the throne since 1946, passed away (13 October 2016), ending his seventy-year reign as the world's longest serving monarch, and throwing the country's political future into great uncertainty. Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn succeeded his father to become the new monarch in December 2017.

17 Talal Asad, *Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 22 cited in Fountain, "Proselytizing Development."

18 Fountain, "The Myth of Religious NGOs," 26–27.

19 Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

20 Thomas Davies, *NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013).

is related to processes of 'civilization,' colonization and transformation accompanying Western expansion into the Global South.[21] At the same time, the historically and culturally specific encounters between Christianities, politics, and social actors in a plurality of different ethno-linguistic contexts have been generating a huge range of local reformulations, appropriations, counter-discourses and context-bound reinventions. While Asian, Latin American and African localities have been shaped by Christianity as well as by international politics, these latter trans-regional formulations have been in turn indigenized in several ways in dynamic interaction with complex local processes driven by the active agency of the 'receivers.'[22] Even though this had already been going on for centuries, the globalization of capitalism and the advent of a secularized humanitarian industry produced—at least in discursive, legislative, and formal policy terms—the eclipse of the very religious assumptions on which the humanitarian project is grounded. Therefore, the current role of religious actors in the humanitarian legacy is certainly different from that of the past and deserves to be investigated.

In order to understand how such dynamics have come to take shape in Thailand and what contemporary meanings the presence of organizations like the Little Ones' House takes on today, it is necessary to start with an historical analysis of the contributions, both religious and secular, of Christian missionaries in this context. At the same time, it's equally important to examine how Catholicism has been variably shaped, indigenized and internally diversified by encounters with Thai and 'non-Thai' cultures in Thailand. This latter issue is particularly interesting in a majority Buddhist context depicted as historically

21 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, "Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa," *American Ethnologist* 13.1 (1986): 1–22; Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Arce Arce and Norman Long, "Reconfiguring Modernity and Development from an Anthropological Perspective," in *Anthropology, Development and Modernity*, eds. Alberto Arce and Norman Long (London: Routledge, 2000), 3–31. The very categories of 'development' and 'underdevelopment' are derived from a Western evolutionary discourse on 'progress,' which seems a post-colonial re-articulation of the same oppressors-oppressed relations that have characterized North–South relationships for centuries.

22 In her history of Jesuits' experience in India during 16th and 17th centuries, Inès Zupanov [*Missionary Tropics: The Catholic Frontier in India (16th–17th Centuries)* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995)] has used the image of "tropics" as a metaphor to show how Indian local traditions have shaped the Jesuit society's identity (rather than the contrary). More recently, Richard Young and Jonathan Seitz ["Introduction," 3] have argued for a "transformation" rather than a "transplantation" of Christianity to Asia.

resistant to Christianization, and where Buddhism is not only the semi-official national religion, but also a core-defining element of 'Thainess.'

Making Siam a Civilized Thai Nation: The Secular Role of Christian Missionaries

The presence of Catholic missionaries in Thailand can be traced back to the 16th century when the first Portuguese Dominican missionaries of 'Christ's caravels' arrived in Ayutthaya, then capital of the Siamese kingdom. Portuguese missionaries were followed by Jesuits and French missionaries of the *Missions Étrangères de Paris* (MEP) operating in Siam from 1662 onwards.[23] Despite this long uninterrupted missionary effort, the Thai Catholic Church today, together with Protestant churches, represents a minority religious group of only about 1% of the national population.[24] Indeed, with the exception of 'non-Thai' *chao khaw* ('hill tribes') groups in northern Thailand, the number of conversions to Christianity did not register any significant expansion over more than five centuries.[25]

While the number of converts made by religious influence of Christian missionaries among Thais has been minimal, the 'secular' roles that the Catholic and Christian missionaries have played in promoting the modernization and Westernization of the 'civilized' (*siwilai*) modern Thai state have been more

23 Dirk Van Der Cruysse, *Siam & the West: 1500–1700* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1991), 149–92.

24 Statistics in Luigi Bressan and Michael Smitihies [*Thai-Vatican Relations in the Twentieth Century* (Bangkok: Amarin, 2006), 1] count about 300,000 Catholics, 400 Thai priests, about 250 'non-Thai' missionaries, mostly Western, 1,500 sisters, and 120 consecrated laymen. The structure of the Thai Catholic Church is divided into ten dioceses and 500 parishes distributed throughout the national territory.

25 Edward Zehner ["Conversion to Christianity among the Thai and Sino-Thai of Modern Thailand: Growth, Experimentation and Networking in the Contemporary Context," in *Asia in the Making of Christianity: Conversion, Agency, and Indigeneity, 1600s to the Present,* eds. R.F. Young and J.A. Seitz (Boston: Brill, 2013), 404] reports the presence of 384,000 Protestant Christians in Thailand by 2006. He also shows that, beginning with the 1970s, the annual conversion rate (5.4%) among Thai and Sino-Thai registered a fast and relevant increase. The author attributes this apparent upsurge of interest in Protestant Christianity to the favorable socio-economic changes of the last decades. These would have made it easier for the Thai to explore "alternative ways of being" (ibid.). Given the increasing recent militarization of Thai society and the ultra-conservative positioning of the ruling military junta, pace Zehner, I argue that it is increasingly difficult for Thai citizens to explore ways of being other than those prescribed by normative Buddhist 'Thainess.'

significant. I argue that this 'secular' dimension of missionary activity is at the core of contemporary normative Thai Catholicism as an indigenization of the Gospels according to 'Thainess.' Furthermore, and in contrast to what happened in other countries, it could even explain why Catholic conversion efforts have been so far quite unsuccessful among Thais.[26]

Charles Keyes has suggested that Thais have not generally been attracted to Christianity due to the strong incorporation of Buddhism into the Thai national identity—so that to be Thai means to be Buddhist.[27] I want to push Keyes's argument further assuming that Thais are not Christians not only due to the secular nationalization of Buddhism but even because Catholicism itself has been accommodating to the national concept of 'Thainess.' I argue that this 'Thaification' of Christianity has historically been promoted by the 'secular collaboration' between Thai monarchical elites and Catholic missionaries in the formation of the Thai modern state: an historical interplay between religious and secular elements that highlights well how relationships of mutual shaping between missions and modernization (development) politics have been at play since the very beginning of Thai Catholic history. Let me briefly mention the most significant historical passages of this interplay.

The scientific and intellectual contribution offered by Western missionaries to the monarchical aristocracy of the central Thais in the fields of science, art, architecture, medicine and printing techniques has been widely documented.[28]

---

26 With regard to the Indonesian case, for example, Karel Steenbrink, has reported that secular education, medical care and welfare were greatly instrumental for the spreading of Christianity. Education in particular was the backbone of Christian influence in Flores, Central Timor and Papua. Moreover, in Mynahs, Kalimantan, and the Batak regions of Sumatra, it was the schools that created the first group of loyal members of the Catholic community. See Karel Steenbrink, *Catholics in Independent Indonesia: 1945–2010* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 133.

27 Charles F. Keyes, "Why the Thai Are Not Christian: Buddhist and Christian Conversion in Thailand," in *Christian Conversion in Cultural Context,* ed. Robert Hefner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 259–83.

28 David K. Wyatt, *The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Keith Watson, *Educational Development in Thailand* (London: Heinemann Educational Books Limited, 1980); Luigi Bressan, *A Meeting of Worlds: The Interaction of Christian Missionaries and Thai Culture* (Bangkok: Assumption University Press, 2005); Bressan and Smithies, *Thai-Vatican Relations in the Twentieth Century*. To mention some relevant examples, the first Jesuit settled in Siam, Thomas Valguarnera, put at the disposal of the crown his architectural skills by participating in the construction of the fortresses of Ayutthaya, Lop Buri and Bangkok. The early French missionaries arrived in Ayutthaya introduced Western medicine in the kingdom. A group of six Jesuits sent to Siam by King Louis XVI at the end of the 18th century founded

Catholic missionaries' influence in promoting Thai secular education, and co-operation between Catholic missionaries and the Thai monarchy in marking the beginning of modern schooling have been particularly pronounced.

In 1659 the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Vatican department responsible for promulgating and defending Catholic doctrine since 1622, formally instructed the apostolic vicariates operating in China and Southeast Asia, stating that: "You have to build schools everywhere with great care and diligence, for the children of Christians but also open to non-Christians."[29] The French Jesuits in Ayutthaya responded to the Vatican's injunctions by establishing an institution for the education of "children beloved to the attention of His Highness the King."[30] In turn, King Narai decided to entrust the education of ten royal blood children to the Jesuits. This is the beginning of a close link between Catholic missionaries and Siamese kings that further intensified over the following centuries, especially after the capital shifted from Ayutthaya to Bangkok and the Rattanakosin dynasty took power. Under the reigns of King Mongkut (Rama IV, 1851–1868) and Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 1868–1910)—the Thai monarchs committed to preserve Siam's political independence in time of Western colonization and make the kingdom a *siwilai* (civilised) nation state—Christian missionaries' position within the court became stronger.[31]

With the establishment of Catholic schools, missionaries finally had the opportunity to expand their activity, previously limited to the evangelization of 'non-Thai' Northern ethnic minorities, to the central Thai elite circles, even though this activity was officially mandated to be primarily 'secular' in nature. Through modern education, missionaries hoped to slowly promote favorable conditions for conversion among Thai elites. Their strategy recognized that, given the pyramidal Indo-Buddhist socio-political structure of Thai society, the conversion of the king could catalyze conversion of the entire population.[32] What actually happened, however, was that the modernizing interventions offered by Catholic missionaries were appropriated by the Siamese kings to enforce the Buddhist ethno-nationalism of the Thai monarchy. As Keyes pointed out, the structure of the Catholic Church was a likely inspiration for Rama IV

---

a center of modern astronomical science in order "to enrich the library of the King of Siam for the development of the arts." Bressan, *A Meeting of Worlds*, 45–46.

29 Bressan, *A Meeting of Worlds*, 10–11.

30 Ibid.

31 On the bonds of friendship and collaboration between Rama IV, the Thai king who signed the Treaty of Bowring (1855) with the British Empire, and the apostolic vicar in Siam Jean-Baptiste Pellagoix, see Bressan and Smithies, *Thai-Vatican Relations in the Twentieth Century*, 3.

32 Van Der Cruysse, *Siam & the West.*

and V when they decided to reform Thai Buddhism in order to politically and doctrinally control and better define the national religion.[33] The 1902 Sangha Act, established by Rama V, organized Buddhist monastics within the administrative structures of the state, thus placing Buddhism under royal patronage and political control.

More importantly, Catholic schools run by missionaries have been used as models for the establishment of the modern Thai school system, especially under King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) and Vajiravudh (Rama VI, 1910–1925)—the primary ideologue of modern conceptions of 'Thainess' (*qwham pen thai*). Vajiravudh, in particular, conceived the enterprise to build a nation-state that was as modern as Western countries and 'genuinely Thai' at the same time. In his formulation of Thai national identity, he converted the colonial British nationalistic slogan "God, King and Country" into the contemporary tripartite slogan of 'Thainess': "Religion, Monarchy and Nation." At the same time, for reasons similar to those adopted by French and English colonial governments in Indochina and Burma, the king became convinced of the need to secularize education based on the premise that all citizens, regardless of their ethno-linguistic background, must receive the same education: teaching had to take place in Thai, the new national language, and combine the subjects of traditional teaching (history of the Thai monarchy and Buddhism) with lessons in arithmetic and natural science. State education was to be the key tool for propagating state ideas of 'Thainess' and promote the nationalistic assimilation of the ethnic-linguistic and peripheral 'non-Thai' minorities (including the Christianised *chao khaw*) under a nation state dominated by the ethno-linguistic, political, economic and religious supremacy of the Thai.

Both Rama V and Rama VI saw in the secular elements of Catholic schools a model to emulate in building their modern secular Thai school system. On the other hand, the religious specificity of the schools, including the teaching of Catholic doctrines and values, was seen as conflicting with the ideological propaganda of 'Thainess' to which schools had to comply. With the Educational Acts of 1902 and 1918, the monarchs solved the problem by mandating Thai schools operating in the country—both state and Catholic—had to adopt the same standardized ministry-approved curriculum grounded on 'Thainess.'[34]

33 Keyes, "Why the Thai Are Not Christian."

34 In most colonized countries of South East Asia (e.g. Vietnam, Myanmar and Malaysia) it was possible to recognize a binary school system—'indigenous schools' where the teaching language was the dominant vernacular one and 'European' (often Christian) schools aimed at the formation of the ruling classes, where the teaching language was English or French. In Thailand, however, in all schools, either state or private, the teaching language is the central Thai, the national language [Charles F. Keyes, "State Schools in Rural

Subsequently missionaries working in schools and hospitals chose to acquiesce to the demands of the Thai state, thus producing the theological and political conditions for the deepening 'Thaification' of institutional normative Catholicism. This, I argue, is an important aspect of history that has not received sufficient critical attention in academic work on Thai Catholicism.

The Indigenization of Catholicism

In order to understand the religious and political context in which contemporary Catholic NGOs operate, I believe it is fundamental to have a closer look at the characteristics of this dominant, localized and 'Thaified' approach of Christianity as it is now represented by the local Catholic Church, particularly in the Archdiocese of Bangkok. The 'Thaification' of Catholicism became officially sanctioned for missionaries after the Second Vatican Council (1962–65) with the foundation of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Thailand (FCBT) and the appointment of Thai Bishops in place of foreigners. The established link between Catholicism, monarchy and 'Thainess' became explicit with the prescriptions, established by documents such as *Gaudium et Spes* (1965), *Nostra Aetate* (1965) and *Ad Gentes* (1965), marking a substantial shift in missionary efforts, from a conversion-based approach to the necessity of the "inculturation" of the Gospels according to local contexts.[35]

The recommendations of the Second Vatican Council, in particular those relating to *Ad Gentes*, seemed to emerge from the critical awareness of the Roman Catholic Church with respect to its historical role in supporting de-culturizing practices of power in relation to the expansion of Western imperialism. Nevertheless, as Italian anthropologist Flavia Cuturi observed, they did not distinguish 'culture' and 'religion' in the various contexts in which

Communities: Reflections on Rural Education and Cultural Change in Southeast Asia." In *Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia,* ed. Charles F. Keyes (New Haven: Monograph 36/Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1991), 7].

35 The theological term "inculturation" gained a wider acceptance at the time of the 32nd General Congregation of the Society of Jesus (December 1, 1974–April 7, 1975). [Ary Roest-Crollius, "What Is So New About Inculturation?." In *Inculturation: Working Papers 1,* ed. Ary Roest-Crollius and T. Nkerahimigo, 1–18. (Rome: Gregorian University, 1984)]. It was intended to be an adjustment of the concept of "adaptation" that had emerged from the statements of the Second Vatican Council [Giuseppe Buono, *Missiologia: Teologia e prassi* (Milano: Paoline Editoriale Libri, 2000), 151, cited in Flavia Cuturi, ed., *In nome di Dio: L'impresa missionaria di fronte all'alterità* (Roma: Meltemi, 2004), 22]. Pope John Paul II then further explained the concept of inculturation in *Redemptoris missio* (1990).

contemporary evangelization was directed, nor did they address problems or questions of 'adaptation' to local cultures, in areas such as liturgical arrangements, communication strategies, theories of preaching, and broader practices of everyday life.[36] As noted by the Jesuit Michael Amaladoss, in many contexts around the world, the inculturation of the Gospel has become the vehicle of dominant cultures.[37] In fact, the mimesis of Christianity through the adoption of the most influential and respected customs of society is not particularly new in the Asian transformations of Catholicism. Giacomo Di Fiore observed that already in the 16th and 17th centuries, the experience of Jesuits Francis Xavier in India, Malaysia and Japan, as well as Matteo Ricci in China opted for strategies of conforming to the models of aristocratic society, to ritual customs deemed to be central in the local civil and religious life, and not to neglect the worldly dimensions of local sociability.[38] An emphasis on poverty and sacrifice, as represented by Christ's crucifixion, had to be avoided as it could arise suspicion and hostility.

Amaladoss's readings of this earlier history provide insight into the post-Council story of Thai Catholicism. My thesis is that in Thailand—the only country in the region not to have suffered colonization and to have developed a monarchical official, as opposed to popular and anti-colonial form of nationalism[39]—the task of inculturation of the Christian message has taken place in order to ensure the continuity of a harmonic political relationship with the Thai monarchy.[40] At least at the institutional level, the Thai Catholic Church has recognized and accommodated the culture of a hegemonic state model of 'Thainess.'

---

36 Cuturi, *In nome di Dio.*

37 Michael Amaladoss, *Oltre l'inculturazione: Unità e pluralità delle chiese* (Bologna: Editrice Missionaria Italiana, 2000), 23–30.

38 Giacomo Di Fiore, "Strategie di evangelizzazione nell'Oriente asiatico tra cinquecento e settecento," in *Il Cammino dell'Evangelizzazione: Problemi Storiografici*, eds. Giacomo Martina and Umberto Dovere (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001), 97–162.

39 Benedict Anderson, "Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies," in *The Study of Thailand*, ed. Eliezer B. Ayal, 193–247. (Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, 1978).

40 The fact that Thailand became a hostile territory for Christian missionaries during the years following the fall of the absolute monarchy (1940–44), and the disappearance of the king from the Thai political scene is meaningful [Shane Strate, "An Uncivil State of Affairs: Fascism and Anti-Catholicism in Thailand, 1940–1944," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42.1 (2011): 59–87]. Coincidentally, Christian missionaries operating in the country will enjoy, once again, safety and political protection with the post-war geo-political repositioning of Thailand as a key American ally in Southeast Asia, and the concomitant return of the monarchy to the center of the Thai political arena.

In the selection of the vernacular language to be used as a vehicle of the Word by Catholic missionaries in the country, the choice fell on central Thai, the national language. Along with this the Church adopted Buddhist terms to designate Christian concepts. Buddhism, the religious component of 'Thainess,' was re-conceptualized as a respectful local philosophy (not as a religion), whereas local cults (such as the belief in spirits, the cult of amulets, divination, etc.) that are particularly popular among 'non-Thai' Northern and North-eastern ethnic groups were labeled as primitive religious superstitions. The 'local culture' to accommodate Catholicism with was consistently identified in the reified, ahistorical, and mono-ethnic (e.g. central Thai) construction of *watthatham Thai* (Thai culture), developed a decade earlier by the Phibun Songkhram's military regime.[41] In the next section I briefly describe some of the aspects of this 'Thaified' Catholicism that I directly experienced while I was ethnographically exploring (2011–2014) the Catholic institutional world of schools, hospitals, churches, missions, and NGOs in Bangkok, where most Catholics are upper-middle class Thais of Chinese descent, rather than from the minority 'tribal' ethnicities of the North that comprise the majority of Catholics in contemporary Thailand.

'Thaification' of the Gospel

Some aspects of the 'inculturation' of Christianity recall essentialized dimensions of *watthantham Thai*: faithful entering the church are expected to take off their shoes and accompany each verbalization of *amen* during liturgy with the *wai* (the traditional Thai salute of folded hands—as opposed to the handshake more common among Northern minority communities). However, Catholicism reproduces 'Thainess' through two other channels. The first is related to the place attributed to the king. As is common in Buddhist temples, government buildings, shopping malls and private homes, grand images depicting the king and members of the royal family are displayed in all Catholic buildings (churches, schools, universities and hospitals) alongside traditional Christian icons. In state schools, in all classes, the three sacred symbols of the national identity are displayed over the blackboard in this exact order: The Thai flag, an image or little statue of Buddha and a picture of the king. In Catholic schools the semantic core of the nationalistic triad is kept unchanged with the only

41 This echoed some of the ways in which racial purity was celebrated in the West as national virtue by Nazi-fascist powers. Scot Barmé, *Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of Thai Identity* (Singapore: ISEAS—Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 138.

replacement of a crucifix in place of the Buddha. This way, even Jesus Christ is placed under the protection of Thai nation and monarchy.

Moreover, during all the most important Catholic celebrations, including Christmas, the liturgy includes prayers in praise of Thailand's recently deceased King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX). According to some priests I interviewed on the topic before King Bhumibol's death, the king is included in Catholic liturgy as a 'secular' element of the local culture, just like how the names of the hosting country are blessed during Catholic masses in the West. Heads of state are mentioned by name in prayers within liturgical contexts of Catholic masses nearly everywhere. Nevertheless, His Majesty was far from simply representing a constitutional head of state for the Thai faithful. He is publicly portrayed as the incarnation of the Hindu God Vishnu and as supreme embodiment of the Buddhist *dharma*.

The second central channel through which Thai Catholicism reproduces 'Thainess' is in the 'embodied rules' governing the relationship between clergy and laity. Laymen should pay respect to priests (often called *phra*—the same word used to designate Buddhist monks) according to ritual relational praxis which already characterizes the normative relationship between laymen and Buddhist monks and that, more broadly, refers to difference in socio-moral status between so called *phu-noi* (small people) and *phu-yai* (big people). Within traditional Thai (and Indo-Buddhist) hierarchical social structures, *phu-yai* are thought to possess more merit (*bun*) and better *karma* than *phu-noi*. Thai aristocracy, monks, military, and state officials historically represent *phu-yai* with respect to 'non-Thai,' laymen, and citizens respectively Similarly, while adults are *phu-yai,* children are *phu-noi*.[42] Adhering to this relational cosmological model, Thai Catholic priests confirm in a bodily way the Buddhist stratification of the cosmos as based on merit and *karma* and thus, at least implicitly, its political implications as well. For their part, most of the faithful relate to this enculturated Christian message by appealing to local interpretations: the figures of Jesus and the saints might be treated as divinities to be recognized alongside the already numerous entities that inhabit the hybridized Indo-Buddhist pantheon. Crucifixes, holy pictures and statues, in turn, are often used as magic charms in ways analogous to Buddhist amulets.

Many foreign missionaries I met during fieldwork described with great disappointment the theological and pastoral approach of Bangkok Thai priests as

42 Giuseppe Bolotta, "Moving within Urban Hierarchical Spaces: Children's Trajectories in the Urban Scenario of Bangkok, Thailand," *Antropologia* 1.1 (2014): 115; Giuseppe Bolotta, "The Good Child's Duties: Childhood in Militarized Thailand," *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia.* Young Academic's Voice 19 (May 2016). https://kyotoreview.org/yav/childhood-militarized-thailand/.

mostly vertical, exclusively otherworldly and grounded on a retributive logic of salvation, which seems religiously and politically consistent with the Thai elitist interpretation of *karma*. The words of Father Nicola, an Italian missionary, heading a Catholic NGO addressing slum children in Bangkok since the 1990s, illustrate this critical approach:

> Thai priests in Bangkok teach that good people go to paradise while the bad guys end up in hell. This is somehow a medieval retributive logic of salvation and sin [in Thai language *bap*—the same word referring to the concept of Buddhist demerit], which overlaps with the Buddhist theory of *karma*: if you act well you gain merit (*tham dee dai dee*). Rich people are then implicitly considered the ones with good *karma*. We Western missionaries are the only ones dealing with poor and miserable people in Bangkok. While Catholic schools for rich Buddhists are way more often headed by Thai 'manager-nuns,' Thai priests look at the urban poor as if they deserved the consequences of their own sins. Even though they sometimes collect money to be delivered to the poor, the latter are still viewed as inferior sinners. There's a lot of work to do here.
>
> FATHER NICOLA, July 2012

Father Nicola belongs to a new generation of Catholic missionaries who were sent to Thailand after the 1960s to officially support the local Thai Church and to carry on humanitarian interventions based on a vision of Christian charity.[43] Contrary to the Thai clergy of Bangkok, missionaries such as father Nicola are now working in the most marginal areas of the capital as 'development missionaries,' often heading formally secular NGOs.[44] They are thus positioned at the crossroad between local and global changes in both the secular and the religious spheres and act as translators of a counter-indigenization of Thai Catholicism which I describe as 'de-Thaification.'[45] Increasingly joined by a significant number of grown 'non-Thai' religious actors (mostly *chao*

43 On Father Nicola's political approach to Christian charity in Thailand, see Giuseppe Bolotta, "'God's Beloved Sons': Religion, Attachment and Children's Self-Formation in the Slums of Bangkok," *Antropologia* 4.2 (2017), 95–120.

44 It's relevant to underline that these 'development missionaries,' following shifting global trends in vocation callings, are increasingly represented by Latin American and African priests and sisters coming from post-colonial countries rather than by European and American religious actors only, as it was during previous centuries.

45 Counter-indigenization' trends by local clergy and communities in reaction to 'vernacularization' work driven largely by European missionaries is not specific of Thailand only. See Bernardo Brown and R. Michael Feener. "Configuring Catholicism in the Anthropology of Christianity." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 28.2 (2017), 139–51.

khaw, Northern and North-Eastern priests), these 'development missionaries' feel deeply uncomfortable within the 'Thaified' Church to which previous generations of Western missionaries in Thailand had given shape. They are also reluctant to view a deified king as a secular local element compatible with Christianity especially during a phase of Thai political history where the present military dictatorship's obsession with the promulgation of 'Thainess'-oriented interventions is exacerbating the political and economic oppression on 'non-Thai' marginal groups. Among these 'development missionaries,' there is Sister Serafina, the Italian head of the Little One's House, where I spent six months as a volunteer during 2012.

The Counter-Indigenization of Catholicism: The Sister of 'Non-Thai' Poor

Sister Serafina's biography embodies in poignant and even brutal ways the commingling of secular and religious, worldly and otherworldly dimensions. Before arriving in Thailand, Serafina was assisting children with polio in Sierra Leone as both a missionary and registered physiotherapist. During this time, she was kidnapped and kept prisoner for 56 days by the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). During her imprisonment, Serafina had the opportunity to dramatically engage and reflect upon the political and economic implications of her religious role. At that time, a profoundly worldly understanding of Christian spirituality as primarily oriented to serve the Last ones, the poor, already marked her conception of the mission. As she explained to me on several occasions, Christian missions have to take into account not only the 'victims' spiritual experience' but also the economic and socio-political causes of social injustice. The latter is conceived by Serafina as a structural sin, a violation of God's plan. Accordingly, Christian charity regains in Serafina's thought its Jewish meaning of *tzedakah*, or action for social justice.[46]

46 The Semitic root of the Hebrew term *tzedakah* is also recognizable in the Arabic word *sadaqa* (voluntary donation or charity) which is used in Islamic literature for forms of religious giving distinct from, and less stringently regulated than obligatory alms, or *zakat*. Even in Islamic contexts, these concepts have been variously used for religious, humanitarian, and social projects [see, for example, Gregory C. Kozlowsky, "Religious Authority, Reform, and Philanthropy in the Contemporary Muslim World," in *Philanthropy in the World's Traditions,* eds. Warren F. Ilchman, Stanley N. Kats and Edward L. Queen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 279–308]. In the context of Southeast Asia, for example, the term is widely used with reference to the work of Islamic NGOs and philanthropy associations advocating poverty reduction, Muslim welfare, and social change

After the African mission, her congregation decided to assign her to Thailand where she arrived in 2000. The beginning of her missionary experience in Thailand was immediately marked by conflict between her own way of understanding both Christian faith and mission, and the 'Thaified' one expressed by the local Catholic hierarchy. Serafina told me how she found the official relationship that the Thai Catholic Church seemed to have with the state, the monarchy, and Buddhism incomprehensible. The vow of obedience that had founded her profession of faith was felt by Serafina as sharply in conflict with what she perceived as "a strongly hierarchical, ceremonial, rich and pro-monarchical Church wrapped in the distancing mechanism of liturgy, and where sisters were exclusively expected to run high-class private schools." These institutions she described as "neo-liberal enterprises addressed to rich Thai Buddhists, where the teaching of Christian religion is forbidden."

Used to working with and for the poor, Serafina found Thai clerical authorities' attitudes toward the urban poor intolerable. It is in fact extremely rare to encounter Thai priests or sisters in the poor marginal urban niches of the capital. Indeed, as I was told several times by slum dwellers themselves, who were mostly 'non-Thai' unskilled ex-peasants who had migrated from the North and the North-East to the big city beginning with the 1960s: "Thai people don't come here. Only *farang* (Caucasians) get here to help us."

In this context, Serafina bravely decided to waive her Thai clerical authorities' indications to provide the wealthy faithful of the parishes of Bangkok with pastoral care and in 2002—with the consent of her Superior Mother in Italy—she decided to move, shifting to a shack within one of the biggest slums of Bangkok. In choosing to live in the slums she joined Father Nicola, who had lived in the slum for five years, and Sister Ana, a Brazilian missionary who had been in Thailand for two years and was trying to translate Latin American liberation theology in the context of the slums. As a nurse, Serafina started to take care of the sick, working especially with disabled children. During my conversations with these missionaries, Serafina, Ana, and Nicola all passionately argued that the inculturation of Catholicism should be realized in the context of the cultures of the 'non-Thai' poor, rather than being placed at the service of the defied and militarized Buddhist monarchical formation of 'Thainess.'

After a one-year stay in the slum, in 2003 Serafina was called back by the Thai clerical authorities to the parish of Bangkok where she had previously been asked to serve. They were upset with the idea that a female member of the

---

in Indonesia. See Amelia Fauzia, *Faith and the State: A History of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

Church should reside alone in a 'dangerous environment' such as the slum.[47] Despite the Thai clergy's irritation, Serafina had the time to lay the foundations of the Little Ones' House. Here it is important to recognize that it was in the 'secular' world of the transnational aid and development system, rather than in that of the local Thai Catholic clergy, that Serafina found an institutional base able to acknowledge the importance of her relief activities in the slum.

The Little Ones' House: Development as Techno-Political Framework for Serafina's Catholicism

Although the Little Ones' House was formally established in 2003, Serafina had already been informally carrying out her humanitarian work for months. While she was still living in the slum, a couple of Italian volunteers working for a secular aid organization paid her a visit. They were very impressed by the work the sister was carrying out alone in the shantytown. After returning to Italy they decided to organize fund-raising campaigns, addressing both Catholic and non-Catholic Italians, to support Serafina's mission which, in the end, could also be 'neutrally' framed as a humanitarian, as opposed to a Catholic or religious intervention, to save the slum's 'little ones.' Pictures of the sister hugging children in a 'dangerous third world slum' produced rapid and enthusiastic response among Italian donors. Money came from both lay and religious channels, including support from Caritas, the major Catholic relief, development and social service agency.[48] The economic support from this important Catholic organization eventually persuaded Thai clerical authorities in Bangkok to authorize sister Serafina's initiative. Meanwhile, the project of building the Little Ones' House had already been initiated. The following year, Serafina asked the Thai government to officially recognize her 'House' as an NGO.

Here it is important to provide a brief description of the Thai state's policy concerning foreign organizations operating on its territory. The ratification by the Thai government of international Human Rights (1976) and Children's Rights (1992) treaties opened the road for NGOs to enter Thailand. NGOs are

47 Sister Serafina, as with all other sisters (nuns), is not a member of the clergy. Even if they are subjected to the authority of the local Church, they are officially members of religious orders or congregations (religious associations) and so are classified by Roman Catholic authorities as 'lay'.

48 Caritas Internationalis is a confederation of over 160 Catholic relief, development and social service organizations operating worldwide. It is the Catholic Church's most important institutional branch devoted to 'charity' and one of the major *de facto* development organizations of the world. It has its own delegation at the United Nations headquarter in New York City.

officially recognized by the Thai government as secular, apolitical entities, defined in terms of international law as, "having an objective to provide assistance to or promote development for a person, a group of persons or a juristic person and/or a government agency or a state enterprise in conformity with the development policy and security of Thailand, and also having the operation plan that is not contrary to the policy of the Thai Government."[49] That is, NGOs are supposed to have nothing to do with either religious proselytizing or politics.

These Thai legal definitions do not provide recognition for religious NGOs as a specific sub-category. On paper, all humanitarian organizations are indistinctly grouped within the secular rubrics of *ongkan* (NGO) or *mulanity* (foundation). Within the list of NGOs recognized by the Thai government, Christian and Catholic NGOs are intuitively recognizable as such by their name only. Nevertheless, looking at the official description the government attributed to each organization, it is not possible to find any mention of the religious nature of its ideological orientation.[50] Accordingly, NGOs such as the Little Ones' House are boxed together with 'non-religious' NGOs onto an abstract category defined in pseudo-legalistic terms, briefly stating formulas like: "charitable foundation providing social relief services to disabled children and promoting children's rights." In this operation of specifying limits and defining boundaries, it is evident that the Thai state seems to implement specific techno-politics, that is to turn political and religious elements of potential interference into a technical 'inert' matter, and to confine NGOs' activities to depoliticized 'technical tasks.'[51]

On the other hand, NGOs such as the Little Ones' House are far from simply assisting disabled children. Rather than that, Sister Serafina takes charge of guiding the spiritual formation, also intended as socio-political conscientization, of the children's mothers. This aspect of her work will be discussed in more detail below. For now, however, I would like to turn attention toward

49 Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of Thailand, "Raichuu ongkan ekachon tang prataet thidairabanuyad damnonngan nai prataetthai (List of the Foreign NGOs Authorized to Work in Thailand)," Foreign Working Administration Office, Department of Employment, 1998a, accessed January 11, 2015. http://wp.doe.go.th/ngo/ngolist/list_thai_org_help_etc.pdf.

50 Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of Thailand, "Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on the Entry of Foreign Private Organizations to Operate in Thailand," Foreign Working Administration Office, Department of Employment, 1998b, accessed January 11, 2015. http://wp.doe.go.th/ngo/documents/rule_2541_eng.pdf.

51 James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Tania M. Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).

the ways in which these discrepancies between Thai state policy, development international language, and NGOs' praxis are conceived and used in her mission work. Sister Serafina explained to me why she wanted her mission to be classified as an NGO by stating:

> We asked to be recognized as an NGO first to have legal protection. Here we deal with disabled children. In case of deaths, a sad possibility that we unfortunately have to keep in mind, without legal recognition we would be exposed to serious risks. Secondly, this allows us to access the benefits that the Thai welfare grants to humanitarian organizations according to international law.

Being recognized as an NGO—a secular organization that officially loses its missionary connotations—gives missionaries legal, economic, political and religious advantages. Alongside donations coming from religious and missionary related channels, being assigned the status of NGOs allows the Little Ones' House to solicit public funding and international donations coming from the 'secular' branch of the humanitarian transnational industry. Serafina takes care of disabled children and works to implement children's rights. The officially religiously-neutral language of rights, imbued with Christian moral categories harmoniously fits Serafina's mission and, over time, has granted the Little One's House the financial support of several local institutions (secular and Buddhist, public and private) dealing with the globalized—though genealogically rooted in Christian values—"moral economy of marginal childhood."[52] The 'developmental conversion' of Sister Serafina's mission has thus opened up access to wider sources of funding and support.

Establishing an officially secular NGO has also produced both political and religious benefits. First, it has allowed Serafina, a Catholic missionary, to engage in pastoral care of the Buddhist poor in Bangkok. As in other Asian contexts where the presence of foreign Christian missionaries is prohibited by law,[53] the technical transnational language of rights and the status of NGOs represent a legal-institutional umbrella for missionaries to circumvent state regulations and enter countries which previously had not been 'missionizable.' Moreover, the label of NGO has made it possible for Serafina to reposition herself not

52 Giuseppe Bolotta, "Playing the NGO System: How Mothers and Children Design Political Change in the Slums of Bangkok," in *Dreams of Prosperity: Inequality and Integration in Southeast Asia*, ed. Silvia Vignato (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2017), 203–234.

53 See the communist cases of China, Laos and Vietnam, or those countries where Buddhist politics take particular forms so to produce restrictions to missionary activities, such as Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Cambodia.

only with respect to the Thai state, but also with respect to the Thai Catholic clergy, thereby gaining an autonomous space to articulate the specific ethics of her religious mission in anti-normative directions that do not conform to the pastoral vision of the 'Thaified' Catholicism of the Bangkok Church.

Serafina's Catholicism: The Sacralization of 'Non-Thai' Poor and the Religious Politicization of Development

What makes the Little One's House specifically religious? And what kind of Catholicism does Sister Serafina translate into her formally secular NGO? The Little Ones' House not only provides medical and physiotherapeutic care to disabled children. According to Sister Serafina, the heart of the NGO's intervention is represented by the spiritual formation of the children's mothers, who are mostly 'non-Thai' slum dwellers.

Serafina organizes daily Bible study sessions aimed at reflecting upon the meaning of childhood disability and urban poverty in the context of Buddhist Thailand through the words of the Gospels. First of all, Serafina's aim is to promote a semantic re-conceptualization of both disability and poverty from embodied evidence of bad *karma* to an incarnated testimony to God's love. While slum women with disabled children may often face a triple discrimination linked to their status of disabled children's mothers, as 'non-Thai' slum dwellers, and as women, Sister Serafina tries to prove them that their condition is particularly sacred, that their children are God's gifts rather than a 'malediction,' and that they have the right to proudly claim their own dignity and that of their children.

Serafina tries moreover to frame the social problem of disabled children's conditions in the slums as shaped by broader economic, political, and religious dimensions. As she told me during an interview:

> The real problems these women have to cope with are not their children's disability. It's rather the secondary cascade of effects produced by the discrimination they face as poor slum mothers. It's in the slum that children's disability becomes an issue due to the poor economic assistance they receive from the state and to the very political-economic factors forcing Northern and Northeastern poor peasants to migrate to Bangkok slums in order to survive. In Thai monarchical Buddhism they were already at the bottom of the social hierarchy well before getting pregnant. Their children's disability just worsens their socio-political and economic marginalization and it's not surprising that Thai rich urban Buddhists explain this in distorted religious terms—by referring to a *karma* law

> preserving their privileged social status. I don't want necessarily to convert them. They can still be Buddhist if their Buddhism is the good one. But I want them to feel liberated by the oppression of the state Buddhism of 'Thainess.'

The Catholicism of the Little Ones' House seems then to theologically and politically challenge both the state Buddhism of 'Thainess' and normative Thai Catholicism within the nation's capital. Contrary to most Thai Catholic priests and nuns, Sister Serafina is strongly critical of the sacralization of the king and of the subservient attitude of the local Church toward the monarchy. Like Father Nicola and Sister Ana, she is even more critical of the 'Thaified' otherworldly, sin-grounded and Thai-oriented approach of the local Church. To her, the Last to be served in Thailand are the 'non-Thai' ethnic minorities. Accordingly, rather than acting as a *phu-yai* (big people) with slum women and children, the quintessential *phu-noi* (small people), she often causes scandal among the rich Thai faithful of her Bangkok parish by hugging dirty poor slum women, sitting at their level during meals, using impolite 'non-Thai' slum dialects—in short challenging all the embodied dimension of 'Thainess' with the enactment of a 'non-Thai' bottom-up engaged Catholicism.

The Catholicism of Serafina, Ana, and Nicola appears to be particularly influenced by the resurgent relevance of Christian liberation theologies, once marginalized as Marxist deviations of Christianity by the Vatican, and now apparently rehabilitated by the geo-political and theological re-structuring of the Roman Catholic Church's center since the appointment of the Latin American pope Francesco Bergoglio (Francis I). However, this doesn't go without contradictions. During official celebrations, when the parish where the Little Ones' House is located receives the visit of Thai high clergy, metropolitan state authorities, or other development organization representatives, a more 'Thaified' picture of the NGO is displayed. During one of these occasions while I was volunteering at the NGO, for example, the guests of the Little Ones' House (the slum women with their disabled children) were asked by Sister Serafina to perform traditional Thai customs, including a typical Thai dance reproducing episodes and characters of the Thai Indo-Buddhist poem *Ramakien*. In so doing, they were temporarily called back to *watthantham Thai* (Thai culture) and to proper *phu-yai*/*phu-noi* patterns of behavior.

For the language of human and children's rights her NGO officially upholds, Sister Serafina explained to me very clearly that they are obvious derivations of the Christian social doctrine. To Sister Serafina, however, they represent a technical and juridical reframing of the work of Christian charity that sometimes lacks "soul." Here, her words seem to somehow echo with the anthropological accounts on NGOs and international development policy

as a technocratic Western device with depoliticizing effects. Tania Murray Li, for example, has described the dynamics of development actors' interventions as grounded on their "rendering purely technical" social problems that are instead profoundly embedded in political-economic structures.[54] Specifically, the framing of sites of development intervention through 'neutral' and 'objective' scientific diagnoses and technical orthodoxies often obscures the historical structure of political-economic relations shaping those contexts, while simultaneously confining the 'solution of the problem' to development experts. In this way, as anthropologist James Ferguson has famously argued, the development system works as "anti-politics machine" that technically neutralizes the aid interventions beneficiaries' possibilities of political consciousness, narration, and self-organization.[55]

In fact, many of the secular NGOs promoting childcare 'best practices' in the slums tend to produce a politically neutral representation of childhood marginality by exclusively describing it through Western psychological and medical categories. Slum children are thus grouped in categories such as psychologically vulnerable 'street children,' 'unattached children,' 'anti-social children,' and the like, that call for expert interventions—namely by psychologists, social workers, and educators. Bangkok 'Thai' Catholic actors, in turn, tend to attribute the slum kids' alleged suffering to their irresponsible and sinful parents, reinforcing the public discourse on slum dwellers as immoral persons, and thus legitimizing the state 'measures of correction' (that is 'Thaification') of 'non-Thai' minorities.[56] Sister Serafina, quite contrarily, seems to use religion—namely the theological valorization of the ethnic urban poor—to repoliticize development and challenge Thai normative Catholicism. She does so by taking a shelter under the 'secular' umbrella of the NGO system and its institutional framework, while simultaneously filling its mechanistic and technical clockwork with her 'political-theological soul.'

Conclusion

A number of recent studies have connected Christian missions to Westernization and 'secular' modernization processes in the Global South. They have

54 Li, *The Will to Improve*, 123.

55 Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine.*

56 The political implications of this humanitarian victimization of children and blaming of parents have also been observed by Didier Fassin in the case of South Africa. See Didier Fassin, "Children as Victims: The Moral Economy of Childhood in the Time of AIDS," In *When People Come First: Critical Studies in Global Health,* edited by Joao Biehl and Adriana Petryna, 109–29 Princeton: Princeton University Press.

also identified in these processes the institutional, moral, and ideological frameworks supporting colonization and Western imperialism. Others have underlined how the promotion of modern education has worked in several contexts as a common entry-strategy to be used by missionaries in order to favor long-term socio-economic, moral, and political transformations of 'civilizing missions' that were thought to be more compatible with Christianity. This case study from Thailand, however, presents yet another view on the complex relations between mission and development.

Catholic missionaries have certainly provided the Siamese monarchical elites with modern rationalizing criteria of conduct—especially through education and a secular school system. By doing so they have, however (inadvertently?), supported the internal colonization of Siam by the hegemonic ethno-linguistic group of the central Thai rather than paving the way to Western imperialism. They even indirectly favored assimilation in the form of 'Thaification' of the very 'non-Thai' minorities that represent the main humanitarian target of Catholic NGOs working in the country—such as the Christianized *chao khaw* ('hill tribes') minority populations.

The close historical links between Catholic missionaries and the Thai monarchy has directed normative Catholicism to be locally readapted and 'inculturated' according to the official models of 'Thainess,' making the local Catholic Church a pro-monarchical semi-capitalist institution running prestigious, secularized hospitals and private schools attended by upper-middle class Buddhist citizens.

Nevertheless, in the post-war era of humanitarianism and development, Thai Catholicism has been pluralized by the activities of 'development missionaries' working in the most marginal areas of the country as heads of officially 'secular' NGOs. They are mostly foreign missionaries or newly ordained 'non-Thai' priests who, like Sister Serafina, are taking advantage of the techno-political framework granted by the NGO system to gain religious and political spaces of action with respect to both the Thai state and the Thai Catholic clergy. Within the officially secular and apolitical domain of development, they have the opportunity to re-address the inculturation of 'Thaified' Catholicism on the 'non-Thai' marginal groups' experiences. By doing so, they are also theologically challenging established forms of Thai Catholicism and the associated politics of official national Buddhist discourse on 'Thainess.'

Sister Serafina has managed to both employ and subvert development techno-politics, as characterized by Ferguson and Li, by taking advantage of the benefits that are granted to organizations officially registered as NGOs, while injecting both political and religious meaning in her work within the

legislative framework of an NGO.[57] As suggested by Louise Burkhart, an anthropologist researching on the historical role played out by missionaries in colonial Mexico, "the missionary is not only dialoguing with those who want to convert, but he is himself 'missionized,' he builds a strong bond with the natives against the settlers and the Church hierarchy and assumes the natives' point of view while still keeping to the purpose of his mission."[58] Indeed, the work of transforming missionary interventions creates opportunities for both submission and resistance.

The fact that Catholicism contains both these possibilities is observable in other missionized Asian contexts. To mention a relevant example, David Mosse has explored the historical genealogy of Tamil Nadu *dalit*'s "Brahmanic Christianity."[59] Mosse highlights the conflict between a 'Hinduized' high society Catholicism (which was accommodated to the culture of caste by the first 17th century Jesuits) and the anti-caste political movement of contemporary *dalit* Catholicism, stating that: "Even while the Church tolerated or helped reproduce hierarchical orders of caste, participation in Christian religion (a realm that tutored explicit meaning and symbolic association) inculcated capacities for the manipulation of symbolic meanings or transactions that would be used (alongside political action) by subaltern groups."[60]

In the case of Thailand, however, we can't yet talk about an organized anti-structural movement of 'non-Thai' Catholics. Elements of dissent seem rather to be expressed by 'development missionaries' working within global dynamics of NGOs, developmentalist and humanitarian interventions. It is however also important to mention that Sister Serafina, Sister Ana, and Father Nicola are not the only missionaries introducing counter-theologies through their development work with the poor. During my fieldwork, I met several 'non-Thai' Catholic priests in the North, leading NGOs and challenging the normative 'Thaification' of the Gospels by hybridizing Catholicism with 'non-Buddhist' vernacular cults. This tendency, furthermore, is not limited to Catholicism.

Even in the field of Thai Buddhism, despite the pro-'Thainess' position of the centralised Buddhist *sangha*, several 'socially engaged' Buddhist monks have been working with local communities against state-led development projects, putting forward worldly interpretations of salvation that emphasize the

57 Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine*; Li, *The Will to Improve.*

58 Louise M. Burkhart, *The Slippery Earth: Nahwa-Christian Moral Dialogue in Sixteenth-Century Mexico* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989), 15, cited in Cuturi, *In nome di Dio,* 41.

59 David Mosse, *The Saint in the Banyan Tree: Christianity and Caste Society in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

60 Ibid., 20.

socio-political and economic causes of *dukkha* (suffering) and the necessity of democratizing *nirvana* by promoting social justice.[61] Some authors have even reported the emergence of Christian-Buddhist liberation movements jointly cooperating to promote the marginal groups' political interests in South-East Asia.[62]

I argue that the emergent internal religious polarizations that characterize both Catholicism and Buddhism are religiously reproducing the contemporary Thai political divide, which is itself an outcome of the historical disputes between Bangkok and rural peripheries, Thai and 'non-Thai' groups, monarchy and democracy. On a broader level, it is connected to global dynamics and fluctuations of theory and approach both within the Church and the humanitarian sector. In these configurations of religion and politics, the international development system represents a 'grey area,' historically shaped by Christian ethos, which can be used by different political and religious actors to move the level of action, conflict and mission to another—apparently a technical and politically neutral—one that can be diversely deployed as strategies within specific contexts.[63]

Sister Serafina both uses the 'technical' mechanisms of NGOs policy and simultaneously critiques them, demonstrating how religion—rather than an 'opium of the masses' or a private spiritual fulfillment—works here as an instrument to counter the "technicalization" of humanitarian aid and to re-politicize development. Sister Serafina doesn't feel she is doing politics, nor development, but rather applying a universal logic of Christ mediating with the

61 See for example Phongphit Seri, *Religion in a Changing Society: Buddhism, reform and the role of monks in community development in Thailand* (Hong Kong: Arena Press, 1988); P. Lapthananon, *Development Monks in Northeast Thailand* (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2012).

62 Robert Bobilin, "Buddhist and Christian Movements for Social Justice in Southeast Asia," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 8 (1988): 5–12.

63 In the context of contemporary Southeast China, Keping Wu describes the "grey zone" within which Christian and Buddhist charitable organizations navigate as "the ambivalent political space located in-between what is legal and what is illegal." By "grey zone," Wu refers to the ambiguity of the Chinese state politics, and to what exceeds its censorship capacities. Even though this partly resonates with my argument, 'third grey area' is used here somewhat differently to describe the parallel, and sometimes concurrent, juridical and political space produced by the transnational humanitarian aid system within context of nation-states sovereignty. See Keping Wu, "Buddhist and Protestant Philanthropies in Contemporary Southeast China: Negotiating the 'Grey Zone,'" in *Religion and the Politics of Development*, eds. Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015), 129–53.

present conditions of the locality she is living in. Still, her NGO interventions carry with them not only religious but also political and economic implications. She is well aware that through her solidarity with the Last—which are here the 'non-Thai' slum dwellers—she is proposing to Thai society an image of moral and socio-political order, which is strikingly different from the present established one. When I discussed this point with her, she smiled proudly before saying, citing the Gospel: "The Little Ones' House is like a grain of mustard."

Bibliography

Amaladoss, Michael. *Oltre l'inculturazione: Unità e pluralità delle chiese*. Bologna: Editrice Missionaria Italiana, 2000.

Anderson, Benedict. "Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies." In *The Study of Thailand*, edited by Eliezer B. Ayal, 193–247. Athens, OH: Center for International Studies, 1978.

Arce, Alberto and Norman Long. "Reconfiguring Modernity and Development from an Anthropological Perspective." In *Anthropology, Development and Modernity*, edited by Alberto Arce and Norman Long, 3–31. London: Routledge, 2000.

Asad, Talal. *Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Barmé, Scot. *Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of Thai Identity*. Singapore: ISEAS—Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.

Barnett, Michael. *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Bobilin, Robert. "Buddhist and Christian Movements for Social Justice in Southeast Asia." *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 8 (1988): 5–12.

Bolotta, Giuseppe. "Moving within Urban Hierarchical Spaces: Children's Trajectories in the Urban Scenario of Bangkok, Thailand." *Antropologia* 1.1 (2014): 105–25.

Bolotta, Giuseppe. "The Good Child's Duties: Childhood in Militarized Thailand." *Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia*. Young Academic's Voice 19 (May 2016). https://kyotoreview.org/yav/childhood-militarized-thailand/.

Bolotta, Giuseppe. "Playing the NGO System: How Mothers and Children Design Political Change in the Slums of Bangkok," in *Dreams of Prosperity: Inequality and Integration in Southeast Asia*, edited by Silvia Vignato, 203–234. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2017.

Bolotta, Giuseppe. "'God's Beloved Sons': Religion, Attachment and Children's Self-Formation in the Slums of Bangkok." *Antropologia* 4.2 (2017), 95–120.

Bornstein, Erica. *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality and Economic in Zimbabwe*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Bressan, Luigi. *A Meeting of Worlds: The Interaction of Christian Missionaries and Thai Culture*. Bangkok: Assumption University Press, 2005.

Bressan, Luigi and Smithies Michael. *Thai-Vatican Relations in the Twentieth Century*. Bangkok: Amarin, 2006.

Brown, Bernardo, and R. Michael Feener. "Configuring Catholicism in the Anthropology of Christianity." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 28.2 (2017), 139–51.

Buono, Giuseppe. *Missiologia: Teologia e prassi*. Milano: Paoline Editoriale Libri, 2000.

Burkhart, Louise M. *The Slippery Earth: Nahwa-Christian Moral Dialogue in Sixteenth-Century Mexico*. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1989.

Burt, Ronald S. "Structural Holes Versus Network Closure as Social Capital." *In Social Capital: Theory and Research*, edited by Nan Lin, Karen Cook and Ronald S. Burt, 31–56. New Jersey: Transaction Publisher, 2001.

Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff. "Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa." *American Ethnologist* 13.1 (1986): 1–22.

Cuturi, Flavia, ed. *In nome di Dio: L'impresa missionaria di fronte all'alterità*. Roma: Meltemi, 2004.

Davies, Thomas. *NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society*. London: Hurst & Company, 2013.

Di Fiore, Giacomo. "Strategie di evangelizzazione nell'Oriente asiatico tra cinquecento e settecento." In *Il Cammino dell'Evangelizzazione: Problemi Storiografici*, edited by Giacomo Martina and Umberto Dovere, 97–162. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001.

Escobar, Arturo. *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Fassin, Didier. *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Fassin, Didier. "Children as Victims: The Moral Economy of Childhood in the Time of AIDS." In *When People Come First: Critical Studies in Global Health*, edited by Joao Biehl and Adriana Petryna, 109–29. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fauzia, Amelia. *Faith and the State: A History of Islamic Philanthropy in Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.

Forest, Alain. *Missionnaires français au Tonkin et au Siam, XVII–XVIII siècles:Analyse comparée d'un relatif succès et d'un total échec*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998.

Fountain, Philip. "The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion." *International Development Policy: Religion and Development* 4 (2013): 9–30.

Fountain, Philip. "Proselytizing Development." In *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development*, edited by Emma Tomalin, 80–97. London: Routledge, 2015.

Fountain, Philip, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, eds. *Religion and the Politics of Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015a.

Fountain, Philip, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener. "Religion and the Politics of Development." In *Religion and the Politics of Development*, edited by Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, 11–34. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015b.

Hovemyr, Anders. *In Search of the Karen King: A Study in Karen Identity with Special Reference to 19th Century Karen Evangelism in Northern Thailand*. Uppsala: Studia Missionalia Upsaliensia XLIX, 1989.

Kammerer, Cann A. "Customs and Christian Conversion among Akha Highlanders of Burma and Thailand." *American Ethnologist* 17.2 (1990): 277–91.

Keyes, Charles F. "Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 30.3 (1971): 551–67.

Keyes, Charles F. "State Schools in Rural Communities: Reflections on Rural Education and Cultural Change in Southeast Asia." In *Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia,* edited by in Charles F. Keyes, 1–18. New Haven: Monograph 36/Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1991.

Keyes, Charles F. "Why the Thai Are Not Christian: Buddhist and Christian Conversion in Thailand." In *Christian Conversion in Cultural Context,* edited by Robert Hefner, 259–83. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

Kozlowsky, Gregory C. "Religious Authority, Reform, and Philanthropy in the Contemporary Muslim World." In *Philanthropy in the World's Traditions,* edited by Warren F. Ilchman, Stanley N. Kats and Edward L. Queen, 279–308. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

Lapthananon, Pinit. *Development Monks in Northeast Thailand*. Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2012.

Latour, Bruno. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Li, Tania M. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.

Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of Thailand. "Raichuu ongkan ekachon tang prataet thidairabanuyad damnonngan nai prataetthai (List of the Foreign NGOs Authorized to Work in Thailand)." Foreign Working Administration Office, Department of Employment, 1998a. Accessed January 11, 2015. http://wp.doe.go.th/ngo/ngolist/list_thai_org_help_etc.pdf.

Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare of Thailand. "Rule of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on the Entry of Foreign Private Organizations to Operate in Thailand." Foreign Working Administration Office, Department of Employment, 1998b. Accessed January 11, 2015. http://wp.doe.go.th/ngo/documents/rule_2541_eng.pdf.

Mosse, David. *The Saint in the Banyan Tree: Christianity and Caste Society in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Pandolfi, Mariella. "Sovranità mobile e derive umanitarie: emergenza, urgenza, ingerenza." In *Oltre lo Sviluppo: Le Prospettive dell'Antropologia,* edited by Roberto Malighetti, 151–85. Rome: Meltemi, 2005.

Roest-Crollius, Ary. "What Is So New About Inculturation?." In *Inculturation: Working Papers 1,* edited by Ary Roest-Crollius and T. Nkerahimigo, 1–18. Rome: Gregorian University, 1984.

Selinger, Lisa. "The Forgotten Factor: The Uneasy Relationship between Religion and Development." *Social Compass* 51.4 (2004): 523–43.

Seri, Phongphit. *Religion in a Changing Society: Buddhism, reform and the role of monks in community development in Thailand*. Hong Kong: Arena Press, 1988.

Steenbrink, Karel. *Catholics in Independent Indonesia: 1945–2010.* Leiden: Brill, 2015.

Strate, Shane. "An Uncivil State of Affairs: Fascism and Anti-Catholicism in Thailand, 1940–1944." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 42.1 (2011): 59–87.

Tambiah, Stanley J. *World Conqueror & World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand Against a Historical Background*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Thongchai, Winichakul. *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994.

Tomalin, Emma. *Religions and Development*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

Van Der Cruysse, Dirk. *Siam & the West: 1500–1700*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1991.

Watson, Keith. *Educational Development in Thailand*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Limited, 1980.

Wu, Keping. "Buddhist and Protestant Philanthropies in Contemporary Southeast China: Negotiating the 'Grey Zone.'" In *Religion and the Politics of Development*, edited by Philip Fountain, Robin Bush and R. Michael Feener, 129–53. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015.

Wyatt, David K. *The Politics of Reform in Thailand: Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.

Young, Richard F., and Jonathan A. Seitz. "Introduction." In *Asia in the Making of Christianity: Conversion, Agency, and Indigeneity, 1600s to the Present*, edited by Richard F. Young and Jonathan A. Seitz, 1–26. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Zehner, Edward. "Conversion to Christianity among the Thai and Sino-Thai of Modern Thailand: Growth, Experimentation and Networking in the Contemporary Context." In *Asia in the Making of Christianity: Conversion, Agency, and Indigeneity, 1600s to the Present,* edited by Richard F. Young and Jonathan A. Seitz, 403–26. Boston: Brill, 2013.

Zupanov, Ines. *Missionary Tropics: The Catholic Frontier in India (16th–17th Centuries)*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995.

CHAPTER 7

Developing Faith and Character to Develop the Nation: Perspectives from an Elite Indonesian Catholic School

Erica M. Larson

During her high school's morning assembly, tenth grader Alicia walked to the center of the field and took the microphone to practice for an upcoming speech competition among Catholic high school students from North and Central Sulawesi.[1] Positioned under the red and white Indonesian flag flapping in the breeze, with picturesque Mt. Lokon visible in the background, she appealed to her fellow students gathered around her in almost-neat rows. "As the young generation," she said, "it's up to us to realize the dreams of the generations who have come before us." She made reference to the young nationalists in the Dutch East Indies who took the Youth Pledge (*Sumpah Pemuda*) in 1928 and declared Indonesia as one homeland and one nation, with one language. To continue this mission, they will need to be faithful, knowledgeable, and take responsibility for their actions, she explained. "Exactly how can we do this?"

FIGURE 7.1 *Flag ceremony at Lokon St. Nikolaus High School.*

1 All first names used without surnames are pseudonyms.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_008

Alicia asked her fellow students. She paused for effect, and then continued, providing them with the answer: "without giving up, we have to keep praying!"

Alicia is a student at Lokon St. Nikolaus High School (hereafter Lokon), a privately run Catholic boarding school in the majority-Protestant province of North Sulawesi, Indonesia. Although Christians as a national minority in Indonesia "have a precarious role in the struggle for shaping the nation," this historically and ethnographically situated analysis focuses on one such attempt through Lokon School's framing of the relationship between Christian piety, development, and national citizenship.[2] Lokon's project of missionizing for development of the nation approaches individual faith and character building as the first step toward producing Christian—not exclusively Catholic—elites from eastern Indonesia who can shape the future of the democratic, multiconfessional Indonesian nation. The educational project, which looks to the high position of Minahasans in the colonial past, promotes a national frame that does not simply reproduce existing national ideologies about the incorporation of religious and ethnic difference, but rather negotiates them in imagining the possibility of a more central position for North Sulawesi in Indonesia's future.[3]

Religion, Development and Re-imagining the Nation

Forms of religious participation in development and national citizenship have come into focus as scholars of the humanities and social sciences have increasingly delved into religion's role in both nationalism and development. For example, Lila Abu-Lughod explains how Egyptians have over the past few decades increasingly seen Islamic values and morals as "leading to the reform and restoration of the good society and nation, not its downfall," challenging previous local assumptions about the relationship between secularism and patriotic nationalism.[4] Likewise, Kevin O'Neill has noted how neo-Pentecostal groups in majority Catholic Guatemala seek to solve national economic problems and fight crime through organizing prayer networks.[5] The importance of

2 Susanne Schröter, "Christianity in Indonesia: An Overview," in *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power*, ed. Susanne Schröter (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 9.

3 The Minahasan ethnic group is the most populous ethnic group in North Sulawesi.

4 Lila Abu-Lughod, *Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 175.

5 Kevin Lewis O'Neill, *City of God: Christian Citizenship in Postwar Guatemala* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

these studies lies both in the continued emphasis on the religious individual as a site of transformation, and the examination of its consequences for the ways in which people re-imagine the boundaries and the contours of national communities. Lokon School was launched during a historical moment of decentralization in Indonesia, with a changing conceptualization of national center and periphery, and of a renewed questioning (and eventual re-affirmation) of the multi-confessional basis of the nation. These conditions shaped the goals of Lokon, including its attempt to redefine the position of the province of North Sulawesi, and the way in which it presents Christianity and the national ideology as mutually reinforcing.

How, then, can we understand this relationship between religion and development? One major anthropological lens for the study of development projects is through the concept of techno-politics, or the view of development projects as "anti-politics machines."[6] These approaches characterize the way in which development projects de-politicize issues by a process of 'rendering technical,' or transforming problems into technical issues to be solved through bureaucratic processes.[7] According to this theoretical approach, Lokon School could be viewed as a project that 'renders ethical' rather than technical, in the sense that it is converting serious political issues into matters of individual faith. Rudnyckyj makes a similar claim in his argument that neoliberalization in the contexts of democratization and decentralization in Indonesia has resulted in the creation of a new spiritual economy.[8] This new spiritual economy, he claims, turns previous development failures into individual moral problems to be addressed through careful self-cultivation. However, I argue that viewing the project of Lokon School through the theoretical frame of techno-politics obscures the important deliberation that is taking place at the school about what it means to be a good Christian and a good citizen. While the school certainly focuses on individual religious transformation as an important step toward national development, the project is much more an attempt to link two ethical systems (civic and religious) rather than simply a case of couching political projects in religious and ethical terms.

---

6 Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development,' Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

7 Tania Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

8 Daromir Rudnyckyj, *Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization, and the Afterlife of Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

It is important to take seriously the educational program of Lokon as multidimensional in nature, instead of analyzing it as simply a push toward or pull against a national development scheme. Rather, it is a forum where deliberation about the relationship between Christian and Indonesian values is taking place. James Hoesterey has documented the ways in which Islamic seminars in Indonesia "have become religio-civic forums through which issues of civic virtue and Muslim citizenship are constituted and contested."[9] As the founders of Lokon school look to a colonial past shaped by conversion of Minahasans to Christianity and the institutionalisation of formal education, they are trying to answer the question of what this might have to offer for the Indonesian national future, in part through the coupling of civic and religious values. As expected, there are points of tension that arise, particularly in the frameworks that it provides for understanding religious and ethnic difference. After presenting the vision of the school and putting it into historical perspective, I focus on the tensions that arise in this dynamic and meaningful debate that have consequences for how individuals understand the national framework and its integration of diversity.

As we consider the educational project of the school it is important to keep in mind the students at Lokon who weave multiple aspirations as they dream about their possible futures. Although Alicia's speech clearly echoes the objectives of her school's educational project, along with her own desire to be a faithful Christian who prays regularly, her aspirations are plural. The mostly upper-middle class students at Lokon dream of becoming successful individuals, have a desire to practice their religion and express their religiosity, hope to find a boyfriend or girlfriend, and often also a desire to participate in and align themselves with a global pop culture through choice of music and brand-name accessories. Although Lokon students are not particularly invested in restoring a glorious past of education in Minahasa, this does not necessarily mean that they are not taking part in the school's project, which at times does overlap with the way students imagine they might make a difference in Indonesia. In this mix of goals, which are also charged with moral connotations, there is a "coexistence of various motivations, aims, and identities that can and often do conflict but do not constitute exclusive opposites."[10] In other words, some of the dreams and desires of the students, including those of becoming pious

9 James B. Hoesterey, "Prophetic Cosmopolitanism: Islam, Pop Psychology, and Civic Virtue in Indonesia," *City & Society* 24.1 (2012): 39.

10 Samuli Schielke, "Being Good in Ramadan: Ambivalence, Fragmentation, and the Moral Self in the Lives of Young Egyptians," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15, s1 (2009): S29.

and successful individuals, can interact with and reinforce the broader vision of the school, but that these same students also have aspirations that may lack commonality with or even conflict with the kind of subjectivity that the school seeks to cultivate.

Lokon School: A Vision and Mission to Revitalize North Sulawesi

Lokon St. Nikolaus High School is a coeducational boarding school with over 400 students who stay in dormitories on the school's expansive campus, set back from the main road in the lush, green, and mountainous city of Tomohon. A visit to the campus impresses with its distinctive style: the buildings are modern, functional, and well maintained, and the manicured landscape showcases stunning flowers and trees native to the region. On the campus, there are classrooms, separate male and female dormitories, a library, a dining hall, sport hall, a library, laundry facilities, a swimming pool, and a fully equipped hostel for parents to stay when they visit. The school offers extracurricular activities such as basketball, marching band, dance team, choir, science and math olympiads, and a hiking club. The administrators often mention their goal of educating students to be 'successful in life,' rather than just successful at school and in academic achievements. The boarding aspect of the school is seen as essential to this end, and is portrayed as the way in which they build students' character. The school has also proven its academic success (prominently on display in the large trophy cases in the school lobby), and earned a reputation of prestige in the surrounding community. The school has welcomed numerous guests of honor, including former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who came to the school for its official inauguration ceremony in 2006. The Minister of Education and Culture, Muhadjir Effendy, also came to the campus in 2016 for the inauguration of the middle school that now shares a campus with the high school.

Ronald and Mary Korompis, the couple who founded the school, are Catholics of Chinese descent from North Sulawesi who have used some of their considerable private capital to implement a number of religious initiatives in the province. Another notable site funded by the Korompis family is an impressive 'Prayer Hill' (*Bukit Doa*) with stations of the cross along a path which climbs up Mt. Mahawu. The stunning bronze statues of the Christ are set against a backdrop of lush greenery and jungle ferns, and are made even more stunning by the fog that often sets in as part of this tropical mountain landscape. At the top of the mountain, there is a spectacular view of the city of Tomohon with a chapel and amphitheatre. There is also a retreat center designed for groups

of pilgrims, also made available for Lokon students during spiritual retreats. In addition, the Korompis family contributes to local parishes to build churches and fund local Catholic charities, one of which is an orphanage that cares for children with severe mental and physical disabilities. These initiatives are part of a broader vision not only to revitalize Catholic presence in the area, but also to develop the region and raise its position on a national level.

The school is run by a private foundation that often works closely with the Catholic Church, but is not officially recognized as a Catholic institution. Many of the teachers are civil servants, and all are lay people of diverse Christian backgrounds (including Catholic, Protestant, and Pentecostal). The foundation governing the school includes on its board an influential priest in the region, and another Carmelite priest acts as a spiritual advisor for students at the school and often preaches during morning announcements and celebrates mass with the students. There are also several religious brothers from a local order who work as dormitory staff. In other words, there is strong collaboration with local Catholic clergy and institutions, but the school is ultimately independent from them as a private foundation. All students are required to take Catholic religious education classes and participate in daily worship sessions and weekly mass. However, the school welcomes students of all official religions in Indonesia (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism), and the majority of students who attend are in fact Protestant. Most of the students at the school are from North Sulawesi, but many provinces across Indonesia are represented in the student body. A significant 30% of the student population is Papuan because the school's foundation has signed an MOU with the foundation of Freeport Indonesia,[11] which provides students from Timika, Papua and the surrounding area with full scholarships to study at the school. The student body is ethnically and religiously diverse, a quality that became integrated with the school's vision and mission.

Lokon School started out with the intention of Ronald and Mary Korompis, now based in Jakarta, to use their position to revitalize education and contribute back to their local community in North Sulawesi. In a publication entitled *Curriculum Based on Life: Education According to Ronald Korompis*, the school's co-founder explains the vision that he hopes to achieve through the school:

> This is the concrete form of my intention to make the children of this nation, especially the children of Minahasans and children from North Sulawesi, mighty in the future and with sufficient capacity to make a

11 Freeport Indonesia, an affiliate of Freeport-McMoRan, is a mining corporation which operates the largest copper and gold mine in the world, located in Papua, Indonesia.

> positive contribution to our nation and country Indonesia, and to humanity on a global scale.[12]

The language used to express his intention, he explains, is taken directly from the Bible: "Blessed are those who fear the Lord, who find great delight in his commands. Their children will be mighty in the land; the generation of the upright will be blessed" (Psalm 112:1–2). Korompis continually stresses that the inspiration to found this school came from God, and also that the overall goal is to bring education back to its true purpose, which he argues can only be done if we recognize that we are God's creation, who are loved by God, and must in return offer love to and be fearful of God.[13]

Ronald and Mary Korompis established the Lokon Educational Foundation in 1997, and in the year 2002 Lokon St. Nikolaus High School began operating with its first cohort of students. In the short time span between the establishment of the foundation and the operation of the school, Indonesia experienced a historical transition of democratization and decentralization, during which the multi-confessional basis of the nation was thrown into question. In this context, they started the school with the aim to form young people who are religious, have strong character, and will therefore be prepared to shape the future of the country. As the project continued and the foundation began to seek students beyond North Sulawesi (including in Papua and other provinces), the project expanded into a national and multicultural one. Now, rather than just providing education for local Minahasans, the goal is to provide educational opportunities to students in eastern Indonesia, where schools are generally less well equipped and where there are few prestigious educational institutions compared to Java. With this expansion, the project became focused on restoring the educational prestige of Minahasa while simultaneously making a contribution on a national level. As explained by Johanis Ohoitimur MSC, a priest at Lokon's educational foundation:

> Ronald Korompis was thinking about how to revive education in Tomohon run by the Catholic Church in this framework of *reformasi*,[14] such that this is double-sided: on one hand, he wants to respond to the needs of Indonesians through education. This is on a national level. On a local

12 Mezak A. Ratag and Ronald Korompis, *Kurikulum Berbasis Kehidupan: Pandangan Tentang Pendidikan Menurut Ronald Korompis* (Tomohon: Yayasan Pendidikan Lokon, 2009), 43.

13 Ibid., 2–3.

14 *Reformasi* is an Indonesian term which denotes the historical transition to democracy and the accompanying push for reform after the fall of president Suharto in 1998.

> level, he wants to return to the heyday of North Sulawesi, which was centered in Tomohon in terms of education.[15]

From this Christian inspiration, the 'curriculum based on life' is focused on helping students grow intellectually and spiritually by teaching them to fear God.[16] It can also be understood as a broadly Christian project rather than exclusively Catholic, although religious ceremonies and prayers at the school are according to Catholic tradition. In the foreword of Korompis's book S.H. Sarundajang, the former Governor of North Sulawesi, praises their progressive vision of quality education as well as its intended contribution to Indonesia:

> Quality education is not only characterized by the ability of its graduates in the mastery of science and technology, but also in the understanding of religious values and devotion, ethics, aesthetics, and personality, as well as improving physical qualities that can deliver Indonesia towards a nation that is *smart, competitive, modern, cultured, and prosperous*.[17]

The 'curriculum based on life' comes from an eclectic mix of educational theories, taking inspiration from a golden age of Catholic education in Europe while also drawing from John Dewey's model of progressive education as an attempt to teach respect for diversity and foster critical thinking and democratic participation. However, Korompis rejects the secular humanist foundation of Dewey's framework, arguing that no matter how good the model, it will be fragile without a basis in religious principles.[18] Therefore, he concludes that this curriculum, taking inspiration from a progressive educational model but given a foundation in religious principles, is "far better than the concept of progressive education formulated by Dewey."[19] While there is faith in the ability of a progressive educational model like Dewey's to drive Indonesia toward progress, there is conviction that if it is done without building character and providing a religious education for students, it will not be effective.

In this section, I have introduced the vision and mission of the school and explained how the educational project began as one concerned with restoring Minahasa as an important center of education as a way to contribute locally. The project evolved to become more national in scope as it sought to incorporate ethnically and religiously diverse students from across eastern

15 Interview, Sept. 30, 2015.

16 Ratag and Korompis, *Kurikulum Berbasis Kehidupan*, 44.

17 Ibid., vii, emphasis in original.

18 Ibid., 112.

19 Ibid., 112–13.

Indonesia who could become influential in national politics. To give historical perspective to this account, I will first discuss the way in which geographical conceptualization of Minahasa has changed since colonial times. Then, I provide a brief historical account of missions in the region during the colonial period to stress the way in which education, missions, and development became strongly intertwined there.

Missionization and the Establishment of Formal Education in Minahasa

The development of education in the Minahasan area of North Sulawesi during the Dutch colonial period took place through the establishment of both Protestant and Catholic missions, as well as the expansion and establishment of the colonial government that created a need for educated natives to work as colonial officials. The establishment of mission schools put Minahasa on the path to becoming a majority Christian region, and by the late 19th century Minahasans had the highest levels of literacy and education among natives in the Dutch East Indies. During the colonial period, Minahasa came to be nicknamed the 'twelfth province of the Netherlands' because its inhabitants were known for being educated Christians with a taste for European culture and sociability. Today, the province of North Sulawesi is lumped in with geographical conceptions of the 'outer islands,' referring to islands outside of Java, or as part of an underdeveloped 'eastern Indonesia.' This contrast between the prominent position of Minahasa in colonial times and its relatively marginal position in post-Independence Indonesia provides a context for the contemporary discourses of development prominent in this elite Catholic boarding school.

In Minahasa, intensive missionary efforts by the Protestant Netherlands Missionary Society (*Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap,* NZG) led to the establishment of formal education as well as widespread conversion to Protestant Christianity in the mid-19th century. Previous waves of missionaries, starting with Portuguese Jesuit missionaries in the mid-17th century and continuing with Dutch Protestant missionaries after the Dutch East India Company established its presence, had been relatively unsuccessful and were mostly active in coastal areas and not in the heart of the Minahasan highlands.[20] NZG missionary Joseph Kam, who played a central role in spreading Christianity to Maluku, began sending missionaries, including G.J. Hellendoorn, to North Sulawesi in

20 Christiaan de Jonge, Arnold Parengkuan and Karel A. Steenbrink, "How Christianity Obtained a Central Position in Minahasa Culture and Society," in *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, eds. Jan S. Aritonang and Karel A. Steenbrink (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 419.

the 1820s. At this point, before a large number of schools were built, missionaries evangelized by inviting children to come to their homes to learn about Christianity by witnessing the daily lives and activities of missionaries and their families. These children were then encouraged to enter schools as they began to be constructed and, later, to build schools to spread the gospel. Hellendoorn played an important role in increasing the number of schools and students, but his missions were limited to Manado and coastal areas. Even at this early point, the importance of education in the success of the missions was already evident: "The success of the mission was counted in pupils rather than in baptisms."[21]

Widespread conversion did not occur until German NZG missionaries J.G. Schwarz and J.F. Riedel began their missionary activities in the Minahasan highlands in 1831, in the first years of the *Cultuurstelsel* (compulsory cultivation system) as the Dutch were in the process of consolidating their control over the vast archipelago of the East Indies.[22] These mission schools played an important role in helping to imagine a Minahasan identity as well as convincing locals that education was "an avenue to material gain and increased status in the realm of colonial power and indigenous social hierarchy alike."[23] The secondary level teacher-training schools, some of which used Dutch as the language of instruction, offered a chance for Minahasans to increase their status. However, one of the most remarkable characteristics about the founding of these mission schools is that many elementary schools (*sekolah rakyat*) offered basic popular education for both boys and girls of villages in the highlands of Minahasa. Conversion efforts through education were highly successful, and by 1880, 80% of the population had converted to Protestant Christianity.[24]

Mission schools continued to grow even as the Dutch colonial government established schools in Minahasa to train natives as colonial personnel. Minahasans who passed through either of these two educational tracks were sent all over the East Indies, continuing their education or working for the colonial government, or assigned to mission posts, such as among the Karo Batak in Sumatra.[25] In 1930, the Manado residency recorded the highest rates of schooling anywhere in the East Indies, at 8.33% of the total population.[26] While there are no literacy statistics for Minahasa alone, the combined literacy rate for Minahasa and Bolaang-Mongondow (the regions which now comprise the province of North Sulawesi) in 1930 was the highest in the Netherlands Indies

21 Ibid., 421.

22 Ibid., 419–22.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 422.

25 David Henley, *Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the Dutch East Indies* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996), 81.

26 Ibid., 80, note 30.

at 38.97%, compared to a 5.48% literacy rate for Java and Madura.[27] In 1934, when the schools that had been started by NZG and continued to expand while under the auspices of *Indische Kerk* were transferred to *Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa* (GMIM; the an autonomous Minahasan Protestant denomination), there were 220 elementary schools, 20 secondary schools with Malay as the language of instruction, and several elite Dutch language secondary schools.[28] Minahasans' high level of education, linked to their embrace of Christianity and thirst to emulate European culture and speak Dutch gave them a high status relative to other ethnic groups in the Netherlands East Indies.[29]

Although Portuguese Catholics were the first European missionaries in North Sulawesi, by 1660 the Dutch presence there had forced them out, and Dutch Catholic missionaries were politically banned from entering Minahasa again until the 1880s.[30] Catholic missions were then allowed to enter despite an official ban on "double missions." They now, however, faced a majority Protestant Minahasan population.[31] The establishment of Catholic missions in Minahasa in the late 19th century was the start a long period of competition and mutual suspicion between Protestants and Catholics, despite the fact that the Catholic population in Minahasa has never been above 5%.[32] Although their numbers remained small, Catholics have made an impact on Minahasan society particularly through their educational and health care institutions. As was the case for Protestants in Minahasa, schools became a key site for conversion, and for setting in motion the significant social and cultural change that accompanied it. Teachers played important roles in communities, and schools also functioned as chapels in different missions areas.[33] One strategy for extending the influence of the church was in catering to elite families by founding schools with Dutch as the language of instruction. This strategy

27 Ibid., 80.

28 Jonely Ch. Lintong, "Sejarah Berdirinya Universitas Kristen Indonesia Tomohon," in *Semangat yang tak pernah Padam: Peringatan 50 tahun Universitas Kristen Indonesia Tomohon*, ed. Denni H.R. Pinontoan (Tomohon: UKIT Press, 2015), 6.

29 Karel A. Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1942: A Documented History*. Volume 2: The Spectacular Growth of a Self-Confident Minority, 1903–1942 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), 265.

30 Adolf Heuken SJ, "Catholic Converts in the Moluccas, Minahasa and Sangihe-Talaud, 1512–1680," in *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, eds. Jan S. Aritonang and Karel A. Steenbrink (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 63.

31 Thomas van den End and Jan S. Aritonang, "1800–2005: A National Overview," in *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, eds. Jan S. Aritonang and Karel A. Steenbrink (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 140.

32 Steenbrink, *Catholics in Indonesia,* 262.

33 Ibid., 263.

was effective in attracting students from elite Protestant families and until the 1930s more than half of the children in the prestigious Dutch language Catholic schools were Protestant.[34] Lokon St. Nikolaus High School is drawing on this Catholic legacy in North Sulawesi and adapting it to contemporary political circumstances aiming to form a young Christian elite that will have an influence in national politics.

Religion's Historical Role in Indonesian National Development

Formal education has long been recognized as an important site of nation building and development for modern states. In Indonesia, the New Order regime (1966–98) under Suharto played a significant role in the expansion of education, enacted for the purpose of fashioning a skilled and knowledgeable workforce to act as the motor of development but also as an attempt to shape the minds of the new generation as moral and loyal citizens of the nation and the regime. One of the technologies used toward this goal was a moral education program based in the national ideology of *Pancasila*. In the end, however, it was the same youth who had just undergone this moral and civic education program who became a major driving force in the pro-democracy movement that swept Indonesia in the late 1990s and challenged the existing political order.[35]

Lokon's educational program is part of a broader public discourse that portrays deepening one's own religious commitment (as a member of one of the now six recognized national religions) as an essential step toward national progress. Daromir Rudnyckyj argues that discourses such as these signal a shift in Indonesia from a previous "faith in development" during the thirty-two years of the authoritarian New Order period in Indonesia (1966–1998) to a new focus on "developing faith" following the 1998–1999 transition to democracy.[36] Relying on his research in a privatizing steel company that began implementing a spiritual training program based on Islamic principles, he claims that this transition entails a growing disillusionment with the nation-state as the principal agent of modernization and development, and integrates citizens into

34 Ibid., 273.

35 Lyn Parker, "The Subjectification of Citizenship: Student Interpretations of School Teachings in Bali," *Asian Studies Review* 26.1 (2002): 3–37; Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

36 Rudnyckyj, *Spiritual Economies,* 3–4.

a spiritual economy that is founded on mutually reinforcing neoliberal and Islamic principles in interaction to produce self-governing subjects. In Lokon's educational project there is recognition of the importance of individual faith in pushing Indonesia toward progress, but not due to a perceived failure of the nation and its role. Rather, it is an attempt to take action toward shaping the nation as a moral community, bound not only as Indonesian citizens, but also because of their commitment to a religiously founded morality.

An overly technical characterization of New Order development projects in Indonesia overlooks their significant moral component and strong functionalization of religious and moral principles toward the goal of national development. During the New Order period, missionaries and religiously based organizations often acted as adjuncts of the state in modernization and development programs. Lorraine Aragon describes the way in which the Salvation Army missionaries in Central Sulawesi during this period are one example of a relationship between religious institutions and the government demonstrating how "religious devotion and economic development have become quietly indexed to one another."[37] In addition, Robert Hefner has indicated that Rudnyckyj's particular characterization of "faith in development" as relying simply on the state and technical expertise overlooks the New Order's strong emphasis on religious education and the launching of nationalist ethical and moral training programs mentioned above.[38] These analyses indicate that what has changed is not a harnessing of religion and ethics to national development projects, but rather a change in the political and religious atmosphere. Democratization, decentralization, and a broad religious resurgence that has made public reflection about the relationship between religion and development more politically possible, and perhaps even necessary as questions about national unity and religious difference have surged to the fore of public debate.

Another important shift that has occurred during and after the transition to democracy and relates very strongly to the relationship between religion and development in a national framework is the emergence of "majoritarian intolerance in post-authoritarian Indonesia."[39] What does this performance of nationalism through religious piety offer for national development in the Indonesian context, where religious identity is becoming foregrounded, and intolerance across religious lines is a serious threat? At Lokon, the proposed

37 Lorraine V. Aragon, *Fields of the Lord Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 305.

38 Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, Economic Globalization, and the Blended Ethics of Self," *Bustan: The Middle East Book Review* 3.2 (2012): 105.

39 Ibid., 105–06.

vision of citizenship is based on Catholic and more broadly Christian principles that are cast as universal principles of all religious believers, consistent with national values and understood as holding the key to progress and development for the region and nation. The way in which this relationship is constructed, which is far from settled even in the day-to-day activities of Lokon School, has serious consequences for the future of a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic Indonesia.

In contemporary democratic, post-*Reformasi* Indonesia, with the trends of re-emergence of local identities and increased decentralization following the authoritarian New Order era, the terms of the nation itself and the basis of national cohesion are under negotiation. Efforts of institutions like Lokon are part of a broader movement by some educational institutions across Indonesia to respond to a perceived threat to the multi-confessional basis of the nation. Following the 1998–1999 transition to democracy, there have been cases of reassertion of ethnic identity, foregrounding religious identity and exclusivism, and in some cases outbreaks of mass violence as a result.[40] These outbreaks of violence threaten the legacy of Indonesia's "spirited commitment to the dream of a multiethnic and multireligious nation."[41]

North Sulawesi has been praised for its ability to resist being pulled into the kinds of conflicts occurring in so many surrounding regions. A discourse of religious harmony (*kerukunan beragama*) has been a major strategy within North Sulawesi to promote "an inclusive cultural identity while re-invoking religious difference through a non-threatening nationalist idiom."[42] In Lokon's

40 Henley, David, and Jamie S. Davidson. "In the Name of Adat: Regional Perspectives on Reform, Tradition, and Democracy in Indonesia." *Modern Asian Studies* 42.4 (2008): 815–52; Tania Li, "Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42.1 (2000): 149–79; Anna Tsing, "Adat/Indigenous: Indigeneity in Motion," in *Words in Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon*, eds. Carol Gluck and Anna Tsing (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 40–64; M.C. Ricklefs, *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, C. 1930 to the Present* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012); Rudnyckyj, *Spiritual Economies*; Sidney Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam Since 1998." In *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, eds. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred C. Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 109–25; John T. Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

41 Robert W. Hefner, "Introduction: Multiculturalism in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia," in *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 37.

42 Kelli Swazey, "A Place for Harmonious Difference: Christianity and the Mediation of Minahasan Identity in the North Sulawesi Public" (PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2013), 98.

educational project, the history of education and Christian missions in North Sulawesi becomes harnessed by the founders of Lokon to present the unique position of Christians in North Sulawesi as evidence that they are poised to become exemplars of this multi-confessional religious citizenship. The school's project to revive education in the region conjures up the historical prominence of Minahasans during colonial times, and the school's intent to contribute to development pledges its commitment to national values.

Avoiding Corruption, Building Integrity

One of the ways in which Lokon School acts as a forum for deliberating about religious and civic values is through discussions about corruption, an action seen as marking personal failure both as a Christian and as an Indonesian citizen. Corruption is a national issue, and is considered a major obstacle to national development. For many Indonesians, it is shameful that their country, known for its strong religiosity, should also become infamous for its rampant corruption. The national effort to educate youth against corruption is based on an expectation that focusing on religious education and instilling a good religious character will guide students to reject corruption. In the national Muslim newspaper *Republika* published on March 1, 2016, the vice chair of the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*) proclaimed the basis for integrity and anti-corrupt behavior is through religious education in any of the official religions, as "no religion has ever justified corrupt behaviour." Efforts to develop faith in this case also focus on the moral crisis that Indonesians presume has caused the failure of earlier development projects. In the regional newspaper *Tribun Manado* on February 13, 2016, Ronald Korompis, Lokon's co-founder observed, "Indonesia does not lack smart people, but smart people with good character." Thus, according to this reasoning, individuals must be educated in religious values and effort must be taken to cultivate their character so that they can be a part of a broader moral community who will positively influence the future direction of the Indonesian nation instead of being concerned only with personal gain.

Responding to what has been cast as a national crisis of morality and the rampant problem of corruption, character building is a major theme at Lokon St. Nikolaus High School. Religious values are projected as universal, therefore suitable to serve as the foundation for civic ones. In practice, corruption is discussed in both civic and religious education classes, and is often mentioned by administrators and in teacher training sessions. The typical message from these lessons is that living one's life according to Christian values and principles will

automatically make one a good citizen, because Christian ethics are universal and in line with the nationalist ideology. Just as the Prophet Muhammad is portrayed by Muslim trainers and self-help gurus in Indonesia as "the ultimate exemplar of civic virtue," in Minahasa, Jesus Christ takes on the role.[43] In other words, following the example of Jesus is presented as preparation for becoming a good Indonesian citizen.

In the school's Catholic religious education course, one teacher explained the importance of living based on Christ's example. He asked students to open their Bibles and read aloud: "If we claim to have fellowship with him and yet walk in the darkness, we lie and do not live out the truth" (1 John 1:6). He proceeded to connect this to the moral failings of the nation. He explained to the students that while many claim to be morally upright, they are still falling into '*KKN*' (*Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme*; corruption, collusion, nepotism).[44] In the classroom, students often echo the dominant national discourse that blames corruption for the lack of development in Indonesia. When students presented short orations on "how to develop Indonesia" for their religion class, eradicating corruption emerged as a major theme. One boy offered his opinion that while Indonesia is extremely rich in natural resources, it still suffers from poverty, which he viewed as a symptom and consequence of corruption. Another boy gave a short speech to his peers that offered a summary of his connection of religious and civic values and invoked *Pancasila*, the five principles that form the basis of the Indonesian nation: "We need *Pancasila* as the foundation of this country, and we need Jesus Christ!"

Integrating Religious Diversity at Lokon School

What are the consequences of this linkage between religious and civic values for the school's broader emphasis on a multi-confessional inclusive citizenship that is put forward as the key to developing the nation? Even if all religions are supposed to be interchangeable in their ability to fill this role of building character in its citizens, there is still no guarantee that such educational or training programs aspire to religious pluralism or that they will not ask participants to proclaim their religious belonging over and above national belonging.[45] At Lokon School, there are some tensions between different understandings of

43 Hoesterey, "Prophetic Cosmopolitanism," 40.

44 An acronym typically associated with the practices of the New Order regime.

45 Hoesterey, "Prophetic Cosmopolitanism," 41; Rudnyckyj, *Spiritual Economies,* 192.

how to integrate and respect other religions, ranging from a position of extreme relativism to one espousing the universality of Catholicism and Catholic values.

From the perspective of the school's founders, Lokon offers an education that is Catholic but appeals to universal values and teaches students about living with difference. Administrators are proud of the diverse student body they have been able to attract and see it as an important learning opportunity for students regarding religious tolerance. They also emphasize their accommodation of diversity in allowing students to leave the campus to celebrate other religious holidays or provide food on a different schedule for Muslim students who are fasting. At the same time, all students are required to take Catholic religious education courses and participate in Catholic prayers and rituals at the school regardless of religious backgrounds. There are debates at the national level regarding such policies and their status in relation to the 2003 Education Act, which requires public and private schools to provide students religious education in accordance with their professed religion. Many private Protestant and Catholic schools, including Lokon, request that parents sign a form agreeing that their child will join the Christian religious education classes and worship services at the school.[46] Christian schools with a good academic reputation are typically able to attract students from other religious backgrounds, which is often framed by those who reject it in the national debate as proselytization and a violation of rights and respect for other religions.

These tensions and internal contradictions represent one way in which deliberation about the coupling of civic and religious values is ongoing at Lokon. While their version of multiculturalism is not entirely consistent with national discourses that emphasize the separation of different religious groups, their approach to using Christian values to fight against corruption also diverges from those presented at a Christian leadership training seminar run by the Haggai Institute for administrators, teachers, and dormitory staff at Lokon School. The Haggai Institute is an international mission organization that offers an alternative to a foreign missionary model and runs workshops held by local missionaries who train and encourage other locals to spread the gospel. Haggai's international website discusses problems of societies suffering from corruption, caused by "the stark reality of separation from God."[47] The Indonesian trainers who ran the session at Lokon (mostly ethnic Chinese preachers from Jakarta who are associated with various Protestant denominations)

46 Chang-Yau Hoon, "God and Discipline: Religious Education and Character Building in a Christian School in Jakarta," *South East Asia Research* 22.4 (2014): 512.

47 Haggai Institute, "About Haggai Institute," accessed May 23, 2016, http://www.haggai-institute.com/about-haggai-institute/.

offered a four-segment session on building integrity and approached the topic of corruption from a Christian perspective. Individual integrity was a key part of the training because, when enacted in tandem with the methods taught for evangelizing, it was said to determine one's effectiveness as an ambassador for Christ.

The Protestant pastor who led the Haggai session on integrity stressed that moral corruption always starts with small actions, but very quickly snowballs out of control. He pointed to some actions that for him represented the start of a slippery slope toward corruption: running traffic lights, carrying around knock-off designer bags, and breaking international copyright laws by downloading pirated media. He notified the teachers of their important position as ambassadors for Christ, asking them, "How are people going to know God if Christians themselves don't have integrity?" The pastor is a convert to Christianity, and he cited his own mother's hesitancy toward Christians because in her experience as a neighborhood tailor the Christians often went back on their word after negotiating a price. The message was clear: if you are corrupt, you might prevent others from coming to Christ. These sessions were juxtaposed with another class on the Biblical Mandate, the only session taught by a speaker who lives in North Sulawesi. He shared practical methods for how to approach Muslims and speak to them about Jesus, and explicitly played on fears of increasing Islamization of the region. He suggested that participants might feel comfortable now because this region is majority Christian, but it might not be that way for their children and grandchildren if they do not take action.

An important distinction between the discourses about morality and anti-corruption from the school administration and those from the Haggai Institute is the school's tendency to connect these issues to the importance of building civic values and forming the future generation of Indonesia. For the Haggai Institute, the importance of these values is clearly for becoming an ambassador for Christ, and implementing Christian values in one's own life to increase the effectiveness of winning souls for Christ. When, during the Haggai Institute leadership training, one speaker notified the teachers of their luck in having a "captive market" to transform, some of the dormitory staff told me they felt this approach was too extreme. Lucas, a religious brother who is part of the dormitory staff at Lokon, explained to me that evangelization is not as narrow as sharing the gospel, but most importantly it is about serving others and being a witness through one's way of life. Whether they realized it or not, the staff's interpretation of missionization aligns closely with the school's project, also more readily reconcilable with multi-confessional and multi-ethnic nationalist values. However, as described above, while missionization is framed as a project for development which transcends sectarian lines, it also violates national sensibilities about religious mixing and provision of religious education.

Developing Papua in Minahasa: Bridging or Reinforcing Ethnic Difference?

Another initiative at Lokon that relates to views of development and inclusion of difference brings promising students from Papua to study at the school. Papua is a predominantly Protestant province of Indonesia with special autonomy as part of a settlement in which the majority of profits from natural resources are returned to the province rather than channelled to the national government. However, due to a number of factors (including corruption), this settlement has failed to improve access to education and healthcare, which remain at the lowest levels in Indonesia.[48] Every year representatives from Lokon go to Timika, Papua and surrounding areas to give a selection test and look for promising new students to bring to North Sulawesi to continue their education, funded by the Freeport Foundation. Some of the Papuan students have parents who are employees at Freeport and whose status and income has helped their children to get an education that qualifies them for admission to Lokon.

Ethnicity, like religion, is a form of difference that is explicitly addressed in discourses about the Indonesian nation. It is also one form of difference that the school explicitly tries to teach students about through the experience of

FIGURE 7.2 *Papuan students lead worship in Catholic Religious Education class.*

48 Bobby Anderson, "The Failure of Education in Papua's Highlands," *Inside Indonesia* 113 (Jul-Sep 2013), http://www.insideindonesia.org/the-failure-of-education-in-papua-s-highlands.

living and studying with students of various ethnic backgrounds. In this case, national discourses about the acceptance of ethnic difference dovetail with Christian notions of brotherhood to result in very little tension or deliberation about the principle of accepting Papuan students. Instead, the tension is between the principle of ethnic inclusion, supported easily by both civic and religious values, and its actual practice, which is often challenged by the actions of both students and teachers.

The founders of the school are ethnic Chinese who are able to flexibly identify as a family with local roots and identifiably Minahasan surnames. While Lokon has attracted mostly local students who are ethnic Minahasan and ethnic Chinese, there are students who come from many other regions and ethnic groups. For most of these students, ethnic difference is something that is clearly publicly recognized and discussed, but easily glossed over by the students' similar upper middle class backgrounds that allow them to bond over their high-end smart phones and brand name accessories. All of the students, Papuans included, conform linguistically to the local Manado Malay language.[49] However, for Papuan students, ethnic difference maps on to class difference that reinforces distance with the other students. The visible ethnic difference between Papuan students and students from other ethnic groups in Indonesia leads to their being grouped together and called "*anak Papua*" (Papuan kids).[50] On a national level, Papuans are stereotyped as backward and uncivilized, and where they are migrants, are often blamed for drunkenness, violence, and criminal activities. Some local parents have called the school administration requesting that their child not be placed in a dormitory with Papuan students. Many teachers and administrators at the school have made efforts to change this view of Papuans, but tensions still exist between the theory of inclusion and its actual implementation.

Although the original idea for the school was and still is that it should contribute first to Minahasa, it has expanded its scope, accepting students from Papua and from other regions. This shift was partially for economic reasons, but also in line with its expanded vision of providing quality education for eastern Indonesia. In practice, Papuan students are seen more as recipients of

49 Referred to as *Melayu Manado* or *Bahasa Manado*, the language is based on the Malay language and therefore similar to the Indonesian national language, *Bahasa Indonesia*.

50 'Papua' is not actually an ethnic but a regional identifier, and many of the Papuan students actually come from different ethnic groups. However, ethnic distinctions among Papuans are rarely recognized or talked about at the school, and their similarity as Papuans is reinforced.

charity that might help to make a difference in their own region, but are not talked about as the 'future of the nation' in the same way as other students are. For example, one of the school employees who works for the foundation cited the program to bring Papuan students as a real charitable gesture from the founders who invite Papuan students despite the fact that their low academic performance drags down the school's overall academic ranking in the region. However, the school has embraced this program as an important part of its mission to prepare students to go on to higher education or vocational training. The school's viewpoint is clearly a mainstream nationalist one that sees Papua as a province of Indonesia in dire need of development and educational opportunities. In Papua, separatist movements calling for independence from Indonesia are still active. While the Papuan students talk about their identity as Indonesian, they are also trying to understand how they fit into the national framework. Some are influenced by the separatist movements, whether they express it by putting symbols on their personal Facebook pages, or by pulling a stunt as one group of students did by raising the Free Papua Movement's flag on the school's grounds.

While the students at Lokon are all influenced by a global pop culture, the Papuan students are most clearly influenced by an Afro-Caribbean culture rather than the mainstream American pop culture and K-pop style their peers' favor. Wearing trucker hats and listening to Bob Marley and American rap music, the Papuan students at Lokon can often be seen sitting on the road running through the school's campus instead of inside their dorm rooms with other students. Matt, a charismatic Papuan student who is highly skilled in English, has expressed his concern about the future of Papua, where he says corruption is high. His dream is to study politics and go back to be an upright leader there. Another Papuan student with a much weaker academic record who was later expelled on behavioral grounds, confided his wish to study in the USA, asking specifically about New Orleans, the former location of Freeport-McMoRan headquarters. Having been affected by the mine's acquisition of land, he wants to become successful and teach corporations that they cannot treat people unfairly. Papuan students, like all students at Lokon, have multiple aspirations at work as they are trying to imagine their future and also navigate the day-to-day life at boarding school.

During the Christian leadership training run by the Haggai Institute, one trainer who was familiar with the situation at the school sympathized with the teachers that it must be difficult to work with Papuan students and to always remind them to bathe, to wash their clothes, and to be disciplined. He then invited everyone to watch a video of a talk show interview with a Harvard Business School graduate who created her own program to serve prisoners and

help rehabilitate ex-convicts by teaching them entrepreneurial skills. In the video, the creator of the program explained her vision from the program, and then the host interviewed ex-convicts who had benefitted from this program and told their success stories. After the trainer stopped the video, he looked at the teachers and dormitory staff and asked them, "If she can change these ex-convicts, can we change Papuan students?" Although he was clearly expecting an enthusiastic affirmative, after a moment of hesitation, the first teacher to speak up answered by qualifying that "it depends." The trainer explained that perhaps Papuan students feel that they do not have a real future, and that it is an opportunity for the school to help change them, and by extension, change Papua.

While the civic and religious principles called upon in the school mutually support a principle of ethnic inclusion in an abstract sense, there is tension between the principle and practice. The implementation of the project seems to have more in common with the goal of reviving education in the region and looking to the historical position of Minahasa as a center of education for all of eastern Indonesia, than with a national project of inclusion and integration. Even so, the effort to educate Papuan students at Lokon does have political implications in its attempt, however tenuous, at incorporating ethnic difference and reinforcing a mainstream nationalist understanding of the Indonesian archipelago as naturally including Papua. At the same time, the Papuan students (just like all of the other students) are also participating in a global pop culture and trying to navigate what their ethnic identity might mean for them personally, and in a national context.

Conclusion: Spreading Christian Values as Civic Values to Reshape Minahasa and the Nation

Born out of the era of decentralization and democratization in Indonesia, Lokon St. Nikolaus High School is promoting an educational program offering a foundation in Christian values and strong character, understood as a necessary prerequisite for becoming a future leader of the nation. While self-management and discipline are a crucial part of this process of self-transformation, the broader goal here is a national one, to create a moral community that will have impact on the future of the nation. Put into historical perspective, it is one that looks back at the former importance and status of Minahasa and the history of education in the region. Accordingly, Lokon seeks to convince the rest of Indonesia that North Sulawesi has a role to play in Indonesia's future and it is preparing the kind of leaders required toward this end. Missionization in this sense channels

the development of faith through broader ideas about building character and civic values. Consequently, this particular understanding seeks to assert and shape national values and emphasize their overlap with Christian values. As I have shown through an analysis of the school's attempt at religious and ethnic inclusion, there are tensions in how the relationship between religious and civic values is understood and practiced at the school, and the processes through which these are deliberated about and contested are important ones.

The strategy employed by this particular school is one which, in response, does not downplay but in many ways emphasizes its Catholic and more broadly Christian foundation and provides a space for deliberation about the mutual influence of religious and national values. This approach reflects another vision of the school that was born out of the experience of the historical moment of *Reformasi* and transition to democracy. As ethnic and religious violence broke out in several regions across the Indonesian archipelago during this period, the school's founders felt the urgency to educate a new generation so that such ethnic and religious conflicts would not be repeated again in Indonesian history. Although all of the religiously diverse students join Catholic mass and religious education, their experience at the school with others is designed as a lesson in multiculturalism and in 'universal values' that are taken from Christianity, but also considered important for character building and nation building. Therefore, the nature of relationship forged between religion and development also has important ramifications for imagining the contours of the nation and how religious and ethnic diversity are incorporated. As this example from Lokon shows, the question is far from settled, but everyday interactions at the school participate in attempts to answer it.

Bibliography

Abu-Lughod, Lila. *Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.

Anderson, Bobby. "The Failure of Education in Papua's Highlands." *Inside Indonesia* 113 (Jul–Sep 2013). http://www.insideindonesia.org/the-failure-of-education-in-papua-s-highlands.

Aragon, Lorraine V. *Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000.

Aspinall, Edward. *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

de Jonge, Christiaan, Arnold Parengkuan, and Karel A. Steenbrink. "How Christianity Obtained a Central Position in Minahasa Culture and Society." In *A History of*

Christianity in Indonesia, edited by Jan S. Aritonang and Karel A. Steenbrink, 419–54. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Ferguson, James. *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development,' Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Haggai Institute. "About Haggai Institute." Accessed May 23, 2016. http://www.haggai-institute.com/about-haggai-institute/.

Hefner, Robert W. "Introduction: Multiculturalism in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia." In *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia*, edited by Robert W. Hefner, 1–58. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001.

Hefner, Robert W. "Islam, Economic Globalization, and the Blended Ethics of Self." *Bustan: The Middle East Book Review* 3.2 (2012): 91–108.

Henley, David. *Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the Dutch East Indies*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1996.

Henley, David, and Jamie S. Davidson. "In the Name of Adat: Regional Perspectives on Reform, Tradition, and Democracy in Indonesia." *Modern Asian Studies* 42.4 (2008): 815–52.

Heuken, Adolf SJ. "Catholic Converts in the Moluccas, Minahasa and Sangihe-Talaud, 1512–1680." In *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, edited by Jan S. Aritonang and Karel A. Steenbrink, 23–72. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Hoesterey, James B. "Prophetic Cosmopolitanism: Islam, Pop Psychology, and Civic Virtue in Indonesia." *City & Society* 24.1 (2012): 38–61.

Hoon, Chang-Yau. "God and Discipline: Religious Education and Character Building in a Christian School in Jakarta." *South East Asia Research* 22.4 (2014): 505–24.

Jones, Sidney. "Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam Since 1998." In *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, edited by Mirjam Künkler and Alfred C. Stepan, 109–25. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Li, Tania. "Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 42.1 (2000): 149–79.

Li, Tania. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.

Lintong, Jonely Ch. "Sejarah Berdirinya Universitas Kristen Indonesia Tomohon." In *Semangat yang tak pernah Padam: Peringatan 50 tahun Universitas Kristen Indonesia Tomohon*, edited by Denni H.R. Pinontoan, 2–23. Tomohon: UKIT Press, 2015.

Mitchell, Timothy. *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

O'Neill, Kevin Lewis. *City of God: Christian Citizenship in Postwar Guatemala*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.

Parker, Lyn. "The Subjectification of Citizenship: Student Interpretations of School Teachings in Bali." *Asian Studies Review* 26.1 (2002): 3–37.

Ratag, Mezak A., and Ronald Korompis. *Kurikulum Berbasis Kehidupan: Pandangan Tentang Pendidikan Menurut Ronald Korompis*. Tomohon: Yayasan Pendidikan Lokon, 2009.

Ricklefs, M.C. *Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Religious History, C. 1930 to the Present*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2012.

Rudnyckyj, Daromir. *Spiritual Economies: Islam, Globalization, and the Afterlife of Development*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010.

Schielke, Samuli. "Being Good in Ramadan: Ambivalence, Fragmentation, and the Moral Self in the Lives of Young Egyptians." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 15, s1 (2009): S24–40.

Schröter, Susanne. "Christianity in Indonesia: An Overview." In *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power,* edited by Susanne Schröter, 9–28. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010.

Sidel, John T. *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Steenbrink, Karel A. *Catholics in Indonesia, 1808–1942: A Documented History*. Volume 2: The Spectacular Growth of a Self-Confident Minority, 1903–1942. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007.

Swazey, Kelli. "A Place for Harmonious Difference: Christianity and the Mediation of Minahasan Identity in the North Sulawesi Public." PhD diss., University of Hawai'i, 2013.

Tsing, Anna. "Adat/Indigenous: Indigeneity in Motion." In *Words in Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon*, edited by Carol Gluck and Anna Tsing, 40–64. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

van den End, Thomas, and Jan S. Aritonang. "1800–2005: A National Overview." In *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*, edited by Jan S. Aritonang and Karel A. Steenbrink, 137–228. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

CHAPTER 8

Missionaries of a Korean Model of Development: Pentecostalism, Asian Modernity, and the Mission of the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Cambodia

Hui-yeon Kim

Development studies have recently paid attention to religion as an emerging and important vector of development.[1] Religious actors involved in very different countries have deeply influenced and shaped the processes of modernization of local societies. They have been actively involved in the creation of education systems and the development of health care and social welfare programs. This was certainly the case of South Korea after the Second World War. Christian missionaries, notably American Protestants, who arrived in the Korea at the end of 19th century played a significant role in the country's modernization.[2] These missionaries were seen by many Koreans as symbols of a religious modernity and as harbingers of new prosperity.

The flow of missionaries into South Korea began to reverse in the 1980s. By the 1990s South Korea was sending thousands of missionaries to other countries, and by 2000 it ranked as the second largest missionary sending country in the world in its number of overseas missionaries, trailing only the United States.[3]

1 Philip Fountain, Robin Bush, and R. Michael Feener, eds., *Religion and the Politics of Development* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015).

2 On Christianity and modernity in Korea, see Shin-yu Chai, ed, *Korea and Christianity* (Seoul: Korean Scholar Press, 1996); Kyuhoon Cho, "Protestantism, Education, and the Nation: The Shifting Location of Protestant Schools in Modern Korea," *Acta Koreana* 19.1 (2016): 99–131; Han-sik Kim, "The Influence of Christianity on Modern Korean Political Thought," *Korea Journal* 23.12 (1983): 4–17; Suk-man Jang, "Protestantism in the Name of Modern Civilization," *Korea Journal* 39.4 (1999): 187–204; and Dae-young Ryu, "Understanding Early American Missionaries in Korea (1884–1910): Capitalist Middle-Class Values and the Weber Thesis," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 113 (2001): 93–117.

3 Steve Sang-Cheol Moon, "The Recent Korean Missionary Movement: A Record of Growth, and More Growth Needed," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 27.1 (2003): 11–17; Steve Sang-Cheol Moon, "The Protestant Missionary Movement in Korea: Current Growth and Development," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 32.2 (2008): 59–64; and Steve Sang-Cheol Moon, "Missions from Korea in 2016: Sustainability and Revitalization," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 40.2 (2016): 181–85. While Moon's most recent

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_009

This remarkable growth took place across a broad range of denominations. Korean mission had a global horizon but concentrated especially in Southeast Asia. Along with the Christian gospel these missionaries propose a model of 'Asian modernity.' While being involved in humanitarian and charitable work, they seek to embody the 'success story' of South Korea and present it as a Protestant model of development. In this chapter I analyze the case of the largest Pentecostal Church in South Korea: the Yoido Full Gospel Church (FGC). This Church also claims to be the Church in South Korea sending the largest number of missionaries abroad.[4]

I examine the work of Korean missionaries in Southeast Asia, more specifically in aid-driven Cambodia, and their effects on local populations.[5] I study how and why they act like development actors while seeking Cambodian converts and building a network of churches. This analysis shows how charity and development programs participate in the 'national branding' of South Korea, and how the Full Gospel Church presents Pentecostalism as an icon of Korean hypermodernity, which is offered as a model for attaining prosperity to the poor in Southeast Asia. In so doing I seek to shed light on the ways in which a political goal—the promotion of South Korea as a pre-eminent economic actor in the region—relies on a conjunction of religious and development work deployed through an elaborate techno-bureaucratic organization.

A Traditional Link with the Korean State and Its Policies

Since the formation of the Republic of Korea in 1948, religion and politics have been formally separated. However, even if this separation is explicitly specified in the Korean Constitution, there have always been ambiguous relations between the Korean state and the country's religions. This ambiguity is not

review of South Korean mission decries a recent significant drop-off in the growth rate of missionary sending it also notes that there are currently over 20,000 Korean missionaries working in 171 countries around the world.

4 It is difficult to know the exact number of missionaries the Church sends abroad. Since 2010, Church leaders have frequently noted that have been sent by the Church. However, according to a survey that I conducted based on documents published by the Church, I estimate the total number at 636 missionaries which have been sent to 57 countries (until 2011).

5 See Hui-yeon Kim, *Le Soft power sud-coréen en Asie du Sud-Est: Une théologie de la prospérité en action* (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2014) and Hui-yeon Kim, "Les pentecôtistes coréens en Asie du Sud-Est: Exporter la 'théologie de la prospérité' pour assurer son salut," in *Chrétiens évangéliques en Asie du Sud-Est: Expériences locales d'une ferveur protestante*, eds. Pascal Bourdeaux and Jérémy Jammes (Rennes: PUR, 2016), 209–25.

only a contemporary phenomenon. During the Koryŏ period (918–1392), Buddhism was the State religion and Buddhist monks occupied important functions in the Royal Court as King's Counselor (*Wangsa*) and Nation's Counselor (*Kuksa*).[6] During the Chosŏn dynasty (1392–1896), the entire political sphere was built upon neo-Confucian ideals. This Korean Confucianism incorporated the sacred and the profane to realize its religious-philosophical ideology through the state.[7]

In contemporary South Korea, Protestant churches have also tended to maintain close relationships with the state, in practice complicating a strict church-state separation. Churches have made use of state strategies and policies to promote and justify their own growth. In this section I analyze the ideological convergence between conservative Korean Christianity and the South Korean state in order to gain a better understanding of the involvement of Protestant churches in social and humanitarian actions. The FGC, and its founder Cho Yonggi, embody this convergence and its implications. Beyond its development rhetoric, the FGC's actions are marked by a form of 'National branding' and a promotion of an Asian modernity that is framed as simultaneously Christian and Korean.[8]

From the 1960s onwards, the FGC has enjoyed an incredible growth, notably due to a focus on a 'prosperity theology' (*pŏnyŏng sinhak*) and the glorification of the economic successes of South Korea. During the 1970s, under Pak Chŏng-hŭi's presidency, the government used Protestant churches to help buttress its strident anti-communism.[9] The FGC at the time delivered a message

6 Arnaud Brotons, Yannick Bruneton and Nathalie Kouamé, eds., *État, religion et répression en Asie, Chine, Corée, Japon, Vietnam* (*XIIIe–XXIe siècles*) (Paris: Karthala, 2011).

7 Bertrand Chung, "Politique et religion en Corée du Sud," *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 32.1 (2001): 85–110.

8 The FGC was founded by Cho Yong-gi after what he called a visionary experience. Cho, born into a Buddhist family, converted to Pentecostalism when he was suffering from tuberculosis. He claimed to have met Jesus Christ in his dreams having been healed by him. On the biography of Cho and the development of his Church, see Syn-Duk Choi, "A Comparative Study of Two New Religious Movements in the Republic of Korea: The Unification Church and the Full Gospel Central Church," in *New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change*, ed. James Beckford (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1986), 113–45; and Ig-Jin Kim, *History and Theology of Korean Pentecostalism: Sunbogeum* (*Pure Gospel*) *Pentecostalism* (Zoetemeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 2003).

9 In-ch'ŏl Kang, *Han'guk'ŭi kaesin'gyo'wa pangongjuŭi: posujŏk kaesin'gyo'ŭi chŏngch'i'jŏk haengdongju'ŭit'amgu*한국의 개신교와 반공주의: 보수적 개신교의 정치적 행동주의 탐구 [*Korean Protestantism and Anti-Communism: An Analysis of the Political Activism of Conservative Protestant Churches*] (Sŏul: Chungsim, 2007).

that embraced capitalist discourse and a specific vision of economic progress which denounced the economic stagnation and the decline of North Korea. Cho also organized patriotic prayer meetings in big stadiums across the country. Because this approach closely corresponded with the policies of the South Korean government, the FGC was able to benefit from favorable treatment by the military regime.

During Chŏn Tu-hwan's presidency (1980–1988), while liberal Protestant churches were actively engaged in democratic movements protesting against the military regime, the FGC continued to support the government. In response, progressive churches were often ostracized and the regime hampered their growth whereas the FGC was able to greatly expand its international activities, notably through the creation of a vision for 'world mission' (*haeoesŏn'gyo*). In line with this, the Church formed a Mission Department (*sŏn'gyoguk*) that sought to encourage church members to support and resource overseas mission. The Mission Department created groups and networks based on professional background and/or age at a time when trade unions were forbidden and did not wield much power. In other words, these mission-oriented structures were supposed to replace and substitute for a more controversial and activist involvement in the political realm. In this context of South Korean politics, the 'world mission' agenda of the FGC was, to a significant degree, a local political mission.

For his devoted support to the military government, Cho earned the privilege of travelling freely abroad from the early 1980s, at a time that other Korean citizens still faced significant restrictions on international travel.[10] Throughout the 1980s Cho travelled around the world, often up to five or six times a year, participating in Christian conferences held in North and South America, Western Europe, Asia and Oceania.[11] At the same time he began establishing satellite churches outside of South Korea and to build an international network with pastors from all around the world, including from the United States.

Cho has maintained particularly close relations with American pastors from the Assemblies of God Pentecostal denomination. Cho has frequently highlighted his connection with the United States and, during its early years, the FGC benefited greatly from its association with the positive image of American capitalist wealth and military power. For many South Koreans, the United

10 Government imposed restrictions on international travel for Korean citizens were only relaxed in 1989.

11 Cho travelled abroad mainly to attend 'Church Growth Seminars' and to participate to 'Crusades' held in the United States, Canada, Finland, Germany, Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

States epitomized modernity and prosperity. South Koreans accepted and even supported the demonization of communism advocated by the US-American and South Korean governments, and preached by the FGC. Pentecostalism in general and the FGC in particular were considered as icons representing Christian America. The period in which the FGC experienced its most dramatic growth corresponds to the time of the Cold War; a time which discourses of development in South Korea framed the country as playing 'catch-up' with the United States and in which military and political relationships were seen by many as providing the very basis for Korean society. However, just as Korean politics has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, so too the FGC has successfully evolved its policies and practice.

Cho has rearticulated the Christian gospel of American missionaries in order to make it suitable for Korea's changing socio-political contexts. After the election of President Kim Tae-chung in 1998, and the beginning of the 'sunshine policy' (*haetpŏt chŏngch'aek*) towards North Korea, Cho moderated his hostility and engaged in less confrontational discourse. He also developed humanitarian projects for North Korea and from 2000 has sent aid and assistance to the North. In so doing, Cho adopted an attitude in tune with the new political and social atmosphere. In 2007, the FGC began the construction of Yong-gi Cho's Hospital in P'yŏngyang which specialised in cardiology.[12] Cho went personally to North Korea to celebrate the inauguration of the site in the presence of Kim Yŏng-nam, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and the second highest official in the North Korean regime. At this event Cho said he regretted the hostile attitude he had adopted earlier in relation to North Korea and that he hoped to play an intermediary role between the two Koreas through the construction of the hospital.

In line with these shifts in his stance on North Korea, since the early 2000s Cho has represented himself as a sort of humanitarian diplomat. In the same period the social, charitable, humanitarian and development work of the FGC has grown considerably. Cho created an NGO called 'Good People' (*kut p'p'ŭl*) in 1999 which, with the support of business leaders, assists the disabled and people facing financial or physical difficulties in South Korea and abroad. Whenever Cho travels to developing countries (particularly those in Southeast Asia), for speaking and mission engagements he is accompanied by an FGC medical team which provides free medical treatment for the local population. An economic dimension also plays an important role in these visits with Cho

12 This project advanced slowly after the election of president Yi Myŏng-Pak (b. 1941) and is on hold since 2010 after several incidents like the sinking of the corvette Ch'ŏnan and the bombardment of Yŏnp'yŏng Island.

frequently being accompanied by members of the Full Gospel Business Men's Mission Federation (*Sunbog'ŭm sirŏpin sŏn'gyo yŏnhaphoe*).[13] The result is that Cho often leads an entourage of hundreds who engage in humanitarian and development activities.

Cho and FGC's evolution embodies what scholars such as Paul Freston, André Corten and André Mary have identified as a general transition still in process from 'classical Pentecostalism' to 'neo-Pentecostalism.'[14] Freston analyses this transition in terms of the believers' stance toward the secular world. In classical Pentecostalism the faithful view the wider world as corrupted and polluting. The task of the faithful is to remain pure and separated by remaining, as much as possible, outside of society. In this position of self-imposed exile they wait for the second coming of Christ while benefiting from the spiritual and material blessings of God through the mediation of the church. Neo-Pentecostalism proposes a contrasting vision of the secular world, and consequently assigns new roles for the faithful. Rather than passively accepting the fallenness of the world, neo-Pentecostals believe they must actively fight against the devil in order to restore the kingdom, as much as is possible, in the present time and thereby prepare the world for the return of Christ. The main difference between the classical Pentecostalism and the neo-Pentecostalism that concerns my argument in this chapter is that the latter encourages and affirms an activist stance among believers for the transformation of society.

While exhibiting this general shift Cho's strategy is also peculiar in that he has always been close to the South Korean government. Without directly becoming active in politics, he has consistently promoted the ideologies of the ruling government, even as this evolved from rigid anti-communism to the 'sunshine policy' toward North Korea. Cho participates each year in the National Prayer Breakfast (*Kugka choch'an kidohoe*), where prominent Korean

13 This organization of church members, established by Cho in 1970, copies the structure of the Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship International founded by Demos Shakarian in the United States in 1953.

14 Jean P. Willaime, "Le pentecôtisme: Contour et paradoxe d'un protestantisme émotionnel," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 105 (1999): 5–28; Paul Freston, "Neo-Pentecostalism in Brazil: Problems of Definition and the Struggle for Hegemony," *Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions* 105 (1999): 145–62; André Corten, "Pentecôtisme et 'néo-pentecôtisme' au Brésil," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 105 (1999): 163–83; André Corten, "Un religieux immanent et transnational," *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 133 (2006): 131–51; Ricardo Mariano, *Neopentecostais: Sociologia do novo pentecostalismo no Brasil* (São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1999); André Corten and André Mary, eds., *Imaginaires politiques et pentecôtismes* (Paris: Karthala, 2000).

religious leaders come together to pray for the nation at the beginning of each year in the presence of the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly, and the President of the Supreme Court. Cho has maintained very close relations with Protestant politicians over the years. Cho Yonggi does not seek to undermine or to replace the authorities but rather to establish a reciprocal relationship with the Korean Government based on their mutual interests. This indirect political involvement is different from many other neo-Pentecostal churches such as the Brazilian Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, which has launched "spiritual warfare" against politicians in order "to liberate politics from the grip of demonic power by instituting the politics of Good against the politics of evil."[15] In a markedly different approach, Cho has avoided such confrontations with the state and instead progressively become a sort of unofficial diplomat celebrating the successes of South Korea and playing explicitly on this successful image to develop FGC—through an elaborate techno-bureaucratic organization—abroad.

In Southeast Asia, the FGC's proselytism is clearly linked to the growing economic and political influence of South Korea in the region. This religious gospel, its Korean aspects, and its social actions have thus to be analyzed as part of a form of 'nation branding' and of the search of a certain 'soft power.'[16] It is thus necessary to examine the relations between South Korea and the countries of this region in order to better understand the humanitarian actions conducted by this Church and its missionaries.

Promoting the South Korean Brand in Southeast Asia

South Korea established diplomatic relations with the countries of Southeast Asia in the late 1950s and the 1960s. However, up until the 1980s, the relations between South Korea and these countries were mainly determined by its alliance with the United States against the communist block and, more specifically, against North Korea. The influence of the Cold War is also apparent in that its diplomatic relations were influenced by the involvement of Filipino

15 Ari Pedro Oro, "Pentecôtisme et politique au Sud du Brésil," in *Imaginaires politiques et pentecôtismes: Afrique/Amérique latine*, eds. André Corten and André Mary (Paris: Karthala, 2000), 307–20; and Ari Pedro Oro, "La transnationalisation du pentecôtisme brésilien: le cas de l'Église Universelle du Royaume de Dieu," *Civilisations* 51 (2004): 155–70.

16 On 'soft power,' see Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

and Thai soldiers in the Korean War (1950–1953) and also of Korean troops in the Vietnam War (1954–1975).[17]

Since the 1980s, South Korea's large business conglomerates (*chaebols*), have invested heavily in Southeast Asia. These investments increased during the 1990s before declining sharply during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which marked an important halt in the growth of the South Korean economy. Since 2003 South Korean investment in Southeast Asia has again seen significant growth with the amount of Korean direct investment in Southeast Asia increasing from US$600 million in 2005 to US$3.5 billion in 2014. This represents 16 percent of all Korean investments abroad. Since 2010, Southeast Asia has become the second most important destination for South Korean investment, after China (at 17 percent).[18]

In 2010 ASEAN and South Korea adopted a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. This helped pave the way for the Han River Declaration in 2011, which established a structure for relations with the five countries bordering the Mekong River (Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam). This agreement facilitated South Korea's involvement in the development of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and was actively promoted by South Korea's president.[19] Since the 2000s, South Korean governments have considered investment in Southeast Asia as part of a broader strategy of regional influence. Faced with ongoing tension with North Korea, and particularly its developing nuclear program, and surrounded by the rising power of China and that of Japan, South Korea has sought to carve out its own space of influence. Frequently presented as a 'shrimp swimming between the whales' (China, Japan, the United States and Russia), South Korea has seen its role in Southeast Asia as one of the ways in which it can enact an autonomous foreign policy and thereby legitimate its claims to being a "middle power."[20]

---

17 The Philippines and Thailand were part of the coalition set up by the United States under the auspices of the United Nations in response to the invasion of the South by the Communist North in 1950. South Korea joined the American and South Vietnamese governments in the 'struggle against communism' by sending over 320,000 South Korean soldiers and support personnel to Vietnam between 1965 and 1973.

18 On the ASEAN-Korea economic relationship, see Choong-lyol Lee, Seok-joon Hong and De-yeong Youn, eds., *ASEAN-Korea Relations: Twenty-five Years of Partnership and Friendship* (Seoul: Nulmin, 2015).

19 See Arnaud Leveau, "Les relations entre la Corée du Sud et les pays d'Asie du Sud-est. Quelle stratégie pour une puissance moyenne," (PhD diss., Ecole Normale de Lyon, 2011).

20 See David Shim, "A Shrimp Amongst Whales? Assessing South Korea's Regional-Power Status," *GIGA Working Paper* 107 (August 2009): 1–25; Andrew O'Neil, "South Korea as a Middle Power: Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges," in *Middle-Power Korea:*

In this context, the growing presence of Korean Christian missionaries in Southeast Asia is part of a broader foreign policy aimed at mobilizing Korean political, economic, and cultural resources. Koreans are relative latecomers to this region where many Japanese companies have been established since the 1970s and where China's influence is established and growing. South Korea plays on ASEAN its fear of the political dominance of these two countries to propose more balanced development partnerships. This forms an important context for the critical analysis of how Korean political, economic, cultural and religious actors promote a very specific discourse to legitimize their presence and their influence in the region to diverse parties.

In its relationships with Southeast Asia, South Korea presents itself as a country which overcame a civil war and desperate poverty to achieve rapid economic development and a genuine democratic transition. In so doing it is described as historically close to the countries of Southeast Asia and, as a consequence, a viable model of development which Southeast Asian countries can emulate. At the same time this Korean discourse promotes possibilities for economic development, opening up of new markets for Korean companies.

These Korean discourses of development should be seen as deeply influenced by a form of 'nation branding'; a term used by the South Korean government itself when, in 2009, President Yi Myong-pak founded the Presidential Council of Nation Branding (PCNB). The aim of the PCNB was to coordinate the use of 'South Korea' as a brand symbolizing economic success. Through an orchestrated campaign employing branding and marketing techniques the government hoped to improve South Korea's international reputation. Similar strategies have been developed by numerous other countries since the 1990s.[21] Nation branding specialists seek to cultivate an original and attractive international image for countries as a tool to increase their comparative advantage over other competitors so as to attract foreign investment, support

Contributions to the Global Agenda, ed. Scott A. Snyder (New York: CFR, 2015), 75–89; Sung-han Kim, *Global Governance and Middle Powers: South Korea's Role in the G20* (Seoul: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013); Sung-mi Kim, *South Korea's Middle-Power Diplomacy: Changes and Challenges* (London: Chatham House, 2016); Yul Sohn, "Searching for a New Identity: South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy," *Policy Brief* 212 (2015): 1–6; and Arnaud Leveau, "L'essor du tigre: Les ambitions sud-coréennes en Asie du Sud-Est," in *L'Asie du Sud-Est en 2011*, eds. Arnaud Leveau and Benoît De Trégodé (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2012), 55–71.

21 See Ying Fan, "Branding the Nation: What is Being Branded?" *Journal of Vacation Marketing* 12.1 (2005): 5–14; and Keith Dinnie, ed., *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice* (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008) on branding and marketing techniques.

export-oriented industries and improve, more generally, its ability to achieve global influence.[22]

While South Korean exercise in nation branding was initiated by the government it involves not only public organizations but also private actors. South Korea's nation branding also includes cultural elements, including the 'K-Pop' music industry, as well as its humanitarian and development initiatives, and the projection of Christian religious influence abroad. Indeed, in many cases the organization of humanitarian aid serves as an incubator for Korean Protestant churches' multi-layered proselytizing activities, especially in the 'developing countries' of Southeast Asia. In these contexts, the FGC emphasizes its Koreanness and uses the Korean brand as a development success story to create opportunities for its work. The Church presents itself as the symbol of this successful path. The 'good reputation' of their country as modern and prosperous facilitates the setting up of churches in order to convert local populations, as we will see in further detail through the example of Cambodia.

Over the past two decades Cambodia has moved from being an impoverished and war-torn country to one of the world's fastest growing economies, albeit one that continues to present glaring inequalities.[23] Marked by a particularly long and violent period of political conflict that started during the Vietnam War era with General Lon Nol's coup in 1970 followed by the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–79) and another long decade of civil war, Cambodia only started seeing increased stability after the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992–93) lead to the first post-war democratic elections as well as the country's rapid economic integration into a global market. This period of economic 'opening' of Cambodia was accompanied by the arrival of large numbers of development organizations, many of which having religious ties.[24]

I have closely studied the establishment of an FGC church in Phnom Penh. This case study embodies the FGC's strategies in Southeast Asia more broadly and shows how this international religious development participates in Korean nation branding in the region.

---

22 Simon Anholt, *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

23 Caroline Hughes and Keang Un, eds., *Cambodia's Economic Transformation* (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2011); and Simon Springer, *Violent Neoliberalism. Development, Discourse, and Dispossession in Cambodia* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015).

24 See Sabine Trannin, *Les ONG occidentales au Cambodge: La réalité derrière le mythe* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2005). For a more general overview of aid in Cambodia, see Sophal Ear, *Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

A Korean-Pentecostal Path to Prosperity

In 1995 the FGC sent a missionary, whom I will call Pastor H to Phnom Penh. Pastor H had received training at the FGC operated Pentecostal Missionary Training Institute (PMTI). This Institute was established in 1994 for the task of "training missionaries destined to convert the indigenous peoples of developing countries" and, in particular, "unreached peoples." Pastor H was one of the first missionaries educated at this Institute and sent abroad for missionary service. After his arrival in Phnom Penh he did not immediately try to evangelize the largely (Theravada) Buddhist population. During his first two years in this city, Pastor H learned Khmer and sought to meet with Cambodians living in deprived areas of the city. He learned that there was a high level of unemployment, and that many in Phnom Penh faced significant economic challenges. He used the grants received from FGC in Seoul to provide food, clothes, and sometimes money for the most needy people he encountered. Thus, before establishing a church, Mr. H had been concretely involved in providing humanitarian and economic assistance to the poorest people of the city.

For this aid, Pastor H mobilized 'Good People,' the non-governmental organization linked to the FGC, and used funds given by church members from Seoul. Good People's involvement has been crucial for the establishment of the FGC in Phnom Penh. With the help of this NGO Pastor H delivered medical care and also engaged in evangelism. Medical teams from the mother Church in Seoul remain active in providing free medical treatment to Cambodians. These 'benevolent actions' prepare and justify the settlement of Korean missionaries inside local communities. This humanitarian work conducted abroad was carried out through the sending of groups on short term missions (*Tankisŏnkyo*) and other forms of assistance from FGC's Department for International Missions and the Full Gospel Business Men's Mission Federation (FGBMF). Combined with the work of Good People and monthly 'mission grants' for the work of missionaries from FGC in South Korea, these are the principal sources of funding for FGC churches in Southeast Asia.

The evangelism of FGC's Korean missionaries includes an emphasis on 'prosperity theology,' a theological vision which—along with a conversion experience and exhibiting the 'gifts of the Spirit' (including glossolalia, prophecy and miraculous healing)—can be regarded as a core element in Pentecostal Christianity.[25] First envisioned in the United States after the Second World War, prosperity theology is characterized by belief that God allows the faithful

25 Walter J. Hollenweger, *The Pentecostals: The Charismatic Movement in the Churches* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1972); Walter J. Hollenweger, *Pentecostalism:*

to obtain the economic success they deserve here and now. This extremely simplified theology offers converts the promise of economic success and can be seen as one of the factors influencing Cambodian conversion to FGC's Pentecostal Christianity. According to this theology the faithful are encouraged to pray for divine intervention in the resolution of everyday problems such as getting a job, or buying a car or a house. Through prosperity theology, FGC's Pentecostalism offers a pragmatic salvation and access to a proximate God who intervenes in everyday life for the believer's benefit.

A number of researchers have already noted that Pentecostalism appears to provide a preferential option for the poor across a range of different countries.[26] Conversion to contemporary forms of Pentecostalism offers the promise of a radical rupture in everyday life, which enables the new believer to become 'a citizen of heaven' and to be distinguished from others by the expectation of the second coming of Christ.[27] This profound affirmation of one's existence, despite the precariousness and apparent disposability felt by poor communities around the world, offers a potent resource for re-imagining the possibilities of social location. Pentecostal theology thus constitutes a response to the demand of social groups shaken by economic vulnerability. It also allows the poor to achieve symbolic social advancement through maintenance of strict moral norms, including such common features such as abstinence from alcohol and cigarettes, leading an exemplary family life, an emphasis on honesty, and a Weberian-esque privileging of hard work. In Phnom Penh, the FGC claims to provide a new way to believe with an 'efficient' gospel and a new radically different vision of the world, because "With Jesus, everything is possible." The appeal to emotion and to the personal experiences of the faithful, and the provision of opportunities for public recognition, are modern religious practices which do indeed deeply differ from their inherited religion of Buddhism in many parts of Southeast Asia. Pentecostalism is thus a faith which enables converts to assume a new identity and to hope for a new destiny.

Origins and Developments Worldwide (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1997); and Freston, "Neo-Pentecostalism in Brazil."

26 On the association between poverty and Pentecostalism see: Corten, "Pentecôtisme" on Latin America, Nils Bloch-Hoell, *The Pentecostal Movement: Its Origin, Development and Distinctive Character* (Oslo: Universitesforlaget, 1964) on the United States, and Christian Lalive D'Epinay, *Religion, dynamique sociale et dépendance: Les mouvements protestants en Argentine et au Chili* (Paris: Éditions Mouton, 1975) on Chile and Argentina.

27 Willaime, "Le pentecôtisme." For a critical review of the emphasis on 'rupture' in the Anthropology of Christianity, see: Bernardo Brown and R. Michael Feener, "Configuring Catholicism in the Anthropology of Christianity," *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 28.2 (2017), 139–51.

Pastor H emphasizes the success of Pentecostalism by explicitly linking it with the economic success of South Korea. The history of South Korea is presented as a model of development for the church community, as well as for their country. The FGC in Phnom Penh frequently uses the image of South Korea's success in overcoming poverty and conflict as an inspiration and model for future progress of Cambodia. This representation of South Korea connects its dramatic past, to which Cambodians can relate, with the present, from which they can hope for a better future. In so doing South Korea is imagined as a form of Asian modernity which is presented as close to the countries of Southeast Asia and as a development model suitable for their needs.

Memories of war devastation and poverty in Korea and its 'miraculous' economic growth are key arguments Pastor H uses when presenting the gospel. Pastor H presents the Full Gospel Church as the embodiment of a successful South Korea:

> In spite of such a miserable past, here is a country that overcame economic and political difficulties. How was it possible? It is because Koreans believe in God. And today, the biggest Church in the world is in Korea. You can do it. You can become like Koreans.[28]

As Judy Han has made clear in her analysis of Korean evangelical missionaries working in Africa this kind of discourse is widely evoked within the world of Korean Christian mission.[29] According to Han, Koreans involved in mission trips to Africa present their help to local people as a first step toward making their country prosperous like "we did through our national modernization."

Korean missionaries also consider their work as a way to repay the debt they accrued in the past by receiving assistance from others. Pastor H explicitly evokes in his sermons the beneficial action of American pastors after the Korean War and he indicates that he would like to play the same role in Cambodia. In so doing Pastor H uses very similar language to that of President Yi Myong-pak who has insisted:

> [Our] remarkable achievement goes out to all those who fought for us and for those who helped us when we were in desperate need. […] The Korean people who have been through wars and destitution are now

28 Sermon of Pastor H. August 19, 2012, Phnom Penh.

29 Ju-hui Judy Han, "'If You Don't Work, You Don't Eat': Evangelizing Development in Africa," in *New Millennium South Korea: Neoliberal Capitalism and Transnational Movements*, ed. Jesook Song (New York: Routledge, 2011), 142–58.

> prepared to contribute to global peace and prosperity [...] We are ready to do our part.[30]

E.H., Pastor H's daughter, told me that: "These people, Cambodians, have been traumatised and deeply saddened by the crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge regime. It is our duty to help them, to save them."

Even though Pastor H does not hide the American origins of Pentecostalism and the historical links between his Church and missionaries from the United States, however, the religion he preaches is not presented or viewed as "American." Instead, the Full Gospel Church offers Cambodians a "Koreanized Pentecostalism." This version of the Christian Gospel lays emphasis on what Pastor H regards as traditional "Asian values" such as respect for elders and the importance of family ties. The church is supposed to constitute a "familial community" which shares food, sometimes lodges its faithful, and treats them "as its own children." Pastor H thus proposes a South Korean capitalist development model inspired by Pentecostalism as central to the history of South Korea and as a viable model for the future of Cambodian development.

By 2010, after fifteen years of mission work, the FGC of Phnom Penh had over 200 church members and had also contributed to the formation of eight other FGC churches in the surrounding area. Each of these churches are led by local preachers chosen and trained by Pastor H. The Phnom Penh church had its own building constructed in 2009. The building complex includes a kindergarten and an elementary school called Emmanuel. All school teachers were also church members. According to Pastor H this was "a miracle and a blessing of God built on the prayers and tears of all these people [who] contributed to the construction by selling what they had."[31] In fact, the creation of such a church involved thousands of Korean faithful, working at the same unifying project. The faithful of Seoul seem to be no longer interested just in the satisfaction of their individual demands but wish to contribute to the improvement of the world by linking religious conviction and social action. They participate in events organized at a national level, sponsor the children of church members in developing countries, and provide financial support for the organization of

30 S. Lee, "Awakening of Billions of African Consumers," *The Korea Economic Daily* (Seoul, South Korea), May 16, 2010, accessed September 16, 2010. http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2010051692531&sid=010504&nid=005&type=0; and Soyeun Kim, "Bridging Troubled Worlds? An Analysis of the Ethical Case for South Korean Aid?" *Journal of International Development* 23.6 (2011): 802–22.

31 The Full Gospel Family Newspaper, (Seoul, South Korea), April 23, 2004, accessed April 3, 2012. http://www.fgnews.co.kr/html/2004/0423/040423035050141200000.htm.

these short term missions. However, what they most look forward to is participating directly in the work of missionaries and thus following them overseas, even if just for a short while. Short-term missions have become one of the core elements of the religious practice at FGC in Korea.

A Gift of 'Hyper-Modernity' Connecting Pentecostals and Neo-Pentecostals

According to one Korean church member I interviewed in Phnom Penh, around 80 percent of church members have participated in this experience of being a 'short-term' missionary.[32] FGC has in fact created different categories of lay missionaries in order to mobilize its church members in Korea to be actively engaged in mission and in order to enhance the visibility of its international missionary work. Lay people are supposed to 'become missionaries' for some days or weeks in another country. These short-term missionaries are mainly mobilized to work alongside long-term FGC missionaries sent to those countries. Participants pay for their own stay in country and are proud of contributing to FGC's charity work which combines development work and evangelization. The short-term missionaries convey aid sent by FGC in Korea such as medicine or small toys or snacks for children. Some short-term mission teams are composed of doctors and deliver free medical services. Others are composed of hairdressers who offer free hair care. This important mobilization of private resources is the basis of the international development work of FGC, and these exchanges are carefully controlled by the mother church in Seoul.

The symbolic, material, and interpersonal exchanges between Cambodians and Koreans resulting from these missions embody FGC's religious evolution and to a great extent determine its work in international development. The internationalization of this Church is in fact based on the complementarities between two different discourses inside the same religious structure. As already noted, in South Korea Cho preached classical Pentecostalism until the 1990s but has more recently shifted to a neo-Pentecostal orientation through new initiatives in social services and humanitarianism. Urban middle-class believers in Seoul want to be part of social action focused on 'changing the world.' In Southeast Asia, however, this shift has not taken place. The FGC faithful in Phnom Penh still believe in a 'Pentecostalism of and for the Poor.' Therefore, the Church channels the charity of the richer believers from Seoul

32 Interview with a 32 year-old male, August 14, 2012 in Phnom Penh.

(neo-Pentecostals) towards 'needy' believers in Southeast Asia (Pentecostals). The FGC uses the complementary needs of Cambodians, cast as 'poor,' and of the richer Koreans to enhance spiritual and symbolical exchange.

While South Korean FGC members are subsidizing development in Cambodia with a view of 'buying their salvation,' for poor Cambodians to become a member of this Korean Church permits identification with Korean Pentecostals in Seoul, including its positive symbolic association with Korean modernity and economic success. FGC membership thereby connects these Cambodians to an international network with flows of goods, services, capital, and people, and, more generally, to a desirable world to which they wish to belong. Church membership relates them to a form of hyper-modernity in which individuals become part of the dynamics shaping transnational networks. In this context and in this sense, Cambodians' conversion to Pentecostalism has to be studied as a strategy to gain access to new resources in order to enable their own development. Rather than contradicting their Christian faith, however, this materialism should be seen as an affirmation and an enactment of a Pentecostal theology of prosperity.

Cambodian FGC members practice classical Pentecostalism. However, the Koreans they meet and see in their church during the short term missions are modern, even hypermodern, neo-Pentecostals. They travel with the latest models of cell phone, cameras, and musical instruments. During these short-term missions participants all wear the same simple t-shirt made for the occasion, but they also bring with them luxury bags and sunglasses. For poor Cambodians, they look a lot like the Korean actors they can watch in Korean television dramas. They represent a modern, wealthy country inhabited by 'beautiful people.'[33] Belonging to this Church in a certain way means to be part of Korea. Attending a church where they can meet these people in person and belonging to this Korean congregation give the Cambodian members a new identity as well as access, in a certain way, to this hypermodern way of life.

Moreover, by converting to Pentecostalism, these Cambodians have chosen their new community, as hypermodern individuals do.[34] They claim their belonging to this Korean religious community by practicing glossolalia, meeting Koreans, and even eating Korean food. The FGC is, in this sense, not only a religious space. Church members are indeed in contact with diverse forms of

33 On Korean popular culture, see Koichi Iwabuchi, *Feeling Asian Modernities. Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).

34 Olivier Bobineau, "La troisième modernité, ou 'l'individualisme confinitaire," *Sociologies, Théories et recherches*, last modified July 06, 2011, accessed April 30, 2016. http://sociologies.revues.org/3536.

Korean culture. They sing Korean gospel songs, share Korean food, and try to understand Korean customs. Through these experiences they participate in a broader, globalized world and so create their own locality, in-between two worlds.[35] They are connected to South Korea not only through interpersonal connections and communication networks, but also through a symbolic and physical network organized by the Full Gospel Church. Joining this Korean Church can in fact be considered as the first step toward migrating to South Korea. As a matter of fact, Pastor H presents himself as the exclusive intermediary between Cambodians and a sort of 'Promised Land' called South Korea.

Dreams of Migration and Emancipation

South Korea is an attractive work destination for Cambodians.[36] In 2015 41,672 Cambodians were officially living in South Korea, 29,094 men and 12,578 women.[37] However, South Korea has become more and more demanding in terms of migration. The Korean Employment Permit System (EPS) was created in 2003. Since then, potential migrants have to pass several tests evaluating their physical aptitude and language skills.[38] There are two kinds of migration from Cambodia to South Korea: migrant workers and spouses. To be integrated in this 'international job or wedding market,' foreigners need to learn some Korean language and be in contact with Korean networks.

In both cases, Korean churches in Southeast Asia, and particularly the FGC due to its large international network, present themselves as the principal intermediaries between potential migrants and Korean society. Before eventual migration, the Church offers Cambodians concrete means to work towards their goal of living and working in South Korea. Missionaries frequently

35 Arjun Appadurai, *Après le colonialisme. Les conséquences culturelles de la globalization* (Paris: Payot, 2001).

36 On Korea-Cambodia relations, see Yeonsik Jeong, "Korea-Cambodia Relations: Last But Not Least," in *ASEAN-Korea Relations: Twenty-five years of Partnership and Friendshi*p, eds. Choong-lyol Lee, Seok-joon Hong, and De-yeong Youn (Seoul: Nulmin, 2015), 484–525.

37 Korea Immigration Service.

38 On the EPS, see Gap-rae Ha, "Woekukin koyong hokajeoi pyunchonkwa kwacha" [Changes and Challenges Facing the Employment Permit System for Foreign Workers], *Nodongpobnonch'ong* [*The Journal of Labor Law*] 22.8 (2011): 333–89; and Hack-chun Lee and Zoon-ki Ko, "Koyonghokacherul tulossan chuyo kaldungkwa chaengchon mit hwanghu pobchok kwache- kiponwonch'ikul chungsimuro" [Major conflicts and issues and legal challenges in the future surrounding the Employment Permit System (EPS)—focus on the basic principles in the Employment Permit System(EPS)], *Notongpob nonch'ong* [*The Journal of Labor Law*] 27.4 (2013): 291–341.

organize Korean language courses which are open to church members as well as others. Language courses serve as points of contact with non-adherents, and some who first attended these free courses eventually become members of the church. After they have gained sufficient language skills, missionaries help provide connections with Korean expatriates where they are able to work as drivers, housekeepers, or babysitters. This is often viewed as an enticing opportunity for Cambodians, and almost a privilege, given the number of Korean residents and their relative wealth.[39] They constitute a potential and large work market for Cambodian church members of the Full Gospel Church.

However, the jobs Cambodian church members can access are not limited to domestic tasks. By learning Korean culture and language and by being in contact with Koreans they open possible avenues to join a Korean company with operations in Cambodia. These same connections can also help Cambodians to prepare for emigration to Korea. Participating in FGC in Cambodia can therefore be a means for Cambodians to improve their situation either by creating pathways to an expanded geographical horizon or through increased opportunities within their home country.

Many of Cambodians living in Phnom Penh are in fact migrants who have come from the countryside to look for a job in the city. They are separated from their traditional points of reference and often struggle to carve out their place in the urban context. If they were initially drawn to the FGC, it might have been for the Church's 'home cell' network, providing a form of sociability. Before establishing the Full Gospel in Phnom Penh, Pastor H had in fact gradually built up 'home cells' which became the basis of the parish's structure. These groups constitute a means of organizing the faithful. Each member of the Church has to belong to a 'cell' which gathers five to fifteen members living in the same district. They meet regularly to worship in one of the members' homes. Each local leader knows about the personal or family concerns of its members but also of their neighbors. This proximity facilitates proselytizing.[40] This strategy, which FGC missionaries are also using in other Southeast Asian countries, originated in the 1960s and 1970s in Korea.[41] Both at home and abroad, it aimed at converting disoriented people facing rapidly changing contexts.

---

39 According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, 8000 Koreans were living in Cambodia in 2015.

40 Kelly H. Chong, "Feminine Habitus: Rhetoric and Rituals of Conversion and Commitment among Contemporary South Korean Evangelical Women," in *The Anthropology of Global Pentecostalism and Evangelicalism*, eds. Simon Coleman and Rosalind Hackett (New York: NYU Press, 2015), 109–28.

41 In 1964, Cho Yonggi advocated the creation of 'home cells' (*kuyŏk yebe*) [Paul Yonggi Cho, *Successful Home Cell Groups* (Alachua: Bridge Publications, 1981); and Paul Yonggi Cho, *Sŏnggong'jŏk kuyŏk* 성 공 적 구 역 [Successful Home Cells] (Sŏul: Sŏul Malssŭmsa, 2011)].

In Cambodia, home cells have always been largely based on the involvement of housewives. By appointing women to lead these 'cells' and construct a network of parishes, the FGC provides new avenues for attaining social status among a group that is often marginalized from opportunities for social recognition. Further, the Church recruits Cambodian women and men in order to manage its day-to-day business and its relations with the local authorities. Korean pastors and Korean missionaries from Seoul increasingly depend on these local actors' work. In return, FGC sponsors some church members' university studies and provides other training opportunities.

The structure of this Church in Cambodia is thus based on a specific role given to the local members, with a focus on education and a valorization of South Korean social and cultural initiatives. The foreign nature of Protestantism can serve to empower church members within their own society, where the appeal of 'successful' South Korea is strong. Cambodian church members are not just trying to find a way to leave Cambodia. They use this foreign Church and its foreign money to reorganize their own community, to ensure a better education for their children, and a better social status for themselves. All this could be helped by a temporary migration to South Korea, but conversion is certainly not just a question of migration. Even though my study of the Full Gospel Church in Cambodia confirms the importance held by hopes of migration and the relative success of the evangelization of some Cambodians, these religious exchanges cannot be reduced only to the potential for migration.

Conclusion

The Full Gospel Church's export of a Korean form of Pentecostalism does not only trigger hope and 'great expectations' among numerous Cambodians. It also provides its local church members with skills and connects them to networks which might enable them to become functional actors in their country's rapidly developing market economy, or even open opportunities to live and work in South Korea. To do so, the FGC relies on a highly organized techno-bureaucracy, channeling money and missionaries through entities such as the Full Gospel Businessmen's Mission Federation or the Department of International Mission of the FGC. The presence of infrastructures, services, and

Each member of the movement had to belong to a 'cell' which gathered fifteen members living in the same district. They had to meet regularly to celebrate worship in one of the members' home while following the instructions of the religious manual written by Cho. This had been the first lay-led organization within the Full Gospel Church.

of hypermodern Korean Church representatives all help to achieve the FGC's aim of contributing to the South Korean government's efforts to promote its 'branded' nation.

With Pentecostalism appearing as part of the 'Korean model of development,' and as a form of 'Asian Modernity,' joining this Pentecostal Church is envisioned as part of a global process of emancipation for Cambodians. This can be seen as paradoxical considering the Church's conservative political attitude in South Korea. Emancipation, however, is not the only effect brought about by the FGC. While I have emphasized the important role that women get to play in home cells and the access that Church-sponsored education provides to young FGC members, the Pentecostal prosperity gospel presents success as a gift of God, but it does not seem to question the economic and political roots of persisting and even increasing inequalities. The FGC's social actions and their recuperation by local church members have become part of the global socio-cultural connectedness that now links Cambodians and South Koreans. However, they also contribute to making poverty appear as a thing that can be addressed by enabling deprived individuals, through a transfer of money and skills, to strive towards a better future, epitomized by South Korea's 'Asian Modernity.' While providing Cambodian FGC members with new opportunities for economic success, one has to wonder if and how the latter will seek betterment that goes beyond individual gain.

Bibliography

Anholt, Simon. *Competitive Identity: The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Appadurai, Arjun. *Après le colonialisme. Les conséquences culturelles de la globalisation.* Paris: Payot, 2001.

Bloch-Hoell, Nils. *The Pentecostal Movement: Its Origin, Development and Distinctive Character*. Oslo: Universitesforlaget, 1964.

Bobineau, Olivier. "La troisième modernité, ou 'l'individualisme confinitaire.'" *Sociologies, Théories et recherches*. Last modified July 06, 2011. Accessed April 30, 2016. http://sociologies.revues.org/3536.

Brotons, Arnaud, Yannick Bruneton, and Nathalie Kouamé, eds. *État, religion et répression en Asie, Chine, Corée, Japon, Vietnam* (*XIIIe–XXIe siècles*). Paris: Karthala, 2011.

Brown, Bernardo and R. Michael Feener. "Configuring Catholicism in the Anthropology of Christianity." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 28.2 (2017), 139–51.

Chai, Shin-yu, ed. *Korea and Christianity*. Seoul: Korean Scholar Press, 1996.

Cho, Kyuhoon. "Protestantism, Education, and the Nation: The Shifting Location of Protestant Schools in Modern Korea." *Acta Koreana* 19.1 (2016): 99–131.

Cho, Paul Yonggi. *Successful Home Cell Groups*. Alachua: Bridge Publications, 1981.

Cho, Paul Yonggi. *Sŏnggong'jŏk kuyŏk* 성 공 적 구 역 [Successful Home Cells]. Sŏul: Sŏul Malssŭmsa, 2011 [1978].

Choi, Syn-Duk. "A Comparative Study of Two New Religious Movements in the Republic of Korea: The Unification Church and the Full Gospel Central Church." In *New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change,* edited by James Beckford, 113–45. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1986.

Chong, Kelly H. "Feminine Habitus: Rhetoric and Rituals of Conversion and Commitment among Contemporary South Korean Evangelical Women." In *The Anthropology of Global Pentecostalism and Evangelicalism*, edited by Simon Coleman and Rosalind Hackett, 109–28. New York: NYU Press, 2015.

Chung, Bertrand. "Politique et religion en Corée du Sud." *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 32.1 (2001): 85–110.

Corten, André. "Pentecôtisme et 'néo-pentecôtisme' au Brésil." *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 105 (1999): 163–83.

Corten, André. "Un religieux immanent et transnational." *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 133 (2006): 131–51.

Corten, André and André Mary, eds. *Imaginaires politiques et pentecôtismes.* Paris: Karthala, 2000.

Dinnie, Keith, ed. *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice.* Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008.

Ear, Sophal. *Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines Democracy.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Fan, Ying. "Branding the Nation: What is Being Branded?" *Journal of Vacation Marketing* 12.1 (2005): 5–14.

Fountain, Philip, Robin Bush, and R. Michael Feener, eds. *Religion and the Politics of Development*. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015.

Freston, Paul. "Neo-Pentecostalism in Brazil: Problems of Definition and the Struggle for Hegemony." *Archives des Sciences Sociales des Religions* 105 (1999): 145–62.

Ha, Gap-rae. "Woekukin koyong hokajeoi pyunchonkwa kwacha" [Changes and Challenges Facing the Employment Permit System for Foreign Workers]. *Nodongpobnonch'ong* [*The Journal of Labor Law*] 22.8 (2011): 333–89.

Han, Ju-hui Judy. "'If You Don't Work, You Don't Eat': Evangelizing Development in Africa." In *New Millennium South Korea: Neoliberal Capitalism and Transnational Movements*, edited by Jesook Song, 142–58. New York: Routledge, 2011.

Hollenweger, Walter J. *The Pentecostals: The Charismatic Movement in the Churches.* Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1972.

Hollenweger, Walter J. *Pentecostalism: Origins and Developments Worldwide*. Peabody: Hendrickson, 1997.

Hughes, Caroline and Keang Un, eds. *Cambodia's Economic Transformation.* Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2011.

Iwabuchi, Koichi. *Feeling Asian Modernities. Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004.

Jang, Suk-man. "Protestantism in the Name of Modern Civilization." *Korea Journal* 39.4 (1999): 187–204.

Jeong, Yeonsik. "Korea-Cambodia Relations: Last But Not Least." In *ASEAN-Korea Relations: Twenty-five years of Partnership and Friendshi*p, edited by Choong-lyol Lee, Seok-joon Hong, and De-yeong Youn, 484–525. Seoul: Nulmin, 2015.

Kang, In-ch'ŏl 강인철. *Han'guk'ŭi kaesin'gyo'wa pangongjuŭi: posujŏk kaesin'gyo'ŭi chŏngch'i'jŏk haengdongju'ŭi t'amgu* 한국의 개신교와 반공주의: 보수적 개신교의 정치적 행동주의 탐구 [*Korean Protestantism and Anti-Communism: An Analysis of the Political Activism of Conservative Protestant Churches*]. Sŏul: Chungsim, 2007.

Kim, Han-sik. "The Influence of Christianity on Modern Korean Political Thought." *Korea Journal* 23.12 (1983): 4–17.

Kim, Hui-yeon. *Le Soft power sud-coréen en Asie du Sud-Est: Une théologie de la prospérité en action*. Bangkok: IRASEC, 2014.

Kim, Hui-yeon. "Les pentecôtistes coréens en Asie du Sud-Est: Exporter la 'théologie de la prospérité' pour assurer son salut." In *Chrétiens évangéliques en Asie du Sud-Est: Expériences locales d'une ferveur protestante*, edited by Pascal Bourdeaux and Jérémy Jammes, 209–25. Rennes: PUR, 2016a.

Kim, Sung-mi. *South Korea's Middle-Power Diplomacy: Changes and Challenges*. London: Chatham House, 2016b.

Kim, Ŭn-gi 김은기. "Hanguk chonggyo munwha'wa kaesin'gyo'wa'ŭi yusasŏng." 한국종교문화와 개신교와의 유사성 [Similarities between Korean Religious Culture and Protestantism]. In *Kidokkyo yŏksa munhwa yŏn'guso* 기독교역사문화연구소, ed., *Han'gug'ŭi kidokkyo* 한국의 기독교 [Korean Protestantism], 91–107. Sŏul: Kyŏppogi, 2001.

Kim, Ig-Jin. *History and Theology of Korean Pentecostalism: Sunbogeum* (*Pure Gospel*) *Pentecostalism*. Zoetemeer: Uitgeverij Boekencentrum, 2003.

Kim, Soyeun. "Bridging Troubled Worlds? An Analysis of the Ethical Case for South Korean Aid?" *Journal of International Development* 23.6 (2011): 802–22.

Kim, Sung-han. *Global Governance and Middle Powers: South Korea's Role in the G20*. Seoul: Council on Foreign Relations, 2013.

Lalive D'Epinay, Christian. *Religion, dynamique sociale et dépendance: Les mouvements protestants en Argentine et au Chili*. Paris: Éditions Mouton, 1975.

Lee, S. "Awakening of Billions of African Consumers." *The Korea Economic Daily* (Seoul, South Korea), 16 May 2010. Accessed 16 September, 2010. http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2010051692531&sid=010504&nid=005&type=0[].

Lee, Hack-chun and Zoon-ki Ko. "Koyonghokacherul tulossan chuyo kaldungkwa chaengchon mit hwanghu pobchok kwache- kiponwonch'ikul chungsimuro." [Major conflicts and issues and legal challenges in the future surrounding the Employment Permit System (EPS)—focus on the basic principles in the Employment Permit System(EPS)]. *Notongpob nonch'ong* [*The Journal of Labor Law*] 27.4 (2013): 291–341.

Lee, Choong-lyol, Seok-joon Hong, and De-yeong Youn, eds. *ASEAN-Korea Relations: Twenty-five Years of Partnership and Friendship*. Seoul: Nulmin, 2015.

Leveau, Arnaud. "Les relations entre la Corée du Sud et les pays d'Asie du Sud-est. Quelle stratégie pour une puissance moyenne." PhD diss., Ecole Normale de Lyon, 2011.

Leveau, Arnaud. "L'essor du tigre: Les ambitions sud-coréennes en Asie du Sud-Est." In *L'Asie du Sud-Est en 2011*, edited by Arnaud Leveau and Benoît De Trégodé, 55–71. Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2012.

Mariano, Ricardo. *Neopentecostais: Sociologia do novo pentecostalismo no Brasil*. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1999.

Moon, Steve Sang-Cheol. "The Recent Korean Missionary Movement: A Record of Growth, and More Growth Needed." *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 27.1 (2003): 11–17.

Moon, Steve Sang-Cheol. "The Protestant Missionary Movement in Korea: Current Growth and Development." *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 32.2 (2008): 59–64.

Moon, Steve Sang-Cheol. "Missions from Korea in 2016: Sustainability and Revitalization." *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 40.2 (2016): 181–85.

Nye, Joseph. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

O'Neil, Andrew. "South Korea as a Middle Power: Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges." In *Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda*, edited by Scott A. Snyder, 75–89. New York: CFR, 2015.

Oro, Ari Pedro. "Pentecôtisme et politique au Sud du Brésil." In *Imaginaires politiques et pentecôtismes: Afrique/Amérique latine*, edited by André Corten and André Mary, 307–20. Paris: Karthala, 2000.

Oro, Ari Pedro. "La transnationalisation du pentecôtisme brésilien: le cas de l'Église Universelle du Royaume de Dieu." *Civilisations* 51 (2004): 155–70.

Ryu, Dae-young. "Understanding Early American Missionaries in Korea (1884–1910): Capitalist Middle-Class Values and the Weber Thesis." *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 113 (2001): 93–117.

Shim, David. "A Shrimp Amongst Whales? Assessing South Korea's Regional-Power Status." *GIGA Working Paper* 107 (August 2009): 1–25.

Sohn, Yul. "Searching for a New Identity: South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy." *Policy Brief* 212 (2015): 1–6.

Springer, Simon. *Violent Neoliberalism. Development, Discourse, and Dispossession in Cambodia.* New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015.

Trannin, Sabine. *Les ONG occidentales au Cambodge: La réalité derrière le mythe.* Paris: l'Harmattan, 2005.

Willaime, Jean P. "Le pentecôtisme: Contour et paradoxe d'un protestantisme émotionnel." *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 105 (1999): 5–28.

CHAPTER 9

Quietist Techno-Politics: Agricultural Development and Mennonite Mission in Indonesia

Philip Fountain and Laura S. Meitzner Yoder

Between 1976 and 1984 the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) carried out agricultural development and mission work among the Kantu' (Dayak) of the Kapuas Hulu area in West Kalimantan. Examining this short period in a decidedly "out-of-the-way"[1] part of Indonesia, we seek to illuminate the everyday techno-politics at work in MCC practices. Building upon earlier published work, while engaging with new archival material, interviews with the former American mission/development workers, and fieldwork in the Kapuas Hulu area itself, we are able to examine in greater detail the textures and complexities of everyday missional development.[2]

In her work on Christian missionary projects in another part of Indonesia, Lorraine Aragon has argued that President Suharto's New Order state deployed foreign missionaries in the outlying islands as part of its nationalist, modernizing project of incorporating 'remote' regions within the control of the centralizing technocratic state.[3] Missionaries were, she argues, the thin wedge of the state, bringing interventionist state institutions in their wake, including schooling and public infrastructure. Aragon is correct to locate missionaries within the orbit of New Order politics. Indeed, this was a key argument Fountain advanced in his earlier work on MCC's initiatives in West Kalimantan. The distinction between religion and development could, in some contexts, become blurred, but this was not unique to the missionaries. The same blurring was also actively embraced by agents of the state who sought to deploy religion as a central vector of its modernizing agenda.[4] The New Order's association

1 Anna L. Tsing, *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way Place* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

2 See especially, Philip Fountain, "Blurring Mission and Development in the Mennonite Central Committee," in *Mission and Development: God's Work or Good Work*, ed. Matthew Clarke (London; Continuum, 2012), 143–66. Though we have researched Kantu' responses to Mennonite interventions, this paper focuses only on the latter.

3 Lorraine Aragon, *Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christianity, and State Development in Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000).

4 Fountain, "Blurring Mission and Development."

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_010

of non-religion ('*tidak ada agama*') and 'backwards' ('*terbelakang*') animism with threats of communism also meant that Dayak communities had strong incentives—political and otherwise—to blur development and mission.

In this paper, however, we are less concerned with the ambitions of the Indonesian state and Dayak communities than with an everyday 'quietist' Mennonite techno-politics. Even though Mennonite projects in West Kalimantan took place within the broader political arena of an ascendant New Order, it is notable that government personnel and material presence in the Kapuas Hulu area were strikingly limited, if not absent altogether. Archival and interview material revealed scant direct interactions between the Mennonite missionaries and the New Order state and military. Decisions over MCC's actual day-to-day operations were not dictated by a state-sanctioned script, but rather emerged out of other theological, political, and technical dynamics.[5] Mennonites willingly engaged in a religiously-rendered vision and practice of development, and this techno-political formation is itself a compelling subject for analysis because it illuminates the complex entanglements between development and religion through the long twentieth century and in so doing shows how, through their interaction, religion and development have reshaped each other.[6]

Our focus on everyday techno-politics draws attention to what Abeysekara calls the "contingent conjunctures" that play out on a "micro" scale.[7] Here, it

5 By theological we do not simply mean 'religious ideology.' Theology in the North American Mennonite case can include a biblical hermeneutics which eschews systematization for the priority of Christocentric discipleship; corporeal and material practices including the cultivation of particular styles of clothing, hair, and vehicles; communal social architectures; ritual and liturgy; and a political cartography which legitimates the construction (and also transgression) of distinctive identities. For further discussion on defining the theological, see: Philip Fountain, "Toward a Post-secular Anthropology," *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 24.3 (2013b): 310–311; Philip Fountain and Sin Wen Lau, "Anthropological Theologies: Engagements and Encounters," *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 24.3 (2013): 230.

6 Our use of 'religion' in this paper is not meant to imply an essentialist, sui generis category. Religion is not ahistorical or transcultural, but rather it is a "moving object" which is deployed in very different ways in different contexts (R. Michael Feener, Philip Fountain, and Robin Bush, "Outlook: Research on Religion and Development," in *Religion and the Politics of Development*, eds. Philip Fountain, R. Michael Feener, and Robin Bush (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2015), 243–245). For a seminal critical study of the concept of religion see: Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). For further discussion on the meanings of 'religion' in scholarship on religious NGOs, see: Philip Fountain, "The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion," *International Development Policy: Religion and Development* 4 (2013a): 9–30.

7 Ananda Abeysekara, "The Saffron Army, Violence, Terror(ism): Buddhism, Identity, and Difference in Sri Lanka," *Numen* 48.1 (2001): 41.

is through ordinary, quotidian practices that development is enacted. Even the largest projects must be instantiated on what Pinto calls "a series of local acts."[8] We focus our discussion on institutional and biographical dimensions of the organization. The everyday techno-politics of MCC in West Kalimantan was, we argue, marked by a quietist Mennonite ethic. North American Mennonites have long seen themselves as 'The Quiet in the Land' (*'Die Stillen im Lande'*), an emic description which is at once a commentary on traditionally rural and 'separated' Mennonite communities as well as Mennonite pacifism.[9] The phrase also evokes Mennonite theological impulses which have tended to hold a dim view of the redemptive potential of coercive state power and other large-scale institutions. While these impulses are contested, and while the general tendency over the twentieth century has been an increasingly proactive engagement with state politics in Canada and the US, Mennonites have nevertheless sought to shape their involvement in politics according to theological norms which emphasize the priority of 'service,' interpersonal relationships, and small-scale initiatives.[10] By framing Mennonite development as characterized by a quietist techno-politics we point to the ways in which MCC workers engaged with, deployed and reconfigured the techno-political by seeking to subsume it within a distinctively Mennonite ethics. Before turning to West Kalimantan, we examine a longer history of MCC's agricultural development work in Indonesia. This enables us to begin tracing the contours of their quietist techno-politics.

8 Sarah Pinto, "Development without Institutions: Ersatz Medicine and the Politics of Everyday Life in Rural North India," *Cultural Anthropology* 19.3 (2004): 351.

9 Though, since the Second World War, Mennonite rurality and pacifism have frequently been in tension with each other. For further discussion of 'quiet' Mennonites, and the ways in which this quietness has been understood and reworked over time, see: Fred Kniss, *Disquiet in the Land: Cultural Conflict in American Mennonite Communities* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997); Joseph S. Miller, "A History of the Mennonite Conciliation Service, International Conciliation Service, and Christian Peacemaker Teams," in *From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International Peacebuilding*, eds. Cynthia Sampson and John Paul Lederach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3–29; Keith Graber Miller, *Wise as Serpents, Innocent as Doves? American Mennonites Engage Washington* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 1–22, 79–123; Brenda Philipps, *Mennonite Disaster Service: Building a Therapeutic Community after the Gulf Coast Storms* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 57–76.

10 For especially illuminating studies on Mennonites and politics, see: Miller, *Wise as Serpents, Innocent as Doves?*; James Urry, *Mennonites, Politics, Peoplehood: Europe—Russia—Canada, 1525 to 1980* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2006).

Mennonites, Agriculture, Indonesia

To understand MCC's agricultural development work in West Kalimantan it is necessary to examine a longer history and a broader geography. Most MCC workers in Indonesia came from North American Mennonite communities, many of which were rural and based on a farming economy.[11] This background shaped Mennonite interest in and sense of capacity for contributing to Indonesian agricultural success.

Up until the Second World War North American Mennonites were primarily located in tight-knit rural and farming communities. This was so much the case that rurality and agriculture were intimately interwoven into the everyday fabric of lived Mennonite religion. This had not always been the case. In his classic historical study of Swiss German Mennonites, Paul Peachey points to the urban roots of the Mennonite movement in Europe at the time of the radical reformation.[12] Extensive persecution, mass emigration from Europe (including to the Americas), disengagement with state authorities, the spatial enactment of a theology of 'non-conformity,' and the associated attempt to fuse Mennonite orthopraxis with 'Germanic' ethnic cultural markers (such as the use of Plautdietsch language in the home and High German in church, as well as the cultivation of particular culinary tastes, etc.) resulted in a thoroughly rural movement. This process of ruralization, according to Mennonite sociologists Kauffman and Driedger, led "into centuries of being the 'quiet in the land,' tucked away toward the periphery of society as tillers of the soil."[13] This ruralization was simultaneously also a fragmentation of (diverse and proliferating) church polities.[14]

---

11 An extensive historical literature examines rural Mennonite identities and traces their twentieth century transformations. See, for example: Royden Loewen, *Family, Church, and Market: A Mennonite Community in the Old and New Worlds, 1850–1930* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Paul Toews, *Mennonites in American Society, 1930–1970: Modernity and the Persistence of Religious Community* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1996); T.D. Regehr, *Mennonites in Canada, 1939–1970: A People Transformed* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Perry Bush, *Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties: Mennonite Pacifism in Modern America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Urry, *Mennonites, Politics, Peoplehood.*

12 Paul Peachey, *Die Soziale Herkunft der Schweizer Täufer in der Reformationszeit: Eine Religionssoziologische Untersuchung* (Karlsruhe: Heinrich Schneider, 1954).

13 J Howard Kauffman and Leo Driedger, *The Mennonite Mosaic: Identity and Modernization* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1991), 28.

14 Goossen argues that Mennonite ethnicity is not "an objectively discoverable category, easily traceable across the centuries" but rather the language of ethnicity, and ideas about

The Second World War was, for many American and Canadian Mennonites, a profound rupture in the cultural and religious patterns of their rural existence. Three overlapping factors are particularly important to the story we tell in this paper. First, mass conscription forced many Mennonites from their rural isolation into direct engagement with their respective governments. Historically a pacifist or 'non-resistant' movement, Mennonite leadership worked closely with Quakers and Brethren in Christ, as well as their governments, to facilitate alternative service options for conscientious objectors. The resulting Civilian Public Service (US) and Selective Service (Canada) camps enhanced this trajectory, with Mennonite young men, and the communities that supported them, entering into new social relationships with societies in the throes of Total War.[15] Mennonite conscientious objectors joined those that had through coercion or choice signed-up for military service in opening rural Mennonite communities to new cultural influences. Among these, and this is the second factor, were vastly expanded opportunities for education and employment. Large numbers of Mennonite young women and men left the family farm in the 1940s and 50s to further their education and, subsequently, entered professional employment. This move toward urbanization and professionalization had enduring cultural and theological effects.

A third factor, closely associated with both preceding points, was that of domestic and international *service*, a keyword in North American Mennonite vernacular theology. The Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), the organization at the center of our study, was created as an inter-Mennonite service agency. Birthed in 1920, MCC brought fragmented Mennonite groups together to assist 'Russian Mennonite' co-religionists in the Ukraine who had been devastated by war and famine. The initial efforts of this fledgling organization were techno-agricultural, including the shipment of modern Fordson tractors equipped with Oliver two-bottom plows, which the Ford Motor Company had begun manufacturing in 1917. Mennonite communities in North America responded to pressing moral concerns by drawing upon their own expertise and resources as farming communities, including their active embrace of the emerging mechanization of agriculture.[16]

---

what constitutes that ethnicity, arise in specific times and places. He posits that "all discussions of Anabaptist identity [are] contingent on the specific circumstances of their production." See Benjamin Goossen, "From Aryanism to Anabaptism: Nazi Race Science and the Language of Mennonite Ethnicity," *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 90 (2016): 138–39.

15 On the US, see especially Bush, *Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties*.

16 The disastrous situation faced by Mennonites in the Ukraine was caused by the Povolzhye (Volga) Famine and the ravages of the First World War (1914–1918), the Russian Civil

After a brief hiatus in the 1930s, MCC re-emerged during the Second World War as the key Mennonite agency responsible for facilitating alternative service for Mennonite conscientious objectors by carrying out the administration of the (government mandated, but church run and resourced) camps. MCC also played an important role in resettling Mennonite emigrants from war-torn Europe to Paraguay and Canada. These communities established themselves as agricultural producers. As the war came to a close MCC was at the forefront of a flourishing Mennonite internationalization by providing opportunities for service in Europe and further afield for Mennonite men and women. Despite ushering in increasing urbanization, Mennonite aid was still shaped by rural roots. Mennonite relief workers—many volunteering for 2–3 years of service as the moral equivalent for conscription—frequently came from the family farm.[17] Mennonite relief efforts drew upon agricultural resources, perhaps best illustrated in the remarkable story of the mobile meat canner which was operated by Mennonite communities who volunteered their time to can meat for shipment nationally and overseas as relief supplies. Initially, the canning primarily involved beef, with cattle frequently coming from Mennonite farms.[18] Agriculture was thus firmly established as an important component of much of MCC's early relief and development work.

War (1917–1922), and class conflict that ensued following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. In these conflicts Mennonites had been positioned awkwardly, as 'Germans' in Russian territory and as being on the wrong side of the Soviet reconstruction of Russian society. MCC activities in the Ukraine were primarily relief oriented, although Reimer and Guenther have argued that a broader agenda characterized this intervention. See William Reimer and Bruce Guenther, "Relationships, Rights and 'Relief': Ninety Years of MCC's Integrated Response to Humanitarian Crises," in *A Table of Sharing: Mennonite Central Committee and the Expanding Networks of Mennonite Identity*, ed. Alain Epp Weaver (Telford, PA: Cascadia, 2011), 353–74. The Mennonite 'colonies' in the Ukraine were themselves decidedly agricultural societies. It was their reputation for agricultural innovation that had led to Mennonite immigration to the Ukraine following an invitation from the government of Catherine the Great. For a thorough discussion of this history see Urry, *Mennonites, Politics, Peoplehood*, especially chapters four to six. See also Philip Fountain, "Mennonite Disaster Relief and the Interfaith Encounter in Aceh, Indonesia," *Asian Ethnology* 75.1 (2016): 165–68.

17 Mennonite conscientious objectors saw their volunteering as the "moral equivalent of war" and this helped lay the moral framework for understanding international service after the Second World War. See Bush, *Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties*, 78–9; Toews, *Mennonites in American Society*, 157.

18 Philip Fountain, "Development Things: A Case of Canned Meat," *Sites: A Journal of Social Anthropology and Cultural Studies* 11.1 (2014a): 39–73.

MCC's Agricultural Programs in Indonesia

MCC initiated its first programs in Indonesia in the immediate post-war period beginning with relief work in North Sumatra in 1948. Soon after, however, MCC shifted its focus to the Muria region of Central Java. This facilitated cooperation between MCC and the (at the time) two Indonesian Mennonite churches: *Gereja Injili di Tanah Jawa* (GITJ) and *Gereja-Gereja Kristen Muria Indonesia* (GKMI).[19] In its early years in Indonesia MCC's programs were varied and diverse including medical care, distribution of material aid (including canned meat) and education.

This section describes agricultural projects that MCC carried out in its first three decades in Indonesia. During this time agriculture was frequently—and given the rural backgrounds of many MCC volunteers it might also be said naturally—a component of MCC programming, even though the politics and practice of agriculture changed considerably over time. But while these shifts might be glossed as tending toward greater levels of expert technical interventions, they were not without tensions and reversals. This was because although some development technocrats have imagined agriculture as a matter of national nutrition and calorie indexes, employment and population distribution, the farming imaginations of many Mennonites were profoundly shaped through the relational experience of community and faith (if also increasing mechanization). These tensions over competing agricultural imaginaries were never resolved, but rather took different expressions at different times.

Although Central Java eventually became the focus of MCC Indonesia's programs, a variety of other projects were initiated elsewhere in the archipelago. MCCers carried out agricultural development, material aid distribution, and health projects in Tobelo, North Maluku (1957–1966); Pakantan, North Sumatra (1971–75); and Kupang, West Timor (1955–1967). Partnership with churches, including Indonesian Mennonites and other Protestants, was important for

19 GITJ was founded in 1854 through the mission efforts of Pieter Jansz and the Dutch Mennonite church. The Dutch mission was located in the Muria region of Central Java and the missionaries focused their efforts on gaining converts among the Javanese. See Sigit Heru Soekotjo and Lawrence Yoder, *Tata Injil di Bumi Muria, Sejarah Gereja Injili di Tanah Jawa-GITJ* (Semarang, Indonesia: Pustaka Muria, 2010). GKMI began in the 1920s and was largely independent of Mennonite mission activity. It was initially composed of largely ethnic Chinese adherents. See Lawrence Yoder, *The Muria Story: A History of the Chinese Mennonite Churches of Indonesia* (Kitchner, Ontario: Pandora Press, 2006); Stefanus Haryono, "Mennonite History and Identity in Indonesia," *Mission Focus: Annual Review* 9 (2001): 62–69. See below for further discussion of GKMI's history. A third synod, Jemaat Kristen Indonesia (JKI), was formed in the 1980s from a split within GKMI.

each of these. In the case of Kupang, MCC worked closely with the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI, *Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia*) and Church World Service (CWS). These projects were part of the broader ecumenical and nationalistic effort which, at the time, was being heavily promoted among Indonesian Protestant churches.[20]

In the 1950s most MCC volunteers had rural upbringings in which agrarian life and the faith community occupied a shared domain. Many of these early volunteers also lacked professional qualifications. Opportunities for formal training in agricultural development at that time was limited, but MCC administrators also thought that Mennonites who had been brought up on the family farm would have the practical skill-sets to do the necessary work, rendering formal qualifications and technical professionalization superfluous. The first MCCers sent to Kupang in 1955 had only a vague sense of what their activities would be once they got there. Only after arriving did they find out that the local church was expecting they would primarily work in agriculture. This focus suited the Mennonites well, and various initiatives were soon under way: poultry breeding, an agricultural training center,[21] and a wide range of plant introductions leading MCC's project to become known as "*dapur Kupang*" (Kupang's kitchen) and a regional hub for vegetable production. In his unpublished report 'And Some Fell on Stony Ground…,' written in the 1980s, Duane Gingerich describes his experiences of being a Pax volunteer with MCC in Kupang.[22] Pax volunteers, he writes, did not have "impressive titles like Plant Pathologist, Agronomist, or Civil Engineer behind our names" but MCC workers all "had farm backgrounds and a knack for do-it-yourself improvisation." This amateur 'DIY' approach to farming was not a matter of academic training as much as of hard work and practical skills learned through the volunteers' own rural upbringing. MCC workers achieved results through "two parts elbow grease, one part imagination and a little common sense."[23] This became

20 Jan Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink, eds., *A History of Christianity in Indonesia* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 823–66.

21 The training center attracted some interest from the Ford Foundation, though funds never eventuated. See the letter by Glenn Zimmerly, "A Brief History of the CWS-MCC Work with the Timor Church (April 1956–1962)," 16-07-1962, MCC archives.

22 The report is in the MCC archives. The Pax program was initiated by MCC workers Calvin Redekop and Paul Peachey as an international alternative service option for conscientious objectors. The program ran from 1951 to 1976. See Urie Bender, *Soldiers of Compassion* (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1969); Calvin W. Redekop, *The Pax Story: Service in the Name of Christ 1951–1976* (Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2001).

23 MCC's farming work introduced to West Timor new varieties of tomato, cucumbers, carrots, Chinese lettuce, cabbages, green beans, peanuts, eggplant and the 'Harapan' variety

a hallmark of MCC's approach to agricultural development in its early decades in Indonesia.[24]

Other inter-institutional agricultural projects reveal wariness for engaging with large-scale development projects. *Yayasan Kerjasama Ekonomi Muria* (YAKEM; Muria Cooperative Economic Development Foundation) was the joint creation of MCC, the two Indonesian Mennonite synods, and *Europäisches Mennonitisches Evangelisationskomitee* (EMEK; European Mennonite Mission Committee).[25] The first of YAKEM's various iterations began in the late 1960s as a highly-anticipated project focused on increasing food production and basic industry.[26] The project injected foreign finance (from MCC and EMEK) in the form of investment loans that would be returned to the commission out of project earnings.[27] YAKEM came undone in 1978 when a recently appointed American MCCer independently pursued major funding from USAID for agricultural development projects in Central Java in order to significantly scale up the development work. This initiative was quickly shut down and the MCCer responsible was sent home. The abrupt closure of this program was guided by a sense that MCC should opt for more modest interventions—focused around interpersonal engagements, localized projects, and 'bottom-up' development—rather than 'Big Development' bureaucracy, with which they saw their work in tension.

In the case of YAKEM the scale of USAID funding was seen as running counter to MCC's ideals of grounded, small-scale ethical practice. MCCers had long

---

corn then recently developed by American scientists in Java. Some farmers who learned to grow these crops with the MCCers recognized Gingerich decades later when he visited the region, naming the varieties that they had introduced and the farmers were still growing. He reports that since the project closed down an "anthropologist friend" had reported to him that Harapan had become the primary corn crop in Timor. This anthropologist was almost certainly Jim Fox whose doctoral fieldwork in Kupang overlapped with Gingerich.

24 By the 1990s most MCCers in Indonesia had already completed graduate studies. In large part this reflected changing visa requirements but it was also due to the increasing requirements of MCC job descriptions, in universities and elsewhere that required professional qualifications.

25 Information on YAKEM in this section is primarily drawn from annual 'Workbook Reports' completed by MCCers during that time and now lodged in the MCC archives.

26 Early projects included an irrigation dam, a soybean processing plant, experimental mechanized rice processing, an orange orchard, and various livestock (pigs, goats, and chickens) and crop (rice) pilot projects.

27 As long as loan payments were outstanding projects remained the joint responsibility of the recipient and the Foundation. By 1970 the Foundation was operating 33 projects ranging from microfinance-style loans to some more substantial projects.

held a deep suspicion of US government funding, including from USAID. Such funding was widely regarded within MCC as imbued with imperialist and militaristic ambitions.[28] The issue of involvement with the American government was especially sensitive given the morally fraught nature of American sponsorship of development activities in Vietnam in the 1960s and 70s. Though initially working with the American government, as the war drew on MCCers emerged as outspoken critics of American policy.[29] For many in MCC, collaborating with official US development efforts—and adopting their techno-political modes of operation—was seen as an unacceptable compromise.

But avoiding Big Development bureaucracy altogether was all but impossible under the modernizing New Order regime of President Suharto (1965–1998). The developmentalist ambitions of the US government were batted away by the Mennonites, but figuring out ways to work with the increasingly powerful Indonesian state became a practical and pressing imperative. After all, various parts of the Indonesian state were able to block such basic components for MCC's work as visa access and financial flows. The state also had considerable influence over local partners. The ascendency of the New Order influenced far-ranging shifts in MCC's programming in the mid-1970s. At this point the work in Central Java effectively shut down and direct partnership with the Indonesian Mennonite synods was severed.[30]

Simultaneously, two new programs opened up. The first is the main subject of this paper and is discussed in detail further below—the church planting and agricultural development work in West Kalimantan. The second involved close cooperation with the Indonesian Department of Transmigration, through which the Indonesian government resettled people from the densely populated islands of Java and Bali to Indonesia's 'outer islands.' Transmigrants were

28 See, for example, discussion of Mennonite engagements with USAID in Richard Yoder, Calvin Redekop, and Vernon Jantzi, *Development to a Different Drummer: Anabaptist/Mennonite Experiences and Perspectives* (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2004).

29 Perry Bush, "The Political Education of Vietnam Christian Service, 1954–1975," *Peace and Change* 27.2 (2002): 198–224; Scott Flipse, "To Save 'Free Vietnam' and Lose Our Souls: The Missionary Impulse, Voluntary Agencies, and Protestant Dissent against the War, 1965–1971," in *The Foreign Missionary Enterprise at Home: Explorations in North American Cultural History*, eds. Daniel H. Bays and Grant Wacker (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2003), 214; Miller, *Wise as Serpents, Innocent as Doves?,* 38–41; David E. Leaman, "Politicized Service and Teamwork Tensions: Mennonite Central Committee in Vietnam, 1966–1969," *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 71.4 (1997): 544–70.

30 'Fraternal' church relationships continued through the unusual route of Indonesian Mennonite leadership bypassing MCC Indonesia's Country Representative so as to work directly with MCC's international office in Akron, Pennsylvania.

supported with basic assistance. Transmigration resulted in lasting demographic change in many regions of rural Indonesia. For close to 15 years MCC's partnership with the Department of Transmigration became the backbone of its operations in Indonesia.[31] In these *transmigrasi* operations MCCers worked as expert technical advisors for the government of Indonesia. They were deployed as field scientists, agricultural extension workers and project managers. Numerous reports written during this time convey the findings of technical interventions and the roll-out of credit schemes. These reports were written to a broad audience, including the Indonesian government. They deployed the discourse of modern science and bureaucratic documentation—notably devoid of discussions of faith, emotion and politics.

However, among the documents written by MCCers during this time are internal letters and reports intended only for fellow MCCers. The sharp differences between these internal reports vis-à-vis the externally-oriented documents is revealing. For example, the Annual Workbook Report for 1983 highlights tensions felt between the author's understanding of MCC's calling and the practicalities of working closely with the Indonesian state. The report includes the following (with erasures in original):

> Indonesia presents many unique challenges for MCC. The MCC unit often feels caught in the dilema [sic] of the governments [sic] secular/professional expectations of MCC—indeed it is accepted that that is the only way to hold a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society together—and the calling to be a relevant, caring and sensitive people living a simple uncomplicated way of life among the transmigrants. Secular professionalism requires quick results, high expenditures and a job properly completed, whereas true development seldom shows quick results nor responds to a high investment of resources. A second challenge facing MCC in Indonesia is to be sensitive to the question of religious conflict. The transmigrants are largely Islamic, with few Christians among them. In a climate of increasing Islamic aspirations with fundamentalist roots, MCC Christian presence must indeed be "tasted and not heard." MCC has a rare opportunity in Indonesia of working in areas closed to other Christian agencies. We need to continuously pray, observe and evaluate and pray again.

31 MCC was involved in a number of different *transmigrasi* sites including Way Abung, Sumatra (1974–1980), Tulang Bawang, Lampung (1980–1985), Rasau Jaya, West Kalimantan (1980–1985), and Mayoa, Central Sulawesi (1985–1991). For further discussion of MCC's work on transmigration in Indonesia see: Philip Fountain, "MCC Indonesia, Transmigration and Colonialism," *Intersections: MCC theory and practice quarterly* 2.1 (2014b): 6–8.

In such internal reports friction between the Indonesian government's "secular/professional" expectations and those of an idealized MCC practice were experienced as thoroughly fraught. In so doing, a particular ethic is imagined and advanced as constitutive of Mennonite development, even if it is not always practicable. This ethic locates Mennonite interventions as "relevant, caring and sensitive" actions enacted through an embodied relationality and embedded in a small-scale, localized geography. This ethic frames Mennonite service as consisting of relational rapport, mutuality and an attempt to come alongside Indonesian counterparts.[32] In this MCC's approach is sharply contrasted with the technocratic orientation of the Indonesian state. Given the New Order's privileging of scientific knowledge, technical expertise and top-down social engineering within its ambitious modernizing and developmentalist agenda, this juxtaposition is hardly surprising.[33]

Yet even though a stark contrast is drawn between MCC and the state's respective approaches, this is not a wholesale dismissal of techno-politics. It is rather a normative promotion of a 'quiet' mode of intervention. The tension between state and Mennonite developmental imaginaries expresses a desire on the part of MCC to subsume techno-politics in the service of Mennonite faith.[34] The professionalism and expertise of state development is portrayed

32 For further discussion of the sacralization of interpersonal relationships in MCC see Fountain, "Mennonite Disaster Relief," 172–76.

33 Neither too is the contrast between the Christianity of MCC and wider arenas of Islamic and secular state practice surprising, given that New Order technocrats included those of both a 'secular' and 'Islamic' in orientation. See Stuart A. Schlegel, "Technocrats in a Muslim Society: Symbolic Community in Aceh," in *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?,* ed. Gloria Davis (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1979), 232–48. For further discussion of the New Order's technocratic approach to development (and also religion) see also: Tania Murray Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 61–95; John James McDougall, "The Technocrat's Ideology of Modernity," in *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?* ed. Gloria Davis (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1979), 156–84; R. Michael Feener, *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 263–267; and Shiraishi Takashi, "Indonesian Technocracy in Transition: A Preliminary Analysis," *Southeast Asian Studies* 3.2 (2014): 257–64.

34 For example, another case that we will not be able to discuss here as it was initiated only after the West Kalimantan work, which is the central focus of this paper, is that of the decade-long partnership with a state agricultural university in West Papua. Beginning in the mid-1990s, MCCers were seconded to Cenderawasih University, Manokwari to engage in rural development work, including agricultural extension, community-built water engineering, health and education. The education work included lecturing and also organizing the *Pengabdian Pada Masyarakat* (PPM; Community Service Unit) program of

as distinct and ultimately less important than the grounded relationality that they view as essential to effect "true" change and improvements in people's lives. The rapid, expensive, and results-oriented methods of New Order development are also seen as contributing to their compromised effectiveness. The actual practice of Mennonite development was not, of course, a simple matter of MCC autonomously forming, ordering and implementing its own priorities. Rather it was negotiated in the course of an entirely unequal tug-of-war with the (powerful, though by no means hegemonic or unchallengeable) Indonesian state, which had its own designs on using MCC to further its developmentalist project.

Developing West Kalimantan (1976–1984)

As the preceding discussion of statist versus quietist techno-politics illustrates, while MCCers necessarily had to negotiate with the Indonesian state, they sought to conduct development through a distinct Mennonite modality. This included combining agricultural development with church work. We have already discussed the former. In terms of the latter, it is important to note at the outset that MCCers have tended to identify their organization as a "church agency that does not plant churches"; a statement that simultaneously establishes an intimate sense of MCC being a part of the church and also distances MCC from evangelistic practices.[35] The project in West Kalimantan drew upon and reconfigured this framing, just as it drew upon and reconfigured MCC's history of agricultural development.

The combining of church and development work brought about complex negotiations within MCC and also with its partners. Development partnerships are always permeated with ambiguity. For partnership to be seen as compelling there must be a degree of difference between the partners that presents itself to both sides as a strategic advantage in collaborations. But partnership also implies some degree of overlapping interests as the necessary basis of collaboration. These tensions between congruence and disjuncture are irresolvable,

---

the university. There are some striking parallels with MCC's programs in Manokwari and the work in West Kalimantan. In both locations MCC carried out long-term programs in remote, marginalized, and highly sensitive regions where few other agencies were permitted to operate. In Manokwari MCC was able to do so because it partnered with a government university which helped facilitate access. Some kind of collaboration with the state was understood as necessary to furnish opportunities for quiet accompaniment.

35 The quotation is from Ray Brubacher, "A Missiology for MCC," *Intercom* 35.9 (1991): 8.

which is both the source of its productive power and a significant source of risk.

MCC's primary partner in West Kalimantan was PIPKA Foundation (Yayasan Pekabaran Injil dan Pelayanan Kasih, the Gospel Evangelism and Service Foundation). PIPKA is the mission board of GKMI, one of the Indonesian Mennonite synods. It was founded in 1965, and although loosely modeled on North American Mennonite predecessors, it was not subservient to them. Indeed, GKMI has been marked by a pronounced independence from both Dutch and North American Mennonite churches, having been founded with only limited influences from foreign missionaries and being endowed with successive competent and capable leaders. Initially primarily an Indonesian Chinese diasporic church, GKMI has expanded to include diverse ethnic groups.[36] PIPKA drew upon and further enhanced this ethnic diversity. PIPKA had an explicit church planting and evangelistic agenda, though it also engaged in charitable activities. It shared GKMI's independent spirit and it was precisely this combination of confident autonomy and theological 'holism' which MCC leadership in Indonesia found compelling. These features also attracted North American volunteers. Around six or seven PIPKA families were sent to work on the project during this period.[37] A Javanese man led the entire PIPKA and MCC team, and other team members included Christians from Bali, Ambon, Sulawesi, Sumatra, and other parts of Kalimantan.

During its work in West Kalimantan MCC also partnered with a North American mission board. This partnership is unique in the history of MCC's work in Indonesia. Within North American Mennonite organizational infrastructure mission boards are mandated by specific conferences (sub-groupings of churches traditionally geographically located) with a theological mandate for evangelistic practices. As with PIPKA, mission boards frequently engage in social services, though often at a scale overshadowed by MCC's projects. Because MCC is an inter-Mennonite organization composed of constituency groups with differing theologies of ritual and practice, MCC has not been

36 The church was founded by Chinese businessman Tee Siem Tat, a *kretek* (clove cigarette) manufacturer in the city of Kudus, and his wife Sie Djoen Nio in the 1920s. Early influences on the movement included the Roman Catholic school where they sent their children, Salvation Army officers, and Dutch Reformed and Mennonite missionaries. Up until 1958 the group was called *Chineeseche Doopsgezinde Christengemeente*. Former MCC administrators have discussed in interviews how thoroughly intimidated they were in their interactions with capable and confident GKMI leaders. On the history of GKMI see Yoder, *The Muria Story*; Haryono, "Mennonite History and Identity in Indonesia."

37 While MCC's work in the area closed in 1984, PIPKA continues to finance workers in the area, including pastors and midwives among others.

mandated to undertake church planting. This is not a rigid disavowal of evangelistic practice—ambiguities are present in MCC's self-representation over this question—but it is an influential institutional demarcation. In West Kalimantan MCC worked together with Eastern Mennonite Board of Missions and Charities (EMBMC), the mission board of Lancaster Mennonite Conference, Pennsylvania. This partnership was important in legitimating and enabling a specifically evangelistic agenda.

'An Adventure in Overcoming Past Divisions'

The enterprise was envisioned and framed by MCC, PIPKA, and EMBMC as holistic and comprehensive. Consecutive MCC Annual Reports for Indonesia over the mid 1970s frame the partnership with PIPKA as engaging in the 'total witness' of the church through a 'comprehensive' engagement across spiritual, educational, agricultural, and health sectors.[38] These reports tend to diminish a sense of difference between evangelism and development, and between MCC, PIPKA and EMBMC in order to emphasize collaborative partnership.

A 1976 MCC press release intended for North American Mennonite audiences justifies MCC's proposed work in West Kalimantan in terms of both spiritual and material need in ways that reflect broader missiological trends of that time.[39] The GKMI synod chair is quoted as saying: "We believe that God is calling us to evangelize these needy people. We know that if we launch into new work there we are to do a comprehensive evangelism, to be concerned with a person in his totality." In the same press release the MCC Country Representative in Indonesia reiterates this:

> Much of the people's physical suffering and inability to improve their livelihood is closely related to the spiritual powers which control every aspect of their daily activity… For these people to accept the gospel means that a power greater than all others had come to free them from the oppressive restraints of the spirituality powers [sic] they have always known. This revolution of the power structure with Jesus Christ now at the top frees them from fears which formerly prevented them from breaking away from traditional ways in all areas of life from agriculture to

38 For more detailed discussion of these reports, see Fountain, "Blurring Mission and Development," 149–51.

39 MCC News Service, "Indonesian Mennonites Expand Outreach," MCC Archives (Akron, PA), May 21, 1976.

> cleanliness and nutrition. Therefore, the plan is to carry on a spiritual and development ministry in a complementary fashion.

Another MCC News Service report announced: "It is an adventure in overcoming past divisions and pulling together evangelism and service."[40]

The 1977 MCC Indonesia Annual Report and Program Plan provides details on what this 'comprehensive,' 'holistic,' and 'total' missional approach would look like.[41] Perceived needs were demarcated into four domains: 'religious-spiritual,' 'socio-economic,' 'health' and 'educational.' The report locates Dayak backwardness in each of these areas as justification for intervention, thereby deploying the technocratic language of development-as-progress in both church planting and social service:

> As with other Dayak ethnic groups, the groups in this area are very backward in almost all aspects of their life, e.g.:
> 1. The religious-spiritual side; generally animist
> 2. The socio-economic side; very low (below the line of absolute poverty)
> 3. The health side; they give little attention to personal health
> 4. Educational side; Most of the people including children are illiterate
>
> Remembering these facts PIPKA enters this area with the goal of helping the people in these four aspects of their lives.

A series of 'objectives' are then outlined under each of the four headings. The "field of evangelism" includes the overall goal: "Form mature congregation/churches for the Lord in the circle of the Muria synod." This involved planning to work in ten or more villages in the Kapuas Hulu area. Of these two or three villages were to be selected "as a kind of pilot project in ministry (i.e. worked in a more intensive way in the four areas mentioned above)." The category "socio-economic community development" included a particular focus on "agricultural work of an exploratory nature" that would help "the community" to "produce enough food of adequate nutritional value" and also diversification of income sources. A further task here was to "prepare development cadres" to work in the agricultural sector. While MCC and PIPKA were to play supporting roles, the responsibility was to be firmly entrusted to the villages themselves:

---

40 MCC News Service, "Partnership in Obedience Characterizes Kalimantan Team," MCC Archives (Akron, PA), August 19, 1977.

41 Mennonite Central Committee Indonesia, "Annual Report and Program Plans—MCC Indonesia," MCC Archives, 1977. All quotations in this paragraph are from this source.

"These village development efforts are executed by the people themselves with support from PIPKA with aid and personnel for a limited period of time." The health sector involved "preventative" and "curative" measures aimed toward imparting of information and personal "demonstrations" about "cleanliness" and the provision of medicines to those who could not afford them. The final goal, education, was focused on literacy to: "Help the community (especially children) to be able to read and write."

The pursuit of 'holistic mission' was, at this time, gaining traction among evangelical and other Protestant communities in North America.[42] This was partly due to changes within liberal or ecumenical Christianity, which along with evangelicalism formed the dominant groups within the 'two-party system' of twentieth-century North American Protestantism.[43] The declining vigor of liberal missionary movements, which had privileged social and technical interventions, opened new spaces for conservative Protestant social action, enabling the rapid growth and proliferation of conservative Protestant missionary and development organizations after the Second World War. For them, 'holism' largely consisted of adding so-called social work to prior emphasis on proclamation evangelism.[44] New ideas and models prompted extensive debate in the missionaries' home contexts. These new discussions of holism also reflected an evolutionary view of human social development ascendant in those years. This was, furthermore, strongly resonant with New Order projections of Indonesia as having a civilized center and unruly outlying areas often populated by minority ethnic groups (such as the Kantu' Dayak), in need of intervention. In such regions, adoption of an officially recognized religion served as a marker of full humanity and citizenship, along with socio-political recognition by the state.

While the program was envisioned as total and holistic, the division itself between religion and development goals actually served to reinscribe the separations it purported to overcome. This process of compartmentalizing different objects into separate spheres, each with their distinct goals and targets, is itself

42 See C. René Padilla, "Evangelism and Social Responsibility: From Wheaton '66 to Wheaton '83," *Transformation* 2.3 (1985): 27–33.

43 On ecumenical Christianity, including extensive discussion of its social engagement, see David Hollinger, "After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Ecumenical Protestantism and the Modern American Encounter with Diversity," *The Journal of American History* 98.1 (2011): 21–48. On the liberal Christian missionary movement see Klassen's outstanding study titled *Spirits of Protestantism: Medicine, Healing, and Liberal Christianity* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011).

44 On 'holism' see Erica Bornstein, *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 45–66.

a crucial feature of modern techno-politics. Only through such distinctions and separations is a total project imaginable and implementable. But having demarcated the targets into separate domains, the question was *how* they would be brought together. In fact, within the team there was a clear division of labor with some focused more on church or 'spiritual' matters and others on development tasks. The combining and dividing of mission and development tasks was an ongoing and volatile process.

These negotiations were highlighted in a letter by Claire Fast, an MCC medical doctor based in Central Java at Tayu Hospital, who reported on her brief visit in 1978 to assess the health needs of the Kapuas Hulu area.[45] Fast detected tensions among the group of missionaries, citing a "broadening gap" between team members:

> Another thing I learned on the trip and that is that there is a broadening gap between evangelism and works. The missionaries are not trained to do anything but preach and the practical workers are not trained to do anything but heal, teach and so on. The preachers look down on the practical workers because (1) of their training in schools that play down the 'works,' (2) they feel so helpless about the social problems because they haven't been trained to deal with them, and would feel guilty if they became trained. The professionals in the field of social problems on the other hand are kept so busy with their work that they leave the spiritual problems to the preachers. Most of them are also not trained to handle spiritual problems or to evangelise. Those who are trained or could do evangelism are often not asked to help because they aren't expected to have any spiritual concern for the people they work with. All this stereotyping has the effect of unnecessary friction, professional jealousy and ineffective programs. The bad thing is that we have passed on these prejudices to the people here. The Javanese are basically people who are concerned about the welfare of others. Although this concern is sometimes limited to their family circle, the idea of helping others in need is there. This is especially true for the villagers. To down-grade this quality is very unfortunate.

Fast's letter is intentionally vague over details and skirts around some delicate interpersonal politics. Nevertheless, according to Fast, by 1978 a pronounced division of labor had already taken place that cut across the grain of holism.

45 All personal names are pseudonyms.

It was within these fraught tensions between compartmentalization and holism that MCCers carried out their work in West Kalimantan. These activities of the MCCers are the focus of the following section. In concluding this discussion it is pertinent to note that of all the activities carried out under the auspices of MCC in Kapuas Hulu undoubtedly the most successful was that of church planting. Within only a short period after arriving in the area, MCCers and PIPKA workers were baptizing large numbers of Kantu' in rituals of mass baptism.[46] The 'adventure in overcoming past divisions,' despite itself, achieved some remarkable outcomes.

Quietist Techno-politics

Two couples—Peter and Mary Burkholder and Amos and Emma Hunziker—were recruited by EMBMC and MCC for the project in West Kalimantan.[47] All four had been brought up in rural Mennonite communities, with Peter's family owning their own family farm. Both couples had previously worked with EMBMC in Vietnam and they were recruited to join in the Kapuas Hulu project in part because of this, including their ability to 'rough it' in basic rural tropical conditions. In West Kalimantan the American and Indonesian workers lived in locally-built stilt-houses or in a *bandung*, a sixteen-meter-long and four-meter-wide houseboat, purchased with MCC funds.[48] Their work in Kalimantan followed scouting visits by PIPKA workers which had resulted in invitations from local communities. Residents of each of the villages they worked in knew that they were both church and development workers. Although taking on different roles within the overall program what is most notable about all four American missionaries was their common quietist approach to their work.

The MCC workers came to Indonesia with a particular model—what we are calling a quietist techno-politics—in mind of how their work should be carried

46 For example, on Easter morning in 1979 Peter and Mary Burkholder baptized 40 villagers in Desa Enkabang, including two headmen and 15 heads of families with their wives and teenage children. At least 198 people were baptised during 1979 alone. See: MCC News Service, "Whom Should We Baptize?" MCC Archives (Akron, PA), June 8, 1979.; Marion Keeney Preheim, "The Right Place: Doing the Right Thing," MCC News Service (Akron, PA), November 23, 1979.

47 The information included in this section is drawn from interviews with Laura Yoder in November 2015 and also from sources from the MCC archives.

48 The *bandung* enabled team members to rotate their presence and work among various riverside villages as access to the villages was, at that time, only by river boat or small aircraft.

out. Models are replicable or imitable examples which serve as guides for other contexts. An emphasis on modeling, pilot projects, blueprints and prototypes has been central to the techno-politics of development since its early post-war origins.[49] Mission too has been deeply influenced by model thinking. The MCCers saw their project as conforming to a model of mission and as itself operating as a model for others. In turn, the MCCers became framed as such by PIPKA and GKMI leaders who saw their involvement as providing a model—an "inspiration"—for Indonesian church members who were hesitant to embark on mission in 'backwards,' remote, rural places like Kapuas Hulu.

The shaping of the American MCCers model of mission took place during their time in Vietnam. EMBMC in Vietnam combined a range of social service, including English-language teaching, and church-related tasks through a paradigm of "presence theology." Neither couple was designated as church planters in Vietnam, although Peter Burkholder did some Bible teaching in English and a small fellowship emerged at Saigon University from their work. They described their approach as "not aggressive," but rather "invitational" and "relationship-building." The Burkholders were acutely concerned with the ethics of undertaking mission in a setting dominated by American war-making. They sought to distance themselves from the archetypal "ugly American." This included an ideological critique of Western colonialism and an embrace of post-colonial reconfigurations of transnational missional relationships. These features had an enduring effect on their understanding of what their work in West Kalimantan should look like.

In Indonesia Amos and Emma Hunziker did not see themselves as evangelists but rather as "nutrition and agricultural development" workers; they differentiated this (with some enduring ambiguity) from the Burkholders who, they said, were "church planters." Amos carried out agricultural extension work and Emma worked on maternal health, including compiling data on baby weights using UNICEF guidelines and metrics. Nevertheless, despite seeing themselves primarily as development workers, PIPKA and GKMI leaders expected the Hunzikers to "contribute to … the overall church planting kind of thing." This was clearly conveyed to Amos during their initial three-month PIPKA training course in Jakarta when he was told by PIPKA leaders that he was going to be a "great preacher." Even so, Amos and Emma continued to see their work largely in terms of MCC's service mandate.

In between their years in Vietnam and their assignment to West Kalimantan, the Hunzikers lived in Ithaca, NY, home to Cornell University and Ithaca

49 On development modeling see Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 43–71.

College. Emma undertook studies in anthropology and nutrition and Amos studied multiple facets of international agriculture, including working with Milton Barnett in the Department of Rural Sociology and H. David Thurston in Plant Pathology.[50] The Cornell connection was not accidental. Between 1930 and 1960, the Cornell School for Missionaries provided short courses for Protestant missionaries on furlough. Building on a growing reputation as a leader in agricultural and botanical sciences, as well as rural sociology and home economics, the School's courses focused on training missionaries in "technical knowledge about agriculture."[51] The School also taught classes in nutrition, family life, human development, home economics, sanitation and the principles of mission work. This was part of a "unique historical moment" in which Cornell professors and missionaries came to the conclusion that "the conditions of human life could only be improved through spreading the Christian religion and modern science."[52] Many of the missionaries were conducting their work in Asia. Mennonite connections with Cornell built upon these connections, and were reinforced by ongoing Mennonite affiliations. Over multiple decades, generations of Mennonite missionaries and MCC workers received training at Cornell. The Hunzikers' time at Cornell therefore was part of a broader and well-trod Mennonite training route in technical aspects of development. After being appointed to their assignment in West Kalimantan, but while still awaiting their visas, the Hunzikers read widely in the anthropology of Iban and Kantu' society in the well-sourced Cornell University Southeast Asian Library. They specifically noted reading recently published work by anthropologists Derek Freeman and Michael Dove, both of whom greatly influenced their understanding of Dayak culture prior to arriving in Indonesia.[53]

50 Milton 'Milt' Barnett was an anthropologist who had previously worked with the Agricultural Development Council (ADC), run by the Rockefeller Foundation, and had lived and worked in China, Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia.

51 Kevin M. Lowe, *Baptized with the Soil: Christian Agrarians and the Crusade for Rural America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 55–60.

52 Anna Schatz, "Fixing Family Problems around the World: Home Economics at the Cornell School for Missionaries," (lecture, College of Human Ecology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, October 2, 2013).

53 In the late 1940s Freeman, a New Zealand anthropologist, began almost three years of fieldwork among the Iban in Malaysian Sarawak, for which he was awarded his doctorate from Cambridge University in 1953. Over the next two decades Freeman produced numerous influential reports on Iban society and culture. Dove completed two years of fieldwork among the Kantu' of West Kalimantan in the mid-1970s and began publishing soon after. His doctorate, awarded in 1981 from Stanford University, examined Kantu' subsistence agriculture.

The Burkholders explained that the title of 'church planters' was conferred upon them: "PIPKA had asked for church planters, so that was us." Peter certainly taught the Bible (primarily through storytelling), though Mary's work ran parallel to Emma's focus on maternal and infant health, including compiling baby weight data. Mary had studied Biology and Elementary Education at a Mennonite college, where Peter had also majored in Biology and Bible. After their three years in Vietnam, Peter spent a further year studying Anthropology in an international development education program. He had also taken a few classes at Fuller Theological Seminary which exposed him to 1970s missionary anthropology and research on 'animism,' including the work of Canadian Don Richardson.[54] In Indonesia, Peter was referred to as '*Pendeta*' (pastor, minister) or '*Guru Injil*' (gospel teacher).[55]

In many ways, and perhaps not incidentally given their anthropological training, the Hunzikers' and Burkholders' experiences in West Kalimantan can be seen as epitomizing the 1970s anthropological ideal of long-term ethnographic fieldwork. Living in stilt huts, learning the local Kantu' language, accompanying villagers to their fields and in their ritual ceremonies were all part of everyday life for the duration of their service. This immersive experience was joined with an interventionary agenda to instigate social change, which also was a prominent feature of 1970s anthropology, in which cultural learning was seen as facilitating more meaningful and less traumatic modernization. Rather than at cross-purposes with the social sciences, Mennonite mission and development drew upon cultural and applied anthropology in their predilection for a "Small is Beautiful" version of development. The mission and development work ran parallel, therefore, in their shared pedagogic intent. Importantly, both the Hunzikers and Burkholders, despite their different orientations and

54 Fuller's School of World Mission opened in 1965 and Alan Tippett, an Australian anthropologist, was the first full time faculty member. Charles Kraft, a member of the Brethren Church, an Anabaptist group, and an influential scholar in missionary anthropology, joined Fuller in 1969. Paul Hiebert, a Mennonnite Brethren professor of anthropology, became a Fuller faculty member in 1977. Fuller was the only American university offering a doctoral program in missiology in the 1970s. Don Richardson had carried out missionary work among the Sawi in Papua from 1962–1977. His *Peace Child*, which posited his theory that tribal cultures have "redemptive analogies" that can facilitate the transmission of Christian truth, was published in 1975, a highly influential book in missionary anthropology. From 1977 Richardson was based at the US Center for World Mission in Pasadena, California, which is located in the same town as Fuller's campus. See Don Richardson, *Peace Child: An Unforgettable Story of Primitive Jungle Treachery in the 20th Century* (Ventura, CA: Regal Books, 1975).

55 Amos was also referred to as 'Pendeta' in correspondence in the MCC archives.

concerns, continually 'rendered relational' their plans and approaches.[56] Even when their initiatives were technically inclined, relational dynamics remained prominent.

A sense of the everyday work of the Hunzikers is fleshed out in an MCC News Service article, composed by a home office writer for a North American audience.[57] Villagers often "drop by" to sit and chat with the Hunzikers in their house, and much of their day is simply spent talking. In their *ruang tamu* (guest room) the Hunzikers made use of this visiting to display posters aimed at helping "disseminate new ideas," including one which "shows a boy, obviously healthy, surrounded by the seven basic foods" and another with "a photo of a high class Indonesian woman breastfeeding her baby." "Along with his Bible teaching and worship services" Amos also provided "short agricultural sessions" intended to provide extra nutrition in villagers' diets. These frequently employed illustrations, such as scientific diagrams of peanut plants or pictures showing the "proper spacing" between plants for newly introduced plant varieties.[58] Amos operated his own pilot garden where he further illustrated new methods and he also visited farmers' fields to give suggestions for "bettering their yield," such as the introduction of a spray program for integrated pest management, since pesticide use at that point had met with only limited success. Emma's baby weighing program similarly became an opportunity to teach mothers about good nutrition, such as the necessity of a balanced diet with sufficient protein.

When asked about his most significant experience in West Kalimantan, Amos noted a failed coffee project. He had sought to encourage farmers to adopt coffee as a possible cash crop to provide financial resources beyond the largely subsistence economy. However, he had made sure to design the project so that the villagers themselves had not risked debt or adverse reactions if the

56 "Rendered relational" is reworked from Li, *The Will to Improve*, 123–55. The practice of "rendering relational" is explored in more depth in Philip Fountain, "Orienting Guesthood in the Mennonite Central Committee, Indonesia," in *Inside the Everyday Lives of Development Workers: The Challenges and Futures of Aidland,* eds. Anne-Meike Fechter and Heather Hindman (Sterling, VA, Kumarian Press, 2011), 83–106.

57 Preheim, "The Right Place: Doing the Right Thing."

58 The same article also indicates that some time after MCC staff members had been living in a village, the villagers decided that "the teaching for nutrition and health and agriculture" was to be conducted during Sunday morning church service. This education slot was placed alongside other announcements. Lessons introduced during this time included short classes on boiling water, eating nutritional greens, and chicken vaccinations. These lessons were part of the church service itself, taking place before the concluding benediction.

project failed. While the project did indeed fail to produce the desired results, Amos was glad that none of the villagers suffered as a consequence.

Peter Burkholder's preaching was similarly mindful to 'do no harm.' Shaped by recent developments in missiology, including especially the popularity of a minimalist interpretative framework as reflected in Vincent Donovan's classic work *Christianity Rediscovered*, Peter focused on narrating biblical narratives without extensive exegesis.[59] The goal was to leave interpretation largely to the Kantu' themselves. Although some PIPKA mission workers were less reticent in critiquing cultural practices, Peter's own approach was not to adjudicate on questions of what should or should not be allowed after communities decided to accept Christianity. This narrative approach was not a move against evangelism, but rather was Peter's attempt to avoid dictating the forms in which Kantu' Christianity would emerge. Peter's evangelism and Amos' agriculture thus both conformed to a similar quietist ethics in that they pursued a model of engagement which sought to avoid coercive, top-down impositions while still seeking transformative effects. This ethics was also a techno-politics, even in its more missional guise, in that it was deeply shaped by model thinking, modern compartmentalization, and practical deployment of academic knowledge.

Conclusion

MCC's work in West Kalimantan took place within the context of the pervasive influence of New Order modernization, a political and technological project of far-reaching social reconstruction. As in other Mennonite farming and missional initiatives in Indonesia throughout the twentieth century, the techno-politics of the state was an influential factor. However, while MCC's interventions in West Kalimantan were configured in relation to the state in complex ways, they were not solely dictated by state imperatives. Instead, Mennonite initiatives in mission and agriculture, church planting and modernization, took place in and through complex negotiations among shifting North American Mennonite identities, and the postcolonial aspirations of local partners, as well as the backgrounds, educational experiences, dispositions, and theologies of the missionaries/development workers themselves.[60] Thus, in addition to recognizing the macro ambitions of statist projects, it is also necessary to examine the ways in which modernization was enacted and imagined, and reworked, at microsital scales. In this chapter we have examined

59 Vincent Donovan, *Christianity Rediscovered* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978).

60 The aspirations of the Kantu' were also, of course, influential. However, as already outlined, this paper focuses on the missionaries/development workers.

a Mennonite quietist techno-politics as one such creative reconfiguring of development, and in conclusion we would like to highlight three points arising out of this case.

The first is that while MCC reports envisaged the West Kalimantan endeavor to be one of engaging in 'holistic' Christian mission, the attempt to bring together service and evangelism proved a complex matter to put into practice. It isn't that these concerns occupy different ontological domains such that mixing them is to risk dangerous alchemy.[61] Rather, the institutional and discursive demarcations between church planting and development work had real-world political effects that were not easily overcome by the architects of MCC's work in Kalimantan. The separation of "evangelism" and "works" into different "objectives" and "fields," the differentiation of tasks among the team (against some striking Kantu' inclinations for non-difference), and some contestation between team members and organizational leaders over which domain should have priority, all point to the enduring moral force of modern categories for defining projects of transformative intervention. These categories, which were techno-political insofar as they assumed a division of domains with each rendered amenable to distinct goals and targets, continued to exert considerable power even in contexts in which everyday practice necessitated a considerable degree of 'blurring.'

The quietist techno-politics of Mennonite interventions were shaped by distinctive Mennonite theological concerns. Our second point is that these concerns did not dictate particular trajectories, but rather served to guide them through the navigation of diverse contexts. Rural Mennonite society in North America has located agriculture as a privileged domain of faith and community, as well as an inherently valuable practice for providing nutrition and security. This privileging infused MCC practices in Indonesia and ensured an enduring and unique prominence for agriculture in MCC's international programs throughout most of the last seven decades. The ways this agriculture was rendered relational, imagined as a medium for the communication of faith, and deployed with minimal state intervention can also be seen as imbuing Mennonite theological and ecclesial emphases. This quiet ethics is a distinctively Mennonite mode of intervention.[62]

61 For a critique of contemporary pejorative discourses of proselytization see Philip Fountain, "Proselytizing Development," in *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development*, ed. Emma Tomalin (London: Routledge, 2015), 80–97.

62 Though, of course, it was never without internal contestation with other contrasting Mennonite visions and 'moral ambitions.' Cf. Omri Elisha, *Moral Ambition: Mobilization and Social Outreach in Evangelical Megachurches* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011).

Finally, while the case study of MCCers in West Kalimantan might be viewed as a rather marginal concern in relation to broader trends in Asian techno-politics, we would argue that it is valuable for assessing the extents to which developmentalist visions both permeated and were negotiated in local contexts. Circulations of people, ideas, and technologies from elsewhere had significant effects, even in far-flung places. Connections with Cornell's rural sociology and missionary anthropology are particularly revealing about the wide-ranging technicalization and professionalization of missionary practice in the 1970s. MCC workers were incorporated into a powerful set of ideas about how to institute change that reconfigured their imaginations, even as they sought to reconfigure techno-politics according to a distinctively Mennonite ethic. The use of checklists and quantitative data collection is one such example of the influence of techno-political framings. Modern science from American universities—and this included the anthropological imagination predominant in the 1970s which saw itself as ancillary to the modernizing agenda—was reworked into Mennonite missional practices in remote regions of the Indonesian Archipelago. The study of Mennonite techno-politics is thus also an investigation into the ways global forms of academic knowledge has become an integral component of missions of development.

Bibliography

Abeysekara, Ananda. "The Saffron Army, Violence, Terror(ism): Buddhism, Identity, and Difference in Sri Lanka." *Numen* 48.1 (2001): 1–46.

Aragon, Lorraine. *Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christianity, and State Development in Indonesia*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000.

Aritonang, Jan and Karel Steenbrink, eds. *A History of Christianity in Indonesia*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

Asad, Talal. *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Bender, Urie. *Soldiers of Compassion*. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1969.

Bornstein, Erica. *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Brubacher, Ray. "A Missiology for MCC." *Intercom* 35.9 (1991): 8.

Bush, Perry. *Two Kingdoms, Two Loyalties: Mennonite Pacifism in Modern America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Bush, Perry. "The Political Education of Vietnam Christian Service, 1954–1975." *Peace and Change* 27.2 (2002): 198–224.

Cullather, Nick. *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Donovan, Vincent. *Christianity Rediscovered*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978.

Elisha, Omri. *Moral Ambition: Mobilization and Social Outreach in Evangelical Megachurches*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011.

Feener, R. Michael. *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Feener, R. Michael, Philip Fountain, and Robin Bush. "Outlook: Research on Religion and Development." In *Religion and the Politics of Development*, edited by Philip Fountain, R. Michael Feener, and Robin Bush, 243–45. New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2015.

Flipse, Scott. "To Save 'Free Vietnam' and Lose Our Souls: The Missionary Impulse, Voluntary Agencies, and Protestant Dissent against the War, 1965–1971." In *The Foreign Missionary Enterprise at Home: Explorations in North American Cultural History*, edited by Daniel H. Bays and Grant Wacker, 206–22. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2003.

Fountain, Philip. "Orienting Guesthood in the Mennonite Central Committee, Indonesia." In *Inside the Everyday Lives of Development Workers: The Challenges and Futures of Aidland,* edited by Anne-Meike Fechter and Heather Hindman, 83–106. Sterling, VA, Kumarian Press, 2011.

Fountain, Philip. "Blurring Mission and Development in the Mennonite Central Committee." In *Mission and Development: God's Work or Good Work*, edited by Matthew Clarke, 143–166. London; Continuum, 2012.

Fountain, Philip. "The Myth of Religious NGOs: Development Studies and the Return of Religion." *International Development Policy: Religion and Development* 4 (2013a): 9–30.

Fountain, Philip. "Toward a Post-secular Anthropology." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 24.3 (2013b): 310–28.

Fountain, Philip. "Development Things: A Case of Canned Meat." *Sites: A Journal of Social Anthropology and Cultural Studies* 11.1 (2014a): 39–73.

Fountain, Philip. "MCC Indonesia, Transmigration and Colonialism." *Intersections: MCC theory and practice quarterly* 2.1 (2014b): 6–8.

Fountain, Philip. "Proselytizing Development." In *The Routledge Handbook of Religions and Global Development*, edited by Emma Tomalin, 80–97. London: Routledge, 2015.

Fountain, Philip. "Mennonite Disaster Relief and the Interfaith Encounter in Aceh, Indonesia." *Asian Ethnology* 75.1 (2016): 163–91.

Fountain, Philip and Sin Wen Lau. "Anthropological Theologies: Engagements and Encounters." *The Australian Journal of Anthropology* 24.3 (2013): 227–34.

Goossen, Benjamin. "From Aryanism to Anabaptism: Nazi Race Science and the Language of Mennonite Ethnicity." *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 90 (2016): 135–63.

Haryono, Stefanus. "Mennonite History and Identity in Indonesia." *Mission Focus: Annual Review* 9 (2001): 62–9.

Hollinger, David. "After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Ecumenical Protestantism and the Modern American Encounter with Diversity." *The Journal of American History* 98.1 (2011): 21–48.

Kauffman, J Howard and Leo Driedger. *The Mennonite Mosaic: Identity and Modernization*. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1991.

Klassen, Pamela. *Spirits of Protestantism: Medicine, Healing, and Liberal Christianity*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011.

Kniss, Fred. *Disquiet in the Land: Cultural Conflict in American Mennonite Communities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997.

Leaman, David E. "Politicized Service and Teamwork Tensions: Mennonite Central Committee in Vietnam, 1966–1969." *Mennonite Quarterly Review* 71.4 (1997): 544–70.

Li, Tania Murray. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007.

Loewen, Royden. *Family, Church, and Market: A Mennonite Community in the Old and New Worlds, 1850–1930.* Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1993.

Lowe, Kevin M. *Baptized with the Soil: Christian Agrarians and the Crusade for Rural America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

MCC News Service. "Partnership in Obedience Characterizes Kalimantan Team." MCC Archives (Akron, PA), August 19, 1977.

MCC News Service. "Whom Should We Baptize?" MCC Archives (Akron, PA), June 8, 1979.

MCC News Service. "Indonesian Mennonites Expand Outreach." MCC Archives (Akron, PA), May 21, 1976.

McDougall, John James. "The Technocrat's Ideology of Modernity." In *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?* edited by Gloria Davis, 156–184. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1979.

Mennonite Central Committee Indonesia. "Annual Report and Program Plans—MCC Indonesia." MCC Archives, Akron, PA, 1977.

Miller, Joseph S. "A History of the Mennonite Conciliation Service, International Conciliation Service, and Christian Peacemaker Teams." In *From the Ground Up: Mennonite Contributions to International Peacebuilding*, edited by Cynthia Sampson and John Paul Lederach, 3–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Miller, Keith Graber. *Wise as Serpents, Innocent as Doves? American Mennonites Engage Washington.* Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1996.

Padilla, C. René. "Evangelism and Social Responsibility: From Wheaton '66 to Wheaton '83." *Transformation* 2.3 (1985): 27–33.

Peachey, Paul. *Die Soziale Herkunft der Schweizer Täufer in der Reformationszeit: Eine Religionssoziologische Untersuchung*. Karlsruhe: Heinrich Schneider, 1954.

Philipps, Brenda. *Mennonite Disaster Service: Building a Therapeutic Community after the Gulf Coast Storms*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.

Pinto, Sarah. "Development without Institutions: Ersatz Medicine and the Politics of Everyday Life in Rural North India." *Cultural Anthropology* 19.3 (2004): 337–64.

Preheim, Marion Keeney. "The Right Place: Doing the Right Thing." MCC News Service (Akron, PA), November 23, 1979.

Redekop, Calvin W. *The Pax Story: Service in the Name of Christ 1951–1976*. Telford, PA: Pandora Press, 2001.

Regehr, T.D. *Mennonites in Canada, 1939–1970: A People Transformed*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.

Reimer, William and Bruce Guenther. "Relationships, Rights and 'Relief': Ninety Years of MCC's Integrated Response to Humanitarian Crises." In *A Table of Sharing: Mennonite Central Committee and the Expanding Networks of Mennonite Identity*, edited by Alain Epp Weaver, 353–74. Telford, PA: Cascadia, 2011.

Richardson, Don. *Peace Child: An Unforgettable Story of Primitive Jungle Treachery in the 20th Century*. Ventura, CA: Regal Books, 1975.

Schatz, Anna. "Fixing Family Problems around the World: Home Economics at the Cornell School for Missionaries." Lecture at the College of Human Ecology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, October 2, 2013. Accessed June 18, 2016. https://ecommons.cornell.edu/handle/1813/35959?show=full.

Schlegel, Stuart A. "Technocrats in a Muslim Society: Symbolic Community in Aceh." In *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?* edited by Gloria Davis, 232–48. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1979.

Soekotjo, Sigit Heru and Lawrence Yoder. *Tata Injil di Bumi Muria, Sejarah Gereja Injili di Tanah Jawa-GITJ*. Semarang, Indonesia: Pustaka Muria, 2010.

Takashi, Shiraishi. "Indonesian Technocracy in Transition: A Preliminary Analysis." *Southeast Asian Studies* 3.2 (2014): 255–81.

Toews, Paul. *Mennonites in American Society, 1930–1970: Modernity and the Persistence of Religious Community*. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1996.

Tsing, Anna L. *In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way Place*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Urry, James. *Mennonites, Politics, Peoplehood: Europe—Russia—Canada, 1525 to 1980*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2006.

Yoder, Lawrence. *The Muria Story: A History of the Chinese Mennonite Churches of Indonesia*. Kitchner, Ontario: Pandora Press, 2006.

Yoder, Richard, Calvin Redekop and Vernon Jantzi. *Development to a Different Drummer: Anabaptist/Mennonite Experiences and Perspectives*. Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2004.

CHAPTER 10

Evangelizing Entrepreneurship: Techno-Politics of Vocational Training in the Global Anti-Human Trafficking Movement

Elena Shih

In downtown Los Angeles, an industrial warehouse that once sat amidst rows of garment factories was repurposed into the venue for a high-end fashion show. The vast loading dock was professionally affixed with sound and lighting to serve as a stage for the *Freedom and Fashion* show, an annual fundraiser that aims to raise awareness about human trafficking. Since 2010, the show has drawn a crowd of several hundred participants, who convene to watch professional runway models don 'ethically produced,' 'fairly traded,' and 'slave free' products on the makeshift catwalk. Highlighting these various social enterprises, it strives to demonstrate the role that socially responsible business practices and ethical consumption can play in ending human trafficking.

The sponsoring organization is a non-profit organization dedicated to ending 'modern-day slavery,' whose organizers met through a Southern California evangelical church. Attuned to these faith-based commitments, about half of the organizations the show features are Christian social enterprises working throughout the Global South, reflecting the well-documented predominance of evangelical Christian organizations in the anti-trafficking movement.[1] Silk pajamas, cashmere scarves, canvas tote bags, and pearl necklaces represent just a sampling of items that organizations claim are made by 'survivors of sex trafficking.' Alternatively labeled 'slave free goods,' these products are sold to consumers and movement activists in the United States, generating transnational circuits of commerce, affect, and morality around the promises of freedom from enslavement and virtuous wages for former sex workers.

As the alleyway outside of the warehouse is transformed into a marketplace, where over thirty vendors sell the items that have just been shown on the runway, any glimpses of Christian faith are eclipsed by the focus on market transactions and the ambitious goal to combat human trafficking. This concrete, and I argue strategic, obfuscation of religious objectives in secular

1 Elizabeth Bernstein, "The Sexual Politics of the 'New Abolitionism,'" *differences* 18.3 (2007): 128–51; Yvonne C. Zimmerman, *Other Dreams of Freedom: Religion, Sex, and Human Trafficking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2018 | DOI 10.1163/9789004363106_011

anti-trafficking environments, allows evangelical Christian organizations to be indistinct from the hundreds of other global anti-trafficking organizations that have come into existence since 2000.

In relation to the theme of this volume on religion and the techno-politics of development, this chapter examines vocational training programs that teach Asian sex workers jewelry-making skills as a strategy for sex trafficking rehabilitation. Jewelry is just one of the numerous commodities sold as part of the anti-human trafficking movement as part of a concerted attempt to leverage the marketplace to raise funds and awareness about the issue of sex trafficking. Vocational training, in this case the skill of making jewelry, is marketed as a technical solution that brings global development goals around human trafficking into sharp focus, while obscuring the equally present faith-based objectives of missionary work and the abolition of prostitution. Drawing on forty months of ethnographic fieldwork across faith-based and secular sites of the anti-human trafficking movement in China, Thailand, and the US, this chapter explores two American evangelical human trafficking rescue projects in Beijing and Bangkok as well as sites of consumer activism in Los Angeles as part of broader trends linking Christian social movements with development goals and capitalist enterprise. This chapter argues that the mission of anti-trafficking rescue is enacted through the corollary goals of salvific evangelism and social entrepreneurship.

Evangelical Missions of Sex Trafficking Abolition

Evangelical Christianity has been a foundational bedrock of the American anti-trafficking movement and has provided significant financial support and human resources to anti-trafficking causes. As Yvonne Zimmerman has detailed, the 2000 US Trafficking Victim's Protection Act (TVPA) and subsequent US anti-trafficking policies were scripted with an explicitly conservative Christian moral framework as their backdrop.[2] For instance, the TVPA sparked the creation of the White House Faith-Initiative on Human Trafficking, which awarded 15 percent of federal funds to Christian organizations. The establishment of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives targeted religious leaders to intervene in human trafficking work because of an underlying belief that "religiously based moral certainty that trafficking is wrong … automatically translates into effective anti-trafficking strategies and programs."[3] Global efforts to combat human trafficking are remarkable in the extent to which they

2 Zimmerman, *Other Dreams of Freedom.*

3 Ibid., 91.

prioritize religious interventions in traditionally secular policy realms. This emphasis even translates into inclusion in international organization meetings. For instance, the 2007 UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking convened a forum of 125 religious leaders to discuss solutions to human trafficking.[4]

Bernstein and Zimmerman have argued that the TVPA reflects conservative sexual politics that have been uniformly folded into US trafficking policy.[5] In particular, the prioritization of an anti-sex trafficking agenda is partly governed by funding allocations to specific counter-trafficking programs; for example, the "anti-prostitution pledge" prevented any organization that advocates for sex worker rights, health, and safety—as opposed to the abolition and exit from sex work—from receiving USAID financial assistance.[6]

The conservative posture towards sex work has generated a focus on sex trafficking as distinct from labor trafficking. For example, the majority of US Victims of Human Trafficking Visas (T-Visas) have been made available to victims of *sex* trafficking, despite ongoing research that concludes that cases of non-sexual labor trafficking far exceed those of sex trafficking.[7] Following extensive critique from researchers, journalists and US government regulatory mechanisms like the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the language and practice of the TVPA have shifted over the past decade to focus equally on non-sexual forms of labor exploitation, in addition to sex trafficking.[8]

---

4 Sarabeth Harrelson, "Mavericks or Allies: The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in the Anti-Trafficking Movement" (presentation, Second Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking, University of Nebraska, September 30—October 2, 2010).

5 Elizabeth Bernstein, "Introduction to Special Issue: Sexual Commerce and the Global Flow of Bodies, Desires, and Social Policies," *Sexuality Research & Social Policy* 5.4 (2008): 1–5; Zimmerman, *Other Dreams of Freedom.*

6 N.F. Masenior and C. Beyrer, "The US Anti-Prostitution Pledge: First Amendment Challenges and Public Health Priorities," *PLoS Med* 4.7 (2007): 1158–161.; Edith C. Kinney, "Appropriations for the Abolitionists: Undermining Effects of the U.S. Mandatory Anti-Prostitution Pledge in the Fight Against Human Trafficking and HIV/AIDS," *Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice* 21 (2006): 158–94.

7 Sex worker rights activists and advocates globally challenge the explicit focus on turning to labor trafficking because commercial sex is still not recognized as a form of legal work, with needs ranging from wage regulations, benefits and to occupational safety. Laura María Agustín, *Sex at the Margins: Migration, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry* (London: Zed Books, 2007).

8 United States Government Accountability Office (US GAO), "Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad," last modified July, 2006, http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/250812.pdf; Jennifer Chacón, "Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of US Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking," *Fordham Law R*eview 74 (2006): 2977–3040; Rhacel Parreñas, *Illicit Flirtations: Labor, Migration, and Sex Trafficking in Tokyo* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

Across the global anti-trafficking movement, Bernstein has documented the presence of some striking "strange bed-fellows coalitions" uniting unlikely partners.[9] Her work has documented a growing contingent of evangelical Christian organizations, which have co-opted the anti-trafficking movement to promote the sexual politics of "new abolition"—reframing a long-standing moral objection to sex work and prostitution within the newer lens of human trafficking.[10] Uniquely, such religious politics align with those of radical feminists, posing a challenge to a singular 'sex panic frame' by demonstrating how new sexual politics are an area of convergence for diverse groups—despite their diverse formal identifications as 'religious' or 'secular.' This 'new abolitionism' around prostitution and sex trafficking converges in broad-based political campaigns which target "the linked phenomena of sex, money and migration."[11]

Furthermore, Bernstein has demonstrated that new evangelical Christian interventions meld profits with humanitarian endeavor, providing a unique example of religious and secular convergence. New abolitionists have used the anti-trafficking movement not only to espouse long-standing restrictive sexual politics, but also to create pathways for the consumption of anti-slavery goods. Bernstein's work emphasizes the need to look to various dimensions of secular-Christian coalitions and the idea of market-based freedoms as undergirding contemporary anti-trafficking campaigns.

Missionary work has long been a tool of relational evangelism promising salvation in areas of extreme poverty, social crisis, or high medical need throughout the Global South.[12] The history of American-led Christian missionary work in Asia has been critiqued for its "civilizing" motives, with moral

9 Bernstein, "The Sexual Politics of the 'New Abolitionism.'" See also Bernstein, "Introduction to Special Issue."

10 Notably, former President Bush's White House Council on Faith-Based Initiatives to combat human trafficking created after the TVPA allocated an unprecedented amount of funding to faith-based anti-trafficking organizations.

11 Bernstein, "Introduction to Special Issue," 2; Sealing Cheng, "Muckraking and Stories Untold: Ethnography Meets Journalism on Trafficked Women and the U.S. Military," *Sexuality Research & Social Policy* 5.4 (2008): 6–18; Gretchen Soderlund, "Running from the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against Sex Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition," *NWSA Journal* 17.3 (2005): 64–87.

12 Erica Bornstein, *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Paul Landau, "Explaining Surgical Evangelism in Colonial Southern Africa: Teeth, Pain and Faith," *The Journal of African History* Vol. 37, No. 2 (1996): 261–81; Amy Stambach, "Evangelism and Consumer Culture in Northern Tanzania," *Anthropological Quarterly* 73.4 (2000): 171–79.

and spiritual correction serving broader imperialist agendas.[13] However, new trends in religious organizing take a more contentious view vis-à-vis the nation state, for instance religious organizations who feel that the state and secular community both are not accountable to justice goals. Given such arguments of decreased state accountability, or governmental corruption, evangelical Christians have emerged as important social movement actors in diverse activities, from post-disaster infrastructural repair in New Orleans and Oklahoma City, to eradicating the phenomena of child soldiers in Uganda.[14] They have been praised for their ability to act rapidly and without state and other forms of bureaucratic oversight. Regarding human trafficking, evangelical Christians have been quick to establish an active presence; in fact, Zimmerman points out that the prominent American evangelical leader Chuck Colson even claimed "that human trafficking was not even 'on the screen' until the tireless work of evangelicals placed it there."[15]

The Techno-Politics of Vocational Training

While Zimmerman and Bernstein have described the growing presence of Christian actors within 'new abolitionism' and their sexual politics, this chapter is primarily interested in how what Bernstein refers to as "redemptive capitalism," is enacted through salvific evangelism and social entrepreneurship as mutually constituted missions for the abolition of sex trafficking.[16] These corollary goals allow a strategic obfuscation of religious agendas amidst the global anti-trafficking movement by focusing on vocational training as a pathway to 'freedom' for sex workers. Herein, I argue that such vocational training programs are presented as providing a solution to a 'technical' (and spiritual) issue, while blurring deeper politico-economical causes at the root of trafficking. However, they do not offer pathways for long-term social mobility or economic independence, but rather create new forms of dependence on aid and

13 Miwa Hirono, *Civilizing Missions: International Religious Agencies in China* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008).

14 Mara Einstein, *Brands of Faith: Marketing Religion in a Commercial Age* (New York: Routledge, 2007); *KONY 2012,* directed by Jason Russell (San Diego: Invisible Children, Inc., 2012), online film.

15 Zimmerman, *Other Dreams of Freedom,* 5.

16 Bernstein, "The Sexual Politics of the 'New Abolitionism'"; Elizabeth Bernstein, "Redemptive Capitalism and Sexual Investability," in *Perverse Politics? Feminism, Anti-Imperialism, Multiplicity* (Political Power and Social Theory 30), eds. Ann Shola Orloff, Raka Ray and Evren Savci (Bingley: Emerald, 2016), 45–80.

intervention as well on the global market economy. By transforming sexual labor into low wage manual labor, such organizations meld Christian morality and salvific evangelism within development goals around 'decent work.'[17]

In 2000, the UN Palermo Convention and related United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act, introduced landmark legislation that brought human trafficking into the mainstream global political agenda.[18] While human trafficking had existed as an agenda amongst feminists and activists working at international conferences under the rubric of 'Violence Against Women,' the UN Palermo Protocol and US TVPA institutionalized new mechanisms to establish the global governance of human trafficking as a relatively new category that subsumed migrant, labor, sexual, and gender-based rights. For instance, in 2003, the TVPA introduced the US State Department's Trafficking in Person's report, which monitors each nation state's progress in conducting anti-trafficking work and ranks 188 countries according to their compliance with US 'minimum standards' of human trafficking intervention. These minimum standards aimed to reflect commitments outlined in the UN Palermo Protocol and were based around the "3Ps" paradigm of: (1) prevention; (2) protection; and (3) prosecution. The first P establishes the need to take proactive measures to prevent human trafficking overseas, the second P calls for protection of victims to help them rebuild their lives in the US with the assistance of federal and state support, and the last P calls for prosecution of traffickers accompanied by stiff federal penalties.[19] Within the protection imperative, a "3Rs" paradigm also emerged, labeling rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration as vital components of protection work. Within this framework, rehabilitation has demanded "efforts to provide emergency assistance and services, effective placement in stable, long-term situations, access to educational, vocational, and economic opportunities for survivors."[20]

Vocational training has thus emerged as a concrete development goal and tool, a vital priority for 'life after trafficking' for its potential to address economic insecurity that often drives migrants into exploitative working conditions. Vocational training has become a staple of anti-trafficking work across

17 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) initiated the category of "decent work" in 2015 as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The four pillars of decent work are: employment creation, social protection, rights at work, and social dialogue.

18 United States Department of State, "Trafficking Victims Protection Act," last modified October 28, 2000, https://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/61124.htm.

19 Ibid.

20 Sarah Chang, "Funding Situation of Anti-trafficking Organizations," last modified 2012, http://www.anti-traffickingorgfunding.weebly.com.

the globe in the forms of government victim shelters and the programs of many transnational civil society organizations. While the justifications for vocational training provide logical imperatives for the creation of economic security for migrants, their underlying assumption about how manual labor skills acquisition unlocks social and economic mobility is questionable given the global precarity of low wage work. Few empirical studies have examined the impact vocational training programs have on their participants, and this research attempts to address this crucial issue.

Methodology

Ethnographic research methods have been fruitful for exploring the inter-subjective meanings of religious practice across different social contexts.[21] This chapter is based on ethnographic fieldwork with two Christian vocational training centers: Cowboy Rescue (CR) in Bangkok, and Freedom Footprints (FF) in Beijing, and their sites of movement organization and commerce in the United States.[22] Between 2008–2013, I served as a full-time volunteer at CR and FF in sites in Beijing, Bangkok, and Los Angeles. During my time in Asia in summers 2008, 2009, 2010, I spent about four hours of each day making jewelry, cooking, and participating in worship alongside the workers, and an additional four hours assisting activists with administration, programming, and outreach. My participant observation research in Los Angeles included processing online sales orders, taking inventory, liaising with customers, and selling jewelry at various anti-trafficking fairs and at in-home jewelry parties.

Unlike other missionary volunteers, I gained access to both organizations given my prior work in establishing an arts program for ethnic minority youth and migrant street youth on the China-Burma border, as well as through my ongoing research on the global anti-trafficking movement. I openly disclosed the fact that I am not Christian, and though I would attend daily church worship alongside workers, I chose not to engage in proselytizing or prayer circles. The fact that I am not Christian created some problems with the activists with whom I interacted. They often asserted that my faith, or lack thereof, posed a barrier to my interpretation and understanding of their beliefs, actions, words, and spirituality, as well as of their role in this movement.

21 Tanya Erzen, "Testimonial Politics: The Christian Right's Faith-Based Approach to Marriage and Imprisonment," *American Quarterly* 59.3 (2007): 991–1015; Ju Hui Judy Han, "Neither Friends nor Foes: Thoughts on Ethnographic Distance," *Geoforum* 41.1 (2010): 11–14.

22 The names of these two organizations and of its members have been changed.

Transnational Sites: Thailand and China

In 2008, Thailand passed its first Trafficking in Persons Act and China signed its first 5-year National Plan of Action Against Human Trafficking.[23] These landmark policies marked the first time these nations had scripted the language of human trafficking into national policy. While both countries adopted human trafficking policies oriented around a global "3Ps" approach of "prevention, prosecution, and protection," there are several crucial divergent characteristics across these cases. China has yet to adopt the international definition of human trafficking—acknowledging only the trafficking of women and children for the purposes of forced prostitution, forced marriage, and child kidnapping. Notably missing from the Chinese definition is the trafficking of men and trafficking for the purposes of labor exploitation.[24]

Christian missionary work and religious proselytizing is illegal in China, causing Freedom Footprints activists to feel as though they must conceal the religious aspect of their work in their promotional material. The Chinese government opposes religious activity organized by foreigners for Chinese citizens, and has relegated the observance of Christianity by Chinese citizens to private home churches. Expatriates living in Beijing may attend church services at Beijing International Christian Fellowship, which is where FF founders met one another. However, in order to uphold policies against Western religious influence, only those with a non-Chinese passport may enter the church to worship. While the number of Chinese Christians is unknown, largely because of the clandestine nature of their worship, the World Christian Database believes that 111 million Chinese are Christian, of whom 90% are Protestant.[25]

By contrast, Thailand (and Bangkok, in particular) is a thriving hub of civil society in the Southeast Asian region. Thailand's Trafficking in Person's Act (2008), almost identical to the UN Palermo Protocol, reveals just one aspect of a more democratic state-society relationship when compared to China. While the Chinese state maintains control over the market and civil society, the Thai state is comparatively more acquiescent to both the global and local markets and civil society and has historically been more hospitable to international treaties and conventions, given its political economic positioning in the region.

---

23 Government of Thailand, "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act B.E. 2551," 2008; State Council of China, "China National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012)," December 13, 2007.

24 State Council of China, "China National Plan of Action."

25 Luke Wesley, *The Church in China: Persecuted, Pentecostal, and Powerful* (East Lansing: AJPS Books, 2004).

As the thriving hub of civil society *and* foreign investment in Asia, Bangkok represents a haven for both aid organizations and multinational firms.[26]

Thai people are proud of being one of the only Southeast Asian nations to have not been colonized; and the lack of colonial history is one of the reasons why many have argued that Thailand holds onto one of the strongest Buddhist religious traditions in Southeast Asia. Though Buddhism is the widely practiced national religion, the Thai government does not impose restrictions on religious practice. In fact, noting the international capital that foreign missionaries bring to Thailand, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Tourism have established a special category of visas for "religious or ministry activities" and allocate hundreds of such R-visas per year to full-time expatriate missionaries in Thailand.[27]

Vocational Training and Social Enterprise

CR Ministry and FF Project were both independently founded in 2005 by American Christian missionaries, and both organizations conduct bi-weekly 'outreach ministry' to sex workers who work in red-light districts in Bangkok and Beijing. Outreach groups comprised of young expatriate women—some long-term volunteers who have learned to speak Thai and Chinese, others on short-term missionary trips who only speak English—inform sex workers about alternative employment opportunities making jewelry. In Thailand, the outreach manual instructs those who participate to "wear the armor of Christ to take war on Thai spiritual amulets and symbols." Sitting in *Hot-Spot*, a go-go bar in the Cowboy red light district, the director of the Cowboy Rescue Project pointed such a symbol out to our group of outreach participants: a woman wearing a black bikini dancing on stage had a Buddhist incantation, scripted in Thai, prominently tattooed on her shoulder. The outreach leader warned that women who bear those tattoos are captured by demonic spirits that must be expelled in order for them to be free from 'human trafficking.' As the dance set finished, outreach participants called this dancer off stage by the number that was affixed to her right bra strap, and were instructed to 'buy her time' with non-alcoholic drinks that cost about $5 USD a piece. Speaking in English, as no

26 Ara Wilson, *The Intimate Economies of Bangkok: Tomboys, Tycoons, and Avon Ladies in the Global City* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

27 For further critical evaluation of the work of Christian missionaries under the regulatory regime of the Thai state, see Giuseppe Bolotta's contribution to this volume.

Thai translator was present, we engaged her in casual conversations about her work, personal life, and migration history. Over the course of the conversation, some outreach participants informed the dancer about an alternative employment opportunity making jewelry.

Through a similar model of engagement in Beijing, China, Chinese and expatriate missionaries visit massage parlors and hair salons in two commercial sex districts and establish contact with Chinese massage parlor and salon workers through promises of English lessons, health education, and friendship. Through the same methods used in Thailand, commercial sex workers are recruited to become jewelry makers at Freedom Footprints (FF), where they will be offered a monthly salary in exchange for jewelry production, as well as mandatory shelter housing and 'spiritual rehabilitation.'

The response to this outreach varies a great deal according to the diverse responsibilities and constraints migrant workers face as they assess various work and financial arrangements. Some sex workers enthusiastically accept the opportunity for employment, especially if they have recently begun sex work and have identified challenges with their employers, clients, or with sexual labor itself. Others wish to leave their jobs because they have become pregnant or entered into relationships where their partners do not want them to work in the sex industry. The majority are skeptical that the minimum wage salary which such programs offer—a pay cut of anywhere from 1/3 to 1/5 of earnings from sex work—will be enough to cover their living expenses. Some older workers see jewelry programs as "retirement" strategies from sex work. Still others are curious about the prospect of having American bosses, and imagine that working at an American jewelry company might have less stringent workplace policies around dress and behavior, and provide a friendlier atmosphere than a Thai company. If a worker decides to leave her job in the sex industry, the organization will train her to make different kinds of jewelry ranging from stringing pearl necklaces to making earrings with glass beads.

In both cities, workers are paid wages that are marginally higher than minimum-wage service-sector jobs, and they are compensated not only for the jewelry they produce, but also for their participation in Christian worship Bible study, and Christian life counseling. The women's work day starts at 8 AM both in Bangkok and in Beijing. Once the workers have made an analogue time punch clock testify to their presence, church worship constitutes the first step of the day in Thailand. In China, a well promoted moment of Bible-study precedes lunch. The value of taking part in these Christian worship and study activities is equivalent to jewelry making, since workers are being paid at the same rate. Bible study and prayer thus appear as constitutive parts of wage labor.

Wages of Faith

Paradoxically, incentive systems that reward quality or speed of jewelry production are de-emphasized at the sites of production in Asia—though penalties for mistakes and faulty craftsmanship are often assessed—at the insistence that all workers must be treated equally under 'rehabilitation.' Despite the insistence on equal pay, workers in China and Thailand expressed feelings that annual wage increases and bonuses, and opportunities for advancements are based on an opaque assessment of work productivity *alongside* an evaluation of spiritual and moral transformation.

One Freedom Footprints veteran worker, Yan, showed me a 'self-assessment form' that workers are required to fill out each year. In addition to assessing their production, leadership, and teamwork skills, the form also asked workers to select—on a scale of 0–5—their commitment toward living the teachings of Jesus Christ, as well as their belief in Christ's teachings. Yan had marked a 0 for belief in Christ's teachings, but was torn about what to indicate for her commitment towards Christ's teachings, noting, "I won't say that I am Christian just so I can get promoted. There are some people here who pretend to buy into Jesus, but I think the fact that I won't lie to get in good favor with the management is a Christian teaching" (Interview with Yan 8/2008). The monetary incentives for conversion and proselytizing to co-workers make it difficult for the workers undergoing rehabilitation to bypass moral labor requirements through rehabilitation in China.

In Thailand, some workers also express that they feel there are concrete material benefits for converting to Christianity. At Cowboy Rescue, where over 30% of the workers have converted to Christianity, some share that those who have converted have increased access to advanced medical services for HIV/AIDS medications that are not covered by insurance, in addition to free childcare and possible financial assistance for children's tuition. Those who have converted, state substantially more stability in their life, and rejoice in being part of a thriving international community of Christian believers.

Freedom Footprints missionaries are more emphatic about Christian conversion than their counterparts in Bangkok because missionary activists run greater risks in China. Packing a Bible and 'smuggling' it through Chinese customs is still regarded as a subversive religious act, while the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly welcomes international missionary workers and volunteers. The contrast suggests that Christian missionaries in China have troublingly adopted authoritarian religious regulations into their own workplace practices. In addition to restrictions placed on religious expression, FF activists internalize and replicate the logics of fear and repression from the Chinese

government of foreign NGOs and of government intolerance to prostitution, as exemplified by their remote location, isolation from others, and co-option of socialist work systems as a way of asserting moral control over their subjects. They differ from earlier missionary projects because they not only seek conversion, but particular forms of redemptive rehabilitation that are enacted through literal spiritual and manual wage labor.

Globalizing Social Enterprise: Generating Transnational Networks of Profit and Faith

Since the time of their founding, socially-entrepreneurial organizations like Cowboy Rescue and Freedom Footprints have grown exponentially. Two significant organizational dynamics reveal why Christian anti-trafficking organizations have begun to pursue change through the global marketplace: (1) as faith-based organizations they are ineligible for certain forms of public and foundation assistance—because proselytizing is an explicit organizational goal, which operates through and alongside the broader agenda to end human trafficking; and (2) the emergence of consumer-led social movements, such as the movements for fair trade products, has opened a precedence for demand of these kinds of products.

In navigating the dual identities of social enterprise, both organizations tread the tenuous line between private enterprise and public service, between profit and charity, by registering as both non-profit faith-based organizations in the US and as private corporations in Thailand and China. This organizational structure is required to navigate the legal requirements for foreign NGO registration in both Thailand and China—though substantially more difficult under China's restrictive foundation law. Both organizations cover a majority of organizational costs through church donations and missionary support organizations, and they supplement their work through jewelry sales. Alongside the curious similarities that allow two organizations with similar ideological missions to emerge in two drastically different political environments, Cowboy Rescue and Freedom Footprint both roll out their capacity of adapting the promotion of their work and their moral economies to diverging political understandings of sex, work, gender, and religion—illustrating a form of 'market humanitarianism.'[28]

28 For an expanded discussion see, Elena Shih, "Freedom Markets: Consumption and Commerce across Human-Trafficking Rescue in Thailand," *positions* 25.4 (2017): 769–794.

In addition to faith-based events, these organizations also attend secular anti-trafficking and fair trade craft shows like *Freedom and Fashion* mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Jewelry is sold as well as through in-home jewelry parties in the United States, in which young women sell jewelry to friends and family through secular and faith-based social networks. The equation of worship as work in China and Thailand is invisible across both organization's promotional materials, including their websites, brochures, and at venues in the US where they sell their jewelry. The Christian evangelical organization's convenient, and I argue strategic, obfuscation of religious objectives amongst secular consumers, allows them to be indistinguishable from the now hundreds of anti-trafficking organizations that frequent monthly anti-trafficking conferences, fairs and symposiums in the US. It prevents them from dissuading activists who only share part of their agenda from becoming customers.

As previously mentioned, Bernstein's critique of recent Christian abolitionist trends in "leveraging the marketplace" to sell goods made by 'victims of trafficking' illustrates an irony behind recent approaches to trafficking that celebrate "purchase" as a social justice intervention.[29] American consumers are told that they can stop trafficking by buying fair trade goods over a range of user-friendly internet sites: "Evangelical anti-trafficking efforts thus extend activist trends that are also increasingly prevalent elsewhere, advocating a form of political engagement that is consumer- and media-friendly, saturated in the tropes and imagery of the very sexual culture that it aims to oppose."[30] This often happens without adequate recognition of the ways in which these acts of consumption and purchase perpetuate a system of capitalist commodification and exploitation that underlie the trafficking problem—in this case turning victim identity into capital.

In addition to selling jewelry through Christian outlets, American Christian anti-trafficking efforts have also begun offering opportunities to participate in outreach efforts and short-term courses to identify victims of human trafficking in the United States, and they organize paid travel opportunities to learn about the topic. These new enterprises affirm Laura Agustín's characterization of a human trafficking 'rescue industry,' or the sex worker rights activist Carol Leigh's observation of an 'anti-trafficking industrial complex.'[31] In 2012, a Los Angeles-based evangelical church *Expression 58* offered a six-week long course

29 Bernstein, "Introduction to Special Issue."

30 Ibid., 140.

31 Agustín, *Sex at the Margins*; Carol Leigh, "Anti-Trafficking Industrial Complex Awareness Day," last modified 2015, https://storify.com/carolleigh/anti-trafficking-industrial-complex-awareness-day.

on human trafficking. The program cost $300, which was a bargain compared to the annual *Justice Conference,* a gathering of evangelicals for social justice that cost nearly the same price for a 2-day weekend long event. At the core of these trainings is an attempt to reconceive Christian citizenship in a global world: "Christians find themselves torn between the desire to uphold laws and the call to minister to the vulnerable." The issue of human trafficking is particularly complicated because it is often embroiled alongside undocumented or illegal immigration. In order to maintain the sanctity of trafficking victimhood, human trafficking is framed around the immorality of sex work, as opposed to the more contentious categories of labor exploitation, and undocumented migration more generally.[32]

The aforementioned interactions between faith and the market are not new, and highlight consumption as new and enterprising forms of social action. New and creative advocacy efforts employ traditional marketing techniques in order to reach out to young Christians to act. For instance, the American Christian anti-trafficking organization *International Justice Mission* (IJM) holds an annual 27 hours "Stand for Freedom" campaign asking young people to stand for 27 consecutive hours to represent the 27 million slaves in the world. Young people stand with hand-designed posters, and receive financial pledges from friends and family for each hour they stand. This campaign, held at college campuses around the country, raises several hundred thousand dollars each year to support IJM's anti-trafficking projects across the Global South.[33]

Commerce and faith celebrate new secular investments in the idea of social entrepreneurship, which map onto religious commitments in the areas of business-as-mission and the prosperity gospel. Pattana Kitiarsa's 2008 volume on religious commodification in Asia discussed the diverse ways in which everything from religious experience to religious artifacts has become integral part of various political economic markets. Discussing these empirical trends within theories of secularization, and post-secularization, Kitiarsa and his colleagues demonstrate that religious commodification does not necessarily signal a turn to the secular, but rather reflects new co-constituted modes of religious engagement. This chapter has extended the intellectual interest of this stream of inquiry, by examining the commodification of labor and "slave

32 Matthew Soerens and Jenny Hwang Yang, *Welcoming the Stranger: Justice, Compassion and the Truth in the Immigration Debate* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009); Ched Myers and Matthew Colwell, *Our God is Undocumented: Biblical Faith and Immigrant Justice* (New York: Orbis Books, 2012).

33 "IJM Campus Chapters Stand for Freedom 2016," Last modified 2016. http://www.ijm.org/stand/.

free goods" though missionary projects that are also development schemes—specifically for 'victims' of sex trafficking.

Evangelicals have long relied on the metaphor of the market as a symbolic space to practice faith outside of the church. For instance, the term "marketplace ministry" was introduced in the late-1980's to encourage Christians who did not choose full time ministry, to practice religious life in the secular world, and away from explicit places of worship.[34] Similarly, the rise of the prosperity gospel in the United States in the 1980s offered promises of abundant financial success with Christian worship. Alongside the emerging global interest around social entrepreneurship, the category of "business-as-mission" has emerged as a novel concept beginning in the early 2000s.[35] The commitment towards business as mission, and the tenets of prosperity gospel, demonstrate not only that spirituality and profit are not distinct from one another, but also that religious engagement may be awarded with economic success.

Recent scholarship on the growing global Pentecostal movement suggests that a new breed of "progressive Pentecostals" seek a form of social ministry that pursues "economic development rather than individual social assistance."[36] The promotion of a transnational moral economy for goods made by 'victims of human trafficking' illustrates how this agenda has bridged secular and sacred development agendas, with good works and faith presented as bringing to the fore material and spiritual transformations. The surge of evangelical Christian social activism into the realm of secular politics has paralleled an increase in Christian consumption, and the celebration of religious identity *through* consumption.[37] Large cohorts of young, middle class, "rapture ready" Christians create and consume brands, t-shirts, concerts and mega industry of commodities to demonstrate and exercise their faith. In addition to navigating secular fairs and shows, these marketplaces, serve as ideal sites for Cowboy

34 Lloyd Reeb and Bill Wellons, *Unlimited Partnership: Igniting a Marketplace Leader's Journey to Significance* (Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2006); Ed Silvoso, *Transformation: Change the Marketplace and you Change the World* (Ventura: Regal Press, 2007).

35 Neal C. Johnson, *Business as Mission: A Comprehensive Guide to Theory and Practice* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009); Patrick Lai, *Tentmaking: The Work and Life of Business as Missions* (Colorado Springs: Authentic, 2005); Steve Rundle and Tom Steffen, *Great Commission Companies: The Emerging Role of Business in Missions* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2011); Mark Russell, *The Missional Entrepreneur: Principles and Practices for Business as Mission* (Birmingham, AL: New Hope Publishers, 2009).

36 Donald E. Miller and Tetsunao Yamamori, *Global Pentecostalism: The New Face of Christian Social Engagement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 48.

37 Daniel Radosh, *Rapture Ready! Adventures in the Parallel Universe of Christian Pop Culture* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008).

Rescue and Freedom Footprints to sell their goods, combining concern with human trafficking, explicitly framed as a Christian moral problem, and business interests and aspirations.

Conclusion

As much as Christian actors have been involved in bringing about and promoting the contemporary discourse of human trafficking, this international discourse is now reshaping evangelical missions in far-reaching and uneven ways. The disparate forms taken by evangelical mission, as illustrated by Cowboy Rescue and Freedom Footprint, are troubling because they often lack transparency, and expose contradictions between stated objectives of vocational training and rehabilitation, with missionary evangelism. Furthermore, the coercive practices of social and moral control, along with the discipline of industrial production of jewelry, appear to be directly in line with prevailing practices in factories in these same countries, but largely in contradiction with international norms in the domains of labor and gender promoted in anti-trafficking fairs in the us. The fact that these two independent organizations navigate so many different discursive fields simultaneously is a remarkable, if disturbing feature of contemporary Christian mission.

The language of self-sustaining economic development presented as a technical solution to sex work made possible through newly acquired skills has tremendous resonance and visibility amongst members of both the faith-based and secular development communities and American consumer activists who wish to combat human trafficking. The mission of salvific evangelism has been crafted into the techno-politics of vocational training, explicit in some contexts, but invisible to large parts of the consumer activist base in the United States who purchase the jewelry out of a fervent belief in the potential of the market to enact lasting change in the lives of sex workers. While optimistically heralding hopes of social mobility, this vision of development is however one that relegates women to low wage work. Within the shop floor, workers persistently find that an hour of manual labor is worth the same as an hour of worship—both are mandatory and both are paid at just the minimum wage.

Bibliography

Agustín, Laura María. *Sex at the Margins: Migration, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry.* London: Zed Books, 2007.

Bernstein, Elizabeth. "Introduction to Special Issue: Sexual Commerce and the Global Flow of Bodies, Desires, and Social Policies." *Sexuality Research & Social Policy* 5.4 (2008): 1–5.

Bernstein, Elizabeth. "The Sexual Politics of the 'New Abolitionism.' *differences* 18.3 (2007): 128–51.

Bernstein, Elizabeth. "Redemptive Capitalism and Sexual Investability." In *Perverse Politics? Feminism, Anti-Imperialism, Multiplicity* (Political Power and Social Theory 30), edited by Ann Shola Orloff, Raka Ray and Evren Savci, 45–80. Bingley: Emerald, 2016.

Biao, Xiang. "Transplanting Labour in East Asia." In *Transnational Migration in East Asia: Japan in a Comparative Focus* (Senri Ethnological Reports 77), edited by Yamashita Shinji, Makito Minami, David Haines and Jeremy Edes, 175–86. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2008.

Bornstein, Erica. *The Spirit of Development: Protestant NGOs, Morality, and Economics in Zimbabwe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Castles, Stephen. "Migration and Community Formation Under Conditions of Globalization." *International Migration Review* 36.4 (2006): 1143–168.

Chacón, Jennifer. "Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of US Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking." *Fordham Law R*eview 74 (2006): 2977–3040.

Chang, Sarah. "Funding Situation of Anti-trafficking Organizations." Last modified 2012. http://www.anti-traffickingorgfunding.weebly.com.

Cheng, Sealing. "Muckraking and Stories Untold: Ethnography Meets Journalism on Trafficked Women and the U.S. Military." *Sexuality Research & Social Policy* 5.4 (2008): 6–18.

Einstein, Mara. *Brands of Faith: Marketing Religion in a Commercial Age.* New York: Routledge, 2007.

Erzen, Tanya. "Testimonial Politics: The Christian Right's Faith-Based Approach to Marriage and Imprisonment." *American Quarterly* 59.3 (2007): 991–1015.

Government of Thailand. "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act B.E. 2551." 2008.

Han, Ju Hui Judy. "Neither Friends nor Foes: Thoughts on Ethnographic Distance." *Geoforum* 41.1 (2010): 11–14.

Harrelson, Sarabeth. "Mavericks or Allies: The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in the Anti-Trafficking Movement." Presentation at the Second Interdisciplinary Conference on Human Trafficking, University of Nebraska, September 30—October 2, 2010.

Hirono, Miwa. *Civilizing Missions: International Religious Agencies in China*. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008.

Huang, Veron Mei-Ying. "Improving Human Rights in China: Should Re-education through Labour Be Abolished?" *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 41 (2002): 303.

"IJM Campus Chapters Stand for Freedom 2016." Last modified 2016. http://www.ijm.org/stand/.

Johnson, Neal C. *Business as Mission: A Comprehensive Guide to Theory and Practice.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009.

Kinney, Edith C. "Appropriations for the Abolitionists: Undermining Effects of the U.S. Mandatory Anti-Prostitution Pledge in the Fight Against Human Trafficking and HIV/AIDS." *Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice* 21 (2006): 158–94.

KONY 2012. Directed by Jason Russell. San Diego: Invisible Children, Inc., 2012. Online Film.

Lai, Patrick. *Tentmaking: The Work and Life of Business as Missions.* Colorado Springs: Authentic, 2005.

Landau, Paul. "Explaining Surgical Evangelism in Colonial Southern Africa: Teeth, Pain and Faith." *The Journal of African History* 37.2 (1996): 261–81.

Leigh, Carol. "Anti-Trafficking Industrial Complex Awareness Day." Last modified 2015. https://storify.com/carolleigh/anti-trafficking-industrial-complex-awareness-day.

Masenior, N.F. and C. Beyrer. "The US Anti-Prostitution Pledge: First Amendment Challenges and Public Health Priorities." *PLoS Med* 4.7 (2007): 1158–161.

Miller, Donald E. and Tetsunao Yamamori. *Global Pentecostalism: The New Face of Christian Social Engagement.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.

Myers, Ched and Matthew Colwell. *Our God is Undocumented: Biblical Faith and Immigrant Justice.* New York: Orbis Books, 2012.

Parreñas, Rhacel. *Illicit Flirtations: Labor, Migration, and Sex Trafficking in Tokyo.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Radosh, Daniel. *Rapture Ready! Adventures in the Parallel Universe of Christian Pop Culture.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008.

Reeb, Lloyd and Bill Wellons. *Unlimited Partnership: Igniting a Marketplace Leader's Journey to Significance.* Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2006.

Rundle, Steve and Tom Steffen. *Great Commission Companies: The Emerging Role of Business in Missions.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2011.

Russell, Mark. *The Missional Entrepreneur: Principles and Practices for Business as Mission.* Birmingham, AL: New Hope Publishers, 2009.

Shih, Elena. "Freedom Markets: Consumption and Commerce across Human-Trafficking Rescue in Thailand." *positions* 25.4 (2017): 769–794.

Silvoso, Ed. *Transformation: Change the Marketplace and you Change the World.* Ventura: Regal Press, 2007.

Soderlund, Gretchen. "Running from the Rescuers: New U.S. Crusades Against Sex Trafficking and the Rhetoric of Abolition." *NWSA Journal* 17.3 (2005): 64–87.

Soerens, Matthew and Jenny Hwang Yang. *Welcoming the Stranger: Justice, Compassion and the Truth in the Immigration Debate.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009.

Stambach, Amy. "Evangelism and Consumer Culture in Northern Tanzania." *Anthropological Quarterly* 73.4 (2000): 171–79.

State Council of China. "China National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008–2012)." December 13, 2007.

Su, Yang. "State-Sponsored Social Movements." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements.* Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2012.

United Nations. "Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime." A/55/383. New York, 15 November 2000.

United States Government Accountability Office (US GAO). "Human Trafficking: Better Data, Strategy, and Reporting Needed to Enhance U.S. Antitrafficking Efforts Abroad." Last modified July, 2006. http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/250812.pdf.

United States Department of State. "Trafficking Victims Protection Act." Last modified October 28, 2000. https://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/61124.htm.

Wesley, Luke. *The Church in China: Persecuted, Pentecostal, and Powerful.* East Lansing: AJPS Books, 2004.

Wilson, Ara. *The Intimate Economies of Bangkok: Tomboys, Tycoons, and Avon Ladies in the Global City*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Zimmerman, Yvonne C. *Other Dreams of Freedom: Religion, Sex, and Human Trafficking.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Index

Abu-Lughod, Lila 166
Ad Gentes (encyclical) 145
Agriculture 63, 84, 88, 101, 107, 124, 126–29, 217–221, 228, 234, 236–38
American Baptist Foreign Mission Society 51
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) 32, 44
American Home Economics Association 49
Aragon, Lorraine 13–4, 111n3, 115n1, 177, 214
Asad, Talal 1, 85n5, 139, 215n2
Assemblies of God 193
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 197–98

Baptists 15, 21, 51, 64, 69
Barker, John 13
Barnett, Michael 2, 4–7, 31, 37, 139
Benedict XVI (Pope) 92
Bernstein, Elizabeth 243n, 245–47, 255
Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) 139n, 148
Bhutan 154n2
Bible 30–31, 37–38, 44, 51, 70, 155, 171, 180, 233, 235–36, 252
Boring, Alice Middleton 33–35, 41, 45, 52
Bornstein, Erica 2n3, 8–9, 137n4, 230n3, 246n4
Bosch, David 12
Boynton, Grace 35, 44–45, 49
Britain 68n2
Bryan, William Jennings 38, 42n
Bryn Mawr College 35, 44
Buck, Pearl S. 43–44, 71–72
Buddhism 67, 115, 138–39, 141–42, 144, 147, 151, 155–56, 159–160, 170, 192, 201, 215n3, 251
Bureaucracy 208, 222–23
Bush, George W. 8–9

Calhoun, Craig 2–3
Cambodia 154n2, 190–91, 197, 199, 202, 205–09
Canada 193n2, 216–19
Cannell, Fenella 14n2
Capitalism 15, 39, 54, 76, 91, 140, 202n2
  Redemptive 247
Carey, George 9
Caritas Internationalis 152
Carrette, Jeremy 10
Catholic Bishops' Conference of Thailand (FCBT) 145
Catholic Church 5–6, 11n, 14, 19–20, 31, 42, 54, 82–102, 107n3, 135–37, 141–159, 165–66, 170–73, 175–76, 227n
Catholic Social Teaching (CST) 91–92
Chaebols (South Korean business conglomerates) 197
Charity 2n3, 5, 11, 121, 149–150, 152, 156, 185, 191, 204, 254
Cheney, Monona 28–29, 35
Childhood 33, 49, 67, 148n, 154–57
China Inland Mission (CIM) 30–31, 42, 59
China, People's Republic of 15, 21, 28–55, 59, 64–65, 69, 76–77, 143, 146, 154n2, 160n3, 197–98, 234n1, 244, 247n1, 249–255
Cho Yonggi 192, 196, 207n3
Chŏn Tu-hwan 193
Chulalongkorn (Rama V) 143–44
Church World Service (CWS) 221
Church-planting 70, 223, 227–29, 232–33, 237–38
  See also Evangelization, Proselytism
Cold War 63, 108–09, 194, 196, 233n
Colonialism / colonies 5, 14, 35, 46, 67–69, 74, 86–89, 93, 101, 107–17, 140, 143–16, 158–59, 166–68, 172–74, 233
Comaroff, John / Jean 13–14, 140n1
Communism 48, 92, 215
  Anti-communism 192, 194–95, 197n1
Confucianism 76, 170, 192
Conscientious objection 218–19
Conversion 6, 11, 13n3, 37, 43, 50, 63, 86, 92, 107n3, 109, 136, 138n3, 141–45, 154, 168, 173–74, 200–01, 205, 207–08, 253–54
Cornell University 6, 233–34, 239
Corruption 18, 100, 179–186, 247
Cultuurstelsel (compulsory cultivation system) 174

Darwinism 39–41
Davies, Thomas 4, 139
Decolonization 7, 12
Democratization 47, 167
Development brokers 8n1, 10, 122–23, 130
Dewey, John 47, 172
Dharma 148
Dove, Michael 234
Dutch East India Company (*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC) 173

Eastern Mennonite Board of Missions and Charities (EMBMC) 228, 232–33
Eastern Mennonite College 235
Education
  of mission personnel 4, 15, 28–55, 235, 237
  missionary provision of 1, 5–6, 18–19, 28–55, 61, 63, 67, 72, 74–75, 83, 87–88, 90, 95, 101, 107, 113, 115, 117, 122–26, 130, 142n1, 143–45, 158, 165–187, 190, 208–09, 218, 220, 225n3, 228–230, 248, 252
Effendy, Muhadjir 169
Ekbladh, David 7, 109n1
Elisha, Omri 238n2
Environmentalism 19–20, 83–86, 86n2, 90–102
  of the rich / the poor 94, 99–100
European Mennonite Mission Committee (*Europäisches Mennonitisches Evangelisationskomitee*, EMEK) 222
Eurocentrism 138
Evangelization 4, 37, 43, 59–61, 68n, 74–75, 114–15, 143, 146, 200, 204, 208, 228, 243
  See also Church-planting, Proselytism

Fair Trade 243, 254–255
Fassin, Didier 3, 138, 157n3
Feener, R. Michael 85–86, 110–11, 114n5, 137n2, 149n2, 160n3, 190n1, 201n2, 215n2, 225n2
Ferguson, James 16, 85n2, 153n3, 157–58, 167n1
First World War 35, 39
Fitzgerald, Timothy 2
Ford Foundation 221n2
Fountain, Philip 2, 6, 85–86, 111n3, 137–39, 160n3, 190n1, 215n1–2, 219n, 224–225n, 228n1, 236n2
France 31, 54, 137, 141–44
Francis (Pope) 156
Franciscans (Order of Friars Minor) 19, 83, 97
Freeman, Derek 234
Freeport Indonesia 117, 183, 185
Fuller Theological Seminary 235

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand 77
Gaudium et Spes (encyclical) 145
Gereja Injili di Tanah Jawa (GITJ) 220
Gereja-Gereja Kristen Muria Indonesia (GKMI) 220
Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa (GMIM) 175
Germany 37, 41, 193n2

Haggai Institute 181–82, 185
Hampden-Sydney College 50
Harvard University 34, 38, 68, 185
Healthcare provision 5, 17, 83, 87, 107, 117, 125–28, 175, 183, 190, 220, 225n3, 228–236
Hefner, Robert 142n2, 177–78
Hellendoorn, G.J. 173–74
Hinduism 115, 170
Hocking, William Ernest 64n2, 69–71, 76–77
Holism 120, 227, 230–32
Hollinger, David 37, 41, 65n12, 230n2
Hudson Taylor, James 30–31
Human Trafficking 243–258
Humanitarianism 2–4, 8, 16, 31–32, 139, 158, 204, 254

Inculturation 69, 89–90, 145–47, 151, 158
India 11n1, 14, 42, 64–65, 69, 77, 113n1, 140n2, 146
Indonesia 6, 14, 16–20, 82–102, 107–131, 142n1, 151n, 165–187, 214–239
Indonesian Council of Churches (*Dewan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia*, DGI) 108, 115, 221
Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) 66–67
Inter-church Organisation for Development Cooperation (*Interkerkelijke Organisatie voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking*; ICCO) 117n3, 120n3, 121, 127n2
International Justice Mission (IJM) 256
Islam 87, 110, 114n4, 115, 150n, 166, 168, 170, 176–178, 182, 224–25
Italy 20, 42, 135, 149–152

Japan 28, 32, 59–78, 146, 193n2, 197–98
Jesuits (Society of Jesus) 11n1, 31, 87–88, 137n1, 140–43, 145–46, 159, 173
John Paul II (Pope) 92, 145n
Judaism 47, 150
Justice and Peace for the Integrity of Creation Commission (JPIC) 83, 93, 97–100

K-Pop 199
Kagawa Toyohiko 62–67, 72–78
Kam, Joseph 183
Karma 148–49, 155
Keane, Webb 14n2 111
Kim Tae-chung 194
Kim Yŏng-nam 194
Klassen, Pamela 45, 230n2
Korea 28, 67–69, 74
  Democratic People's Republic of (North) 193, 196
  Republic of (South) 7, 18, 190–209
Korompis, Mary / Ronald 169–172, 179

Lamott, Willis 74
Laos 154n2, 197
Latour, Bruno 17, 20n2, 138n2
Laymen's Inquiry 15, 18, 59–78
League of Nations 7, 77
Leo XIII (Pope) 91
Lewis, David 8, 122n1
Li, Tania 16, 60n1, 85n2, 111n3, 153n3, 156, 167n2, 178n1, 225n2
Liberation Theology 20, 91–92, 98, 112–13, 156, 160

Marley, Bob 185
Marx, Karl (Marxism) 44, 156
Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) 6, 9, 18, 111n3, 214–39
Mexico 13n1, 159
Middle East 4n4, 54
Miner, Luella 35, 49
Mining 19, 82–84, 93, 97–102
Missions Étrangères de Paris (MEP) 137n1, 141
Mitchell, Timothy 17, 85n3, 167n1
Modernity 37, 41, 48, 78, 86, 139
  Asian Modernity 18, 190–94, 202, 209
  Christian conceptions of 52
  Hyper-Modernity 7, 204–05
Modernization 5–9, 36, 49, 53–54, 63, 109–31
Mongkut (Rama IV) 143
Moral Economy 154, 257
Mosse, David 1n1, 8, 10, 14, 16–17, 20n2, 122n1, 123n5, 130, 159
Mott, John R. 62, 64–65
Mount Holyoke College 35
Muria Cooperative Economic Development Foundation (*Yayasan Kerjasama Ekonomi Muria,* YAKEM) 222
Myanmar 144n2, 154n2, 197

Namae Takayuki 62–63
Neoliberalism 22
Netherlands 6, 11, 86–88, 93, 95, 111, 115, 121, 173–76, 220n, 227
Netherlands Missionary Society (*Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschap*; NZG) 173–75
New Abolitionism 243n, 246–47
New Order 14, 83, 93–97, 101, 110, 115, 117–18, 120, 130–31, 176–78, 180n2, 214–15, 223, 225–26, 230, 237
Niebuhr, Reinhold 44, 62
Nostra Aetate (encyclical) 145

O'Neill, Kevin 166
Oberlin College 35, 49
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives 9n1, 244
Omi Brotherhood (*Kyōdaisha*) 59–61, 63, 67–70, 74–76
Oregon University 29, 49
Orthodox, Eastern 107

Pacifism 216–17
Pak Chŏng-hŭi 192
Pancasila 115, 118, 120, 176, 180
Paraguay 219
Park, Robert E. 65
Peking Union Medical College 45, 52
Pentecostalism 14, 18, 170, 190–96, 200–05, 208–09, 257
  Neo-pentecostalism 166, 195, 201n1, 204–05
Philippines 35, 55, 67n2, 193n2, 197n1, 234n1
PIPKA Foundation (*Yayasan Pekabaran Injil dan Pelayanan Kasih*; the Gospel Evangelism and Service Foundation) 227–237, 277
Political Theology 20, 136, 156–57
Portugal 86–87, 141, 173, 175

Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions 68
Progress / progressive
Visions of 4–5, 42–43, 53, 72–73, 78, 84–85, 92, 101–02, 109, 140n1, 172, 176–78, 192–93, 202, 229, 257
Progressivism 7, 66
Progressive Era 28–42, 53
Proselytism 2n2, 3, 12, 30, 108, 114, 135, 138n1, 153, 196, 199, 207, 238n1, 249–250, 253–54
See also Church-planting, Evangelization
Prosperity Theology 192, 200–01, 205, 209, 256–57
Protestant Association for Cooperation in Development (*Evangelische Zentralstelle für Entwicklungshilfe*; EZE) 121
Protestantism 5, 12, 15–16, 21, 30–32, 141, 166, 170, 173, 174–76, 181, 190–96, 208, 220–21, 234, 250
Evangelical 8–9, 19, 43, 60, 182–83, 202, 230, 243–47, 255–58
Fundamentalist 30, 37–39, 44, 71–72
Liberal / modernist 36–45, 53, 60, 63–71, 107, 114–15, 194, 230

Quaker (Society of Friends) 34, 218
Quarles van Ufford, Philip 10, 111n3

Rama IV (King of Thailand), see: Mongkut
Rama V (King of Thailand), see: Chulalongkorn
Rama X (King of Thailand), see: Vajiralongkorn
Rama VI (King of Thailand), see: Vajiravudh
Rama IX (King of Thailand), see: Bhumibol Adulyadej
Rauschenbusch, Walter 15, 36–42
Redemptoris Missio (encyclical) 145n1
Redfield, Peter 2–4
Reformasi 101, 171, 178, 187
Reformation 11
Rerum Novarum (encyclical) 91
Ricci, Matteo 146
Richardson, Don 235
Riedel, J.F. 174
Robbins, Joel 14n2
Rockefeller Foundation 51–54
Rockefeller, John D. 35, 64–65, 234
Rudnyckyj, Daromir 167, 176
Russia 197, 218–19

Salemink, Oscar 85–86
Salvation Army 14, 37, 177, 227n1
Schwarz, J.G. 174
Schweitzer, Albert 61, 77
Science 6, 15, 29–30, 38, 40–41, 45–55, 59–61, 65–67, 72, 75, 78, 142–44, 169, 172, 224, 234–35, 239
Scripture 30, 37
See also Bible
Second World War 7, 61n, 107, 139, 190, 200, 216–19, 230
Secular / Secularity
Conceptions of 1–15, 18, 20–21, 30, 36, 37, 49, 51–53, 61, 85–86, 109–112, 135–144, 148–158, 172, 195, 224–25, 244–47, 255–58
Secularization 1–2, 5–6, 37, 52, 109, 118–19, 256
Secularism 139, 166
Sierra Leone 150
Simatupang, T.B. 119, 130–31
Social Darwinism 39–41
Social Engineering 109–110, 120, 123, 130–31, 225
Social Gospel 18, 36–47, 53–55
Social Justice 5, 91–92, 113–15, 120–21, 129, 150, 160, 255–56
Society of the Divine Word 87
Society, Development and Peace (Joint Committee on), SODEPAX 110, 113, 119
Soekarno 115
Soft Power 42, 191n2, 196
South Africa 92
Speer, Margaret 35, 44
Speer, Robert 44, 62, 71–72
Spiritual economy 167, 177
Sri Lanka 154n2
Stamatov, Peter 4n4
Steenbrink, Karel 11n1, 86n4, 111n2, 116n1, 142n1, 173n, 175n3, 221n1
Stuart, John Leighton 44, 50–53
Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions (SVM) 4, 32, 42–43, 59, 62n1
Suharto 111, 117, 171n3, 176, 214, 223
Switzerland 217

Taylor, Charles 4
Taylor, Geraldine 59
Techno-politics 2, 15–21, 78, 84–85, 136, 152–53, 167, 214–16, 223–26, 231–33, 237–39, 243–44, 247, 258
Technocracy 7–8, 15, 17–18, 41, 43, 94, 101, 114, 118, 156, 214, 220, 225, 229
Thailand 19, 21, 136–161, 197, 244, 250–55
Tomalin, Emma 2n2, 8–9, 137n, 238n1
Tsing, Anna 178n1, 214n1
Tvedt, Terje 1n2

Uganda 247
Ukraine 218–19
Ukur, Fridolin 114n3, 116–19
Union Theological Seminary 44
United Nations 10, 99, 152n, 197n1
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 233
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 199
UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking 245, 250
United States of America (USA) 7–9, 15, 28–53, 60n2, 68n2, 69, 73, 190, 193–97, 200–01, 203, 243, 248–49, 255–58
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 8–10, 222–23, 245
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 196
University of Michigan 40
University of Würzburg 41

Vajiralongkorn (Rama X) 139n
Vajiravudh (Rama VI) 144
Van der Veer, Peter 4
Vatican II 89, 90, 100–01, 145
Vietnam 107n2, 136, 144n2, 154n2, 197, 199, 223, 232–33, 235
Vories, William Merrell 59–78

Wallerstein, Immanuel 107
Walls, Andrew 12
Weber, Max 201
Wellesley College 35, 41, 44–46, 49, 52
Wolfensohn, James 9
World Bank 9, 16, 110
World Council of Churches (WCC) 7, 16, 107–131
World Missionary Conference, 1910 5, 64, 67–68
World Vision 9

Xaverian Missionary Society of Mary 135
Xavier, Francis 146

Yenching University 15, 28, 32–35, 41–55
Yi Myong-pak 194n, 198, 202
Yoido Full Gospel Church (FGC) 18, 190–209
Yoshida Etsuzō 68
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) 5, 43, 65, 67
Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) 64
Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang 169

Zimmerman, Yvonne 243–45, 247

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

UC RIVERSIDE

BRILL *Over three centuries of scholarly publishing*

The Mission of Development

Religion and Techno-Politics in Asia

Editors: Catherine Scheer, Philip Fountain and R. Michael Feener

The Mission of Development interrogates the complex relationships between Christian mission and international development in Asia from the 19th century to the new millennium. Through historically and ethnographically grounded case studies, contributors examine how missionaries have adapted to and shaped the age of development and processes of 'technocratisation', as well as how mission and development have sometimes come to be cast in opposition. The volume takes up an increasingly prominent strand in contemporary research that reverses the prior occlusion of the entanglements between religion and development. It breaks new ground through its analysis of the techno-politics of both development and mission, and by focusing on the importance of engagements and encounters in the field in Asia.

Readership

All interested in past and present entanglements of religion and international development. In addition to historians and anthropologists, the book will also appeal to Asia specialists and development practitioners.

For more information see brill.com

Order information: Order online at brill.com
For the Americas call (toll free) 1 (844) 232 3707 | or email us at brillna@turpin-distribution.com
For outside the Americas call +44 (0) 1767 604-954 | or email us at: brill@turpin-distribution.com

Submission information: brill.com/authors



Print Publication Date:
24 May 2018

Available Formats:
- E-Book
- Paperback

· May 2018

· Paperback

· ISBN 9789004359086

Price € 55 / US$ 64

· E-ISBN 9789004363106

E-Price € 105 / US$ 122

· *Theology and Mission in World Christianity, 10*

Series:
Theology and Mission in World Christianity, Volume: 10

BRILL MyBook

MyBook:
Printed E-book for € 25 / $ 25
brill.com/mybook

Subjects: World Christianity, Theology and World Christianity, Religion in Asia, Religious Studies, Religion, Asian Studies, Global History, History, Sociology & Anthropology, Social Sciences